Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 6717 Guj
Judgement Date : 18 September, 2025
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IN THE HIGH Court OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13064 of 2025
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GUJARAT URJA VIKAS NIGAM LTD.
Versus
MANISHABEN RAMJIBHAI CHAUHAN & ORS.
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Appearance:
MR DIPAK R DAVE(1232) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT
Date : 18/09/2025
ORAL ORDER
1. Heard learned advocate Mr.Dipak R. Dave for the
petitioner.
2. The present writ application has been filed under Article
227 of the Constitution of India seeking following relief:-
"(A) This Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to quash and set aside the impugned order dated 05.04.2025 passed by learned Principal District Judge, Botad in Civil Misc. Application No.9 of 2025 at Annexure-A to the petition and further may be pleased allow the to delay condonation application of the petitioner and may be pleased to direct the learned District Judge to hear the main appeal on merits;
(B) Pending the admission hearing and final disposal of this petition, this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to stay the execution, implementation and operation of judgment and order dated 30.12.2023 passed by learned Principal Civil Judge, Gadhada in Regular Civil Suit No.286 of 2021 at Annexure-B to the petition;
(C) Pending the admission hearing and final disposal of this petition, this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to stay the further proceedings of Regular Civil Application No.50 of 2025 pending before learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Gadhada;
(D) Any other and further relief reliefs to or which this Hon'ble Court deemed fit, in the interest of justice; may kindly be granted;"
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3. The petitioner happens to be original defendant, whereas
respondents herein are original plaintiff of the Regular Civil
Suit No. 286 of 2021 decreed against the petitioner, whereby,
the Trial Court directed the petitioner to pay compensation of
Rs.9,00,000/- + Rs.1,00,000/- towards mental agony,
consortium and costs with 6% interest from 03.07.2015 till its
realization.
3.1. The suit appears to have been filed on principle of tort
questioning the tortious liability of the petitioner herein,
whereby, the husband of respondent No.1 and the son of the
respective respondents, respectively, who lost his life due to an
electrocution.
3.2. The said judgment and decree were passed by the trial
Court on 30.12.2023. The petitioner appears to have challenged
such judgment and decree before the Appellate Court
concerned on 04.03.2025, wherein there was a delay of 399
days in filing the appeal.
3.3. After hearing the parties, the Appellate Court did not
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condone the delay on the part of the petitioner in filing such
appeal, thereby rejecting Civil Miscellaneous Application No.9
of 2025 vide its order dated 05.04.2025, which is impugned in
the present application.
4. Learned advocate Mr. Dave would submit that the
Appellate Court has taken a very hyper-technical approach in
not condoning the delay of 399 days in filing the appeal. It is
submitted that a liberal approach is required to be taken by
the Appellate Court while adjudicating the delay application.
4.1. Learned advocate Mr. Dave would submit that the
petitioner is an electricity company - State public undertaking,
and it was required to obtain necessary approval before filing
any appeal before the District Court in the matter, which took
some time, resulting into delay in filing the appeal. It is
submitted that whenever such a cause is pressed into service,
as per settled legal positions of law, the Court is required to
condone the delay by imposing costs.
4.2. Learned advocate Mr. Dave would submit that
although, no date and particulars about moving the file have
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been mentioned in the delay application but it is so stated in
paragraphs 3.3 and 3.4 of the present application, whereby this
Court can consider such fact and may condone the delay in
the interest of justice.
4.3. Lastly, learned advocate Mr. Dave would request this
Court that by imposing costs also, this Court may condone the
delay in filing the appeal.
4.4. To buttress his argument, learned advocate Mr. Dave
would rely upon the decision of the Honorable Supreme Court
in the case of Sheo Raj Singh (Deceased) Through Lrs and Ors
vs. Union of India and Anr. reported in 2023 (10) SCC 531.
5. The facts, which are noted hereinabove, are not in
dispute. While appreciating the submissions so canvassed by
learned advocate Mr. Dave, when this Court has gone through
the impugned delay application, it appears that the petitioner
has filed such an application in very casual manner under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, inasmuch as no particulars
about the cause of delay stated in the application.
6. It only whispered that, being the Gujarat State
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Undertaking and to get appropriate permissions / sanction from
the head office, there was delay occurred in filing the appeal.
This would be the case, and as such, there is no sufficient
cause made out in the application.
7. The Appellate Court, while passing the impugned order,
took into account the aforementioned fact whereby it correctly
observed that the applicant-petitioner herein has not stated
when a certified copy of the judgment and decree, with an
opinion of its learned advocate to file an appeal, was
forwarded to the concerned authority and on which date, such
opinion was received by such authority. Further, process at the
end of higher authority was also disclosed in the application.
8. In the absence of any such details provided to the
Appellate Court and having not found any sufficient cause,
despite observing that a liberal approach is required to be
considered by the Court, it rejected the application.
