Date Of Decision: 11.5.2023 vs State Of Hp And Anr
2023 Latest Caselaw 5731 HP

    IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA




                                                                    .
                                                     CrMMO No. 382 of 2023





                                                 Date of Decision: 11.5.2023
    _____________________________________________________________________
    Mazid Khan





                                                                        .........Petitioner
                                         Versus
    State of HP and Anr.
                                                                       .......Respondent





    Coram

    Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
    Whether approved for reporting?

    For the Petitioner:       Mr. Amit Singh Chandel, Advocate.

    For the Respondent:       Mr. Anup Rattan, Advocate General with Mr. Rajan
                              Kahol, Mr. Vishal Panwar and Mr. B.C. Verma,
                              Additional Advocates General with Mr. Rahul
                              Thakur and Mr. Ravi Chauhan, Deputy Advocates


                              General, for the State.

                              Mr. Arvind Sharma, Advocate, for respondent No.2.
    ___________________________________________________________________________




    Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral)

By way of instant petition filed under Section 482 Cr.PC,

prayer has been made on behalf of the petitioner, who stands convicted of

his having committed offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable

Instruments Act in Complaint No. 290-I/2017 (Registration No. 222/2017),

passed by the learned ACJM-I, Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P., further

upheld by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sundernagar, District Mandi,

H.P., in Criminal Appeal No. 141 of 2018, for setting aside the judgment of

conviction as detailed herein above after compounding the offence alleged

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to have been committed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments

Act.

2. Precisely, case of the petitioner is that since after recording of

the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the courts

below, he has settled the matter with the complainant under OTS Scheme

for sum of Rs. 3,52,000/-, this Court may compound the offence while

exercising power under Section 147 of the Act and thereafter, set-aside the

judgment of conviction and order of sentence recorded by the courts below.

3. Pursuant to notice issued in the instant proceedings, Mr.

Arvind Sharma, Advocate, has put in appearance on behalf of respondent

No.2. While fairly acknowledging factum with regard to One Time

Settlement arrived inter-se parties, Mr. Sharma, states that since amount

as settled under OTS scheme has been received by the respondent Bank, it

shall have no objection in case petitioner is acquitted of the charges framed

against him under Section 138 of the Act and judgment of conviction and

order of sentence passed by the courts below against the petitioner is

quashed and set-aside.

4. Though parties in the case at hand have resolved to settle their

dispute amicably inter-se them as is evident from the statement given by

Mr. Arvind Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent-bank, but moot

question which needs to be decided in the instant proceedings is "whether

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this Court can quash the judgments of conviction and order of sentence

recorded by the courts below on the basis of amicable settlement arrived

inter-se parties while exercising power under Section 482 of CRPC or not?"

5. This Court vide judgment passed in Cr.MP No. 1197 of 2017 in

Cr. Revision No. 394 of 2015 titled Gulab Singh v. Vidya Sagar Sharma,

while relying upon judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court as well as other

Constitutional Courts has already held that court, while exercising power

under Section 147 of Negotiable Instruments Act, court can proceed to

compound offence even in those cases, where accused stands convicted.

Relevant portion of the order passed by this court in order supra is

reproduced as under:

"8. Before acceding to aforesaid joint request having been made by learned counsel for the respective parties, moot question arise for determination of this Court is whether it has power to review/recall

its own order/judgment passed in Criminal Revision No.394 of 2015, wherein judgment of conviction recorded by both the Courts below

came to be upheld.

9. Mr. Manohar Lal Sharma, learned counsel representing the petitioner, has invited attention of this Court to the judgment passed by Hon'ble High Court of Rajasthan in Naresh Kumar Sharma versus

State of Rajasthan & another, Criminal Misc. Application No.371 of 2016 in Criminal Revision Petition No.1267 of 2016, to suggests that in view of amicable settlement arrived inter se the parties, this Court has power to recall its judgment in the light of the provisions contained in Section 147 of the Act, which permits compounding of the offence under Section 138 of the Act. At this stage, it would be profitable to reproduce the judgment passed by Hon'ble High Court of Rajasthan hereinbelow:-

"The accused-petitioner has field this criminal misc. application under section 482 Cr.P.C read with section 147 of Negotiable

Instruments Act( for short the 'Act') with a prayer to review/recall the order dated 6.10.2016 passed by this Court in

.

