Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On 06.08.2024 vs Ms. Sharu Gupta & Others on 13 August, 2024
Author: M.S. Ramachandra Rao
Bench: M.S. Ramachandra Rao
1 ( 2024:HHC:6921 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
LPA No.76 of 2024
Reserved on 06.08.2024
.
Decided on: 13.08.2024
_________________________________________________________
The Secretary, Managing Committee,
Loreto Convent, Tara Hall School, Shimla,
& Another ...Appellants
Versus
Ms. Sharu Gupta & Others. ....Respondents
Coram
Hon'ble Mr. Justice M.S. Ramachandra Rao, Chief Justice.
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Satyen Vaidya, Judge.
____________________________________________________________
Whether approved for reporting? No
For the Appellants : Mr. Peeyush Verma, Advocate.
For the Respondents : Mr. Gobind Korla, Additional
Advocate General, for respondents
No.2 & 3/State.
Satyen Vaidya, Judge
The instant Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the
appellants against the judgment dated 28.12.2023 passed by learned
Single Judge, in CWP No.4122 of 2020, whereby the challenge of the
appellants to the order dated 14.09.2020 passed by the Labour
Commissioner-cum-Chief Inspector of Factories-cum-Appellate Authority
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(for short "the Appellate Authority") under Section 17(3) of Maternity
Benefits Act, 1961 (for short "the Act") has been rejected.
.
2. The services of respondent No.1 as Assistant Teacher were
dispensed with by the appellants vide termination letter dated 20.12.2018.
Respondent No.1 at that time was pregnant. Thereafter, respondent No.1
had given birth to a child on 12.04.2019.
3. Respondent No.1 filed complaint under Section 17 of the Act
before the Inspector seeking monetary benefits under the Act as also an
order for setting aside the termination order. The Inspector after holding
an inquiry under the Act, allowed the complaint of respondent No.1 and
directed the appellants to pay to respondent No.1 maternity benefits under
the Act and to take joining of respondent No.1 on the same post which she
was holding.
4. The appellants unsuccessfully assailed the order passed by
the Inspector before the Appellate Authority by invoking provision of
Section 17(3) of the Act. The Appellate Authority vide order dated
14.09.2020 not only affirmed the order passed by the inspector, but also
directed the appellants to make additional payment equivalent to three
months' salary to respondent No.1 as per the provisions contained under
Section 17(2)(a)(b) of the Act.
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5. The challenge of the appellants to the order passed by the
Appellate Authority by invoking jurisdiction of this Court under Article
.
226 has also remained unsuccessful. The learned Single Judge, vide
judgment impugned in this appeal, has rejected all the pleas raised by the
appellants and has resultantly dismissed the petition.
6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also
gone through the records of the case carefully.
7. Learned counsel for the appellants has made endeavour to
persuade us to take different view than the one taken by learned Single
Judge, while affirming the orders passed by the Appellate Authority and
the Inspector. He contended that the termination of the services of
respondent No.1 w.e.f. 20.12.2018 had nothing to do with the provisions
of the Act; that her services were terminated on account of her
unsatisfactory service record in terms of the contract of employment
between respondent No.1 and appellants. Learned counsel for appellants
further submitted that respondent No.1 was not entitled to any benefit
under the Act, as she had not submitted the requisite applications for
maternity leave. As per him, respondent No.1 had not even informed the
appellants about her pregnancy.
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8. The instant appeal is against a judgment rendered by learned
Single Judge, while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
.
Constitution of India, whereby the concurrent findings of fact returned by
the authorities under the Act have been affirmed. Thus, it is not open to
the appellants to assail such findings before us except on the grounds of
gross illegality or perversity committed by the statutory authorities and
affirmed by learned Single Judge, while exercising writ jurisdiction.
