Gujarat High Court
Tristar Lifesciences Pvt. Ltd. Thro ... vs Indian Bank (E-Allahabad Bank) on 24 September, 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION (QUASHING) NO. 4793 of 2025
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TRISTAR LIFESCIENCES PVT. LTD. THRO ARPIT ARUN MEHRA
Versus
INDIAN BANK (E-ALLAHABAD BANK) & ANR.
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Appearance:
ARJUN R SHETH(7589) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MS SHRUTI PATHAK, APP for the Respondent(s) No. 2
RITESH D PATADIA(6460) for the Respondent(s) No. 1
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HASMUKH D. SUTHAR
Date : 24/09/2025
ORAL ORDER
1. By way of this application, the applicant has prayed to
quash and set aside the impugned order dated 13.03.2025
passed by the learned 8th Additional Senior Civil Judge, Surat,
in Criminal Misc. Application No. 4251 of 2025 (Annexure-A),
and further to quash and set aside the impugned notice dated
18.03.2025 issued by the Court Commissioner, Ms. Jyoti Patel,
seeking to take possession of the properties mentioned therein
(Annexure-B).
2. Heard learned advocates for the respective parties.
3. The learned advocate for the petitioner submits that the
impugned order dated 13.03.2025 passed by the 8th Additional
Senior Civil Judge, Surat in CRMA J No. 4251 of 2025 is
without jurisdiction, inasmuch as a Civil Judge has no role to
play in an application under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act. It
is further submitted that the learned court has erroneously
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appointed a "Court Commissioner" under Section 14(1-A) of the
Act, though no such position is contemplated either under the
SARFAESI Act or under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023. Consequently, the person so appointed operates
in a sphere unknown to law. Pursuant to the said order, a notice
dated 18.03.2025 has been issued by one Ms. Jyoti V. Patel in
her capacity as alleged Court Commissioner, seeking to take
possession of the secured property on 06.04.2025 at 8:00 a.m.,
which property in fact belongs to and is being operated as a fully
functional multi-speciality hospital of the petitioner.
3.1 The learned advocate for the petitioner submits that the
petitioner is a company registered as an MSME under the Micro,
Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006, owning
and operating. Tristar Hospital, a multi-speciality hospital at
Surat with about 108 beds, providing essential and life-saving
medical services to the citizens of Surat and South Gujarat. The
hospital annually undertakes approximately 600 cardiac
procedures, more than 6000 dialysis procedures, and over 3000
critical care cases, apart from providing services under the PM
Yojana scheme. It is further submitted that several employees of
the hospital belong to marginalised sections of society, including
women and single mothers, whose livelihood would be directly
affected by the impugned order. It is further submitted that the
impugned order dated 13.03.2025 has been passed by the
learned 8th Additional Senior Civil Judge, Surat, acting in the
capacity of a Civil Judge. The learned Civil Judge has no
jurisdiction under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, since such
application can only be entertained by the Chief Metropolitan
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Magistrate or the District Magistrate, as is evident from the
express language of Section 14 of the Act. Thus, the impugned
order is wholly without authority of law. It is therefore submitted
that the petitioner has challenged the limited aspect of
jurisdictional error on the part of the learned Court, and has
accordingly prayed for allowing the present petition. That the act
of the concerned Court in appointing a Court Commissioner is
alien to criminal jurisprudence, and further, there exists a
specific bar under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act on the
jurisdiction of Civil Courts to entertain or decide such
applications.In this regard, the learned advocate for the
petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble
Apex Court in Standard Chartered Bank and Ors. v. V. Noble
Kumar and Ors., MANU/SC/9874/2013.
4. The learned advocate for respondent No. 2 has opposed the
petition and submitted that respondent No. 2 is a banking
financial institution, which had filed an application under
Section 14 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial
Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002
(hereinafter referred to as "SARFAESI Act") before the learned
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Surat. The said application came to be
placed before the Court of the 8th Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate and Senior Civil Judge, Surat, wherein the impugned
order below Exhibit-1 was passed in the capacity of Chief
Judicial Magistrate.
