Himachal Pradesh High Court

Criminal Misc. Petition (Main) ... vs State Of Punjab And Another on 11 October, 2022

Bench: Sandeep Sharma

          IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA

                  ON THE 11TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2022

                              BEFORE

                HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANDEEP SHARMA




                                                            .

     CRIMINAL MISC. PETITION (MAIN) U/S 482 CRPC NOS. 321 AND 79
                               OF 2021
    1.   CRIMINAL MISC. PETITION (MAIN) U/S 482 CRPC NO. 321
         2021





    Between:-

    SH. SUBHASH CHOPRA
    S/O SH SHAKTI PRAKASH CHOPRA
    R/O RESIDENT OF HOUSE NO. 1789-3B-2,





    SECTOR 60, MOHALI PUNJAB-160059


                                                             PETITIONER
    (BY MR. V.D. KHIDDTA, ADVOCATE)

    AND

    1.     STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH
                                                          RESPONDENT
    2.     SH. MANOJ SOOD
           S/O SH. VIDYA SAGAR,


           R/O SOOD NIWAS, THIRD FLOOR,
           LOWER DOODHLI, P.O BHONT, SHIMLA, H.P.

    3.     SH. NARESH SOOD,




           S/O SH. VIDYA SAGAR,
           R/O SOOD NIWAS, THIRD FLOOR,





           LOWER DOODHLI, P.O BHONT, SHIMLA, H.P.

    4.    SH. KAILASH VAHI,
          S/O SH. ISHWAR DAS,





          R/O HOUSE NO. 11, NEW LAKSHMI NARAYAN MANDIR,
          CHOTA SHIMLA, H.P.
                                                RESPONDENTS
    (MR. SUDHIR BHATNAGAR AND
    MR. NARINDER GULERIA,
    ADDITIONAL ADVOCATES GENERAL
    WITH MR. SUNNY DHATWALIA,
    ASSISTANT ADVOCATE GENERAL,
    FOR R-1)

    (MS. MEERA, ADVOCATE,




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                                   2


    FOR R-2)

    (MR. RAJAN KAHOL, ADVOCATE
    FOR R-3)

    (MR. SUBHASH PUNSHI, ADVOCATE
    FOR R-4)




                                                          .

    2.   CRIMINAL MISC. PETITION (MAIN) U/S 482 CRPC NO. 79 2021
    Between:-

    MANOJ SOOD





    S/O SH. VIDYA SAGAR,
    R/O SOOD NIWAS, THIRD FLOOR,
    LOWER DUDHLI, P/O BHONT, DISTT. SHIMLA, H.P.





                                                           PETITIONER
    (BY MS. MEERA, ADVOCATE)

    AND           r
    1.    STATE OF H.P.

    2.    SH. NARESH SOOD,
          S/O SH. VIDYA SAGAR,
          R/O SOOD NIWAS, THIRD FLOOR,
          LOWER DOODHLI, P/O BHONT, SHIMLA, H.P.


    3.    SH. SUBHASH CHOPRA
          S/O SH SHAKTI PRAKSH
          HUSE NO. 1132 1ST FLOOR SECTOR 387, CHANDIGARH
          AT PRESENT HOUSE NO. 1631,




          SECTOR 60 MOHALI PUNJAB 160059





    4.    SH. KAILASH VAHI,
          S/O SH. ISHWAR DASS,
          R/O HOUSE NO. 11, NEW LAKSHMI NARAYAN MANDIR,
          CHOTA SHIMLA, H.P.





                                                RESPONDENTS
    (MR. SUDHIR BHATNAGAR AND
    MR. NARINDER GULERIA,
    ADDITIONAL ADVOCATES GENERAL
    WITH MR. SUNNY DHATWALIA,
    ASSISTANT ADVOCATE GENERAL,
    FOR R-1)

    (MR. RAJAN KAHOL, ADVOCATE
    FOR R-2)




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                                           3


    (MR. V.D. KHIDDTA, ADVOCATE
    FOR R-3)

    (MR. SUBASH PUNSHI, ADVOCATE
    FOR R-4)




                                                                    .
    Whether approved for reporting:





    1


        These petitions coming on for orders this day, the court passed the





                                      following:

                                    O R D E R

By way of instant petitions filed under S. 482 CrPC, prayer has

been made on behalf of the petitioners for quashing of order dated

23.3.2020 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge (II), Shimla in Cr.

