Gujarat High Court

Kutchh District Panchayat vs Anwarsha Maheboob Saiyed on 22 September, 2025

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                                  IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

                       R/CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY) NO. 2083 of
                                                  2024

                                             In F/SECOND APPEAL NO. 11279 of 2024

                     ==========================================================
                                                KUTCHH DISTRICT PANCHAYAT
                                                               Versus
                                             ANWARSHA MAHEBOOB SAIYED & ORS.
                     ==========================================================
                     Appearance:
                     MR PREMAL R JOSHI(1327) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
                     MR KEYUR A VYAS(3247) for the Respondent(s) No. 1
                     MR.HASMUKH S SOLANKI(6778) for the Respondent(s) No. 1
                     RC JANI & ASSOCIATE(6436) for the Respondent(s) No. 2
                     RULE SERVED for the Respondent(s) No. 3,4
                     ==========================================================

                       CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT

                                                        Date : 22/09/2025

                                                          ORAL ORDER

1. Rule returnable forthwith. Learned Advocate Mr. Keyur A.

Vyas waives service of notice on behalf of opponent-

respondent No. 1 and learned Advocate Mr. R. C. Jani waives

service of notice on behalf of opponent - respondent No. 2.

Though served, none appears for opponents - respondent Nos.

3 and 4.

2. With the consent of the learned Advocates appearing for the

respective parties, the matter is taken up for hearing.

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3. Heard learned Advocate Mr. Premal R. Joshi for the applicant,

learned Advocate Mr. Keyur A. Vyas for the opponent No.1

and learned Advocate Mr. R. C. Jani for the opponent No.2.

4. The present application is filed under Section-5 of the

Limitation Act, seeking condonation of a delay of 1357 days in

filing the Second Appeal, which filed at the instance of original

defendant No. 1, who was respondent No. 2 of the Regular

Civil Appeal.

5. As far as possible, the parties will be referred to as per their

original position before the Trial Court/Appellate Court.

THE SHORT FACTS OF THE CASE:

6. It appears from the record that opponent-respondent No. 1

herein happens to be the original plaintiff of Regular Civil Suit

No.384 of 2006, filed against the present applicant as well as

opponents-respondent Nos. 2 to 4 herein, who were original

defendant Nos. 2 to 4. After hearing the parties, the trial Court

decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff vide its judgment and

order dated 24th March 2008, whereby it decreed the suit

against the present applicant, and further directed defendant

Nos. 2 to 4 to grant benefits relating to pension, gratuity, and

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revised salary from 13th November 1985, along with 9%

interest. The suit against applicant was dismissed.

7. The defendant Nos. 2 to 4 appears to have preferred Regular

Civil Appeal No. 46 of 2008, which came to be dismissed by the

7th Additional District Judge, Bhuj at Kutch, on 25th April

2018. While dismissing the appeal, it directed appellants-

defendant Nos. 2 to 3, as well as respondent No. 2 (defendant

No.1 - applicant herein) to pay the amount as per the decree

passed by the Trial Court. It requires to be noted here that as

per the decree passed by the Trial Court, defendant No.1-

applicant herein, was not required to pay any amount.

8. None of the defendants have complied with the judgment and

decree passed by the Trial Court, the plaintiff appears to have

filed Execution Application No. 28 of 2023 before the Court

concerned, wherein, notice came to be issued and later on,

attachment warrant of immovable property of the applicant

herein was ordered by the Executing Court. The same is

challenged before this Court by way of writ application being

Special Civil Application No. 4088 of 2024, wherein, this Court

vide its order dated 13th March 2024, stayed the order passed

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by the Executing Court on condition to deposit 25% of the

decretal amount before the Trial Court by applicant herein.

9. Thereafter, the applicant thought it fit to challenge the

judgment and decree dated 25th April 2018 passed by the

Appellate Court by way of Second Appeal, which was filed

only on 4th April 2024, wherein, there is a delay of around

1357 days in filing such Second Appeal. Hence, present delay

application.

10. SUBMISSIONS OF APPLICANT-DEFENDANT NO. 1:

10.1 Learned Advocate Mr. Premal R. Joshi would submit that the

applicant was bona fide pursuing legal remedies, and upon

came to know about the execution proceedings filed against the

applicant by the decree holder, the present Second Appeal has

been filed on getting advice, challenging the judgment and

decree passed by the Appellate Court, whereby, the applicant is

also required to pay the amount to the plaintiff.

