Gujarat High Court

Nirupaben Natawarlal Madhu vs Anilbhai Dahyabhai Leua on 18 September, 2025

                                                                                                                    NEUTRAL CITATION




                           C/SCA/13058/2025                                          ORDER DATED: 18/09/2025

                                                                                                                    undefined




                                  IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

                                   R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13058 of 2025

                      ==========================================================
                                              NIRUPABEN NATAWARLAL MADHU
                                                                 Versus
                                              ANILBHAI DAHYABHAI LEUA & ANR.
                      ==========================================================
                      Appearance:
                      party-in-person(5000) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
                      ==========================================================

                        CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT

                                                         Date : 18/09/2025

                                                           ORAL ORDER

1. Heard, Petitioner Ms. Nirupaben Natawarlal Madhu appeared

in as party-in-person, at length.

2. The present writ application is filed under Article 227 of the

Constitution of India, seeking the following reliefs:

"૨૬: સબબ દાદ માંગવાની કે :-

૨૬(૧) : ગાંધીનગરના નામદાર પાંચમા એડી. સીવીલ જજ સાહે બશ્રીની કોર્ટે રે .દી.મુ. નં. ૯૧/૨૦૦૪ ના કામમાં અમો અરજદારે રજૂ કરે લી આંક-૧૯૮ ની અરજી નીચે કરે લ વાદગ્રસ્ત હુકમ તા. ૨૨-૦૮-૨૦૨૫ ને રદ ઠરાવવાનો હુકમ કરવા મે. થશોજી.

૨૬(૨) : અમો અરજદાર મૂળ વાદીની સરતપાસ રે .દી.મુ. નં. ૯૧/૨૦૦૪ ના અસલ રે કર્ડ માં નથી તેવું ઠરાવી આપવાનો હુકમ કરવા મે. થશોજી.

૨૬ (૩) : રે .દી.મુ. નં. ૯૧/૨૦૦૪ ના અસલ રે કર્ડ માં સરતપાસ અને મૌખિક

NEUTRAL CITATION

C/SCA/13058/2025 ORDER DATED: 18/09/2025

undefined

પુરાવાઓ અને લેખિત દસ્તાવેજી પુરાવાઓ અમો અરજદારને રજૂ કરવા દેવાનો હુકમ કરવા મે. થશોજી.

૨૬(૪) : નામદાર કોર્ટે "મુદ્દા ઘડયા" પછી દાવો બોર્ડ ઉપર ચાલવા ઉપર આવ્યો છે તેની જાણ કરતી નોટિસ સામાવાળા નં. ૨ મૂળ પ્રતિવાદી નં. ૨ ને બજાવેલ નથી તેવું ઠરાવી સામાવાળા નં. ૨ મૂળ વાદી નં. ૨ ને નોટિસ બજાવવામાં આવે તેવો હુકમ કરવા મે. થશોજી.

૨૯ (૫) : આ અરજી ચાલે ત્યાં સુધી ગાંધીનગરના નામદાર પાંચમા એડી. સીવીલ જજ સાહે બશ્રીની કોર્ટ , મુ. ગાંધીનગરની કોર્ટ રે .દી.મુ. નં. ૯૧/૨૦૦૪ નું ઈન્સાફી કામ ચલાવે નહીં અને સ્થગિત રાખે તેવો મનાઈ હુકમ આપવા મે. થશોજી.

૨૬ (૬) :ગાંધીનગરની નામદાર લોઅર કોર્ટમાંથી રે .દી. મુ. નં. ૯૧/૨૦૦૪ નું અસલ રે કર્ડ મંગાવવાનો હુકમ કરવા મે. થશોજી."

3. It is very deplorable state of affairs to note here that how

petitioner herein appeared as party-in-person who in fact

happens to be qualified advocate misusing the legal remedy and

concession available to party-in-person as per the Gujarat High

Court Rules, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as "Rules, 1993"),

this would be one of such classic example.

