Gujarat High Court
Navinbhai Gangaram Agrawal vs Reena Sanjaybhai Bhatt on 13 October, 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION (QUASHING) NO. 6926 of 2017
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NAVINBHAI GANGARAM AGRAWAL
Versus
REENA SANJAYBHAI BHATT & ORS.
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Appearance:
MR RJ GOSWAMI(1102) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MR VAIBHAV N SHETH(5337) for the Respondent(s) No. 1,2,3,4
MR. CHINTAN DAVE, APP for the Respondent(s) No. 5
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI
Date : 13/10/2025
ORAL ORDER
1. The present petition is preferred under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India assailing the legality, propriety, and correctness
of the order passed by the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, Court No. 22, Ahmedabad, whereby the learned
Magistrate, in exercise of powers under Section 203 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973, declined to issue process in Criminal
Inquiry No. 38 of 2013 instituted by the petitioner. The said order,
upon challenge, came to be confirmed by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad, vide order dated 21.08.2017 passed in
Criminal Revision Application No. 71 of 2015.
2. Shorn of non-essential details, the relevant factual matrix of
the lis in hand is adumbrated, thus: The petitioner was previously
employed with a company styled Vishal Travels Private Limited. It
is the petitioner's case that the said company represented to him that
upon investment of certain funds, he would be inducted as a Director
in the said company. Acting upon such representation, the petitioner
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invested a total sum of ₹2.50 lakhs by issuing two cheques --
Cheque No. 798599 dated 15.08.2008 drawn on Bank of Baroda and
Cheque No. 642396 dated 05.08.2012 drawn on State Bank of India
and also paid ₹50,000/- in cash. The said cheques were duly
encashed by the company. However, despite the assurance, the
petitioner was not appointed as a Director, thereby giving rise to
allegations of deceit and breach of trust.
2.2. Being aggrieved, the petitioner lodged a written complaint
dated 31.05.2013 before Ellisbridge Police Station, Ahmedabad, but
as no FIR came to be registered, he preferred a private complaint
dated 30.10.2013 before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Court
No. 22, Ahmedabad, which was registered as Criminal Case No. 38
of 2013 for offences punishable under Sections 406, 420, and 114 of
the Indian Penal Code. The petitioner's verification was recorded,
witnesses were examined, and documentary evidence was produced
in support of his allegations. However, by order dated 17.11.2014,
the learned trial Court dismissed the said complaint under Section
203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
2.3. The petitioner, being dissatisfied with the aforesaid dismissal,
preferred Criminal Revision Application No. 71 of 2015 before the
learned City Sessions Court, Ahmedabad. The said revision came to
be heard and dismissed by a detailed order dated 21.08.2017, thereby
affirming the order of the learned Magistrate. Aggrieved thereby, the
petitioner has approached this Court by way of the present petition,
assailing the concurrent findings of the courts below.
3. Heard learned advocate for the petitioner, learned APP for the
respondent-State. None appeared for the respondent Nos. 1 to 4.
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4. Learned advocate appearing for the petitioner fervently
contended that the impugned order dated 21.08.2017 passed by the
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad, confirming the
order of dismissal of the private complaint under Section 203 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, suffers from patent illegality and
material irregularity, warranting interference by this Court in
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction.
4.1. It is submitted that the learned trial Court, while dismissing the
complaint, failed to appreciate that the petitioner had placed on
record cogent documentary evidence as well as the oral testimony
establishing the inducement and the consequent dishonest intention
on the part of the accused persons from the very inception. The
cheques issued by the petitioner towards the promised investment,
having been duly encashed by the company, coupled with the
assurance of his induction as Director, clearly disclose a prima facie
case of deception and criminal breach of trust. It is, therefore, urged
that the summary dismissal of the complaint under Section 203
CrPC, without proper evaluation of the materials on record, amounts
to a manifest miscarriage of justice.
4.2. Learned advocate further submitted that the revisional Court,
instead of independently evaluating the material evidence and
examining the legality, propriety, and correctness of the order passed
by the learned Magistrate, has merely reiterated the reasoning of the
subordinate court sub silentio, without assigning any cogent reasons
or appreciating the factual substratum of the case. It is thus urged
that both the orders -- the one passed by the learned Magistrate
dated 17.11.2014 and the one passed by the learned Additional
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Sessions Judge dated 21.08.2017 are ex facie unsustainable in law
and deserve to be quashed and set aside.
4.3. Ergo, it is prayed that this Court may be pleased to quash and
set aside the impugned order dated 21.08.2017 passed by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad in Criminal Revision
Application No. 71 of 2015, as well as the order dated 17.11.2014
passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No. 22,
Ahmedabad in Criminal Case No. 38 of 2013, and direct the learned
trial Court to proceed with the complaint in accordance with law.
