Rajput Sandipbhai Madhusinh vs Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation
2021 Latest Caselaw 6799 Guj

     C/SCA/6449/2021                                JUDGMENT DATED: 24/06/2021




             IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

               R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6449 of 2021


FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:


HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE UMESH A. TRIVEDI

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1     Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed                   Yes
      to see the judgment ?

2     To be referred to the Reporter or not ?                            Yes

3     Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy                   No
      of the judgment ?

4     Whether this case involves a substantial question                   No
      of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution
      of India or any order made thereunder ?

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                         RAJPUT SANDIPBHAI MADHUSINH
                                    Versus
                       AHMEDABAD MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
==========================================================
Appearance:
MR UT MISHRA(3605) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
for the Respondent(s) No. 1
==========================================================

    CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE UMESH A. TRIVEDI

                                Date : 24/06/2021

                               ORAL JUDGMENT

1. Challenge in this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the

Constitution of India is to the judgment and award dated 26.06.2019

passed by Presiding Officer, Labour Court No.5, Ahmedabad in

Reference (LCA) Case No.289 of 2014 whereby, the Labour Court had

C/SCA/6449/2021 JUDGMENT DATED: 24/06/2021

rejected the Reference filed by the present petitioner.

2. Brief facts of the case are as under.

2.1 The petitioner-workman, as per his Statement of Claims was

working since last 2 years honestly and diligently and he was paid

Rs.3500/- per month by the Respondent-Corporation in Garden as also

Water Branch as Helper / Labourer. It is the case of the petitioner that

the respondent did not provide Earned Leave Card, Presence Card as

also Pay Slip. Only his presence was noted in the Muster Roll and

except that, the petitioner was not provided with anything. Though he

demanded every benefits as provided under the Labour Laws but it

has not been provided / paid. According to the case of the petitioner,

he completed 240 days in each year and he was doing the same work

as permanent employees were doing. It is further stated that all of a

sudden on 3.10.1999, by oral order, he was terminated from his

service and while terminating him, no notice or notice pay was given,

no departmental proceedings initiated and no reason assigned for

terminating his services. Therefore, as asserted in the Reference, the

respondent has committed breach of Section 25F, 25G and 25H of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (herein after referred to as, 'the Act'). It

is his further case that after the service of the petitioner terminated,

several workmen were employed by respondent without offering

C/SCA/6449/2021 JUDGMENT DATED: 24/06/2021

service to the petitioner in the case of necessity even.

2.2 As observed in the impugned judgment and award, on a

complaint made by petitioner to the appropriate Government, on

failure of conciliation, the Conciliation Officer-Assistant Labour

Commissioner vide his communication dated 25.3.2014 informed him

that in view of Section 2A of 'the Act', petitioner may approach the

Labour Court directly for the individual industrial dispute. Pursuant

thereto, the petitioner had directly approached the Labour Court by

filing the aforesaid Reference.

2.3 On being served with the notice, respondent appeared and filed

their written reply vide Exh.9 denying the claim made by the

petitioner. It was specifically mentioned in the reply, as referred to in

para-5 of the impugned judgment and award that the order of oral

termination even if it is presumed to be true, since it had been

challenged after 15 years in the year 2014, on the ground of delay,

the Reference be rejected. Not only that, in view of insertion of Sub-

Sections (2) and (3) to Section 2A of 'the Act' with effect from

15.9.2010, the Reference is required to be filed under it within 3 years

from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise

termination of service, as specified in Sub-Section (1) of Section 2A of

'the Act'. It is further pleaded in the reply that inconsistent plea is

C/SCA/6449/2021 JUDGMENT DATED: 24/06/2021

raised by the petitioner-workman. If his complaint for termination

made to the appropriate Government is seen, he claimed to be

working in Garden section of the Corporation as Gardener / Labourer

since 2 years whereas in the Statement of Claims, he claimed that he

was working in the Garden section and Water section as Helper /

Labourer. It is further asserted in the reply that, no evidence is

produced to show that he was working in the Garden section or even

Water section. It is further pleaded that no specific date on which he

started working is also mentioned by him. It is further asserted that

since Reference is filed after about 15 years of inordinate delay from

the date of alleged termination, any relief even if his termination

appears to be or proves to be illegal, be refused when there is no

dispute alive. However, since 15.9.2010 with insertion of the provision

for making Reference by the individual workman directly before the

Court complaining about discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or

otherwise termination under Section 2A of 'the Act', a limitation of 3

years from the date of such termination is provided for. Therefore, it

was requested to reject the Reference filed by the petitioner-

workman.