SB Criminal Revision Petition No.1267/2016 in the light of

compromise dated 4.11.2016 subsequently entered between the parties and as a consequences thereof to acquit the accused petitioner for the offence under Section 138 of N.I. Act.

Vide order dated 6.10.2016, the aforesaid revision petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed by this Court while upholding and affirming the judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court as well as by the Appellate Court. It was jointly submitted by the learned counsel for the parties that after the order dated 6.10.2016 the parties have

amicably settled their dispute and entered into compromise and the amount in the dispute has been paid by the petitioner to the respondent-complainant.

It was further submitted that although the revision petition has

been dismissed by this Court on merits vide order dated

6.10.2016, but even then that order can be recalled in the light of provisions of Section 147 of N.I.Act which permits compound of the offence under Section 138 of the Act at any stage and the accused can be acquitted.

In support of their submissions, they relied upon the case of K. Subramanian Vs. R.Rajathi reported in (2010) 15 SCC 352 and

order dated 7.7.2015 passed by a Single Bench of Hon'ble Gujarat High Court in S.B. Criminal Misc. Application (Recall) No.10232/2015 filed in Special Criminal Application No.3026/2014.

On consideration of submissions jointly made on behalf of the respective parties and the material including the compromise

entered into between the parties and the fact that the amount in dispute has been paid by the accused-petitioner to the respondent- complainant and the principles of law laid down in the aforesaid decisions, I find it a fit case in the criminal misc.

application is to be allowed and the order dated 6.10.2016 is to be recalled.

Consequently, the criminal misc. application is allowed and the order dated 6.10.2016 is recalled and all the orders whereby the accused-petitioner was convicted and sentenced for the offence under Section 138 of N.I. Act are set aside and as a consequence thereof he is acquitted therefrom."

6. Reliance is also placed upon the judgment passed by Hon'ble

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Gujarat High Court, wherein similar application came to be filed for

recalling the judgment passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat. In the

aforesaid judgment, Hon'ble Gujarat High Court, has reiterated that

judgment passed by the High Court affirming the judgment of conviction

recorded under Section 138 of the Act, can be recalled in view of the

specific provisions contained in Section 147 of the Act, which provides for

compounding of offence allegedly committed under Section 138 of the Act.

"11. The Hon'ble Apex Court in K. Subramanian Vs. R.Rajathi; (2010)15 Supreme Court Cases 352, also in similar situation ordered

for compounding of offence after recording of conviction by the courts below, wherein it has been held as under:-

"6. Thereafter a compromise was entered into and the petitioner claims that he has paid Rs. 4,52,289 to the respondent. In support of this claim, the petitioner has produced an affidavit

sworn by him on 1.12.2008. The petitioner has also produced an affidavit sworn by P. Kaliappan, Power of attorney holder of R. Rajathi on 1.12.2008 mentioning that he has received a sum of Rs. 4,52,289 due under the dishonoured cheques in full

discharge of the value of cheques and he is not willing to prosecute the petitioner.

7. The learned counsel for the petitioner states at the Bar that

the petitioner was arrested on 30.7.2008 and has undergone the sentence imposed on him by the trial Court and confirmed by the Sessions Court, the High Court as well as by this Court. The two affidavits sought to be produced by the petitioner as

additional documents would indicate that indeed a compromise has taken place between the petitioner and the respondent and the respondent has accepted the compromise offered by the petitioner pursuant to which he has received a sum of Rs.4,52,289. In the affidavit filed by the respondent a prayer is made to permit the petitioner to compound the offence and close the proceedings.

8. Having regard to the salutary provisions of Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act read with Section 320 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, this Court is of the opinion that in view of the compromise arrived at between the parties, the petitioner

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should be permitted to compound the offence committed by him

under Section 138 of the Code."

7. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment has

categorically held that in view of the provisions contained under Section

147 of the Act, read with Section 320 of Cr.P.C, compromise arrived inter se

the parties, can be accepted and offence committed under Section 138 of

the Act, can be ordered to be compounded:

13. Another question which arise for determination/ adjudication of this Court is with regard to maintainability of present review petition. Admittedly, instant review petition has been filed after withdrawal of

Special Leave Petition, preferred by the applicant/ petitioner against

the judgment passed by this Court in Criminal Revision No.394 of 2015, wherein conviction/ sentence awarded by the Court below came to be upheld. In the case at hand, Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) filed by the applicant/petitioner was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 18.08.2017. Subsequent to passing of aforesaid order by Hon'ble Apex Court, petitioner/applicant has approached this Court,

praying therein for modification/recalling of its judgment dated 10.3.2017, passed in Criminal Revision No.394 of 2015 on the ground that parties have amicably settled the matter and entire amount stands paid to the respondent/complainant in terms of

judgment passed by the learned trial Court. Learned counsel representing the petitioner/applicant, contended that once the

Supreme Court permits withdrawal of a Special Leave Petition without recording reasons, it is as if no appeal was ever filed or entertained, since in the absence of grant of special leave, there is no appeal in existence. Learned counsel further contended that where a

Special Leave Petition is permitted to be withdrawn and equally when it is dismissed in limine without recording reasons, the High Court judgment neither merges into any proceedings before the Supreme Court nor is it in any manner affected by the filing and subsequent withdrawal or dismissal of the Special Leave Petition. In support of aforesaid contentions, learned counsel representing the applicant/ petitioner also invited attention of this Court to the judgment passed by the three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in Kunhayammed Vs. State of Keral (2000) 6 SCC 359, wherein it has been held that after dismissal of SLP in limine, review petition can be filed because

at the stage of dismissal of SLP, there exists no appeal in the eyes of law.

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8. It would be also profitable to take note of judgment passed by

Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Kanoria Industries Limited & ors. Versus

Union of India & Ors on 27th February, 2017, wherein it has been held as

under:-

"8. We are in the factual situation of the present case concerned not

with a case of dismissal in limine by a non-speaking order of an SLP preferred against the judgment of which review is sought but with dismissal as withdrawn of the SLP. Though the review petitioners, while seeking to withdraw the SLP also sought liberty to move this Court in review petition but the Supreme Court merely dismissed the

SLP as withdrawn and has not stated that the liberty sought had been granted.

9. The question which arises is, whether the dismissal as withdrawn of the SLP, even in the absence of the words "with liberty sought" is to be read as grant of liberty.

10. The review petitioners obviously were of the opinion that without the aforesaid words, they did not have liberty to approach this Court by way of review and claim to have made an application to the Supreme Court in this regard but which application is stated to have

been refused to be listed.

11. In our opinion, it is not for us to venture into, whether the order,

notwithstanding having not provided that the review petitioners had been granted liberty, grants liberty or not. It cannot be lost sight of that it is not as if the counsel for the review petitioners, when the SLP came up before the Court, stated that the filing of SLP was

misconceived and withdrew the same. The order records that it was "after some arguments" that the counsel for the review petitioners sought permission to withdraw the SLP. It is also not as if the Supreme Court is not known to, while dismissing the SLP as withdrawn, grant such liberty. The order thus has to be read as it is i.e., of dismissal of SLP as withdrawn.

12. Rule 9 of Order XV titled "Petitions Generally" of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 provides for withdrawal of the petition. Once a

proceeding / petition is permitted to be withdrawn, the effect of such withdrawal is as if, it had not been preferred. It is a different matter

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that the Rules may prohibit the petitioner who so withdraws his

petition from re-filing the same or even in the absence of such Rules, such re-filing may be treated as an abuse of the process or by way of re-litigation. But in law a dismissal of the petition as withdrawn cannot be at par with the dismissal of the petition.

13. Neither counsel has however addressed us on this aspect and has proceeded on the premise as if dismissal as withdrawn is the same as dismissal of the petition.

14. As far as the effects, if any, of dismissal in limine of a SLP on a

subsequent review petition before the High Court is concerned, which arise for consideration are firstly whether, Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm and Kunhayammed (supra), both of three Judges Bench hold differently and secondly whether the two deal with different factual situations i.e. of a review having been preferred

before the dismissal of SLP or after the dismissal of SLP. We have

studied the two judgments in this light.

