Sh. Sahil And Others vs State Of Himachal Pradesh
2023 Latest Caselaw 5440 HP

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr.MMO No. 758 of 2022 Date of Decision:10.05.2023

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_______________________________________________________

Sh. Sahil and others .......Petitioners Versus

State of Himachal Pradesh ... Respondent _______________________________________________________ Coram:

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting? 1yes.

For the Petitioners: Ms. Pooja Thakur, Advocate.

    For the Respondent:        Mr. Rajan Kahol, Mr. Vishal Panwar
                               and   Mr.   B.C.Verma,    Additional
                               Advocate Generals with Mr. Rahul
                              rThakur,   and Mr. Ravi Chauhan,

                               Deputy Advocate Generals.

_______________________________________________________ Sandeep Sharma, Judge(oral):

By way of instant petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C, prayer

has been made on behalf of the petitioners for quashing of FIR No.119 of

2019, dated 28.06.2019, registered at police Station, Dhalli, District Shimla,

H.P., under Sections 341 and 143 of IPC alongwith consequential

proceedings pending in the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate,

Shimla, District Shimla, H.P.

2. Precisely, the facts of the case as emerge from the record are

that FIR, sought to be quashed in the instant proceeding, came to be

instituted on the basis ruqua sent by Investigating Officer, namely Suraj

Kumar, who alleged that on 28.06.2019, at 10.10 AM, information was

Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

received at police Station, Dhalli that one boy has sat infront of HRTC bus

bearing registration No.HP-10-A-7189 enroute Chandigarh to Devidhar, as

a result of which, there is big traffic jam. Above named complainant further

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alleged that though police official present on the spot tried to persuade the

boy sitting on the road to permit the vehicles to leave, but he laid down on

the road and obstructed the entire traffic with the help and aid of 5-6 boys,

as a result of which, persons travelling in the buses and other private

vehicles were put to undue harassment. On the basis of aforesaid

information, police conducted the investigation and found that petitioners

herein with the help and aid of other 5-6 boys obstructed the traffic for 20

minutes and as such, registered case against six persons including

petitioners herein. Though, after completion of the investigation, police has

already presented challan in the competent court of law, but before same

could be taken to its logical end, petitioners herein have approached this

Court in the instant proceedings for quashing of FIR as well as consequent

proceedings, if any, pending in the competent court of law.

3. Precisely, the grouse of the petitioners as has been

highlighted in the body of the petition and has been further canvassed by

learned counsel representing the petitioners is that no case muchless under

section 341 of IPC is made out against the petitioners. Learned counsel

representing the petitioners argued that none of the passenger travelling in

HRTC bus or other private vehicles ever lodged complaint that they were

restrained by the petitioners from taking their vehicles on the public path.

Learned counsel representing the petitioners argued that though on the

date of alleged incident, petitioners alongwith other persons had gathered

on the road to lodge protest for their having been not permitted to board the

bus, but at no point of time, passage of the bus was obstructed. She further

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submitted that none of the witness adduced on record by prosecution in

support of its case has stated something specific with regard to obstruction,

if any, caused by the petitioners. She further submitted that bare perusal of

contents of FIR itself suggests that complainant was not aware of the

names of the persons, who had actually gathered on the spot with a

common object to obstruct the vehicular traffic on the road and as such, no

case, if any, under Section 143 of IPC is made out. Lastly, learned counsel

representing the petitioners argued that there is nothing on record

suggestive of the fact that petitioners after having formed an unlawful

assembly created rucksack, if any, of any kind or caused any damage to

public property, rather they after having registered their protest dispersed

from the spot.

4. Mr. B.C.Verma, learned Additional Advocate General while

refuting aforesaid submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioners

argued that bare perusal of material available on record clearly reveals that

vehicular traffic was obstructed for more than 20 minutes, as a result of

which, passengers traveling in the public transport as well as private

vehicles were put to undue harassment. Learned Additional Advocate

General further argued that since passenger travelling in public transport

and private vehicles were not allowed to move beyond one point, a case

under Section 341 of IPC, rightly came to be registered against the

petitioners. He further submitted that evidence collected on record by the

prosecution clearly reveals that petitioners after having formed an unlawful

assembly obstructed the vehicular traffic and as such, they have been

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rightly booked under Section 143 of IPC.