4. As per the Rule 31-A (1) of the Rules, 1993, no party-in-person

can be allowed to appear before this Court as party-in-person

be it petitioner or respondent, without getting competency

certificate from the committee consist of two officers of the

Registry of this Court, who are working on deputation from

the State Judicial Service, to be nominated by the Honourable

NEUTRAL CITATION

C/SCA/13058/2025 ORDER DATED: 18/09/2025

undefined

the Chief Justice. Nonetheless, the aforesaid rule would not

apply to an advocate appearing as party-in-person like

petitioner having Registration of Bar Council, thus, such party

is exempted from obtaining such competency certificate. The

petitioner herein holding degree of Law, appears to have been

issued 'Sanad' having registration/enrolment as an advocate

with Bar Council of Gujarat, exempted to get said competency

certificate.

5. The petitioner claiming herself to be an advocate, but despite

holding a degree of law, appeared as party-in-person before

this Court confessed that she is not at all conversant with the

English language and thereby, she has not filed the present writ

application in English, which is otherwise official language of

this High Court.

6. As per Article 348 of the Constitution of India, all proceeding

in every High Court shall be in the English language. So, as per

Rule 36 of the Rules, 1993, whenever any memoranda of

appeals or Application presented by the Advocate shall be in

the English language. But, as per Rule 37 of the Rules, 1993,

whenever, party-in-person is allowed to appear, he/she may file

NEUTRAL CITATION

C/SCA/13058/2025 ORDER DATED: 18/09/2025

undefined

pleading in Gujarati or in English. Thus, under this pretext,

petitioner herein has preferred the present writ application in

the vernacular language i.e. Gujarati as appeared in person

who even not requires to get competency certificate.

7. Prima facie, whenever any party-in-person happens to be an

advocate possessing registration of Bar Council, due to second

proviso to Rule 31-A (1) of Rules, 1993, getting exemption

from obtaining any certificate of competence required as per

aforesaid Rule, according to my view, necessary and suitable

amendment needs to be brought in Rule 37 of Rules, 1993,

thereby a proviso also be incorporated in such Rule that in a

case where, any party-in-person happens to be an advocate

having registration of Bar Council allows to appear

accordingly be it as petitioner or respondent, such party-in-

person needs to present any memoranda of proceedings in this

Court must be in English. To overcome misuse of aforesaid

Rules by such class of party-in-person, suitable amendment in

the Rules is a need of the hour.

8. Thus, in view of aforesaid, Registrar (Judicial) of this Court, to

take note of such fact and bring such an issue to the notice of

NEUTRAL CITATION

C/SCA/13058/2025 ORDER DATED: 18/09/2025

undefined

the Honourable the Chief Justice for taking appropriate

decision in this issue.

9. The aforesaid facts needs reference because of the previous

history of the present litigation, whereby, in past, judicial time

was not only consumed in such frivolous litigations filed at the

instance of the petitioner, but from the record, it suggests that

the petitioner is in the habit of making frivolous applications

one after another at different stages. It needs mention that

petitioner though an advocate, not disclosed all the orders

which were passed by this Court in her previously instituted

litigation, by conveniently submitting only initial orders passed

by this Court in such litigation i.e. Special Civil Application

No. 3522 of 2015 and Special Civil Application No. 19989 of

2019.

10. Now, adverting to the facts of present case. The petitioner

happens to be the original plaintiff of Regular Civil Suit No. 91

of 2004, having not served the defendant No. 2 for years

together and under that pretext, sought an exemption from the

Trial Court that unless and until, defendant No. 2 would be

served, the petitioner/plaintiff should not be allowed to lead her

NEUTRAL CITATION

C/SCA/13058/2025 ORDER DATED: 18/09/2025

undefined

oral evidence. Such request was rejected in the past by the Trial

Court and appears to have been confirmed by this Court in

aforesaid writ applications instituted by the petitioner. So,

petitioner's right to lead oral evidence was closed as back as in

year 2016 then also once reopened in year 2018, but remains

closed having not complied with condition. This apart, the

main thrust of the arguments so canvassed by the petitioner

that despite there is no oral evidence submitted on record by

the plaintiff, learned Advocate of defendant No. 1, having filed

an application below Exhibit-37 on 3rd March 2014, whereby,

she would contend that when no examination-in-chief of the

plaintiff available on record, such averment of defendant No.1

in his said application is factually incorrect.