2.4 After recording the evidence of both the sides, production and

proof of various documents and hearing the parties at length, the

Labour Court concluded that petitioner is the workman of the

C/SCA/6449/2021 JUDGMENT DATED: 24/06/2021

Respondent-Corporation. It is further held at para-15, page 53 that

before his services were terminated, he completed 240 days in a year.

It is further concluded at para-17, page 55 of the impugned judgment

and award that it has been proved that service of the petitioner is

terminated on 3.10.1999. However, after detailed discussion and

consideration of case laws submitted by the parties, the Reference

Court rejected the Reference on the ground of inordinate delay of 14

years after the termination without any explanation legal or

reasonable even prayed for.

3.1 Mr.U.T.Mishra, learned advocate for the petitioner submitted

that it was incumbent upon the Labour Court to adjudicate upon the

Industrial Dispute raised by the petitioner. It is further submitted that

though all the findings are recorded in favour of the petitioner being

workman of the respondent-Corporation, completion of 240 days

before a year of illegal termination dated 3.10.1999, the Labour Court

could not have rejected the Reference only on the ground of delay in

approaching it.

3.2 It is further submitted that the Labour Laws are social welfare

legislation for workmen and the rightful claim of the workmen should

not be defeated on technicalities like delay in filing the Reference.

       C/SCA/6449/2021                            JUDGMENT DATED: 24/06/2021



3.3      It is further submitted that there is no limitation provided for

filing Reference and therefore, Reference could not have been

rejected on the ground of delay.

3.4 It is further submitted that the Labour Court has ignored the

evidence adduced before it in rejecting the Reference.

3.5 It is further submitted that once the Reference is made, it is

mandatory statutory duty of the Labour Court to adjudicate the

dispute on merits instead of rejecting the same on the ground of

delay.

3.6 Mr.U.T.Mishra, learned advocate for the petitioner further

submitted that in the present case, Reference was made to the

Labour Court by the appropriate Government under Section 10 of 'the

Act'. Once Reference is made by the appropriate Government, it could

not have rejected by the Labour Court on the ground of delay.

3.7 In support of his submission, Mr.Mishra, learned advocate for

the petitioner relied on a decision in the case of Raghubir Singh

V/s. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in

(2014) 10 SCC 301 [Equivalent (2014) (0) AIJEL-SC 55657], more

particularly, para-33 thereof, in support of his argument that, once the

C/SCA/6449/2021 JUDGMENT DATED: 24/06/2021

Reference is made in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10

of 'the Act' by the State Government to the Labour Court for

adjudication of the Industrial Dispute, it is the mandatory statutory

duty of the Labour Court under Section 11A of 'the Act' to adjudicate

the dispute on merits on the basis of evidence produced on record.

3.8 He relied on a decision rendered in Misc. Civil Application

No. 1 of 2017 in Letters Patent Appeal No.906 of 2016 in the

case of Danjibhai Bhanabhai Alias Bhanjibhai Maru V/s. State

of Gujarat, in support of his argument that, instead of rejecting the

Reference of the workman on the ground of delay, relief ultimately to

be granted should have been moulded accordingly in view of the

delay caused. He read and referred paras 6, 12 and 19 in support of

his argument.

3.9 He next relied on a decision dated 30.12.2010 rendered by the

Division Bench of this Court rendered in Letters Patent Appeal

No.2290 of 2010 in the case of Bhavnagar Municipal

Corporation V/s. Dharmendra B. Vegad, in support of his

argument that, law of limitation will not apply to the disputes under

the Industrial Disputes Act and relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay. If there is a delay, the relief

ultimately to be granted to the workman be moulded accordingly

C/SCA/6449/2021 JUDGMENT DATED: 24/06/2021

even by denying back wages but it could not have been rejected on

the ground of delay.

3.10 Next he relied on a decision in the case of State of

Uttarakhand and Another V/s. Raj Kumar reported in AIR 2019

SC 310, in support of his submission that, even for raising dispute

almost after 25 years of alleged termination, proper course was to

award lump sum monetary compensation in full and final satisfaction

to the claim of his reinstatement as was done in the said case.

3.11 A decision in the case of Brambhatt Jayesh Bhupatray V/s.

State of Gujarat dated 13.3.2019 rendered in Letters Patent

Appeal No. 1554 of 2018 is pressed into service more particularly

paras 3 and 7 thereof to argue that, even on the ground of delay,

benefit of continuity in service cannot be denied.