5. Before adverting to the factual matrix of the case, this Court

deems it necessary to elaborate upon the scope and competence of this

Court to quash the criminal proceedings while exercising power under

Section 482 of Cr.P.C. Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment titled State of

Haryana and others vs. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335

has laid down several principles, which govern the exercise of jurisdiction of

High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Before pronouncement of aforesaid

judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court, a three-Judge Bench of

Hon'ble Court in State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy and others, 1977

(2) SCC 699, held that the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding, if it

comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be

an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that

the proceeding ought to be quashed. Relevant para is being reproduced

herein below:-

"7....In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion

that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are

higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would

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be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that

salient jurisdiction."

6. Hon'ble Apex Court in Bhajan Lal (supra), has elaborately

considered the scope and ambit of Section 482 Cr.P.C. Subsequently,

Hon'ble Apex Court in Vineet Kumar and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr.,

while considering the scope of interference under Sections 397 Cr.P.C and

482 Cr.P.C, by the High Courts, has held that High Court is entitled to

quash a proceeding, if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the

proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or

that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to be quashed.

The Hon'ble Apex Court has further held that the saving of the High Court's

inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a

salutary public purpose i.e. a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to

degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In the aforesaid

case, the Hon'ble Apex Court taking note of seven categories, where power

can be exercised under Section 482 Cr.P.C, as enumerated in Bhajan Lal

(supra), i.e. where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with

malafides and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an

ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to

spite him due to private and personal grudge, quashed the proceedings

7. Hon'ble Apex Court in Prashant Bharti v. State (NCT of Delhi),

(2013) 9 SCC 293, while drawing strength from its earlier judgment titled as

Rajiv Thapar and Ors v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330, has

reiterated that High Court has inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., to

quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused, at the stage of

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issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing

of charge, but such power must always be used with caution, care and

circumspection. While invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of

the Cr.P.C., the High Court has to be fully satisfied that the material

produced by the accused is such, that would lead to the conclusion, that

his/ their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts and

the material adduced on record itself overrules the veracity of the

allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/

complainant. The material relied upon by the accused should be such, as

would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual

basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience

of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482

Cr.P.C. to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of

process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. In the aforesaid

judgment titled Prashant Bharti v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC

293, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:-

"22. The proposition of law, pertaining to quashing of criminal proceedings, initiated against an accused by a High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "the Cr.P.C.") has been dealt with by this Court in Rajiv Thapar & Ors. vs. Madan Lal Kapoor wherein this Court inter alia held as under: (2013) 3 SCC 330, paras 29-30)

29. The issue being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused, at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These

are all stages before the commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far reaching consequences, inasmuch as, it would negate the prosecution's/complainant's case without allowing the

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prosecution/complainant to lead evidence. Such a

determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. To invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. the High Court has to be fully satisfied, that the material produced by the accused is such,

that would lead to the conclusion, that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; the material produced is such, as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused; and the material produced is such, as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in

the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. It should be sufficient to rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without the necessity of recording any evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or

alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material relied upon by

the accused should be such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the

court, and secure the ends of justice.

30. Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to

determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.:-

30.1 Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the material is of sterling and impeccable quality?

30.2 Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false.

30.3 Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such, that

it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant?

30.4 Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice?

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30.5 If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal - proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Such exercise

of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused."

8. Hon'ble Apex Court in Asmathunnisa v. State of A.P. (2011) 11

SCC 259, has held as under:

"12. This Court, in a number of cases, has laid down the scope and

ambit of the High Court's power under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Inherent power under section 482 Cr.P.C. though

wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the Court would be

justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the Statute.