11. So, by way of impugned application filed below Exhibit-198,

petitioner-plaintiff prayed before Trial Court that plaintiff be

allowed to lead oral evidence in form of affidavit in lieu of

examination in chief and allowed to submit oral &

documentary evidence in the aforesaid suit proceeding

instituted by her. It further prayed that Trial Court should

declared that there is no examination-in-chief of plaintiff

available on the record of the aforesaid suit.

NEUTRAL CITATION

C/SCA/13058/2025 ORDER DATED: 18/09/2025

undefined

12. According to petitioner, unless and until, defendant No.2

served in the suit, there was no occasion arose for her - plaintiff

to lead any evidence i.e. oral evidence in any form. Further, she

would submit that she should be allowed to submit oral

evidence as prayed in the impugned application filed below

Exhibit- 198 in the suit. It is submitted that if she would not

allow to lead evidence, it prejudice her case. Lastly, petitioner

would submit that as there is no examination-in-chief of

plaintiff in fact available on record of the suit, the Trial Court

should declare such fact by way of passing judicial order.

13. To appreciate such arguments, when this Court gone through

previous orders passed by the Trial Court made available in

this writ application, it appears that vide order dated

28.08.2015 passed below Exhibit 63, Trial Court categorically

observed in it that defendant No.2 was duly served appeared

through his lawyer i.e. learned advocate Mr. Bharat A. Raval,

who never withdraw his appearance. After framing of the issues

@ Exhibit-34 in the year 2009, notice already served upon

plaintiff on 21.03.2011. Although, granting more than

reasonable opportunities to plaintiff, she did not submit her

oral evidence and availed such opportunity to lead her oral

NEUTRAL CITATION

C/SCA/13058/2025 ORDER DATED: 18/09/2025

undefined

evidence.

14. It further appears and noticed in said order, that instead of

conducting Trial of the suit, plaintiff was busy in getting

transfer her suit from one court to another, which was refused

by the District Court and so also by this Court, when it allowed

petitioner to withdraw R/SCA/22/2015. So, Trial Court by way

of said order, directed plaintiff to peremptorily remain present

on 19/09/2015 to lead her evidence. The record suggest that she

did not follow the said order having not submitted her

evidence.

15. The order of the Trial Court dated 04.02.2016 passed below

Exhibit-73 in the suit would also clearly suggest that plaintiff

was in no mood to given up her claim that first defendant No.2

be served till than there would not be any stage of plaintiff

comes for leading evidence. It appears that in terms, Trial

Court vide its said order refused such request of plaintiff

having so observed that there is no need to issue notice upon

defendant No.2 as his lawyer duly appeared in the suit for him.

16. It is very unfortunate that petitioner happens to be an advocate

appeared in person despite knowing all these orders having

NEUTRAL CITATION

C/SCA/13058/2025 ORDER DATED: 18/09/2025

undefined

passed by Trial Court in year 2015/2016, appears to have been

confirmed and in no case disturbed by any Court including this

Court, still in year 2025, just to consume precious time of this

Court, again and again, as a repeated arguments, petitioner

drew the attention of this Court to such fact i.e. Non-service of

notice to defendant No.2.

17. In view of aforesaid, such an argument is thoroughly

misconceived, falsehood and frivolous, requires outright

rejection.

18. As far as false statement made by defendant No.1 in his

application dated 03.03.2014 filed through his lawyer below

Exhibit-37 in the suit, it appears that there was a reference

about the factum of plaintiff not coming forward for her

evidence and unnecessary, defendants have to attend the suit

proceedings and in that view of the matter, requested the Trial

Court to reject the suit. Of course, in one line, it has been so

stated in the said application that plaintiff has submitted his

oral evidence (examination-in-chief) but not remaining present

for her cross-examination by defendant. Be that as it may, such

application filed by defendant No. 1 below Exhibit-37 was

NEUTRAL CITATION

C/SCA/13058/2025 ORDER DATED: 18/09/2025

undefined

already rejected by the Trial Court vide its order dated 28th

August 2015. So, grievance addressed by the party-in-person is

not only misconceived but uncalled for when praying for relief

by way of the impugned application that the Trial Court

should declare that there is no examination-in-chief of plaintiff

available on the record of the suit. According to me, such a

relief could neither be sought for by plaintiff nor could have

been granted by Trial Court inasmuch as such is not a real

issue germen between the parties in the suit. Consequently, no

such relief/prayer to that effect can be granted to the petitioner.

