Wednesday, 03, Jun, 2026
 
 
 
Expand O P Jindal Global University
 
  
  
 
 
 

Bhadresh Mahendrabhai Manvawala vs State Of Gujarat
2025 Latest Caselaw 2783 Guj

Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 2783 Guj
Judgement Date : 7 February, 2025

Gujarat High Court

Bhadresh Mahendrabhai Manvawala vs State Of Gujarat on 7 February, 2025

                                                                                                         NEUTRAL CITATION




                              R/CR.MA/24084/2022                           ORDER DATED: 07/02/2025

                                                                                                         undefined




                                IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

                              R/CRIMINAL MISC. APPLICATION NO. 24084 of 2022
                                          (FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL)
                                                    In
                                    R/CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2623 of 2022

                         =============================================
                                          BHADRESH MAHENDRABHAI MANVAWALA
                                                         Versus
                                                STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.
                         =============================================
                         Appearance:
                         MS MITA S PANCHAL(530) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
                         MR ARPIT A KAPADIA(3974) for the Respondent(s) No. 2
                         MR BHARGAV PANDYA, APP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
                         =============================================

                          CORAM:HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE S.V. PINTO

                                                      Date : 07/02/2025

                                                        ORAL ORDER

1. The present application is filed by the applicant -

original complainant under Section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973 (for short "Cr.P.C.") seeking leave to file an

appeal against the judgment and order dated 23.08.2022 passed by

the learned 2nd Additional Senior Civil Judge and Additional Chief

Judicial Magistrate, Surat in Criminal Case No. 52516 of 2018,

whereby the respondent No 2 original accused came to be

acquitted from the charge levelled against him under Section 138

of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as

'the NI Act"). The respondent No 2 is hereinafter referred to as

"the accused" as he stood in the original case for the sake of

convenience, clarity and brevity.

NEUTRAL CITATION

R/CR.MA/24084/2022 ORDER DATED: 07/02/2025

undefined

2. The brief facts culled out from the memo of the present

application as well as the impugned judgment and order and paper

book filed by the applicant are as under:

2.1 The applicant filed a complaint against the accused

under Section 138 of the Act, as the accused had taken a friendly

loan of Rs. 50,00,000/- from the applicant during the period

November -2015 to May 2018 on different occasion for his personal

need. The accused filed bogus complaint against the applicant to

avoid to make payment at Lal Gate Police Station and the matter

was settled and the accused had issued a cheque bearing no.

000090 from his account with Bank of Baroda Bhaga Talav Branch,

Surat for Rs.20,00,000/- dated 27th August 2018. The applicant

deposited the said cheque on 27.08.2018 in his bank and the same

was dishonored and the reason mentioned in the return memo

dated 29.08.2018 was "Funds Insufficient". The applicant sent the

statutory demand notice to the accused on 11.09.2018 against

which no reply was given and no payment was made though it was

served on 14.09.2018 and 18.09.2018. The applicant filed the

criminal complaint before the Court of the Chief Judicial

Magistrate, Surat under Section 138 of the NI Act, 1881 which was

registered as Criminal Case no. 52516 of 2018.

NEUTRAL CITATION

R/CR.MA/24084/2022 ORDER DATED: 07/02/2025

undefined

2.2 The accused was served with the summons and

appeared before the learned Trial Court and his plea was recorded

and the evidence of the applicant was taken on record. The

applicant was examined as a witness and 05 documentary

evidences were produced in support of the case and after the

closing pursis at exhibit 33 was filed, the further statement of the

accused was recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure in which he pleaded that the blank cheques were given

as a security and the applicant has filed a false complaint and has

failed to prove the case. The applicant has not produced any

evidence to show that the amount has been given to accused. The

arguments of the advocates for both the parties were heard and by

impugned judgment and order, the learned Trial Court acquitted

the accused from the offence under Section 138 of the N.I.Act.

3. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the same, the

applicant has preferred the present application seeking leave to

appeal mainly stating that the learned Trial Court has not properly

considered and interpreted evidence on record and presumption of

Sections 118 and 139 of the Act.

4. Heard learned advocate Ms. Mita S. Panchal appearing

for the applicant and learned APP Mr. Bhargav Pandya for the

respondent - State and learned advocate Mr. Arpit A. Kapadia for

NEUTRAL CITATION

R/CR.MA/24084/2022 ORDER DATED: 07/02/2025

undefined

the respondent No.2.