10.2 Learned Advocate Mr. Joshi would further submit that as

such, there is no negligence or mala fide intention on the part

of the applicant not to file the appeal, but due to reasons set

out in the application and so also the fact that decree was also

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against original defendant Nos. 2 to 4-appellant of the appeal,

who in fact are required to pay the amount under decree,

having not paid, thereafter, entire burden shifted upon

applicant. So, when filed Second Appeal, there was some delay

on the part of the applicant in its filing, which may be

condoned in the interest of justice.

10.3 Learned Advocate Mr. Joshi would further submit that if this

Court will not accept the explanation as a sufficient cause on

the part of the applicant and not condoned the delay, it caused

great injustice to the applicant, inasmuch as under law, it is not

required to pay any monetary benefit to the applicant. It is

submitted that once the Trial Court not decreed the suit against

applicant-defendant No.1, which was not questioned by the

plaintiff, at the instance of defendant Nos. 2 to 4, defendant

No. 1 - applicant herein, could not have been liable to pay,

which was not in fact the prayer made in the appeal.

10.4 Learned Advocate Mr. Joshi would further submit that when

there is a good case on merit, this Court should exercise its

discretion in favor of the applicant, thereby, can condone the

delay or imposing any condition including costs, which can

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compensate the other side, thereby, this Court can examine the

Second Appeal on its merits.

10.5 To buttress his arguments, learned Advocate Mr. Joshi would

rely upon the following three judgments:

(i) Sheo Raj Singh (Deceased) Through Legal Representatives and others V/s. Union of India and another reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531;

(ii) Binod Pathak and others V/s. Shankar Choudhary and others reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1411;

(iii) Om Prakash Gupta V/s. Satish Chandra reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 291.

10.6 Making the above submissions, learned Advocate Mr. Joshi

would request this Court to allow the present application.

11. SUBMISSIONS OF OPPONENT NOS. 2 TO 4-ORIGINAL

APPELLANTS/DEFENDANT NOS. 2 TO 4:

11.1 Learned Advocate Mr. R. C. Jani, appearing for opponent

Nos. 2 to 4, would as such adopt the arguments so canvassed

by learned Advocate Mr. Joshi, as according to learned

Advocate Mr. Jani, the impugned judgment and decree passed

by the Appellate Court is without jurisdiction. According to

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him, the plaintiff had an alternative efficacious remedy to file

an appropriate application before the Service Tribunal, which

was constituted under the Gujarat Civil Services Tribunal Act,

1972 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act, 1972") . It is

submitted that as per Section 16 of the Act, 1972, there was an

express bar on the Civil Court to exercise its jurisdiction to

entertain the dispute as arising between the parties in the

present case. According to learned Advocate Mr. Jani,

impugned judgement/decree is nullity.

11.2 So, making the above submissions, learned Advocate Mr. Jani

would request this Court to condone the delay and decide the

appeal on its merits.

12. SUBMISSION OF OPPONENT NO. 1-PLAINTIFF:

12.1 Per contra, learned Advocate Mr. Keyur A. Vyas, appearing

for opponent No.1, has vehemently opposed the delay

condonation application preferred by applicant-defendant

No.1. It is submitted that applicant has failed to establish any

sufficient cause for such inordinate long delay. It is further

submitted that there is complete carelessness, negligence,

indolent approach and intentional delay on the part of

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applicant in filing the Second Appeal, which should not be

causally condoned by this Court, while exercising its discretion

in favor of the applicant.

12.2 Learned Advocate Mr. Vyas would further submit that there is

no explanation coming forth in the delay application, inasmuch

as the applicant is unable to explain the delay of around 1357

days in filing the Second Appeal. It is submitted that when

there is no sufficient cause made out, this Court should not

condone the delay merely because it is filed by the Panchayat,

who is one of the arm of the State. It is settled law that callous

attitude of State in filing proceeding in Court of Law, should

not be casually condoned by the Court.

12.3 Learned Advocate Mr. Vyas would further submit that it is not

even the case of the applicant that he was not aware about

judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Court in the year

2018. As such, when having full knowledge of the effect of the

decree passed by the Appellate Court, nothing prevented

applicant to file Second Appeal in time, thereby, the rights of

the parties could have been decided at the earliest. It is

respectfully submitted that due to the delay on the part of the

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applicant, the plaintiff-decree holder till date deprived of the

benefit of the money decree passed by the competent court,

inasmuch as no amount has been disbursed till date in favor of

the plaintiff.

12.4 To buttress his arguments, learned Advocate Mr. Vyas would

rely upon the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of

State of Madhya Pradesh V/s. Ramkumar Choudhary reported

in 2024 (0) AIJEL-SC 74355.

12.5 So, making the above submissions, learned Advocate Mr. Vyas

would request this Court not to condone the delay and reject

the application.