4.1 Further it is submitted that this is not a case where the
application was entertained by a Court lacking jurisdiction. The
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mere mention of the designation as "Senior Civil Judge" while
passing the order cannot be a 13 ground to quash and set aside
the order, inasmuch as the Court of the Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate and Senior Civil Judge functions as one and the same
Court and exercises the same powers. The impugned order was
not passed in the capacity of a Civil Judge alone, and thus the
objection raised by the petitioner is purely technical in nature. It
is further submitted that the petitioner is attempting to take
undue advantage of such a technicality with the sole object of
delaying the proceedings. If the petitioner is aggrieved by the
order passed under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, the proper
course available to him is to avail the alternative statutory
remedy before the Debt Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of
the Act. Instead of doing so, the petitioner has approached this
Court with an ulterior motive of stalling the proceedings. It is
further contended that the use of the word "Commissioner" in
the impugned order does not vitiate the proceedings, as the
Court is empowered to appoint subordinate staff to assist in
ministerial work while exercising powers under Section 14 of the
Act. The Court has duly satisfied itself regarding the
requirements of Section 14, and the secured assets are situated
within its territorial jurisdiction. Moreover, in paragraph 11 of
the impugned order, the Court has specifically recorded that the
Judicial Magistrate is empowered to entertain applications under
Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act. Hence, merely due to
inadvertence or clerical error in mentioning the designation as
"Additional Senior Civil Judge," the order cannot be said to be
without jurisdiction. Accordingly, the learned advocate for
respondent No. 2 has prayed for dismissal of the petition. The
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learned advocate appearing for respondent No.2 has placed
reliance to the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
the case of (i) Phoenix ARC Pvt. Vs Ganesh Murthy, 2023
LiveLaw (SC) 513; (ii) Authorized Officer, Indian Bank vs. D
Visalakshi, Manu/1SC/1303/2019; (iii) South Indian Bank
Ltd. v. Naveen Mathew Philip; (iv) Phoenix ARC Pvt. Ltd. v.
Vishwa Bharati Vidhya Mandir, (2022) 5 SCC 345; (v) State
Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C., (2018) 03 SCC 85; (vi)
United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110;
(vii) R.D. Jain & Co. v. Capital First Ltd., OnLine SC 921.
5. The learned APP has adopted the submissions of the
learned advocate for respondent No. 2 and further submitted
that the SARFAESI Act provides a complete code and a separate
mechanism. Any order passed under Section 14 of the Act is
required to be challenged before the Debt Recovery Tribunal
under Section 17 of the Act. Hence, the present petition is not
maintainable and deserves to be dismissed.
6. Having heard the learned advocates for the respective
parties, perused the record, and considered the synopsis
produced by their advocates, it appears that the learned
advocate for the petitioner has challenged the order dated
13.03.2025 passed by the learned 8th Additional Senior Civil
Judge, Surat in CRMA J No. 4251 of 2025, contending that the
said order is without jurisdiction, inasmuch as a Civil Judge has
no role to play in an application under Section 14 of the
SARFAESI Act. It is further submitted that the learned Court has
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erroneously appointed a "Court Commissioner" under Section
14(1A) of the Act, on the ground that such appointment is
impermissible, as (i) the learned Senior Civil Judge, Surat, and
(ii) the learned Magistrate have no authority to appoint a Court
Commissioner, the very concept being alien to the scheme of the
Act.
7. The provision of Section 14(1A) of the SARFAESI Act read
as under:
"14(1A) The District Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate may authorise any officer subordinate to him,--
(i) to take possession of such assets and documents relating
thereto; and
(ii) to forward such assets and documents to the secured creditor.]
(2) For the purpose of securing compliance with the provisions of
sub-section (1), the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District
Magistrate may take or cause to be taken such steps and use, or
cause to be used, such force, as may, in his opinion, be
necessary.
