Citation : 2023 Latest Caselaw 16953 HP
Judgement Date : 20 October, 2023
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr.MMO No. 672 of 2023
Date of Decision: 20.10.2023
.
_________________________________________________
Vishal Chaudhary & others
....Petitioners
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & others
...Respondents
_________________________________________________
Coram
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sushil Kukreja, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
________________________________________________
For the petitioners: Mr. Surinder Saklani, Advocate.
For respondent No. 1/State: Mr. Jitender Kumar Sharma,
Additional Advocate General.
For respondents No.3 & 4: Mr. Rakesh Kumar Thakur,
Advocate.
________________________________________________
Sushil Kukreja, Judge (Oral)
The accused persons (petitioners herein), after
compromising the matter with the prosecutrix/respondent No.
2 and complainant/respondent No. 3, have come up before
this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., by invoking inherent
powers of this Court, seeking quashing of FIR No. 113 of
2022, dated 19.08.2022, under Sections 363, 366A, 376,
506, 201 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short "IPC")
and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual
1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
Offences Act (for short "POCSO") registered at Police Station
Nagrota Bagwan, District Kangra, H.P..
.
2. The present FIR was lodged by the mother of the
prosecutrix (complainant) and today the prosecutrix/
respondent No. 2 (name withheld), complainant/respondent
No. 3 and the petitioner No. 1-accused are present in person
and the statements of respondents No. 2 and 3 and
petitioner No. 1 have been separately recorded and placed
on the file.
3. In her statement, prosecutrix/respondent No. 2
stated that on the basis of the complaint of her mother, FIR
No. 113 of 2022, dated 19.08.2022, under Sections 363,
366A, 376, 506, 201 and 34 IPC and Section 6 of the
POCSO Act, was registered gainst the petitioners-accused
persons at Police Station Nagrota Bagwan, District Kangra,
H.P.. She has further stated that the aforesaid FIR was
lodged due to some misunderstanding and now the parties
have entered into a compromise, vide compromise deed,
Annexure P-2, as she had solemnized marriage with
petitioner No. 1-Vishal Chaudhary on 18.10.2023, as per her
own free will/consent and without any external pressure and
they are residing happily as husband and wife under the
same roof. She has also stated that she has no objection in
case the aforesaid FIR and the consequent proceedings,
.
arising out of the said FIR, pending before the learned
Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court (Rape &
POCSO), Kangra at Dharamshala, are quashed and set
aside.
4. Similarly, the complainant/respondent No. 3
stated that on the basis of her complaint, FIR No. 113 of
2022, dated 19.08.2022, under Sections 363, 366A, 376,
506, 201 and 34 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act was
registered agaisnt the petitioners-accused persons at Police
Station Nagrota Bagwan, District Kangra, H.P.. She has
further stated that the aforesaid FIR was lodged due to some
misunderstanding and now the parties have entered into a
compromise, vide compromise deed, Annexure P-2, as her
daughter (prosecutrix) had solemnized marriage with the
petitioner No. 1-Vishal Chaudhary on 18.10.2023 and they
are residing happily, as husband and wife under the same
roof. She has also stated that she has no objection in case
the aforesaid FIR and the consequent proceedings, arising
out of the said FIR, pending before the learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court (Rape & POCSO), Kangra
at Dharamshala, are quashed and set-aside.
.
5. The petitioner No. 1-Vishal Chaudhary stated
that FIR No. 113 of 2022, daed 19.08.2022, under Sections
363, 366A, 376, 506, 201 and 34 IPC and Section 6 of the
POCSO Act, was registered against him and petitioners No.
2 and 3 at Police Station Nagrota Bagwan, District Kangra,
H.P.. He has further stated that the aforesaid FIR was
lodged due to some misunderstanding and now the parties
have entered into a compromise, vide compromise deed,
Annexure P-2, as he has solemnized marriage with
respondent No. 1 (prosecutrix) on 18.10.2023, as per his
own free will/consent and without any external pressure and
they are residing happily as husband and wife under the
same roof. He has also stated that the aforesaid FIR and the
consequent proceedings, arising out of the said FIR, pending
before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track
Curt (Rape & POCSO), Kangra at Dharamshala, may be
quahsed and set-aside.
6. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners,
learned Additional Advocate General for respondent No.
1/State, learned counsel for respondents No. 2 and 3 and
also gone through the material available on record.
.
7. In Madan Mohan Abbot vs. State of Punjab,
(2008) 4 SCC 582, the Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasized
and advised that in the matter of compromise in criminal
proceedings, keeping in view the nature of the case, to save
the time of the Court for utilizing to decide more effective and
meaningful litigation, a common sense approach, based on
ground of realities and bereft of the technicalities of law,
should be applied.