9. As such, I cannot and should not find any fault with the
view taken by the Appellate Court, inasmuch as after perusing
the impugned delay application, I am also fully satisfied that it
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is bereft of any particulars, and as such, there is no sufficient
cause made out by the petitioner.
10. Nonetheless, learned advocate Mr. Dave having appraised
this Court about the fact that though before the Appellate
Court, dates and particulars about getting sanction from the
higher authority were not provided but the same is provided in
paragraphs 3.3 and 3.4 of the present application.
11. At the first instance, this Court, while exercising its
power under Article 227 of the Constitution, should not allow
a party to add anything new, which would not germane in the
impugned application but considering the fact that it is a delay
application, which was not entertained by the Court on the
ground of not supplying proper explanations, dates, and
particulars, taking a liberal view on the issue therein, I have
gone through the averments made in paragraphs 3.3 and 3.4 of
the present application.
12. Even after going through the averments made in
paragraphs 3.3 and 3.4 of the present application, it is very
much clear that sanction was given by the competent authority
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to file an appeal on 28.06.2024. Thereafter, there was a
transfer of the Deputy Engineer serving in the office from
where the appeal was to be filed, but it further cleared that
from 16.12.2024, there was no such transfer. The appeal only
came to be filed on 04.03.2025, and as such, there is no
explanation between the period from 16.12.2024, till
04.03.2025, on record.
13. According to my view, once the sanction has been
obtained from the competent authority, there was no reason
for the subordinate office and/or any Deputy Engineer to hold
back the file and not move towards filing the appeal. It shows
that there are serious lapses on the part of the officials of the
petitioner in pursuing the legal remedy available to it.
14. It is true that the petitioner, being State undertaking, is
required to take appropriate sanctions/permissions from the
competent authority before proceeding further in the matter,
but at the same time, such an attitude can be observed in a
case where, after obtaining such sanction/permission from the
competent authority, the petitioner must act bonafidely,
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diligently and without wasting further time, requires to
institute legal proceedings, which is apparently lacking in the
present case.
15. The case cited by learned advocate Mr. Dave in support
of his submission i.e., Sheo Raj Singh (Supra), it was the case
where the delay was condoned by the Court, and it was
challenged by the aggrieved party before the Hon'ble Supreme
Court, wherein, in clear terms, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
observed that when there is a delay condoned by the Court
concerned, there would be a presumption that there was a
sufficient cause made out, and such discretion observed in
favor of the applicant by the Court concerned should not be
interfered with by the Higher Court. It would be apposite to
refer to the following passage from the said decision, which is
as under:-
"33. Be that as it may, it is important to bear in mind that we are not hearing an application for condonation of delay but sitting in appeal over a discretionary order of the High Court granting the prayer for condonation of delay. In the case of the former, whether to condone or not would be the only question whereas in the latter, whether there has been proper exercise of discretion in favour of grant of the prayer for condonation would be the question. Law is fairly well- settled that "a Court of appeal should not ordinarily
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interfere with the discretion exercised by the Courts below". If any authority is required, we can profitably refer to the decision in Manjunath Anandappa v. Tammanasa, 2003 10 SCC 390. which in turn relied on the decision in Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha, 1980 2 SCC
593. where it has been held that "an appellate power interferes not when the order appealed is not right but only when it is clearly wrong".
41. Having bestowed serious consideration to the rival contentions, we feel that the High Court's decision to condone the delay on account of the first respondent's inability to present the appeal within time, for the reasons assigned therein, does not suffer from any error warranting interference. As the aforementioned judgments have shown, such an exercise of discretion does, at times, call for a liberal and justice-oriented approach by the Courts, where certain leeway could be provided to the State. The hidden forces that are at work in preventing an appeal by the State being presented within the prescribed period of limitation so as not to allow a higher Court to pronounce upon the legality and validity of an order of a lower Court and thereby secure unholy gains, can hardly be ignored. Impediments in the working of the grand scheme of governmental functions have to be removed by taking a pragmatic view on balancing of the competing interests."
(emphasis supplied)
15.1. So, according to me, this cited decision would not be
applicable to the facts of the present case as neither the
Appellate Court nor this Court found that any sufficient cause
made out by the petitioner in its delay application.
16. At this stage, the following decisions are required to be
taken note of by this Court, wherein in clear terms, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down the law that in a case
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where there is gross negligence, dilatory tactics, malafide
intention, or delay/laches on the part of the litigant in
pursuing legal remedy, such act of the litigant would not
constitute sufficient cause and should not be liberally
construed. In that view of the matter, the Court should not
condone the delay.