(3) No act of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District
Magistrate [any officer authorised by the Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate or District Magistrate] done in pursuance of this
section shall be called in question in any court or before any
authority."
The SARFAESI Act, 2002 has been enacted for the benefit
of banks and financial institutions with a view to ensuring
speedy recovery of public dues by enabling them to take physical
possession of secured assets and auction the same, without
intervention of any Court of law.
8. Section 14 of the Act confers power upon the secured
creditor to seek assistance from the Chief Metropolitan
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Magistrate, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, or the District
Magistrate, as the case may be, for obtaining possession and
control of the secured assets. As per Section 14(1-A) of the Act,
the designated authority is empowered to authorize any officer
subordinate to him to take possession of the secured assets. The
Hon'ble Apex Court has also settled the issue that it would be
permissible to appoint an advocate as a "Court Commissioner"
for the purpose of taking possession of the secured assets and
handing over the same to the secured creditor. In NKGSB
Cooperative Bank Limited v. Subir Chakravarty, (2022) 10
SCC 286, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that an advocate is
an officer of the Court and, thus, subordinate to the
CJM/CMM/DM. Accordingly, it would be open to the
CJM/CMM/DM to appoint such a Commissioner to assist in the
execution of an order passed under Section 14(1A) of the Act.
9. While exercising power under Section 14 of the SARFAESI
Act, the learned Magistrate has no jurisdiction to adjudicate
disputes between the secured creditor and the debtor. The
functions and powers under Section 14 are ministerial in nature,
not adjudicatory. This position has been reiterated by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Balkrishna Rama Tarle (Dead)
through LRs & Anr. v. Phoenix ARC Private Limited & Ors.,
(2023) 1 SCC 662, and in Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited v.
Girnar Corrugators Pvt. Ltd., MANU/SC/0013/2023.
10. Further, as per Section 17 of the Act, any person aggrieved
by the measures taken under Section 14 must challenge the
same before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. No remedy is available
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under Section 528 of the Cr.P.C. In this regard, reference may be
made to the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in: (i) Phoenix
ARC Pvt. Ltd. v. Ganesh Murthy, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 513; (ii)
Authorized Officer, Indian Bank v. D. Visalakshi,
MANU/SC/1303/2019; (iii) South Indian Bank Ltd. v.
Naveen Mathew Philip; (iv) Phoenix ARC Pvt. Ltd. v. Vishwa
Bharati Vidya Mandir, (2022) 5 SCC 345; (v) State Bank of
Travancore v. Mathew K.C., (2018) 3 SCC 85; (vi) United
Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110. In
view of the above, the judgment in Standard Chartered Bank
(supra) would not render any assistance to the learned advocate
for the petitioner. It is also pertinent to note that Section 14(1A)
of the SARFAESI Act was enacted with effect from 15.01.2013,
i.e., subsequent to the decision in Standard Chartered Bank
(supra).
11. So far as the arguments regarding the appointment of a
Court Commissioner under the Cr.P.C. are concerned, the same
are not acceptable on two grounds. Firstly, the concept of
appointing a Court Commissioner is not alien to the Cr.P.C.,
inasmuch as Sections 285 and 286 of the Cr.P.C. [corresponding
to Sections 320 and 321 of the BNSS] specifically provide for
issuance and execution of commissions. Hence, the appointment
of a Court Commissioner cannot be said to be foreign to the
scheme of the Cr.P.C. Secondly, the appointment of a Court
Commissioner is in the nature of a delegated power, whereby the
learned Court below authorizes the Commissioner to perform
certain acts on its behalf. Sections 286 of the Cr.P.C. / 321 of
the BNSS provide for execution of such commissions, and the
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purpose of appointing a Commissioner is only to exercise the
powers of the Court on its behalf. The Hon'ble Apex Court in
NKGSB Cooperative Bank Limited v. Subir Chakravarty
(supra) has recognized that even an advocate can be appointed
as a Court Commissioner to assist in taking possession of
secured assets, Rule 8 of the SARFAESI Act also permits same
and provision of secured assets or immovable property by
"authorized officer".