15. We find that in Kunhayammed (supra) the review petition was filed after the dismissal of SLP. The Supreme Court was approached aggrieved from the order of the High Court overruling the preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the review petition on the

ground of the SLP having been dismissed. Supreme Court held that where the judgment of the High Court has come up to the Supreme Court by SLP and the SLP is dismissed, the judgment of the High Court does not merge in the order of dismissal of SLP and the

aggrieved party is not deprived of any statutory right of review, if it was available and he can pursue it; it may be that the review Court

may interfere or it may not interfere depending upon the law and principles applicable to interference in review; but the High Court, if it exercises a power of review or deals with the review application on merits, cannot be said to be wrong in exercising statutory

jurisdiction or power vested in it. It was expressly held that review can be filed even after SLP is dismissed and as also before special leave is granted but not after it is granted. It was held that once special leave is granted, the jurisdiction to consider the validity of the High Court's order vested in the Supreme Court and the High Court cannot entertain a review thereafter unless such a review application was preferred in the High Court before the SLP was granted. With respect to Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm (supra) it was observed that the facts and circumstances of the case persuaded the Supreme Court to form an opinion that the tenants were abusing the process

of the Court by approaching the High Court and the very entertainment of review petition and then reversing the earlier order

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was an affront of the order of the Supreme Court. It was explained

that the three Judges Bench in Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm (supra) nowhere in the course of judgment relied on the doctrine of merger for taking the view they had taken and rather a careful reading of Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm (supra) also fortified the

view taken in Kunhayammed (supra).

16. It would thus be seen that Kunhayammed (supra), though of a Bench of the same strength as Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm (supra), did not read Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm (supra) as laying down anything to the contrary than what was held in

Kunhayammed (supra). The Supreme Court having expressly held so, it is not open today to the respondent UOI to contend or for us to hold that there is a conflict in the two.

17. We now proceed to analyze whether Sunil Kumar (supra) carves

out any different factual scenario in which Abbai Maligai Partnership

Firm and Kunhayammed (supra) operate.

18. Supreme Court in Sunil Kumar (supra) was concerned with a petitioner who was held to be a blackmarketer exploiting helplessness of the poor people of the society and capable of engaging lawyers and found to be abusing the process of the Court

and wanting to use the Courts as a safe haven. The subject matter of Sunil Kumar (supra) was a transaction under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The petitioner therein was found to have approached the High Court for modifying the order of his

conviction after the SLP against the order of conviction had been dismissed and had again preferred the SLP to the Supreme Court

against the order of the High Court refusing to modify the order of conviction. It was held that Section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts a complete embargo on the Criminal Court to reconsider after the delivery of judgment as the Court becomes

functus officio. In this background when the petitioner relied on Kunhayammed (supra), it was observed that Kunhayammed (supra) has been explained in various subsequent judgments as holding that review petition filed before the High Court after approaching the Supreme Court amounts to abuse of the process of the Court. Reference in this regard was made to Meghmala (supra). However, after holding so, it was further held that the ratio of Kunhayammed (supra) has no application to Sunil Kumar (supra) as Kunhayammed (supra) was dealing with civil cases.

19. We have already noticed above that in Kunhayammed (supra) the review petition was filed after the order of dismissal of the SLP.

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20. What we find is that the observations, of preferring review petition after the dismissal of SLP amounting to abuse of the process of the Court, in Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm (supra) as well as in Sunil Kumar (supra) are on a factual finding of the petitioners

therein abusing the process of the Court and not on the maintainability of the review petition. Certainly, if we are to find the review petitioners herein also to be abusing the process of the Court by preferring this review petition after withdrawal of the SLP preferred against the judgment of which review is sought, the review petition of the review petitioners would also suffer the same fate.

However it would not make the review not maintainable."