3.12 He has further relied on a decision in the case of Rajasthan

State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur V/s. Phool Chand

reported in (2018) 18 SCC 299, to submit that though workman in

the said case was terminated after holding departmental inquiry on

the ground of dereliction of duties, the Labour Court converted the

punishment of removal from service to that of "stoppage/forfeit of

four annual grade increments without cumulative effect" and directed

C/SCA/6449/2021 JUDGMENT DATED: 24/06/2021

the reinstatement of the deceased workman in service with award of

full back wages. The said order was not interfered by the Supreme

Court except back wages was substituted to 50% instead of full back

wages as ordered by the Labour Court.

3.13 Mr.U.T.Mishra, learned advocate for the petitioner has relied on

a decision in the case of G.M.Haryana Roadways V/s. Pawan

Kumar reported in (2005) 12 SCC 459, in support of his submission

that the Reference could not have been rejected on the ground of

delay in raising dispute.

3.14 He also relied on a decision in the case of Singareni Collieries

Company Ltd. V/s. Ande Lingaiah reported in (2000) 10 SCC

294, in support of his submission to argue that, the Supreme Court

has permitted to file Reference under Section 2A(2) of 'the Act'

before the Central Labour Court without going into wider question of

the applicability of Section 2A(2) of 'the Act'.

3.15 In short, learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the

impugned judgment and award passed by the Labour Court is

required to be interfered with and deserves to be quashed and set

aside.

C/SCA/6449/2021 JUDGMENT DATED: 24/06/2021

4. From the record of the case, it is clear that the appropriate

Government did not make any Reference under Section 10 of 'the

Act'. One communication at page 14 referred by Mr.U.T.Mishra,

learned advocate for the petitioner reflects that he approached the

Assistant Labour Commissioner, Ahmedabad making complaint under

Section 2A of 'the Act' on 27.1.2014. Referring to page 15, which is an

application addressed to the appropriate Government, he prayed for

condonation of delay. In the said communication, he referred that he

is working with the Respondent-Corporation since last 4/5 years and

the details about his services were narrated in the claim form as

provided under Section 10(1) of 'the Act' addressed to the appropriate

Government. As such, no such claim form is forming part of record

either before the Labour Court or before this Court. What he

complained for is a complaint under Section 2A of 'the Act' and filled

in the form in respect thereof, which is at page 14 of the compilation.

5. From the impugned order, it is clear that petitioner made direct

Reference under Section 2A of 'the Act' before the Labour Court, as

advised by the Conciliation Officer, as communicated vide

communication dated 25.3.2014 by the Conciliation Officer and

Assistant Labour Commissioner. Therefore, on facts, Mr.U.T.Mishra,

learned advocate for the petitioner is unable to show that any

Reference under Section 10 of 'the Act', as claimed by him, was ever

C/SCA/6449/2021 JUDGMENT DATED: 24/06/2021

sent by appropriate Government to Labour Court for adjudication. On

the contrary, the order impugned speaks about Reference submitted

by the petitioner under Section 2A of 'the Act'. Therefore, the

submission on facts that it is Reference under Section 10 of 'the Act',

as submitted by Mr.Mishra, learned advocate for the petitioner, is

incorrect, which cannot be countenanced. The said submission is very

consciously made so as to come out of Limitation provided under Sub-

Section (3) of Section 2A of 'the Act'.

6. Although, no limitation is prescribed under 'the Act' for making

a reference under Section 10(1) of 'the Act' yet it is for the

appropriate Government to consider whether it is expedient or not to

make Reference. Laws of Limitation are not applicable to the

proceedings under 'the Act'. However, the policy of Industrial

adjudication is that very stale claims should not be generally

encouraged or allowed in as much as unless there is satisfactory

explanation for delay, apart from the obvious risk to industrial peace

from the entertainment of the claims after long lapse of time, it is also

necessary to take into account the unsettling effect which it is likely

to have on the employers' financial arrangements and to avoid

dislocation of an Industry. (kindly refer Prabhakar V/s. Joint

Director Sericulture Department and another reported in

2015(15) SCC 1). Therefore, though there is no period of limitation

C/SCA/6449/2021 JUDGMENT DATED: 24/06/2021

provided for making Reference under Section 10(1) of 'the Act' and

Law of Limitation is not applicable to the proceedings under 'the Act',

there are decisions taking view that, very stale cases, in absence of

any reasonable explanation, cannot be entertained and it could be

rejected on the ground of delay. Moulding of relief and denial of back

wages or part of wages on the ground of delay is altogether a

different thing than to entertain very stale cases when there is no live

link alive between the employee and employer.

7. In the present case, there is no evidence produced by the

petitioner to show that after his termination dated 3.10.1999, he

approached any one including the respondent, except his bare words,

that too, after about 15 years. It appears that after his termination, he

has abandoned the attempts and therefore, there is no live, real or

substantial link alive to the dispute with regard to the termination.