Revision No. 16-S/10 of 2017 reversing order dated 17/24.10.2017

passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.7 Shimla in

case No. 1-2 of 17/15 tilted State v. Manoj Sood and others, whereby,

petitioners came to be discharged for the offences punishable under Ss.

420, 411 and 120B IPC. Since both the petitions arise out of same

proceedings, as such, they were heard together and are being disposed

of by way of this common order.

2. Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the record, are

that the petitioners namely Subhash Chopra, Manoj Sood and other

persons namely Naresh Sood and Kailash Vahi came to be named in FIR

No. 210 of 2013, dated 25.10.2013 lodged at the behest of the

complainant, Narender Kumar Sood, who alleged that the accused

namely Manoj Sood fraudulently and with the intention to cheat his sister-

in-law (Bhabhi) i.e. Smt. Kumud Sood, took her gold jewelry weighing 800

grams and Rs. 5.50 Lakh on the pretext that he needs some money for

his business but never returned the same. After completion of

investigation, police presented Challan in the competent court of law but

vide order dated 17.10.2017, Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.7,

Shimla, Himachal Pradesh discharged the accused of the offences

alleged to have been committed by them under S. 420, 411 and 120B IPC

on the ground that there is no material adduced on record suggestive of

the fact that there was common intention, if any, inter se accused to

commit the charged offences at any point of time. Being aggrieved and

dissatisfied with aforesaid order, respondent-State filed criminal revision

petition before learned Additional Sessions Judge (2), Shimla, Himachal

Pradesh, who vide order dated 23.3.2020, Annexure P-1, allowed the

criminal revision petition and remanded the case back to the learned trial

Court to decide the same afresh, after going through the entire Challan

and relevant documents and provisions under S. 405 and 406 IPC. In the

aforesaid background, petitioners Subhash Chopra and Manoj Sood, who

were discharged vide order dated 17.10.2017 passed by Judicial

Magistrate First Class, have approached this Court in the instant

proceedings filed under S. 482 CrPC, praying therein to set aside order

dated 23.3.2020 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge (2),

Shimla, Himachal Pradesh.

3. On 22.12.2021, all the parties came present in court pursuant

to order dated 23.12.2021 and Ms. Meera, learned counsel for the

respondent No.1 in CrMMO No. 321 of 2021 and for the petitioner in

CrMMO No. 79 of 2021, stated that the parties have resolved to settle the

dispute inter se them amicably, whereby respondent No.2 to 4 have

agreed to pay Rs. 12.50 Lakh to the complainant namely Kumud Sood

within three months.

4. Today, during proceedings of the case, learned counsel for the

parties on instructions of their clients, apprised this court that Manoj Sood,

petitioner in CrMMO No. 79 of 2021 has already paid Rs. 3,12,000/- to the

complainant Kumud Sood, whereas, Naresh Sood, respondent No. 3 in

CrMMO No. 79 of 2021, has settled the matter with complainant for Rs.

2,87,500/- and such amount has already been paid to the complainant.

Similarly, petitioner Subhash Chopra, who is respondent No.3 in CrMMO

No. 79 of 2021, has also settled his dispute with the complainant for Rs.

1.00 Lakh, which has been handed over to the complainant in the court

itself. Ms. Poonam, who is daughter of respondent No. 4 Shri Kailash

Vahi, has also compromised matter with complainant for Rs. 1.00 Lakh

and handed over Rs. One Lakh, in cash to the complainant in the court.

5. Complainant Kumud Sood, who is present in court, fairly admits

the factum with regard to her having received Rs. 7,99,500/-, in total, as

per compromise, from the aforesaid persons/accused. She states that in

view of amicable settlement inter se parties, she does not wish to

prosecute the case any further and in case FIR lodged at her behest by

Narender Kumar Sood, her brother in law, who is no more, is quashed

and set aside and accused are acquitted of charges framed against them.