5. Per contra, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for
the respondent-State has vehemently opposed the present petition,
contending that both the courts below have passed well-reasoned and
legally sustainable orders after due consideration of the material
placed on record. It is submitted that no illegality, impropriety, or
perversity can be attributed to the concurrent findings recorded by
the learned Magistrate as well as by the revisional court.
5.1. Learned APP submitted that the learned trial Court, upon
meticulous appreciation of the verification statement, documents,
and other materials produced by the petitioner, rightly concluded
that the dispute, even if accepted at its face value, is essentially of a
civil nature arising out of a failed commercial understanding, and
does not disclose the necessary mens rea or dishonest intention
requisite to constitute the offences alleged under Sections 406 and
420 of the Indian Penal Code. It is urged that the mere non-
fulfilment of a commercial promise or failure to perform an
agreement cannot be clothed with criminality unless the intention to
deceive existed at the inception of the transaction.
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5.2. Accordingly, it is urged that the present petition, being devoid
of merit and filed merely to re-agitate issues already adjudicated
upon concurrently, deserves to be dismissed in limine.
6. Having given my anxious consideration to the rival
submissions advanced at the Bar and upon a circumspect
examination of the material on record, it emerges that both the
learned courts below have concurrently held that the dispute, as
projected by the petitioner, stems from an alleged non-fulfilment of a
commercial assurance pertaining to his induction as Director in a
private company upon investment of certain funds. The learned trial
Court, upon due appraisal of the verification statement, documents,
and attendant circumstances, arrived at a reasoned conclusion that
the factual substratum of the complaint, even if accepted in toto,
does not disclose the essential ingredients of criminality envisaged
under Sections 406 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code. The revisional
Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Sections 397 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, has, upon an independent reappraisal,
concurred with the said finding. Relevant paras are as under:-
"(6) Considering the facts of both parties, the Applicant-
Complainant had lodged a complaint on 30/10/2013 before
the Ld. Addl. Chief Metro. Magistrate Court No. 22
(hereinafter referred to as the "Trial Court") against Accused
No. (1) Rina Sanjay Bhatt, (2) Rupen Navinchandra Shah, (3)
Karan Sajaybhai Bhatt, and (4) Sanjay Bhatt, i.e., the
Opponents No. 1 to 4 in this case, for an offence under
Sections 406, 420, and 114 of IPC. The Trial Court carried
out the verification of the Complainant regarding the
complaint and passed an order to keep the matter for a court
inquiry under Section 202 of the Cr.P.C., and during the
inquiry, the statements of the witnesses produced by the
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Applicant were recorded before the Trial Court.
(8) Thus, as per the facts of the complaint of the
Applicant, he has not produced any documentary evidence to
show that he had paid rupees four lakhs to the Opponents No.
1 to 4 for the purchase of Vishal Travels. Further, he has not
produced any evidence of the bank if the amount was paid by
cheque, or any evidence if it was given in cash, or any
evidence such as a bank passbook if the amount was
withdrawn from the bank and then paid. He has not produced
any evidence of being made a director in Vishal Travels. The
Trial Court observed in its order that there is no documentary
evidence on the record to show that Opponents No. 1 to 4 had
given any inducement to the Applicant to make him a
director. Further, the Trial Court also observed in its order
that this alleged incident occurred in the year 2008, for which
the Applicant filed a complaint in the year 2013. Further, the
Trial Court also observed in its order that during this five-
year period, the Applicant could have initiated any
proceedings against the accused in this regard, but it does not
appear from the evidence that any such proceedings were
initiated. Further, the Trial Court also observed that the
dispute between the parties is of a Civil nature. Taking all the
evidence into consideration, the Trial Court found no
evidence that the Opponents No. 1 to 4 had committed any
breach of trust or cheating with the Applicant. Therefore, the
order passed by the Trial Court dismissing the complaint of
the Applicant under Section 203 of the Cr.P.C. is proper and
just, and I do not see any illegality or irregularity in this
order. Therefore, as it does not appear necessary to interfere
with the order of the Trial Court, the answer to Issue No. 1 is
given in the negative, and the following final order is passed
with respect to Issue No. 2."
6.1 The grievance ventilated by the petitioner stands effectively
addressed by both the Courts below, which, upon meticulous
appraisal of the record, have rightly concluded that there is an
absolute dearth of evidentiary material suggestive of any
inducement, false representation, or deceit on the part of the accused
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in persuading the petitioner to invest the alleged sum in Vishal
Travels Private Limited under the pretext of conferring directorship.
6.2. Succinctly put, the petitioner has miserably failed to
demonstrate the essential ingredients of criminal breach of trust or
cheating as contemplated under Sections 405 and 415 of the Indian
Penal Code.
6.3. In this backdrop, it would be apposite to recapitulate the well-
settled legal position governing the exercise of supervisory
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In
Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC
329, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in unmistakable terms, held that
the power of superintendence under Article 227 is intended to ensure
that courts and tribunals act within the bounds of their authority and
is not to be exercised as an appellate or revisional jurisdiction to
correct mere errors of fact or law. The Court emphatically observed
that interference under Article 227 is warranted only when there is
patent perversity, gross miscarriage of justice, or jurisdictional error
apparent on the face of the record. Relevant paras are as under:-
"62. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the
following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction
under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated:
(a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is
different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of
exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles
is also different.