19. Lastly, so far as principle relief as regards to allow plaintiff to

lead oral and documentary evidence is concern, the fact

remains that, for reasons best known to the petitioner-plaintiff

happens to be an advocate never come forward for her oral

evidence, but under one or another pretext, tried to delay the

trial of the suit. In light of such facts, vide order dated

10.02.2016 passed by 4th Additional Senior Civil Judge,

Gandhinagar below Exhibit-1 in Regular Civil Suit No. 91 of

2004 in question, closed the right of the plaintiff to lead her

oral evidence and kept the matter for the evidence of the

defendants.

NEUTRAL CITATION

C/SCA/13058/2025 ORDER DATED: 18/09/2025

undefined

20. The petitioner appears to have requested the Trial Court to

reopen her right to lead oral evidence by filing an application

below Exhibit-98 on 05.10.2018, which was in fact despite

aforesaid facts, readily accepted by the Trial Court vide its

order dated 17.10.2018, thus, directed the petitioner/plaintiff to

deposit a cost of Rs.5,000/- with the D.L.S.A. (District Legal

Services Authority) and further directed the plaintiff to remain

present with her evidence on the next date, otherwise the suit

gets dismissed. It is so observed at the end of said order that

such above facts may be taken note by the plaintiff.

21. Even despite such leniency shown by the Trial Court to the

petitioner/plaintiff, who appears to have been pursuing her suit

in person and so also possessing degree of law, no effective

steps have been taken by the petitioner to avail such

opportunity, thereby, not filed any original evidence in the suit

till 2025.

22. It further appears from the record that instead of filing her oral

evidence, the petitioner was busy in pursuing the litigation so

filed before this Court, challenging an order passed below

Exhibit-182 in the suit, having so filed Special Civil Application

NEUTRAL CITATION

C/SCA/13058/2025 ORDER DATED: 18/09/2025

undefined

No. 19989 of 2019. Such writ application was also dismissed by

this Court on 18.09.2024. Whereas, Special Civil Application

No. 3522 of 2015 was withdrawn by her on 09.07.2015.

23. As such this Court would not gone much deep into the issue

but considering overall conduct of petitioner appeared in

person though an advocate, it feel so to refer some of the

observations, so made by this Court in the aforesaid Special

Civil Application No. 19989 of 2019, needs some reference. As

stated hereinabove, the petitioner conveniently chooses not to

submit the copy of the CAV Order dated 18.09.2024 passed in

Special Civil Application No. 19989 of 2019 by this Court. So,

this Court having got its print out, wherein found thus, as

under:

"4. Learned advocate Mr. Kishor Prajapati appearing for the respondents would submit that the present petitioner is habitual in coming to the Court on one or the other pretexts as she did not intend to proceed further with the proceedings of the Regular Civil Suit which she has filed in the year 2004. Learned advocate Mr. Prajapati would submit that in Special Civil Application No.4777 of 2019, the Coordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 27.8.2019 directed the learned Trial Court to complete the proceedings within six months from the date of receipt of the writ of the order. He also refers to another order dated 20.4.2018 passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Misc. Civil Application No.603 of 2016 to submit that this Court has also noted the conduct of Party-in-person. Further, he would refer to the observations made by the Coordinate

NEUTRAL CITATION

C/SCA/13058/2025 ORDER DATED: 18/09/2025

undefined

Bench in para-7 and para-9.2 of the said order dated 20.4.2019 as under:-

"7. This Court has considered the matter on the merits and it is found that, the very basis of institution of the proceedings is invoking the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, which would not be applicable in the facts of this case. The relationship between the applicant and the respondent, going by the say of the applicant herself, has started after the year 2002. There are various other grounds, including finding of this Court that there is complete lack of bona fide on the part of the applicant and she has abused the process of law. This prima facie observations may be sufficient for the Trial Court to dispose of the proceedings even by having recourse to the provisions of Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

9.2 It is directed that the Trial Court that, in the event any application is filed by the defendant (as noted above), the same shall be considered by the Trial Court within a period of one month from the date of filing such an application, keeping in view the conduct of the plaintiff, as noted above. While deciding the said application, the Trial Court shall also keep in view the merits of the matter and observations of this Court."