Her statement made on oath is taken on record.

6. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners state that though

they have approached this Hon'ble Court against the order of remand

made by the learned Court below, but since the matter stands

compromised inter accused and the victim, as such, instead of quashing

order passed by learned Court below, FIR alongwith consequential

proceedings may be quashed.

7. After having heard statement of complainant made on oath, Mr.

Narinder Guleria, learned Additional Advocate General, states that though

the complainant has compromised the matter with the accused named in

FIR but keeping in view gravity of offence alleged to have been committed

by accused, prayer of the petitioners and victim for quashing of FIR as

well as consequential proceedings deserves to be rejected. However, he

fairly states that chance of conviction of petitioners and other accused are

remote and bleak on account of statement made by victim, on oath before

this court and as such, this court may pass appropriate order.

8. Since the matter stands compromised inter se

petitioners/accused and the victim and victim has received the aforesaid

amount from the petitioners/accused, as such, this on the oral request

and with the consent of the parties deems it fit to quash the FIR alongwith

consequential proceedings, in view of compromise entered into inter se

parties.

9. The question which now needs consideration is whether FIR in

question can be ordered to be quashed when Hon'ble Apex Court in

Narinder Singh and others versus State of Punjab and another

(2014)6 SCC 466 has specifically held that power under S. 482 CrPC is

not to be exercised in the cases which involve heinous and serious

offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc.

Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on

society.

10. At this stage, it would be relevant to take note of the judgment

passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in Narinder Singh (supra), whereby the

Hon'ble Apex Court has formulated guidelines for accepting the

settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the

settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings.

Perusal of judgment referred to above clearly depicts that in para 29.1,

Hon'ble Apex Court has returned the findings that power conferred under

Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies

in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No

doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power

to quash criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not

compoundable and where the parties have settled the matter between

themselves, however, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with

great caution. Para Nos. 29 to 29.7 of the judgment are reproduced as

under:-

"29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving

adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1 Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court.

While exercising the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. 29.3. Such a power is not be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by Public Servants while working in that capacity are not to be

quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the

offender.

29.4. On the other, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre- dominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes

among themselves.

29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases. 29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore is to be generally treated as crime against

the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For

this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury

sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the

criminal proceedings whereas in the later case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.

29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence

and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy

stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is

already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime".

11. Careful perusal of para 29.3 of the judgment suggests that such

a power is not to be exercised in the cases which involve heinous and

serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape,

dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious

impact on society. Apart from this, offences committed under special

statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by

Public Servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed

merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and

predominantly civil character, particularly arising out of commercial

transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes

may be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes

among themselves.

12. The Hon'ble Apex Court in case Gian Singh v. State of Punjab

and anr. (2012) 10 SCC 303 has held that power of the High Court in

quashing of the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in exercise of its

inherent power is distinct and different from the power of a Criminal Court

for compounding offences under Section 320 Cr.PC. Even in the

judgment passed in Narinder Singh's case, the Hon'ble Apex Court has

held that while exercising inherent power of quashment under Section 482

Cr.PC the Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the

crime and its social impact and it cautioned the Courts not to exercise the

power for quashing proceedings in heinous and serious offences of

mental depravity, murder, rape, dacoity etc. However subsequently, the

Hon'ble Apex Court in Dimpey Gujral and Ors. vs. Union Territory

through Administrator, UT, Chandigarh and Ors. (2013( 11 SCC 497

has also held as under:-

"7. In certain decisions of this Court in view of the settlement arrived at by the

.

parties, this Court quashed the FIRs though some of the offences were non-

compoundable. A two Judges' Bench of this court doubted the correctness of those decisions. Learned Judges felt that in those decisions, this court had permitted compounding of non-compoundable offences. The said issue was, therefore, referred to a larger bench.