8. Since the inception of 'the Act', dismissal of individual workman

was not to be termed as Industrial Dispute. It has been recognized for

the first time with effect from 1.12.1965 when Legislature inserted

Section 2A by Act No.35 of 1965. For the first time, from that date,

discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination is deemed to be

industrial dispute, notwithstanding that, no other workman nor any

union of workmen is a party to the dispute. However, at that time, no

C/SCA/6449/2021 JUDGMENT DATED: 24/06/2021

limitation was provided for raising such individual industrial dispute

under Section 2A of 'the Act' before the Labour Court. It is for the first

time introduced by Act No.24 of 2010 with effect from 15.9.2010

whereby Section 2A was renumbered as Sub-Section (1), (2) and (3)

with effect from 15.9.2010 providing for limitation of 3 years from the

date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination in

service as specified in Sub-Section (1) of Section 2A of 'the Act'.

9. When there was no provision for limitation in making Reference

to the Labour Court, there are precedents by the Apex Court taking a

view that though no Limitation Act is applicable to the disputes under

'the Act', very stale claims may not be entertained and such claim is

required to be rejected on the ground of delay in absence of any link

alive with disputes itself. However, so far as individual industrial

dispute in the case of dismissal when there is specific limitation

provided for in approaching the Court, it can never be ignored by

anyone.

10. Apart from the provision under Sub-Section (3) of Section 2A to

be retrospective or prospective, even present individual industrial

dispute is also not referred to the Labour Court by the petitioner even

within 3 years from the insertion of Sub-Section (3) of Section 2A of

'the Act'.

C/SCA/6449/2021 JUDGMENT DATED: 24/06/2021

11. As such, there is an amendment even to Sub-Section (3) of

Section 2A of 'the Act' so far as its applicability to the State of Gujarat

is concerned, substituting period of '3 years' as mentioned in Sub-

Section (3) to 'one year' pursuant to Laobur Laws (Gujarat

Amendment) Act, 2015 vide Gujarat Act No.29 of 2015 with effect

from 30.9.2015. Though nothing much turns on it as individual

industrial dispute was raised by the petitioner directly before the

Labour Court in the year 2014, fact remains that, within 3 years from

the insertion of such limitation, no Reference is filed within the

limitation provided for filing it.

12. Though, tall claim is made by the petitioner that this is a

Reference under Section 10 of 'the Act' which learned advocate for

the petitioner is unable to answer in how and in what manner the

Reference can be said to be under Section 10 of 'the Act'. As

observed in the impugned award, no such Reference was sent by the

appropriate Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the same.

At the same time, when for the first time, petitioner approached the

office of the Assistant Labour Commissioner when he filled in claim

form for individual complaint on 27.1.2014, it is clear that he filled in

form as provided under Section 2A of 'the Act'.

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13. Learned Labour Court Judge, has, in para-18 of the impugned

judgment and award, very specifically mentioned that on a compliant

made on 27.1.2014 to the office of Assistant Labour Commissioner

wherein, on failure of conciliation proceedings, petitioner was, vide

communication dated 25.3.2014 by the Assistant Labour

Commissioner, informed to file individual industrial dispute directly

before the Labour Court under Section 2A of 'the Act'. Pursuant

thereto, the petitioner has filed the present Reference directly before

the Court under Section 2A of 'the Act' on 17.4.2014. By asserting

those attempts that this is a Reference under Section 10 of 'the Act'

as he approached the Assistant Labour Commissioner and conciliation

proceedings were initiated, it would become Reference under Section

10(1) of 'the Act', cannot be said to be a Reference under Section 10

of 'the Act'. Even communication addressed to the petitioner by the

office of the Assistant Labour Commissioner is also clear that instead

of making Reference under Section 10(1) of 'the Act', on failure of

conciliation, he was asked to approach directly the Labour Court for

his individual industrial dispute under Section 2A of 'the Act'. If at all,

the petitioner was aggrieved by such action, he could have

challenged that communication at the relevant time. As such, it is not

challengeable at all, as he is made aware of his right under 'the Act'

for his individual industrial dispute.

C/SCA/6449/2021 JUDGMENT DATED: 24/06/2021

14. Even Labour Court has referred and discussed in detail all the

precedents even on the question of delay cited on behalf of the

petitioner in detail and rejected the contention of the petitioner that

by suitably moulding the relief Reference be allowed instead of

rejecting his Reference on the ground of delay.

15. There is meaningful difference between Reference under

Section 10(1) of 'the Act' and Reference under Section 2A of 'the Act'.