12. In the present case, the Court Commissioner has been
appointed from amongst the staff of the Court, i.e., an employee
subordinate to the establishment of the learned Magistrate who
is an authorized officer. The Court, while making such
appointment, has duly considered that the said officer is capable
of handling the situation at the spot and of dealing with any
objection that may arise. Keeping the aforesaid aspects in mind,
the learned Magistrate has appointed Ms. J.V. Patel,
Superintendent, as Court Commissioner to assist the secured
creditor in taking possession of the secured assets under Section
14(1-A) of the SARFAESI Act. The said order dated 13 th March
2025 is, therefore, just, legal and proper, having been passed
with specific directions.
13. Merely because the learned Magistrate has used the
expression "Court Commissioner," the learned advocate for the
petitioner has failed to point out as to how the same causes any
prejudice to the petitioner. The fact remains that delegation of
powers to the staff subordinate to the Chief Judicial Magistrate
is duly recognized under law. If the learned Magistrate had
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instead used the words "Ms. J.V. Patel, Superintendent, is
authorized/appointed to take possession of the secured assets,"
the substance and effect would remain the same. The order
passed by the learned Magistrate authorizes the said officer to
take possession of the secured assets, which is a purely
ministerial act. Merely delegating such ministerial duties does
not, in any manner, cause prejudice to the petitioner. No
sustainable argument has been canvassed by the learned
advocate for the petitioner to demonstrate otherwise. The very
object of appointing a Court Commissioner is recognized under
the Cr.P.C., BNSS, as well as the Code of Civil Procedure,
wherein the Court is empowered to appoint a Commissioner to
carry out a variety of ministerial and administrative duties. The
concept of appointment of a Court Commissioner is, therefore,
not alien but a customary and recognized feature under
procedural law. Accordingly, the argument canvassed by the
learned advocate for the petitioner is devoid of merit and not
acceptable.
14. So far as the argument canvassed by the learned advocate
for the petitioner that the order passed by the learned Magistrate
under Section 14(1A) of the SARFAESI Act is without
jurisdiction, as it is stated to have been passed by the Court of
the Senior Civil Judge who, under the Act, has no such power, is
concerned, this Court has given thoughtful consideration to the
said contention. It is true that an order passed without
jurisdiction would be a nullity. However, upon perusal of the
record, it clearly appears that the application under Section 14
of the SARFAESI Act was filed before the Court of the Chief
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Judicial Magistrate, Ahmedabad, and the same came to be
assigned to the Court of the 8th Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate and Civil Judge. It is an admitted and undisputed
fact that the officer concerned was holding dual designation as
Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate as well as Senior Civil
Judge, and in that capacity, he was exercising powers in both
criminal and civil matters. Merely because in the order or cause
title the designation "Senior Civil Judge" is mentioned, by itself,
does not cause any prejudice to the petitioner.
15. It is pertinent to note that the application was filed before
the Chief Judicial Magistrate, who had the competent
jurisdiction under Section 14 of the Act. Once the matter was
assigned to the concerned officer, he was exercising the powers
of Chief Judicial Magistrate in criminal jurisdiction and has
accordingly passed the order. Hence, the order cannot be said to
be without jurisdiction merely on account of the designation
mentioned therein.
16. Further, the learned advocate for the petitioner has relied
upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Asset
Reconstruction Company Ltd. v. Bishal Jaishwal, (2021) 6
SCC 366, and submitted that when an order is passed contrary
to law, a writ petition is maintainable. It is an undisputed
proposition that if an order is passed contrary to law, the
petition would be maintainable. However, the facts of the present
case are entirely different. It is not the case here that any order
has been passed by the learned Court below without jurisdiction
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or authority. On the contrary, all relevant parameters were duly
considered while passing the impugned order. It further appears
that the same authority exercises powers in both civil and
criminal matters, and merely due to a typographical error, the
designation has been mentioned as "Civil Judge." Such
inadvertent error on the part of the learned Magistrate cannot be
a ground for the applicant to claim prejudice. Hence, the
authority relied upon by the learned advocate for the petitioner
is of no assistance to the present case.