13. The law has been crystallized more than half a century ago in

the case of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 wherein this Court has summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings. This

Court summarized the following three broad categories where the High Court would be justified in exercise of its powers under section 482:

(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar

against the institution or continuance of the proceedings;

(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;

(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge."

14. In Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi and Others (1976) 3 SCC 736, according to the court, the process against the accused can be quashed or set aside :

"(1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the

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statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same

taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused; (2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person

can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused;

(3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and (4) where the complaint suffers from

fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like".

15.

This court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy & Others (1977) 2 SCC 699, observed that the wholesome power

under section 482 Cr.P.C. entitles the High Court to quash a proceeding when it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice requires that the proceedings ought to be quashed. The High Courts have been invested with inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, to achieve a salutary public

purpose. A Court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In this case, the court observed that ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice must be administered according to laws made by the

Legislature. This case has been followed in a large number of subsequent cases of this court and other courts."

9. Hon'ble Apex Court in Asmathunnisa (supra) has categorically

held that where discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is

capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on

materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and where the

complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction,

or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like, High

Court would be justified in exercise of its powers under S. 482 CrPC.

10. Also, reliance is placed upon a judgment rendered by Hon'ble

Apex Court in Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judciial Magistrate, (1998) 5

SCC 749, wherein, it has been observed that summoning of an accused in

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a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion

as a matter of course. Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment (supra) has held

as under:

"28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. it is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint

to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in

support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the

accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or

otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused."

11. From the bare perusal of aforesaid exposition of law, it is quite

apparent that exercising its inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., High

Court can proceed to quash the proceedings, if it comes to the conclusion

that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process of

the law.

12. Careful perusal of aforesaid law taken note herein above, clearly

reveals that power under S.482 for quashing of complaint and summoning

order cannot be used mechanically in every case by High Court rather, such

power is required to be used sparingly and in extra-ordinary circumstances,

especially in those cases, where court, after having seen record, comes to a

conclusion that if prosecution, on the basis of contents contained in the

complaint, is allowed to continue, would result in sheer abuse of process of

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law and miscarriage of justice. Besides above, court, after having scanned

material, if arrives at a conclusion that the material collected on record by

prosecution is not of that kind that it would result in conviction of accused, it

can quash proceedings, so that accused is not subjected to protracted trial.

Most importantly, in all the judgments relied above, especially Pepsi

Foods Ltd. (supra), Hon'ble Apex Court has categorically held that

summoning of an accused in criminal case is a serious matter. Order of

summoning must reflect that the court issuing such order has applied its

mind to the facts of case and law applicable thereto. While deciding to issue

summons, court is necessarily required to examine nature of allegations

made in the complaint and evidence, both oral and documentary in support

thereof. After having seen contents of the complaint as well as evidence led

on record in support of allegations, court is required to satisfy itself that the

material placed before it would be sufficient for the complainant to bring

home charge to the accused.

13. Now, in the light of the aforesaid exposition of law, this Court shall

make an endeavor to examine the material available on record vis-à-vis

prayer made in the petition for quashing of FIR, with a view to arrive at a

conclusion that, whether facts of the case warrant exercise of power by this

court under Section 482 Cr.P.C for quashing of summoning process or not?

14. Though, it is quite apparent from the material available on record

that on the date alleged incident petitioners after being denied entry in the

public transport attempted to stop bus bearing registration No. HP-10-A-

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7189 enroute Chandigarh to Devidhar on Dhalli chowk, but there is nothing

on record that beside aforesaid bus, other vehicles, if any, on the road were

stopped by the petitioners. It is the specific case of the prosecution that on

28.6.2019, one boy sat in front of bus bearing No. HP-10-A-7189 enroute

Chandigarh to Devidhar, as a result of which, entire traffic plying on Dhalli

road was disrupted. Though, there is nothing on record suggestive of the

fact that on account of obstruction, if any, caused by the petitioners,

persons traveling in the bus or other private vehicles were put to undue

harassment, but even otherwise this Court finds that none of the passenger

from HRTC bus, detailed hereinabove, or other private vehicles ever came

forward to lodge complaint against petitioners that they were restrained or

were not allowed to move beyond one point, if it is so, it is not understood

how and on what basis a case under Section 341 of IPC is made out

against the petitioners.