6. The reliefs claimed by the party-in-person indicate that she challenges the order passed below Exh.142 in the Regular Civil Suit. Various narratives have been raised in the subject of application Exh.142, which could be absurd on plain reading of it. The plaintiff/ party-in-person in Exh.142 made north-south averments and it shows that the plaintiff- party-in-person is not interested in proceeding further with the suit. If the argument of the party-in-person is taken, she submits that since the defendant No.2 is not served, the suit cannot be proceeded further. This submission lacks merits as procedural law cast duty upon the plaintiff party-in-person to serve the process to the defendant No.2. If process is not served within the time bound manner, as stated in Order-V of the Code of Civil Procedure, plaintiff / party-in-person cannot shelter its cause in the suit by stating that since the defendant No.2 is not served, she will not proceed further with the suit against the defendant No.1 nor can the learned Trial Court. This submission of the party-in-person is wildly unreasonable, illogical and inappropriate. In nutshell, the petition has no substance.

7. I am also taken by surprise that despite the Coordinate

NEUTRAL CITATION

C/SCA/13058/2025 ORDER DATED: 18/09/2025

undefined

Bench of this Court on 20.4.2018 passed the directions to the learned Trial Court to pass necessary order under Order-VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It appears that yet, the said order is not complied.

8. For the foregoing reasons, this preposterous and ludicrous application/ petition is DISMISSED, directing the Court below to follow the commands made in the order dated 27.8.2019 passed in Special Civil Application No.4777 of 2019 as well as the commands made in the order dated 20.4.2018 in Misc. Civil Application No.603 of 2016. Notice is discharged."

(emphasis supplied)

24. The aforesaid would clearly indicate that how the petitioner -

party-in-person is prosecuting the legal remedy and trying to

take undue advantage of the legal system and having the liberty

not to prosecute the matter in a language which is the official

language of this Court. Such conduct of the petitioner, who

happens to be a lawyer, requires to be deprecated and

discouraged by the Court.

25. Even after lapse of more than 9 years, without any justifiable

reasons, rather on same repetitive grounds, the impugned

application came to be filed below Exhibit-198 by the

petitioner. She requested the Trial Court to reopen her right to

lead oral evidence, which was though accepted by the Trial

Court way back in year 2018 but no avail having not complied

with its condition, as so observed herein above. The impugned

NEUTRAL CITATION

C/SCA/13058/2025 ORDER DATED: 18/09/2025

undefined

application was filed only on 22.08.2025, after about within a

year from the dismissal of her writ application by this Court on

18.09.2024, as aforesaid.

26. As such, considering the overall conduct of the petitioner, all

throughout smacks of mala fide and dilatory tactics used by

her just to prolong and delay the trial of the suit at the costs of

others, no relief can be granted in her favour. The petitioner

has undoubtedly consumed judicial time of the Trial Court as

well as this Court, no leniency and any indulgence, now

requires to be shown in favour of the petitioner, having

remained silent for years together and fought the matter on a

completely non-germane ground i.e. Trial should not proceed

and plaintiff should not requires to lead her oral evidence till

service of notice to the defendant No. 2, and Asking for copy

of her examination-in-chief as aforesaid.

27. Lastly, it is gainsaid that this Court should not ordinarily

interfere with the order passed by the Trial Court like a

routine, having limited jurisdiction under Article 227 of the

Constitution of India. Unless and until, it has been shown on

the record that the order impugned passed by the Court is

NEUTRAL CITATION

C/SCA/13058/2025 ORDER DATED: 18/09/2025

undefined

erroneous, perverse, arbitrary, contrary to settle principles of

law and/or not exercising its jurisdiction so vested in it, this

Court should not interfere with such order of the

Court/Tribunal. None of the aforesaid grounds made out by

the petitioner in the present writ application.

