Govindsingh Fulsingh Rajput vs Regional Director
2022 Latest Caselaw 4195 Guj

     C/CA/1800/2021                                 ORDER DATED: 18/04/2022




           IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

                      R/CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1800 of 2021
                                       In
                        F/FIRST APPEAL NO. 24220 of 2021

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                        GOVINDSINGH FULSINGH RAJPUT
                                   Versus
                             REGIONAL DIRECTOR
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Appearance:
JUCKY LUCKY CHAN(8033) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MR AV NAIR(5602) for the Respondent(s) No. 1
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 CORAM:HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE GITA GOPI

                                Date : 18/04/2022

                                 ORAL ORDER

1. Perused the Office Note.

2. Heard learned Advocate Mr. Jucky Lucky Chan for the applicant, who submits that he has already provided a copy of the memo of the application to the other side.

3. Today, learned Advocate Mr. A.V. Nair confirms the receipt of the memo of the application. In view of the above, the Note stands disposed of.

4. It is submitted by learned Advocate for the applicant that because of the Covid protocols and restrictions, the applicant could not contact his Advocate and therefore, the same has led to a delay of 183 days.

C/CA/1800/2021 ORDER DATED: 18/04/2022

5. To the above, learned Advocate Mr. A.V. Nair submits that the judgment and award is dated 24.07.2019 and the application is dated 06.10.2021 and no sufficient cause has been stated in the memo of the application to justify the delay of 183 days which is calculated after the grace period granted by the Apex Court and therefore, urged to reject the application.

6. In the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another v. Mst. Katiji and Others reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353 it has been observed as under :-

"3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaning- ful manner which subserves the ends of justice--that being the life- purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:-

1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is con- doned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.

C/CA/1800/2021 ORDER DATED: 18/04/2022

3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.

4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.

5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.

6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so."

7. I have heard the submissions canvassed by learned Advocates for the parties and perused the records of the case. Considering the reasons stated for the delay in preferring the Appeal, and also taking into account the pandemic situation as well as the judgment as referred herein above, the Civil Application is allowed. The delay of 183 days in preferring the First Appeal is condoned. Rule made absolute.

Sd/-

(GITA GOPI, J) CAROLINE