9. Reliance is also placed upon the judgment passed by Hon'ble

Apex Court in Kunha Yammed and others versus State of Kerala and

others; (2000) 6 Supreme Court Cases 359, wherein it has been held as

under:-

"22. We may refer to a recent decision, by Two-Judges Bench, of this

Court in V.M. Salgaocar & Bros. Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax 2000 (3) Scale 240, holding that when a special leave petition is dismissed, this Court does not comment on the correctness or otherwise of the order from which leave to appeal is

sought. What the Court means is that it does not consider it to be a fit case for exercising its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. That certainly could not be so when appeal is dismissed

though by a nonspeaking order. Here the doctrine of merger applies. In that case the Supreme Court upholds the decision of the High Court or of the Tribunal. This doctrine of merger does not apply in

the case of dismissal of special leave petition under Article 136. When appeal is dismissed, order of the High Court is merged with that of the Supreme Court. We find ourselves in entire agreement with the law so stated. We are clear in our mind that an order dismissing a special leave petition, more so when it is by a non-speaking order, does not result in merger of the order impugned into the order of the Supreme Court.

27.A petition for leave to appeal to this Court may be dismissed by a non-speaking order or by a speaking order. Whatever be the

phraseology employed in the order of dismissal, if it is a non- speaking order, i.e. it does not assign reasons for dismissing the

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special leave petition, it would neither attract the doctrine of merger

so as to stand substituted in place of the order put in issue before it nor would it be a declaration of law by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution for there is no law which has been declared. If the order of dismissal be supported by reasons then also

the doctrine of merger would not be attracted because the jurisdiction exercised was not an appellate jurisdiction but merely a discretionary jurisdiction refusing to grant leave to appeal. We have already dealt with this aspect earlier. Still the reasons stated by the Court would attract applicability of Article 141 of the Constitution if there is a law declared by the Supreme Court which obviously would

be binding on all the courts and tribunals in India and certainly the parties thereto. The statement contained in the order other than on points of law would be binding on the parties and the court or tribunal, whose order was under challenge on the principle of judicial discipline, this Court being the Apex court of the country. No court or

tribunal or parties would have the liberty of taking or canvassing any

view contrary to the one expressed by this Court. The order of Supreme Court would mean that it has declared the law and in that light the case was considered not fit for grant of leave. The declaration of law will be governed by Article 141 but still, the case not being one where leave was granted, the doctrine of merger does not apply. The Court sometimes leaves the question of law open. Or it

sometimes briefly lays down the principle, may be, contrary to the one laid down by the High Court and yet would dismiss the special leave petition. The reasons given are intended for purposes of Article

141. This is so done because in the event of merely dismissing the

special leave petition, it is likely that an argument could be advanced in the High Court that the Supreme Court has to be understood as

not to have differed in law with the High Court.

10. Since in the case at hand, petitioner after being convicted

under Section 138 of the Act has compromised the matter with the

respondent complainant and in terms thereof has already paid the entire

amount of compensation, prayer for compounding the offence can be

accepted in terms of judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in

Damodar S. Prabhu V. Sayed Babalal H. (2010) 5 SCC 663, wherein it

has been categorically held that court, while exercising power under

.

Section 147 of the Act, can proceed to compound the offence even after

recording of conviction by the courts below. Hon'ble Apex Court in K.

Subramanian v. R. Rajathi represented by P.O.A.P. Kaliappan, 2010 (15)

SCC 352, has held that in view of the provisions contained under Section

147 of the Act read with Section 320 of Cr.PC, compromise arrived can be

accepted even after recording of the judgment of conviction.

11. Hon'ble Apex Court in Cr.Appeal Nos. 1488 and 1489 of

2012, titled Ramgopal and Anr v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (a/w

connected matter), has held that even after recording of conviction, court

can proceed to compound the offence if it is satisfied that same would bring

harmony and peace among the parties and no prejudice would be caused to

either of the parties.

12. Having perused aforesaid judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex

Court, this Court finds that court while exercising power under Section 482

Cr.PC can proceed to compound the offence even after recording of the

judgment of conviction and order of sentence. In the aforesaid judgment

Hon'ble Apex Court has categorically held that High Court having regard to

the nature of offence and the fact that parties have settled their dispute

and the victim has willingly consented to the nullification of criminal

proceedings can quash such proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers

under Section 482 Cr.PC., even if the offense are non-compoundable,

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however while doing so, high court is under obligation to evaluate the

consequential effects of the offence beyond the body of an individual and

thereafter, adopt a pragmatic approach to ensure that the felony even if

goes unpunished, does not tinker with or paralyze the very object of the

administration of criminal justice system. The Hon'ble Apex Court having

taken note of its earlier judgment passed in Narinder Singh & others vs.