13. No other and further submissions are made.

ANALYSIS

14. Having heard learned Advocates appearing for the respective

parties, following facts emerge from the record.

15. The suit came to be filed against the applicant and respondent

Nos. 2 to 4 herein, which was partially decreed in favor of the

plaintiff i.e. decreed the suit only against defendant Nos. 2 to 4,

thereby they were directed to grant monetary benefits relating

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to pension, gratuity and revised salary from 13th November

1985, along with 9% interest. The plaintiff never questioned

such judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court, but

appeal came to be filed at the instance of original defendant

Nos. 2 to 4 being Regular Civil Appeal No. 46 of 2008.

16. After hearing the parties, the Appellate Court vide judgment

and decree dated 25th April 2018, dismissed the appeal.

Nonetheless, it has been held that applicant-defendant No. 1

also liable to pay monetary benefits to be paid to the plaintiff

along with defendant Nos. 2 to 4. It remains undisputed that

defendant Nos. 2 to 4 never filed any second appeal, having not

challenged the decree passed by the Appellate Court becomes

file qua them.

17. Thus, the decree passed by the Trial Court merges in the decree

passed by the Appellate Court. That be so, the applicant herein

is required to pay monetary benefit as per the decree passed by

the Appellate Court.

18. The execution application appears to have been filed in the year

2023, wherein, order of attachment of immovable property was

passed against defendant No. 1. Although, it was carried before

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this Court and aforesaid writ application is still pending for its

final adjudication.

19. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the decree passed in the

year 2018 was well within the knowledge of the applicant

herein, thereby, it could have preferred the appeal in time

and/or within reasonable time. A bare reading of the impugned

delay application, applicant unable to explain as to why the

applicant did not file a Second Appeal between the years 2018

till 2024. No satisfactory explanation has been provided by the

applicant for the inordinate delay of 1,357 days in filing the

second appeal.

20. The conduct of the applicant would surely constitute gross

negligence, inordinate delay and indolent behaviour on its part,

having not questioned the judgment and decree passed by the

Appellate Court, against which the Second Appeal is preferred

after about 6 years. If the applicant was really aggrieved by any

judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Court in the year

2018, it could have challenged it within reasonable time. In the

absence of any explanation coming forth, as observed herein

above, it would not be appreciated and not accepted the

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submissions so made by learned Advocate Mr. Joshi in support

of his arguments, inasmuch as when sufficient cause is not

made out by the applicant, this Court should not exercise its

discretion in favor of the applicant.

21. The judgments which are cited by learned Advocate Mr. Joshi

as such would not be applicable to the facts of the present case,

inasmuch as in the case of Sheo Raj Singh (supra), the

Honorable Apex Court was dealing with the appeal, wherein,

the High Court has condoned the delay, having found

sufficient cause. Even, it is so observed that once discretion so

used by High Court placed reliance upon the decisions so

prevailed at time of its decision holding field, as an appellate

Court, it should not disturb such discretionary order. What is

deduced and discernible, clear by reading paragraph 33 & 34 of

said decision, observed thus:

"33. Be that as it may, it is important to bear in mind that we are not hearing an application for condonation of delay but sitting in appeal over a discretionary order of the High Court granting the prayer for condonation of delay. In the case of the former, whether to condone or not would be the only question whereas in the latter, whether there has been proper exercise of discretion in favour of grant of the prayer for condonation would be the

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question. Law is fairly well-settled that "a court of appeal should not ordinarily interfere with the discretion exercised by the courts below". If any authority is required, we can profitably refer to the decision in Manjunath Anandappa v. Tammanasa [Manjunath Anandappa v. Tammanasa, (2003) 10 SCC 390] , which in turn relied on the decision in Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha [Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha, (1980) 2 SCC 593 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 197] where it has been held that:

"an appellate power interferes not when the order appealed is not right but only when it is clearly wrong".

34. The order under challenge in this appeal is dated 21-12-2011 [Union of India v. Sheo Raj, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 5511]. It was rendered at a point of time when the decisions in Katiji [Collector (LA) v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107] , Ramegowda [G. Ramegowda v. LAO, (1988) 2 SCC 142] , Chandra Mani [State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani, (1996) 3 SCC 132] , K.V. Ayisumma [Tehsildar (LA) v. K.V. Ayisumma, (1996) 10 SCC 634] and Lipok AO [State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao, (2005) 3 SCC 752 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 906] were holding the field. It is not that the said decisions do not hold the field now, having been overruled by any subsequent decision. Although there have been some decisions in the recent past [State of M.P. v. Bherulal [State of M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654 : (2021) 1 SCC (Civ) 101 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 117 :

(2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 84] is one such decision apart from University of Delhi [University of Delhi v. Union of India, (2020) 13 SCC 745] ] which have not accepted governmental lethargy,

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tardiness and indolence in presenting appeals within time as sufficient cause for condonation of delay, yet, the exercise of discretion by the High Court has to be tested on the anvil of the liberal and justice oriented approach expounded in the aforesaid decisions which have been referred to above."