5. Learned Advocate Ms.Mita Panchal for the applicant

submits that the deposition of the applicant has been recorded at

exhibit 4 and the issuance of the cheques and the signatures have

not been disputed, except at the time of recording of the further

statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The accused has not replied to the statutory notice and has not set

out his defence and the learned Trial Court ought to have convicted

the accused, but the learned Trial Court has given over weightage

to the cross examination of the applicant by coming to a conclusion

that the applicant has not produced any evidence to show his

financial capacity to lend the amount to the accused. The accused

has not disputed the signatures on the cheques and the

presumption under Section 118 and 139 of the N I Act must be

raised in favour of the applicant and the applicant has proved that

he has lent the amount on different dates of different amounts

during the year 2015 to 2018. Learned advocate submits that the

impugned judgement is illegal and bad in law and hence leave to

appeal must be granted.

6. Learned APP Bhargav Pandya for the respondent No. 1

and learned advocate Mr. Arpit Kapadia for the respondent No. 2

have submitted that the learned Trial Court has considered all the

NEUTRAL CITATION

R/CR.MA/24084/2022 ORDER DATED: 07/02/2025

undefined

evidence in proper perspective and it is on record that the

respondent No. 2 has successfully rebutted the facts of the

complaint and has raised a probable defence during the cross

examination of the applicant. It is settled law that the accused is

not required to prove his defence beyond reasonable doubts but is

required to rebut the presumption up to the extent of

preponderance of probability which has been successfully carried

out by the respondent No.2 during the cross-examination of the

applicant. There is no perversity or illegality in the impugned

judgment and order and no interference is required and hence the

application of the applicant must be rejected.

7. Since this is an application seeking leave to appeal

against an order of acquittal, at this juncture, it would be fit to

refer the settled principles of laws in cases filed under the NI Act.

7.1 With regard to the facts in the present case, we can

also refer to the following observations made Apex Court in

Rangappa vs Sri Mohan reported in (2010) 11 SCC 441 in Para

14 wherein it is observed as under:

"14. In light of these extracts, we are in agreement with the respondent-claimant that the presumption mandated by Section 139 of the Act does indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. To that extent, the impugned observations in Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra) may not be correct. However, this does not in any way cast doubt on the

NEUTRAL CITATION

R/CR.MA/24084/2022 ORDER DATED: 07/02/2025

undefined

correctness of the decision in that case since it was based on the specific facts and circumstances therein. As noted in the citations, this is of course in the nature of a rebuttable presumption and it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. However, there can be no doubt that there is an initial presumption which favours the complainant. Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies a strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. However, it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the accused/defendant cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof. In the absence of compelling justifications, reverse onus clauses usually impose an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. Keeping this in view, it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is that of 'preponderance of probabilities. Therefore, if the accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. As clarified in the citations, the accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is conceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce evidence of his/her own."

7.2 The Apex Court in Tedhi Singh vs Narayan Dass

Mahant reported in (2022) 6 SCC 735 has observed as under:

"7. It is true that this is a case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Section 139 of the N.I. Act provides that Court shall presume that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. This presumption, however, is expressly made subject to the position being proved to the contrary. In other words, it is open to the accused to establish that there is no consideration received. It is in the context of this provision that the theory of 'probable

NEUTRAL CITATION

R/CR.MA/24084/2022 ORDER DATED: 07/02/2025

undefined

defence' has grown. In an earlier judgment, in fact, which has also been adverted to in Basalingappa (supra), this Court notes that Section 139 of the N.I. Act is an example of reverse onus [see (2010) 11 SCC 441). It is also true that this Court has found that the accused is not expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof. It is accordingly that the principle has developed that all which the accused needs to establish is a probable defence. As to whether a probable defence has been established is a matter to be decided on the facts of each case on the conspectus of evidence and circumstances that exist. "

7.3 The Apex Court in the case of Basalingappa vs.

Mudibasappa reported in 2019 0 AIR (SC) 1983 has observed in

Para 23 and 28 as under:

"23. We having noticed the ratio laid down by this Court in above cases on Sections 118(a) and 139, we now summarise the principles enumerated by this Court in following manner:

(i) Once the execution of cheque is admitted Section 139 of the Act mandates a presumption that the cheque was for the discharge of any debt or other liability.

(ii) The presumption Under Section 139 is a rebuttable presumption and the onus is on the Accused to raise the probable defence. The standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities.

(iii) To rebut the presumption, it is open for the Accused to rely on evidence led by him or Accused can also rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise a probable defence. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials brought on record by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which they rely.

(iv) That it is not necessary for the Accused to come in the witness box in support of his defence, Section 139 imposed an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden.

(v) It is not necessary for the Accused to come in the witness box to support his defence.

24. xxxx

25. xxxx

26. xxxx

27. xxxx

28. We are of the view that when evidence was led before the Court to indicate that apart from loan of Rs. 6 lakhs given to the

NEUTRAL CITATION

R/CR.MA/24084/2022 ORDER DATED: 07/02/2025

undefined

Accused, within 02 years, amount of Rs. 18 lakhs have been given out by the complainant and his financial capacity being questioned, it was incumbent on the complainant to have explained his financial capacity. Court cannot insist on a person to lead negative evidence."