28. At this stage, it would be apt to refer to and rely upon the

following two decisions of Honourable Supreme Court of

India.

28.1 First one in a case of Sameer Suresh Gupta TR PA Holder vs.

Rahul Kumar Agarwal, reported in 2013 (9) SCC 374, the

relevant observation of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:-

"[6] In our view, the impugned order is liable to be set aside because while deciding the writ petition filed by the respondent the learned Single Judge ignored the limitations of the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. The parameters for exercise of power by the High Court under that Article were considered by the two Judge Bench of this Court in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and Ors., 2003 6 SCC 675. After considering various facets of the issue, the two Judge Bench culled out the following principles:

(1) Amendment by Act No. 46 of 1999 with effect from 01-07-2002 in Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

NEUTRAL CITATION

C/SCA/13058/2025 ORDER DATED: 18/09/2025

undefined

(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by the

of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.

(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction, i.e. when a subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction - by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction - by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice.

(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When the subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.

(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and

(ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of

NEUTRAL CITATION

C/SCA/13058/2025 ORDER DATED: 18/09/2025

undefined

justice has occasioned thereby.

(6) A patent error is an error which is self- evident, i.e. which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long- drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.

(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis.

(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not covert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character.

NEUTRAL CITATION

C/SCA/13058/2025 ORDER DATED: 18/09/2025

undefined

(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate Court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.

7. The same question was considered by another Bench in Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil [(2010) 8 SCC 329 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 338] , and it was held: (SCC pp. 347-49, para 49)

"(a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by the High Court under these two articles is also different.

(b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above.

NEUTRAL CITATION

C/SCA/13058/2025 ORDER DATED: 18/09/2025

undefined

under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of the Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court.

(d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of their power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh [Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215] and the principles in Waryam Singh [Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215] have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court.

(e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh [Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215] , followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, 'within the bounds of their authority'.

(f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them.

(g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest

NEUTRAL CITATION

C/SCA/13058/2025 ORDER DATED: 18/09/2025

undefined

failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.

(h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised.

(i) The High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India [(1997) 3 SCC 261 :

1997 SCC (L&S) 577] and therefore abridgment by a constitutional amendment is also very doubtful.

(j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227.

(k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu.

(l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory.

NEUTRAL CITATION

C/SCA/13058/2025 ORDER DATED: 18/09/2025

undefined

(m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to the High Court.

(n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above.

(o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality."

(emphasized supplied)

28.2 The second decision in a case of Garment Craft v. Prakash

Chand Goel, reported in (2022) 4 SCC 181 , wherein the

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has held as under:-

15. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the view that the impugned order [Prakash Chand Goel v. Garment Craft, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 11943] is contrary to law and cannot be sustained for several reasons,

NEUTRAL CITATION

C/SCA/13058/2025 ORDER DATED: 18/09/2025

undefined

but primarily for deviation from the limited jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a Court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior Court or tribunal.

[Celina Coelho Pereira v. Ulhas Mahabaleshwar Kholkar, (2010) 1 SCC 217 : (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 69] The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. The power under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, like when there is no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so perverse that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion that the Court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice.

16. Explaining the scope of jurisdiction under Article 227, this Court in Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd. [Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 97] has observed : (SCC pp. 101-102, para 6)

"6. The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained in a number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior Courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do the duty expected or required of them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the

NEUTRAL CITATION

C/SCA/13058/2025 ORDER DATED: 18/09/2025

undefined

jurisdiction of the subordinate Courts or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the Courts or tribunals is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if the High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this Article cannot exercise its power as an appellate Court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate Court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of an inferior Court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the Court or tribunal has come to."

(emphasized supplied)

29. Thus, in view of the ratio of the aforesaid decisions and

coupled with the aforesaid facts and the conduct so observed of

the petitioner appeared in person, this Court does not find any

merit in the writ application, which requires to be dismissed

with costs quantified to Rs.15,000/- to be deposited by the

petitioner with the D.L.S.A., Gandhinagar within one month

from today. The compliance of the payment of costs by the

petitioner shall have to be taken care of by the concerned Trial

Court.

30. As such, Trial Court should requires to observe/follow the

direction so issued by this Court in previous litigations filed by