(b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be
called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of
writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different
from the history of conferment of the power of
Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227
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and have been discussed above.
(c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise
of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the
Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or
Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power,
act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or
tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative
statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would
also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by
the High Court.
(d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in
exercise of its power of superintendence have been
repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the
High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by
the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh
(supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have
been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution
Benches and various other decisions of this Court.
(e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra),
followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise
of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in
order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to
it, `within the bounds of their authority'.
(f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such
tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is
vested in them and by not declining to exercise the
jurisdiction which is vested in them.
(g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High
Court can interfere in exercise of its power of
superintendence when there has been a patent perversity
in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or
where there has been a gross and manifest failure of
justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been
flouted.
(h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High
Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or
fact or just because another view than the one taken by
the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible
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view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very
sparingly exercised.
(i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article
227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been
declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution
by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L.
Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India & others, reported in
(1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a
Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful.
(j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather
cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure
Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act,
1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High
Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it
must be remembered that such statutory amendment does
not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction
of superintendence under Article 227.
(k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on
equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can
be exercised suo motu.
(l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered
power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires
that the main object of this Article is to keep strict
administrative and judicial control by the High Court on
the administration of justice within its territory.
(m) The object of superintendence, both administrative
and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly
functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a
way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power
of interference under this Article is to be kept to the
minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not
come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure
and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in
the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to
High Court.
(n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial
intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief
in individual cases but should be directed for promotion
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of public confidence in the administration of justice in the
larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for 14
ptprotection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power
under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is
subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out
above.
(o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power
will be counter-productive and will divest this
extraordinary power of its strength and vitality."
7. The principle so enunciated has been reiterated and further
elucidated in Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, (2022) 4 SCC
181, wherein the Apex Court, after surveying the earlier precedents,
observed that the supervisory jurisdiction is to be exercised
sparingly, only to keep subordinate courts within the bounds of their
authority, and not to re-appreciate evidence or substitute one's own
conclusions for those concurrently recorded by the courts below.
The Court, in no uncertain terms, cautioned that Article 227 does not
confer unlimited prerogative to correct all species of errors, nor does
it clothe the High Court with the authority to function as a court of
appeal. Relevant paras are as under:-
"15. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the
view that the impugned order is contrary to law and cannot be
sustained for several reasons, but primarily for deviation from the
limited jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 227
of the Constitution of India. The High Court exercising
supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to
reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the
determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction
is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the
final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is
not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that
of the inferior court or tribunal [Celina Coelho Pereira (Ms) and
Others v. Ulhas Mahabaleshwar Kholkar and Others, (2010) 1
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SCC 217]. The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of
correctional1 jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or
flagrant abuse, violation of fundamental principles of law or
justice. The power under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in
appropriate cases, like when there is no evidence at all to justify,
or the finding is so perverse that no reasonable person can
possibly come to such a conclusion that the court or tribunal has
come to. It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be
exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice.
16. Explaining the scope of jurisdiction under Article 227, this
Court in Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 97
has observed:-
"6. The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by
a High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is
examined and explained in a number of decisions of this Court.
The exercise of power under this article involves a duty on the
High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the
bounds of their authority and to see that they do the duty
expected or required of them in a legal manner. The High Court
is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of
hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the
jurisdiction of the subordinate courts or tribunals. Exercise of this
power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunals is
restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant
violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if the
High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains
uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while
acting under this article cannot exercise its power as an appellate
court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the
subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the
face of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the
findings of facts of an inferior court or tribunal, if there is no
evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no
reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which
the court or tribunal has come to."
7.1. Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid authoritative
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pronouncements, it becomes manifest that the impugned orders do
not suffer from any jurisdictional infirmity, perversity, or manifest
error of law warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its
supervisory jurisdiction. Both the learned Magistrate and the
revisional Court have rendered their findings upon due consideration
of the material placed before them, and no perversity or illegality is
discernible therein.
8. In absence whereof, the very foundation for invocation of
Article 227 crumbles. Ergo, this Court finds no justification to
interdict the concurrent findings of the courts below.
9. In view of the prevenient ratiocination, the present petition
fails and is accordingly DISMISSED. The orders dated 17.11.2014
passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No. 22,
Ahmedabad in Criminal Case No. 38 of 2013, and the order dated
21.08.2017 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Ahmedabad in Criminal Revision Application No. 71 of 2015, are
hereby affirmed. Rule/Notice, if any, stands discharged. Interim
relief granted earlier, if any, stands vacated.
(J. C. DOSHI,J)
MANISH MISHRA