8. In light of the above settled principles of law and

considering the arguments advanced by the learned advocates for

the parties and on perusal of the record of the case as per the case

of the applicant, the applicant had given the amount of

Rs.50,00,000/- to the accused during the period, November 2015

and May 2018 towards which the cheques in question have been

given by the accused. The applicant has deposed as per the

complaint and during the cross-examination by the learned

advocate for the accused, the applicant has stated that his yearly

income is about Rs. 25,00,000/- to Rs. 30,00,000/- and he is filing

his income tax returns from 1999. That he had given the amount in

pieces to the accused but has not stated the dates on which what

specific amount was given to the accused in his notice, complaint

or examination in chief. That he had not given the amount by

cheque and had not executed any promissory note agreement or

any document for the amount given to the accused. That no

witness was present at the time when the amount was given and it

is within his knowledge that as per the income tax rules, any

amount above Rs.20,000/- has to be given by cheque. That no

evidence is produced to show that he had withdrawn the amount

NEUTRAL CITATION

R/CR.MA/24084/2022 ORDER DATED: 07/02/2025

undefined

from the bank and after demonetisation in 2016 only an amount of

Rs.2500/- could be withdrawn from the bank. The notice,

complaint and examination in chief does not state the time period

for which the amount was given and he was not charging any

interest on the amount that was given to the accused. That all the

three cheques are of the same date and the handwriting on the

cheques seems to be different from the signature on the cheque.

That he does not remember the financial transactions before 2015,

and he had not kept any accounts of the amount of Rs.50,00,000/-

given in pieces to the accused during 2015 to 2018. That he has

not shown this amount in his income tax returns and he has not

produced any government or semi government documentary

evidence to show that the amount is due from the accused.

8.1 The accused has successfully rebutted the presumption

during the cross examination of the applicant and has brought on

record that the applicant has not kept any accounts for the amount

alleged to have been loaned to the accused. The amount as stated

by the applicant is a huge amount of Rs.50,00,000/- and the

applicant has stated that the amount was given without interest.

The applicant has not stated the dates and the exact amounts that

were given on those dates and there is no clarification as to how

the amount of Rs.50,00,000/- has been arrived at by the applicant

as he does not have any written account of the amounts given. As

NEUTRAL CITATION

R/CR.MA/24084/2022 ORDER DATED: 07/02/2025

undefined

per the law settled in the case of Tedhi Singh (Supra) and

Basalingappa (Supra) the accused can rebut the presumption to the

extent of preponderance of probability from the material brought

on record of the applicant and it is not necessary for the accused to

step into the witness box to prove his defence. Moreover, once the

financial capacity and the giving of the amount has been

challenged, it is incumbent on the applicant to produce evidence to

prove that he had given the amounts on particular dates. The

applicant has also stated that it was within his knowledge that any

transaction of more than Rs. 20,000/- has to be given by cheque,

but has stated that he has given the huge amount of Rs.50,00,000/-

by cash and the same has not been shown in his income tax

returns.

9. The learned Trial Court has considered all the

documents produced by the applicant and has also considered that

the applicant has not produced any evidence to show his capacity

to lend such huge amount of Rs. 50,00,000/- lakhs in cash and as

there is no evidence produced by the applicant about the lending of

the huge amount of Rs.50,00,000/- in cash to the accused and has

concluded that the applicant has not proved the case beyond

reasonable doubts. In light of the same the learned Trial court has

relied on observation made by Apex court in cases of Basalingappa

(supra), K. Subramani vs K. Damodar Naidu reported in (2015) 1

NEUTRAL CITATION

R/CR.MA/24084/2022 ORDER DATED: 07/02/2025

undefined

SCC 99, K. Prakashan vs P. K. Surendran reported in 2008 1 SCC

258, APS Forex Services PVT. LTD. Vs Shakti International Fashion

Linkers & Ors reported in 2020 AIR(SC) 0 945 and Tedhi Singh

(supra), and has passed the impugned judgment and order of

acquittal, which is just and proper and does not require any

interference of this Court.

10. Consequently, the present application seeking leave to

prevent an appeal under Section 378(4) of the Cr.P.C. fails and

hereby dismissed.

11. Since the leave to prefer appeal is rejected, no order is

required to be passed in the Criminal Appeal, which is at filing

stage and the same stands disposed accordingly.

(S. V. PINTO,J) F.S.KAZI

 
Download the LatestLaws.com Mobile App
 
 
Latestlaws Newsletter
 

Publish Your Article

 

Campus Ambassador

 

Media Partner

 

Campus Buzz

 

LatestLaws Guest Court Correspondent

LatestLaws Guest Court Correspondent Apply Now!
 

LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026

 

LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!

 
 

LatestLaws Partner Event : MAIMS

 
 
Latestlaws Newsletter