15. Moot question which needs to be decided in the instant

proceedings is "whether on account of stoppage of bus, if any, by the

petitioners, provisions of S.341 would be attracted or not?."

16. Before exploring answer to aforesaid question, it would be apt to

take note of S.341 IPC, which reads as under:-

"341. Punishment for wrongful restraint. --whoever wrongfully restrains any person shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to

one month, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both."

17. Bare perusal of S.341 IPC, reveals that Whoever wrongfully

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restrains any person shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term

which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to five

hundred rupees, or with both. "Wrongful restraint" has been defined under

S.340 IPC, which reads as under:

"Section 340 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 defines wrongful confinement as, "whoever wrongfully restrains any person in

such a manner as to prevent that person from proceeding beyond certain circumscribing limits, is said "wrongfully to confine" that person."

18. As per aforesaid provision, whoever wrongfully restrains any

person in such a manner as to prevent that person from proceeding beyond

certain circumscribing limits, is said "wrongful confinement" that person."

19. Though, Mr. B.C.Verma, learned Additional Advocate General

strenuously argued that on account of stoppage of bus, passengers

traveling in the bus as well as other occupants of the private vehicles were

wrongfully confined, but perusal of FIR sought to be quashed reveals that

FIR was lodged on the basis of ruqua sent by police official namely, Suraj

Kumar, who simply stated that he received telephonic information that one

boy has sat infront of HRTC bus bearing registration No.HP-10-A-7189

enroute Chandigarh to Devidhar, as a result of which, entire traffic has

disrupted. Since, no specific complaint ever came to be made on account of

alleged wrongful confinement of the persons travelling in the bus or in other

private vehicles, there appears to be merit in the submission of learned

counsel for the petitioners that no case muchless under Section 341 of IPC,

is made out against the petitioners. Similarly, this Court finds that no case is

made out under Section 143 of IPC against the petitioners, there is no

allegation in the FIR that petitioners formed an unlawful assembly and

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caused damage to the public property or bus.

20. At this stage, it would be apt to take note of provision of

Sections 141 and 143 of IPC hereinbelow:

141. Unlawful assembly:-An assembly of five or more persons is designated an "unlawful assembly", if the common object of the persons composing that assembly is--

First.--To overawe by criminal force, or show of criminal force, 1[the Central or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State], or any public servant in the exercise of the lawful power of such public servant; or

Second.--To resist the execution of any law, or of any legal

process; or

Third.--To commit any mischief or criminal trespass, or other offence; or

Fourth.--By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to any person, to take or obtain possession of any

property, or to deprive any person of the enjoyment of a right of way, or of the use of water or other incorporeal right of which he is in possession or enjoyment, or to enforce any right or supposed right; or

Fifth.--By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to compel any person to do what he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do what he is legally entitled to do.

143. Punishment: Whoever is a member of an unlawful assembly, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with

fine, or with both.

21. Though, perusal of provisions under Sections 141 and 143 of IPC

reveals that an assembly of five or more persons shall be designated an

"unlawful assembly", if the common object of the persons composing that

assembly is to overawe any public servant by criminal force, or show of

criminal force. If the aforesaid provision is read in its entirety, it clearly

suggests that to determine the existence of common object, court is

required to see the circumstances, in which the incident had taken place

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and conduct of member of unlawful assembly including the weapon of

offence they carried or used on the spot. In the instant case, there is no

allegation that petitioners used criminal force of any kind, rather they after

being denied entry in bus, lodged protest by sitting infront of the bus. It is

admitted case of the prosecution that after 20 minutes petitioners and other

persons gathered on the spot dispersed. No doubt, common object may be

formed at the spur of the moment and prior concert in the sense of meeting

unlawful members is not necessary, but there is nothing on record to

suggests that petitioners, who allegedly formed unlawful assembly, had

common object to cause disruption of traffic, rather they stopped the

movement of the bus for few minutes to lodge their protest on account of

their being denied entry in the bus.