17. Now, coming to the contention that merely because the
officer has mentioned his designation as "Civil Judge" in the
order, the same would amount to the order being without
jurisdiction -- this argument cannot be accepted. On perusal of
the arguments and the reasons assigned by the learned Court, it
is evident that the order has been passed strictly within the
parameters of Section 14(1A) of the SARFAESI Act. The
concerned officer has exercised powers vested in him under the
SARFAESI Act, and the mere mention of the designation as
"Senior Civil Judge" does not render the order without
jurisdiction. It is noteworthy that the officer concerned was
holding dual designation, namely, Senior Civil Judge and
Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, and accordingly was vested
with both civil and criminal jurisdiction. Therefore, while
discharging his powers under Section 14(1A) of the SARFAESI
Act, the order cannot be said to be without authority of law
merely on account of how the designation is reflected.
18. In fact, the Gujarat High Court, vide Notification No.
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A.0705(II)2023[3], has clarified this position and issued a
notification in this regard.
"In exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (2) of
Section 12 of the Code of Chininal Procedure, 1973 (II of
1974), the Honourable the Chief Justice and Judges of the
High Court of Gujarat, are pleased to appoint the Principal
Senior Civil Judges at the District: Headquarter as Additional
Chief Judicial Magistrates, for their respective District,
traxercise all Judicial powers exercisable by a Chief Judicial
Magistrate, under the Code of Chiminal Procedure except
those under Sections 14(1) and 15(2) of the said code, for
hearing criminal cases arising from the area under the
jurisdiction of their respective Court"
In view of the above, it is crystal clear that the Civil Judge
is vested with powers whereby civil cases are entrusted to the
Civil Court and criminal proceedings are entrusted to the Chief
Judicial Magistrate, depending upon the pendency of cases in
the district. Based on the said notification issued by the High
Court, the order has been passed by the learned Magistrate.
Hence, this is not a case of lack of jurisdiction, and the order
passed by the learned Magistrate cannot be said to be without
authority of law.
19. Even one more aspect requires consideration. In the
present case, respondent No.2 cannot be said to be at fault. He
has filed the litigation before the proper jurisdictional Court, and
the Court has passed the order. Merely because the concerned
Court mentioned the designation as "Civil Judge" is an error
attributable to the Court itself, for which respondent No.2
cannot be made responsible. The legal maxim "Actus Curiae
Neminem Gravabit" which means that an act of the Court shall
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prejudice no man, or that neither party should suffer due to the
delay or mistake of the Court fully applies to the facts of this
case. The Legislature could never have intended that an error on
the part of the Court in mentioning the designation would render
the order without jurisdiction or prejudice the rights of the
parties. It is also a settled principle that procedural lapses
should not defeat substantive justice. Non-compliance with
procedural requirements relating to pleadings, memoranda of
appeal, or applications for substitution or other reliefs should
not entail automatic dismissal or rejection unless the relevant
statute expressly mandates so. Procedural defects or
irregularities which are curable should not be allowed to defeat
substantive rights or cause injustice. Procedure is meant to be a
handmaiden of justice and should never be converted into a tool
for denying justice or perpetuating injustice by an oppressive or
punitive application. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed
that "to perpetuate an error is no heroism; to rectify it is the
compulsion of judicial conscience." (See: Mayuram v. CBI, (2006)
5 SCC 752, para 11). It has further been held that once the
Court concludes that a wrong order has been passed, it is the
solemn duty of the Court to rectify its mistake rather than
perpetuate the same (See: State of Orissa v. Mamata Mohanty,
(2011) 3 SCC 436). It is equally well settled that no person
should suffer on account of the inaction or fault of the Court.
(See: Jang Singh v. Brij Lal, AIR 1966 SC 1631).