(emphasis supplied)

22. Likewise, in the case of Binod Pathak (supra) and Om Prakash

Gupta (supra), both these decisions would not be helpful

inasmuch as, it would not be applicable to the facts of the

present case. It was arising out of delay application appears to

have been filed under Order 22 CPC proceedings, which stands

on different footing than any delay application filed in regular

appeal, which is a case on hand. It is true that every delay

application filed in any proceedings must be decided in

accordance with Section 5 of the Limitation Act and on

touchstone of premise as to whether sufficient cause made out

by applicant or not. However, the criteria laid down by the

Honorable Apex Court for deciding delay applications in

different sets of proceedings would stand on a different footing

and require different approach. There would not be any

straightjacket formula, in deciding any delay application. It

always depends upon facts and circumstances of each case.

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23. It is a well-settled legal position of law, as held by The

Honorable Apex Court, in the case of Sardar Amarjit Singh

Kalra v. Pramod Gupta reported in (2003) 3 SCC 272 , wherein

held that the procedure envisaged under Order 22 of the CPC is

not penal in nature and ordinarily, the Court should lean in

favor of granting delay on part of an applicant who prefers

such an application, thereby it would be any delay in bringing

legal heirs on record. Whereas, in a case like the present one,

where a competent court has passed a judgment and decree, the

rights of the parties stand crystallized by virtue of such decree.

If, without any valid reason, the opposite party fails to

challenge the decree after a prolonged period, the rights of the

decree-holder become frustrated only due to the inaction of the

opposite party. In such a situation, the Court should not

exercise its discretion in favor of an applicant who has

remained negligent, indolent, and inactive for years without

any justification.

24. Thus, according to my view, none of the judgments so cited by

learned Advocate Mr. Joshi would either assist his submissions

and helpful to the case of the applicant.

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25. So far as, the decision cited by learned Advocate Mr. Vyas in

the case of Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), wherein, the

Honorable Apex Court categorically held thus:

"6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside the delay occurred in preferring the second appeal, due to callous and lackadaisical attitude on the part of the officials functioning in the State machinery. Though the Government adopts systematic approach in handling the legal issues and preferring the petitions/applications/appeals well within the time, due to the fault on the part of the officials in merely communicating the information on time, huge revenue loss will be caused to the Government exchequer. The present case is one such case, wherein, enormous delay of 1788 days occasioned in preferring the second appeal due to the lapses on the part of the officials functioning under the State, though valuable Government lands were involved. Therefore, we direct the State to streamline the machinery touching the legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases before the Tribunal/Courts, etc., fix the responsibility on the officer(s) concerned, and penalize the officer(s), who is/are responsible for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value of the loss caused to the Government. Such direction will have to be followed by all the States scrupulously.

7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we have noticed that whenever there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained right from

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the time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the same. For example if the period of limitation is 90 days then the party seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings within that period of limitation. What events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence. The court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. (See : Ajit Singh Thakur Singh v. State of Gujarat, (1981) 1 SCC 495 : AIR 1981 SC 733).

(emphasis supplied)

26. As such, the ratio of the aforesaid decision would squarely

applies to the facts of the present case, inasmuch as it was a

case where State instrumentality, having found callous and

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lackadaisical attitude on the part of the officials functioning in

the State machinery, delay was occurred, the delay was not

condoned by the High Court, which was also confirmed by the

Honorable Apex Court, rather it was dismissed with the heavy

costs of Rs.1,00,000/-.

27. At this stage, the following few other decisions of the

Honorable Apex Court would also clarify the issue germane in

the present case, inasmuch as when it held that once found that

there is any gross negligence, dilatory tactics, inordinate delay

and the applicant remained indolent for years together, even

though there is sufficient cause made out, the Court should not

condone such delay on the part of such an applicant, even by

imposing any condition.

28. It is apt to rely first relied upon the decision of Honourable

Supreme Court of India in a case of Rajneesh Kumar & Anr V/S

Ved Prakash reported in 2024 (14) SCALE 406 wherein held as

under,

"[10] It appears that the entire blame has been thrown on the head of the advocate who was appearing for the petitioners in the trial Court. We have noticed over a period of time a tendency on the part of the litigants to blame their lawyers of negligence and carelessness in

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attending the proceedings before the Court. Even if we assume for a moment that the concerned lawyer was careless or negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground to condone long and inordinate delay as the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending in the Court initiated at his instance. The litigant, therefore, should not be permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the advocate and thereby disown him at any time and seek relief.