State of Punjab & another, (2014) 6 SCC 466, has though reiterated that

court should be reluctant in compounding the heinous and serious offences

of mental depravity, murder, rape and dacoity etc, but categorically ruled

that criminal proceedings involving non-heinous offences, where the

offences predominantly are of private nature, could be set aside at any

stage of the proceedings, including at the appellate level. It would be apt to

take note of following paras of the judgment passed in Ramgopal's case

(supra):

"12. The High Court, therefore, having regard to the nature of the

offence and the fact that parties have amicably settled their dispute and the victim has willingly consented to the nullification of criminal proceedings, can quash such proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., even if the offences are non compoundable. The High Court can indubitably evaluate the consequential effects of the offence beyond the body of an individual and thereafter adopt a pragmatic approach, to ensure that the felony, even if goes unpunished, does not tinker with or paralyze the very object of the administration of criminal justice system.

13. It appears to us that criminal proceedings involving nonheinous offences or where the offences are predominantly of a private nature,

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can be annulled irrespective of the fact that trial has already been

concluded or appeal stands dismissed against conviction. Handing out punishment is not the sole form of delivering justice. Societal method of applying laws evenly is always subject to lawful exceptions. It goes without saying, that the cases where compromise

is struck post conviction, the High Court ought to exercise such discretion with rectitude, keeping in view the circumstances surrounding the incident, the fashion in which the compromise has been arrived at, and with due regard to the nature and seriousness of the offence, besides the conduct of the accused, before and after the incidence. The touchstone for exercising the extraordinary power

under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would be to secure the ends of justice. There can be no hard and fast line constricting the power of the High Court to do substantial justice. A restrictive construction of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. may lead to rigid or specious justice, which in the given facts and circumstances of a case, may

rather lead to grave injustice. On the other hand, in cases where

heinous offences have been proved against perpetrators, no such benefit ought to be extended, as cautiously observed by this Court in Narinder Singh & Ors. vs. State of Punjab & Ors and Laxmi Narayan (Supra).

14. In other words, grave or serious offences or offences which involve moral turpitude or have a harmful effect on the social and moral fabric of the society or involve matters concerning public policy, cannot be construed betwixt two individuals or groups only, for such offences have the potential to impact the society at large.

Effacing abominable offences through quashing process would not only send a wrong signal to the community but may also accord an

undue benefit to unscrupulous habitual or professional offenders, who can secure a 'settlement' through duress, threats, social boycotts, bribes or other dubious means. It is well said that "let no guilty man escape, if it can be avoided."

19. We thus sum-up and hold that as opposed to Section 320 Cr.P.C. where the Court is squarely guided by the compromise between the parties in respect of offences 'compoundable' within the statutory framework, the extraordinary power enjoined upon a High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, can be invoked beyond the metes and bounds of Section 320 Cr.P.C. Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind: (i) Nature

and effect of the offence on the conscious of the society; (ii) Seriousness of the injury, if any; (iii) Voluntary nature of compromise

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between the accused and the victim; & (iv) Conduct of the accused

persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant considerations."

13. Since in the case at hand, petitioner-accused and complainant

have resolved their dispute amicably under OTS Scheme, no fruitful

purpose would be served by sending the person behind bars pursuant to

judgment of conviction recorded against him. In the peculiar facts and

circumstances of the case as well as law taken into consideration, this

Court finds no impediment in accepting the prayer made by the parties for

quashing of Complaint (i.e Registration No. 222/2017) as well as

consequential proceedings arising out of it.

14. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made herein

above as well as law taken into consideration, present petition is disposed

of as compromised, as a result of which, Complaint No. 290-I/2017

(Registration No. 222/2017) as well as judgment of conviction and order of

sentence dated 30.7.2018 and 23.6.2021, passed by the courts below are

quashed and set-aside and petitioner is acquitted of the charges framed

against him under Section 138 of the Act. Interim order, if any, is vacated.

Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.

    May 11, 2023                                                  (Sandeep Sharma),
          (manjit)                                                     Judge