8. In case Narinder Singh and others vs. State of
Punjab and others, reported in (2014) 6 SCC 466 and also
in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi Narayan and
others, (2019) 5 SCC 688, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
summed up and laid down principles by which the High
Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the
settlement between the parties and exercise its power under
Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and
quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the
settlement with direction to continue with criminal
proceedings.
9. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Parbatbhai Aahir
alias Parbhathbhai Bhimsinghbhai Karmur and others
.
vs. State of Gujarat and another, (2017) 9 SCC 641,
summarizing the broad principles regarding inherent powers
of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has recognized
that these powers are not inhibited by provisions of Section
320, Cr.P.C. The broad principles which emerge from the
precedents on the subject may be summarized in the
following propositions:-
"(i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the
High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognizes and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court;
(ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been
arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the
purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.
(iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power;
(iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to
secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;
(v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground
.
that the offender and victim have settled the dispute,
revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;
(vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious
offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly
speaking, not private in nature but have a serious
impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences;
(vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent
power to quash is concerned;
(viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in
appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute;
(ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and
(x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions (viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of
a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences
.
of the act complained of upon the financial or economic
system will weigh in the balance."
10. Although, as per the directions of the Supreme
Court in Parbatbhai Aahir's case supra, the FIR should not
be quashed in case of rape as it is a heinous offence, but
when complainant-prosecutrix herself takes the initiative and
states that now she is married with the petitioner-accused
and living happily with him under one roof, in my considered
opinion, in such cases, there will be no purpose in continuing
with the trial as ultimately, in case of continuation of trial, the
result will be of acquittal in favour of the accused persons.
11. In Kapil Gupta vs State of NCT of Delhi and
another, (Criminal Appeal No. 1217 of 2022 decided on
10.08.2022), the Supreme Court while considering an appeal
against an order of High Court of Delhi rejecting a quashing
petition for proceedings under Section 376 IPC, has held that
though court should be slow in quashing the proceedings
wherein heinous and serious offences are involved, the High
Court is not foreclosed from examining as to whether there
exists material for incorporation of such an offence or as to
whether there is sufficient evidence which if proved would
lead to proving the charge for the offence charged with. The
court has also to take into consideration as to whether the
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settlement between the parties is going to result into
harmony between them, which may improve their mutual
relationship. The relevant portion of the judgment (supra)
reads as under:
"12. No doubt that the learned ASG is right in
relying on various judgments of this Court which reiterate the legal position that in heinous and serious offences like murder or rape, the Court should not quash the
proceedings. It will be relevant to refer to paragraph 29.5 to 29.6 of the judgment of
this Court in the case of Narender Singh versus State of Punjab, which read thus:
"29.5 While exercising its powers, the
High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal
cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice
and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.
29.6 Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed
under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC
.
is there for the sake of it or the
prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307
IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on
the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim r can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima
facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of
conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings
whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the
High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between
the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship."
12. This Court is aware that offences like rape
cannot be quashed by exercising jurisdiction under Section
482 Cr.P.C. if a compromise has been reached, but, at the
same time, this Court cannot ignore and overlook the future
.
of the prosecutrix. In the facts of the case, since the
petitioner No. 1-accused has married the prosecutrix
(respondent No. 2) and they are living happily and peacefully
under one roof, continuation of the proceedings would cause
immense harm to them, as the same may adversely affect
their marital life. Moreover, in view of the compromise, the
settlement between the parties is going to result into
harmony between them. Therefore, I am of the considered
view that no fruitful purpose will be served to continue the
proceedings against the petitioners-accused persons, as
continuation of the proceedings will be an exercise in futility.
The justice in the case demands that the dispute between
the parties is put to an end and peace is restored in order to
maintain harmonious relations/atmosphere between them.
13. Hence, considering the facts and the
circumstances of the case in entirety, I am of the opinion that
the present petition deserves to be allowed for securing the
ends of justice and, therefore, the same is allowed.
Accordingly, FIR No. 113 of 2022, dated 19.08.2022, under
Sections 363, 366A, 376, 506, 201 and 34 IPC and Section 6
of the POCSO Act, registered against the petitioners-
accused persons, at Police Station Nagrota Bagwan, District
.
Kangra, H.P., and the consequent proceedings, arising out of
the said FIR, pending before the Court of learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court (Rape & POCSO), Kangra
at Dharamshala, are quashed and set-aside.
14. Petition stands disposed of in above terms, so
also the pending application(s), if any.
r ( Sushil Kukreja )
th
20 October, 2023 Judge
(virender)
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