[12] As regards the law of limitation, we may refer to the decision of this Court in Bharat Barrel & Drum MFG Go. v. The Employees State Insurance Corporation, 1971 2 SCC 860, wherein this Court held as under:-

"The necessity for enacting periods of limitation is to ensure that actions are commenced within a particular period, firstly to assure the availability of evidence documentary as well as oral to enable the defendant to contest the claim against him; secondly to give effect to the principle that law does not assist a person who is inactive and sleeps over his rights by allowing them when challenged or disputed to remain dormant without asserting them in a Court of law. The principle which forms the basis of this rule is expressed in the maximum vigilantibus, non dermientibus, jura subveniunt (the laws give help to those who are watchful and not to those who sleep). Therefore, the object of the statutes of limitations is to compel a person to exercise his right of action within a reasonable time as also to

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discourage and suppress stale, fake or fraudulent claims."

(Emphasis supplied)

29. It is apposite to refer to and rely upon a recent decision of the

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of K.B. Lal

(Krishna Bahadur Lal) v. Gyanendra Pratap & Ors., reported in

2024 (4) Scale 759, wherein, after revisiting the law on the

aspect of condonation of delay, the Hon'ble Apex Court has

held as under:

"10. There is no gainsaying the fact that the discretionary power of a Court to condone delay must be exercised judiciously and it is not to be exercised in cases where there is gross negligence and/or want of due diligence on part of the litigant (See Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao v. Reddy Sridevi & Ors. (2021) 18 SCC 384). The discretion is also not supposed to be exercised in the absence of any reasonable, satisfactory or appropriate explanation for the delay (See P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and Anr., (1997) 7 SCC 556). Thus, it is apparent that the words 'sufficient cause' in Section 5 of the Limitation Act can only be given a liberal construction, when no negligence, nor inaction, nor want of bona fide is imputable to the litigant (See Basawaraj and Anr. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer., (2013) 14 SCC 81). The principles which are to be kept in mind for condonation of delay were succinctly summarised by this Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing

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Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors., (2013) 12 SCC 649, and are reproduced as under:

"21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the Courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

21.2. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause"

should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation.

21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.

21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.

21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.

21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the Courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.

21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal

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approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.

21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.

21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the Courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.

21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted, or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the Courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation."

(Emphasis supplied)

30. It is also profitable to refer to and rely upon ratio laid down by

recent past decision of Honourable Supreme Court of India in

a case of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) BY L RS & ORS V/S

Special Deputy Collector (LA) reported in 2024 INSC 286 : 2024

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(4) SCR 241 : 2024 (4) Scale 846, wherein after referring to its

previous decisions, summarized the case law on the issue of

limitation vis-a-vis condonation of delay in context of

"sufficient cause". It has been so observed and held as under,

"[26] On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:

(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;

(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;

(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;

(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;

(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where

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there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;

(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the Court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;

(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and

(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision."

(Emphasis supplied)

31. It is also profitable to rely upon the decision of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court of India in the case of case of Basawaraj and

Another v. Special Land Acquisition Officer reported in 2013

(14) SCC 81 wherein it is held as under:-

"15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the Court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a

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justified ground to condone the delay. No Court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the Court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."

(Emphasis supplied)

32. Even, recently also, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of

Shivamma (DEAD) By Lrs Vs. Karnataka Housing Board &

Ors. reported In 2025 INSC 1104, in clear terms held that

where there is delay/laches on the part of the applicant in not

prosecuting the legal remedy, in the absence of any sufficient

cause made out by the applicant, the Court should not condone

the delay while exercising its power under Section 5 of the

Limitation Act, 1963. In the case of Shivamma (Supra), the

Hon'ble Supreme Court has held thus:-

"258. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the Court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the respondents, it appears that they want to fix their own period of

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limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, it cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the Court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The Court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the Court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay."

(emphasis supplied)

32.1 Thus, in view of aforesaid, it is clearly held that Court should

not first looks at merit of the matter, when decides/adjudicate

delay application. When the explanation is not found

satisfactory and bonafide, such delay application deserves

rejection irrespective of good case on merit. When, such would

be position of law stand as on date, this Court having not

found any satisfactory explanation while bare reading of delay

application and so also, not found any sufficient cause made

out by applicant, it has no other option left but to reject the

delay application.

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