State Of Gujarat vs Jakhra Umar Ladak
2021 Latest Caselaw 3825 Guj

        C/SCA/3909/2021                                   ORDER




         IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

          R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 3909 of 2021

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                           STATE OF GUJARAT
                                 Versus
                          JAKHRA UMAR LADAK
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Appearance:
MR BHARGAV PANDYA AGP (1) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
for the Respondent(s) No. 1,2
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 CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.G.URAIZEE

                            Date : 05/03/2021

                             ORAL ORDER

1. The State of Gujarat has preferred the present petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to assail the award dated 30.11.2015 passed by the Labour Court, Bhuj Kutch in Reference (LCB) Case No.18 of 2005 wherein the reference is allowed and the respondent is ordered to be reinstated on his original post with continuity of service, full backwages and consequential benefits.

2. The facts of the petition are not many and move in a narrow compass. As per the case of the respondent, he was working with the petitioner since six years prior to his oral termination on 1.6.2003 as daily chowkidar. Being aggrieved by oral termination, the respondent raised an industrial dispute before the Labour Court, Bhuj which came to be registered as Reference (LCB) No.18 of 2005. The Labour Court vide judgment and award dated 30.11.2015 allowed the claim of the respondent and directed the petitioner to reinstate the respondent on original post with full backwages and continuity of service. The petitioner is also saddled

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with cost of Rs.5000/­ to be paid to the respondent. Being aggrieved, the State has preferred the present petition.

3. I have heard Mr. Bhargav Pandya, learned AGP for the petitioner.

4. Mr. Pandya, vehemently submits that the court below has fallen in error in not appreciating the fact that the respondent had not worked for continuous period of 240 days in any of the years prior to his oral termination. He submits that the court below ought to have appreciated that the work done by the respondent was not of permanent nature and the same was seasonal one. It is his further submission that the respondent had stopped coming to work on his own and his services were never terminated by the petitioner. It is his further submission that the court below has not properly considered the fact that there was delay on the part of the respondent in raising the industrial dispute. He, therefore, submits that the present petition deserves consideration.

5. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced by the learned AGP. I have also perused the award impugned in this petition.

6. It emerges from the award impugned that the services of the respondent were orally terminated on 1.6.2003 and thereafter he had promptly raised the industrial dispute which was registered as Reference (LCB) No.18 of 2005. The reference was finally decided by the Labour Court by judgment and award dated 30.11.2015. The petitioner has assailed the award of 2015 by way of the present petition after around six years.

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7. The Supreme Court in the case of Chairman/Managing Director, U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. v. Ram Gopal reported in LAWS(SC) 2020 1 91 has very lucidly captured the concept of delay and laches as under:­

"14. Finally, the prolonged delay of many years ought not to have been overlooked or condoned. Services of the Respondent were terminated within months of his appointment, in 1978. Statedly, the Respondent made a representation and served UPPCL with a legal notice in 1982, however such feeble effort does little to fill the gap between when the cause of action arose and he chose to seek its redressal (in 1990).

15. Seen from a different perspective also, it is clear that the Respondent has shown little concern to the settled legal tenets. Even a civil suit challenging termination of services, if filed by the Respondent, would have undoubtedly been barred by limitation in 1990. In a similar situation where the appellant belatedly challenged the promotion of his junior(s), this Court in P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1975) 1 SCC 153, held as follows:

"2. ... if the appellant was aggrieved by it he should have approached the Court even in the year 1957, after the two representations made by him had failed to produce any result. One cannot sleep over the matter and come to the Court questioning that relaxation in the year 1971. ... In effect he wants to unscramble a scrambled egg. It is very difficult for the Government to consider whether any relaxation of the rules should have been made in favour of the appellant in the year 1957. The conditions that were prevalent in 1957, cannot be reproduced now. ...It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters......"

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16. Whilst it is true that limitation does not strictly apply to proceedings under Articles 32 or 226 of the Constitution of India, nevertheless, such rights cannot be enforced after an unreasonable lapse of time. Consideration of unexplained delays and inordinate laches would always be relevant in writ actions, and writ courts naturally ought to be reluctant in exercising their discretionary jurisdiction to protect those who have slept over wrongs and allowed illegalities to fester. Fence sitters cannot be allowed to barge into courts and cry for their rights at their convenience, and vigilant citizens ought not to be treated alike with mere opportunists. On multiple occasions, it has been restated that there are implicit limitations of time within which writ remedies can be enforced. In SS Balu v. State of Kerala, (2009) 2 SCC 479, this Court observed thus:

"17. It is also well­settled principle of law that "delay defeats equity". ...It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment."

8. Not only the State has approached this court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to assail the judgment and award rendered by the Labour Court in the year 2015, even such a delay in approaching the court is not at all explained in the petition. It appears that the State has assumed that the impugned award of the Labour Court is illegal and, therefore, it can agitate its validity at its sweet will which cannot be in my considered view countenanced.

9. The consideration of unexplained delay and inordinate laches are always relevant in writ jurisdiction and the constitutional court is normally reluctant in exercising discretionary jurisdiction to protect those who have exhibited lackadaisical approach and indolence in approaching the court for redressal of their grievance.

10. For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the considered view that

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the petition deserves to be dismissed solely on the ground of delay and laches without entering into the merits of the case and, accordingly, the petition is dismissed at the threshold.

(A.G.URAIZEE, J) Z.G. SHAIKH