The larger Bench in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303

considered the relevant provisions of the Code and the judgments of this court and concluded as under: (SCC pp. 342-43, para 61)

61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320

of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be

prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences

of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot

provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or

the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise

between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the

victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding." (emphasis supplied)

8. In the light of the above observations of this court in Gian Singh, we feel that this is a case where the continuation of criminal proceedings would tantamount to abuse of process of law because the alleged offences are not heinous offences showing extreme depravity nor are they against the society. They are offences of a personal nature and burying them would bring about peace and amity between the two sides. In the circumstances of the case, FIR No. 163

dated 26.10.2006 registered under Section 147, 148, 149, 323, 307, 452 and 506 of the IPC at Police Station Sector 3, Chandigarh and all consequential proceedings arising there from including the final report presented under Section 173 of the Code and charges framed by the trial Court are hereby quashed."

13. Hon'ble Apex Court in its judgment dated 4th October, 2017,

titled as Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and

others versus State of Gujarat and Another, passed in Criminal Appeal

No.1723 of 2017 arising out of SLP(Crl) No.9549 of 2016, reiterated the

principles/ parameters laid down in Narinder Singh's case supra for

accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings. It would be

profitable to reproduce para No. 13 to 15 of the judgment herein:

"13. The same principle was followed in Central Bureau of Investigation v. Maninder Singh (2016)1 SCC 389 by a bench of two learned Judges of this Court. In that case, the High Court had, in the exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 quashed proceedings under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 read with Section 120-B of the Penal Code. While allowing the appeal filed by the Central Bureau of

Investigation Mr Justice Dipak Misra (as the learned Chief Justice then was)

observed that the case involved allegations of forgery of documents to embezzle the funds of the bank. In such a situation, the fact that the dispute had been settled with the bank would not justify a recourse to thepower under Section 482: "...In economic offences Court must not only keep in view that money has been paid to the bank which has been defrauded but also the society at large. It is not a case of simple assault or a theft of a trivial amount; but the offence with which

we are concerned is well planned and was committed with a deliberate design with an eye of personal profit regardless of consequence to the society at large. To quash the proceeding merely on the ground that the accused has settled the amount with the bank would be a misplaced sympathy. If the prosecution against the economic offenders are not allowed to continue, the entire community is

aggrieved."

14. In a subsequent decision in State of Tamil Nadu v R Vasanthi Stanley (2016) 1 SCC 376, the court rejected the submission that the first respondent was a woman

"who was following the command of her husband" and had signed certain documents without being aware of the nature of the fraud which was being perpetrated on the bank. Rejecting the submission, this Court held that: "... Lack of awareness, knowledge or intent is neither to be considered nor accepted in economic offences. The submission assiduously presented on

gender leaves us unimpressed. An offence under the criminal law is an offence and it does not depend upon the gender of an accused. True it is, there are certain provisions in Code of Criminal Procedure relating to exercise of jurisdiction Under Section 437, etc. therein but that altogether pertains to a different sphere. A person committing a murder or getting involved in a financial scam or forgery of documents, cannot claim discharge or acquittal on the ground of her gender as that is neither constitutionally nor statutorily a valid argument. The offence is gender neutral in this case. We say no more on this score..."

"...A grave criminal offence or serious economic offence or for that matter the offence that has the potentiality to create a dent in the financial health of the institutions, is not to be quashed on the ground that there is delay in trial or the

principle that when the matter has been settled it should be quashed to avoid the load on the system..."

15. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject may be summarized in the following propositions:

(i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognizes and preserves powers which

inhere in the High Court;

(ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of

Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.

(iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power;

(iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it

has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;

(v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;

vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious

impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences;

(vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on

a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned;

(viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial,

mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute;

(ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is

remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and

(x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions (viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance."

14. In the case at hand, the offences alleged to have been

committed by the accused are petty offences and further in view of the

fact that the victim has compromised the matter with the accused and she

is no more interested in pursuing the case further, there are bleak and

remote chances of conviction of accused and as such, this court sees no

impediment in accepting the prayer made by petitioners for quashing of

FIR.

15. Since the matter stands compromised between the parties and

the victim is no more interested in pursuing the criminal proceedings

against the accused, no fruitful purpose would be served in case

proceedings against the accused r are allowed to continue, as such,

prayer made in the petition at hand can be accepted.