9. It has been concurrently held by the statutory authorities
under the Act as also the learned Single Judge that the appellants had
raised a false defence regarding absence of knowledge as to pregnancy of
respondent No.1. Reliance has been placed on the fact that respondent
No.1 was granted leave by the appellants for the period w.e.f. 20.09.2018
to 30.09.2018 and 12.11.2018 to 24.11.2018 on her applications
accompanied by medical record, clearly revealing her pregnancy.
Alongwith this appeal, the appellants have preferred an application being
CMP No.4566 of 2024 for placing on record the leave applications of
respondent No.1 and medical prescriptions attached therewith. On perusal
of the leave applications dated 26.09.2018 and 24.11.2018, it is revealed
that the leave was sought on health issues. The prescription slips annexed
with the leave applications left nothing in doubt as to the nature of the
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health issues faced by respondent No.1. The prescription slips clearly
spelt out that respondent No.1 was carrying pregnancy at the relevant
.
time. In light of unimpeachable evidence, there cannot be any conclusion
but to hold that the appellants had due knowledge of the pregnancy of
respondent No.1 and it had taken false stand before the authorities.
10. The allegation with respect to the unsatisfactory service
record of respondent No.1, has been held to be not proved on the basis of
an undated document allegedly communicated to respondent No.1 that too
without any acknowledgment or receipt from respondent No.1. Learned
counsel for appellants has not been able to challenge such findings. No
record has been shown to prove the contrary. It being so, no interference
is called for from this Court in the findings of fact recorded by the
statutory authorities to above effect.
11. It has further been contended that the services of
respondent No.1 were on probation and as per the terms of her
employment with appellants, no reasons was required to be assigned for
termination of the services. While raising such an argument, probably it
has been forgotten that the instant matter does not arise from disciplinary
proceedings under the service Rules. The matter simply relates to the
violation, if any, of the Act and Rules framed there under.
6 ( 2024:HHC:6921 )
12. Section 12 of the Act makes it unlawful for the
employer of a women to discharge or dismiss her from service during or
.
on account of her absence from work in accordance with the provisions of
this Act. The only exception has been carved out in respect of dismissal
for any prescribed gross misconduct.
13. Under Section 10 of the Act a woman suffering from
illness arising out of pregnancy is entitled to leave with wages for a
maximum period of one month. Therefore, the leave availed by
respondent No.1 for the periods between 20.09.2018 to 30.09.2018 and
12.11.2018 to 24.11.2018 was authorized under the aforesaid provision,
more particularly, when respondent No.1 was pregnant at that time and
was facing illness on account of pregnancy.
14. The contention that respondent No.1 had not submitted
any application for maternity leave also evidences intent of appellants to
cover up their own illegalities. The Appellate Authority under the Act has
rightly held that the submissions of advance application/request for
maternity leave was neither sine-qua-non nor mandatory. The holistic
reading of Section 6 of the Act, admits of no other interpretation. The
provision of Sub Section 6 of Section 6 of the Act clearly provides that the
failure to give notice under Section 6 of the Act is no ground to disentitle
7 ( 2024:HHC:6921 )
a woman to maternity benefits under the Act, if she is otherwise entitled to
such benefits. The appellants has not been able to show any disability
.
carried by respondent No.1 which makes her disentitled for maternity
benefits under the Act.
15. This also is not a case, where respondent No.1 is
alleged to be guilty of any gross misconduct under Section 12 (2)(a) of the
Act. The gross misconduct has been defined in Rule 9 of the Maternity
Benefits Rules, 1973. Admittedly, there is no allegations against
respondent No.1 to attract mischief of aforesaid Rules.
16. In light of above discussion, we find no merit in the
appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed with costs of Rs.50,000/- to
be paid by the appellants to respondent No.1, as the appellants after
having committed illegality, have been dragging respondent No.1 in
prolonged litigation without any justifiable cause.
17. The appeal is accordingly disposed of, so also the
pending miscellaneous application(s) if any.
( M.S. Ramachandra Rao )
Chief Justice
( Satyen Vaidya)
Judge
13th August, 2024
(subhash)