22. To attract provision contained under S. 141 and 143 IPC, it is

incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that on the date of alleged

incident, some force or violence was used by members of unlawful

assembly and that at the relevant time they had come on the spot with

weapon.

23. In the instant case, bare perusal of contents of FIR nowhere

suggest that any member of 'unlawful assembly' was carrying any kind of

weapon with him, or he had used any kind of criminal force upon the driver

and conductor of the bus in question.

24. Similarly to attract provisions contained under section 141 and

143, it is incumbent upon prosecution to prove that an unlawful act was

committed by any member of the assembly and all members gathered on

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the spot had a common object. In the instant case, petitioners had actually

gathered on the spot to board a bus, but once they were denied entry they

lodged protest by sitting infront of the bus, but in that process, they neither

caused any damage to public property or to public servant i.e. driver and

conductor.

25. Leaving everything aside, this court having taken note of the

material placed on record has no hesitation to conclude that the alleged

incident of obstructing road happened on account of emotional outburst of

the petitioners after their being denied entry in the bus and none of the

agitators including the petitioners had any kind of intention to obstruct the

road or cause damage to public property.

26. Moreover, this Court finds from the material adduced on record

that prosecution intends to prove its case with the help of witnesses, who

are employees of the HRTC, version thereof being interested witnesses

otherwise required to be taken into consideration with utmost care and

caution. No doubt, version put forth by interested witnesses cannot be

brushed aside on account of their being interested or having relation with

the complainant/injured, but certainly their statements cannot be taken as a

gospel truth rather, same are required to be corroborated by independent

witnesses, which in the present case is missing.

27. Leaving everything aside, this court after having scanned entire

material placed on record by respective parties, finds that the prosecution

launched by respondents, if permitted to continue would result in sheer

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abuse of process of law, because material collected on record in support of

complaint by the Department, itself does not support the case of the

prosecution. Material collected on record by the Department in support of

complaint, if perused in its entirety, nowhere suggests that the prosecution

is likely to succeed. In case prosecution in the case at hand, is allowed to

continue, it would unnecessarily expose the petitioners to protracted trial.

28. Apart from above, evidentiary material on record, if accepted

would not reasonably connect the petitioners with the crime. Neither there is

sufficient evidence to conclude that on the date of the alleged incident,

petitioners had any intention to cause damage to public property or obstruct

the passage of bus or they with the help and aid of each other committed

alleged crime in furtherance of common intention. Otherwise also, in view of

the material available on record by the Investigating Agency, case of the

prosecution is bound to fail in as much as against present petitioners is

concerned and hence, no fruitful purpose would be served by allowing such

proceedings to continue. To the contrary, petitioners would suffer

irreparable loss, harassment and mental agony, if criminal proceedings in

the present case, are allowed continuing. Moreover, chances of conviction

of the petitioners are very remote and bleak keeping in view the standard of

evidence brought on record by the prosecution and in case, FIR sought to

be quashed in the instant proceedings as well as consequent proceedings

pending in the competent court of law are allowed to sustain, petitioners

would unnecessarily be put to ordeals of protracted trial, which ultimately

may lead to acquittal of the accused.

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29. Consequently in view of the detailed discussion made herein

above as well as law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court, this court finds merit

in the present petition, which is accordingly allowed. FIR No. 119 of 2019,

dated 28.06.2019, registered at police Station, Dhalli, District Shimla, H.P.,

under Sections 341 and 143 of IPC alongwith consequential proceedings

pending in the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shimla, District

Shimla, H.P. are quashed and set aside. All the petitioners are acquitted.

All pending applications also stand disposed of. Interim directions, if any,

stand vacated.

(Sandeep Sharma), Judge May 10,2023

(shankar)