16.1. It is apt to rely upon the decision of Honourable
Supreme Court of India in a case of Rajneesh Kumar & Anr V/
S Ved Prakash reported in 2024 (14) SCALE 406 wherein held
as under,
"[10] It appears that the entire blame has been thrown on the head of the advocate who was appearing for the petitioners in the trial Court. We have noticed over a period of time a tendency on the part of the litigants to blame their lawyers of negligence and carelessness in attending the proceedings before the Court. Even if we assume for a moment that the concerned lawyer was careless or negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground to condone long and inordinate delay as the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending in the Court initiated at his instance. The litigant, therefore, should not be permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the advocate and thereby disown him at any time and seek relief.
[12] As regards the law of limitation, we may refer to the decision of this Court in Bharat Barrel & Drum MFG Go. v. The Employees State Insurance Corporation, 1971 2 SCC 860, wherein this Court held as under:-
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"The necessity for enacting periods of limitation is to ensure that actions are commenced within a particular period, firstly to assure the availability of evidence documentary as well as oral to enable the defendant to contest the claim against him; secondly to give effect to the principle that law does not assist a person who is inactive and sleeps over his rights by allowing them when challenged or disputed to remain dormant without asserting them in a Court of law. The principle which forms the basis of this rule is expressed in the maximum vigilantibus, non dermientibus, jura subveniunt (the laws give help to those who are watchful and not to those who sleep). Therefore, the object of the statutes of limitations is to compel a person to exercise his right of action within a reasonable time as also to discourage and suppress stale, fake or fraudulent claims."
(Emphasis supplied) 16.2. It is apposite to refer to and rely upon a recent
decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of
K.B. Lal (Krishna Bahadur Lal) v. Gyanendra Pratap & Ors.,
reported in 2024 (4) Scale 759, wherein, after revisiting the
law on the aspect of condonation of delay, the Hon'ble Apex
Court has held as under:
"10. There is no gainsaying the fact that the discretionary power of a Court to condone delay must be exercised judiciously and it is not to be exercised in cases where there is gross negligence and/or want of due diligence on part of the litigant (See Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao v. Reddy Sridevi & Ors. (2021) 18 SCC 384). The discretion is also not supposed to be exercised in the absence of any reasonable, satisfactory or appropriate explanation for the delay (See P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and Anr., (1997) 7 SCC 556). Thus, it is
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apparent that the words 'sufficient cause' in Section 5 of the Limitation Act can only be given a liberal construction, when no negligence, nor inaction, nor want of bona fide is imputable to the litigant (See Basawaraj and Anr. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer., (2013) 14 SCC 81). The principles which are to be kept in mind for condonation of delay were succinctly summarised by this Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors., (2013) 12 SCC 649, and are reproduced as under:
"21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice- oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the Courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. 21.2. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause"
should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. 21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.
21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.
21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the Courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or
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few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.
21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the Courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted, or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the Courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation."
(Emphasis supplied)
16.3. Last but not least, it is also profitable to refer to and
rely upon ratio laid down by recent past decision of
Honourable Supreme Court of India in a case of Pathapati
Subba Reddy (Died) BY L RS & ORS V/S Special Deputy
Collector (LA) reported in 2024 INSC 286 : 2024 (4) SCR 241 :
2024 (4) Scale 846 wherein after referring to its previous
decisions, summarized the case law on the issue of limitation
vis-a-vis condonation of delay in context of "sufficient cause".
It has been so observed and held as under,
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"[26] On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the Court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision."
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(Emphasis supplied)
16.4. It is also profitable to rely upon the decision of the
Hon'ble Supeme Court of India in the case of case of
Basawaraj and Another v. Special Land Acquisition Officer
reported in 2013 (14) SCC 81 wherein it is held as under:-
"15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the Court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No Court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the Court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."
(Emphasis supplied)
17. Recently also, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Shivamma (DEAD) By Lrs Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors.
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reported In 2025 INSC 1104 in clear terms has held that where
there is delay/laches on the part of the applicant in not
prosecuting the legal remedy, in the absence of any sufficient
cause made out by the applicant, the Court should not
condone the delay while exercising its power under Section 5
of the Limitation Act, 1963. In the case of Shivamma (Supra),
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held thus:-
"258. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the Court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the respondents, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, it cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the Court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The Court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the Court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay."
(emphasis supplied)
18. In view of the aforesaid discussions and reasons, there is
no case made out by the petitioner to interfere with the well-
reasoned order passed by the Appellate Court while rejecting
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the delay application, especially, when this Court has a very
limited jurisdiction of interference in the order passed by the
Court while exercising its power under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India. [See Sameer Suresh Gupta TR PA Holder
vs. Rahul Kumar Agarwal, reported in (2013) 9 SCC 374 (Para
6 and 7) and Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, reported
in (2022) 4 SCC 181 (Para 15 and 16)].
19. Thus, in view of the foregoing conclusion, the present
application is hereby rejected.
20. The impugned order passed by the Appellate Court is
hereby confirmed. No order as to costs.
(MAULIK J.SHELAT,J) MOHD MONIS
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