20. Hence, the procedural lapse of inadvertently mentioning
the designation as "Civil Judge" is required to be ignored. As per
the settled principles of law, if the violation of any procedural
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requirement or a procedural mistake does not cause prejudice to
any party, the same is to be treated as directory, even if the
statute uses the word "shall." In this regard, reference may be
made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Shivjee
Singh v. Nagendra Tiwary, AIR 2010 SC 2261.
21. In view of the above, merely mentioning the wrong
designation in the order does not invalidate the order, as the
same Court had the requisite power. It is settled law that when
the authority is vested with power, the exercise of such power
under a wrong designation will not render the order illegal. In
the present case, the action taken by the authority is within its
jurisdiction and cannot be invalidated merely on account of an
incorrect designation being mentioned. If the authority has
jurisdiction to take a particular action or pass an order, then an
incorrect reference to a provision or omission of the correct
designation does not render the action without jurisdiction,
unless the authority itself lacks jurisdiction over the matter. As
discussed earlier, the learned Magistrate had the power to pass
an order under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, and therefore,
the argument canvassed by the learned advocate for the
petitioner is not acceptable. The exercise of power under Section
14 of the SARFAESI Act is administrative and quasi-judicial in
nature, and the interpretation thereof must be guided by the
purpose and object of the legislation.
22. Now, one more aspect is required to be considered.
Respondent No.2 has neither challenged the order nor
approached the Court for correction of the designation. It is
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needless to say that if any error is brought to the notice of the
Court, then to perpetuate an error is no heroism. Whether by
way of challenge or even without formally setting aside the order,
the Court has the inherent power to rectify such defects, and
there is no bar to correct defective orders even in the absence of
a challenge thereto. In this regard, reference may be made to Om
Prakash Gupta v. Satish Chandra, AIR 2025 SC 1201, and
Minu Kumari v. State of Bihar, (2006) 4 SCC 359, wherein
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that:
"The Section does not confer any new power on the High
Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court
possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages
three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction
may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under
the Code, (i) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii)
to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible
nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would
govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative
enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases
that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent
powers apart from express provisions of law which are
necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties
imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds
expression in the section which merely recognizes and
preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts,
whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any
express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such
powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong
in course of administration of justice on the principle "quando
lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res
ipsae esse non potest" (when the law gives a person anything
it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While
exercising powers under the section, the court does not
function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction
under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly,
carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is
justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section
itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and
substantial justice for the administration of which alone
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courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of
justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so
as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse.
It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any
action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion
of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to
quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of
it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of
these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice.
23. It is also not mandatory for the Court to issue any writ
or exercise its powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India in cases involving minor procedural
defects. In this regard, reference may be made to Anurag
Bhatnagar v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2025 INSC 895. In
the present case, the minor procedural defect pertains only to
the mention of designation in the order. No substantial
prejudice or irregularity is found in the order, and the
petitioner has failed to demonstrate any prejudice caused to
him on account of this defect.
24. This Court is of the considered view that, though an
alternate remedy is available under Section 17 of the
SARFAESI Act, the petitioner has directly approached this
Court only with a view to thwart the recovery proceedings
initiated by respondent No.2. It is well settled that when an
efficacious alternate remedy is available, the writ petition is
ordinarily not maintainable. In this regard, reference may be
made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in United
Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon & Ors., (2010) 8 SCC
110, wherein it has been categorically held that the High
Courts should not ordinarily entertain a petition under
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Article 226 of the Constitution of India if an effective remedy
is available under the statute. The applicant fails to point out
or show any prejudice cause to him due to mentioning wrong
designation in the order only using the word "Court
Commissioner.
25. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 13.03.2025
passed below Exhibit-1 in Criminal Misc. Application No.
4251 of 2025 (Annexure-A), along with the subsequent order
passed pursuant thereto, does not suffer from any
jurisdictional error so as to warrant interference. The petition
is, therefore, dismissed.
(HASMUKH D. SUTHAR,J)
ALI