Till the insertion of the provision under Section 2A of 'the Act' for an

individual industrial dispute, an individual was unable to directly

approach the Labour Court or to the appropriate Government, it was

only for collective action for collective benefit either through Union or

through other affected workmen, a Reference was being sent by the

appropriate Government. Therefore, individual right for an individual

industrial dispute in the case of dismissal from service under Section

2A of 'the Act' has come to be inserted but with limitation provided

therein for invoking the same. Once there is express limitation

provided for, there is no discretion left with any of the authority.

16. There is no evidence produced by the petitioner to show that

since the date of termination i.e. on 3.10.1999, said dispute, may be

individual, is alive by production of any material either before the

Labour Court or even before this Court, which shows that the

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petitioner has also acquiesced the dismissal or expressly abandoned

the right to challenge it or accepted the decision. That is the proof of

the fact that he has waived his right even to challenge his order of

termination. As referred to by the Labour Court in its impugned

judgment and award at internal page No.21 of the impugned award,

this Court in its two of the decisions by the Division Bench held that

estoppel, waiver and acquiescence is also applicable to the industrial

disputes as well. In absence of any specific provision of limitation

even delay and latches may also bar the remedy and therefore, when

there is a specific limitation provided for filing proceedings it has to be

filed within that period or not at all.

17. So far as reliance on the decision in the case of Raghubir

Singh (supra) more particularly, para-33 thereof is concerned, it

does not support the case of the petitioner on the ground of

limitation. It has been relied on to assert that once Reference is made

to the Labour Court for adjudication of the existing industrial disputes,

it is the mandatory statutory duty of it to adjudicate on merits on the

basis of evidence produced on record. The word 'on merits'

mentioned in it, is sought to be interpreted to the merits alone to

argue that it could not have been rejected on the ground of delay.

However, I fail to see any such precedent enumerated therein by the

Supreme Court. As such, Labour Court has answered each issue

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involved and on the contrary, held all the issues in his favour except

the issue of limitation. If claim by the petitioner is required to be

rejected on the basis of delay then also answering all the issues in

favour of the petitioner would not prevent Labour Court from rejecting

the Reference.

18. As such, Respondent-Corporation vide Exh.5 before the Labour

Court gave an application to determine the issue of delay as

preliminary issue but since it was to be determined on conclusion of

the evidence, it was not pressed at the relevant time as endorsed on

it as referred to in para-4 of the impugned decision.

19. So far as reliance placed on the decision of Danjibhai

Bhanabhai Alias Bhanjibhai Maru (supra) more particularly, paras

6, 12 and 19, it is clear that in para-6, there is submission of learned

advocate recorded therein. So far as para 12 thereof is concerned, it

again records the facts of that very case and the arguments advanced

therein. Whereas, para-19 is conclusion recorded by the Court while

interfering in a review proceedings on the facts of its own case. As

such, there is no law determined therein whether limitation would

apply to an individual industrial dispute to be filed under Section 2A of

'the Act' or not. However, the argument as recorded therein praying

to mould the relief rather than to reject the Reference on the ground

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of delay relying on the decision in case Shahaji V/s. Executive

Engineer, PWD reported in 2007 (115) FLR 674 is a decision not

determining issue in respect of limitation as provided under Section

2A of 'the Act'.

20. Next decision relied in the case of Bhavnagar Municipal

Corporation (supra) rendered in Letters Patent Appeal No. 2290 of

2010 is concerned, again a decision in the case of Ajaib Singh V/s.

the Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Porcessing Service

Society Ltd. (AIR 1999 SC 1351) is relied in it. It is again on issue

of delay where there is no express provision for it. Whereas, in the

present case, there is express provision providing limitation to prefer

a Reference / claim before the Labour Court in the case of individual

industrial dispute and therefore, such authority is also not applicable

at all.

21. The decision in the case of State of Uttarakhand (supra) is

concerned, it is not on issue of limitation. It is only relied on to argue

that dispute was raised after 25 years of an alleged termination,

despite that Supreme Court, instead of rejecting the Reference,

awarded lump sum monetary compensation in full and final

satisfaction of his claim of reinstatement. Again it is not a decision or

precedent on the issue of limitation which arises in the present case

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and therefore, a reliance placed on it, is misplaced.

22. Decision in the case of Brambhatt Jayesh Bhupatray (supra)

rendered in Letters Patent Appeal No.1554 of 2018 is concerned, it is

on the issue of benefit of continuity of service, which cannot be

denied on the ground of delay in making Reference. However, no such

issue arises in the present case and therefore, said authority is also

not on the point which learned advocate for the petitioner proposes to

canvas before this Court.

23. The reliance in the case of G.M.Haryana Roadways (supra)

is not an authority on the point of limitation provided under Section

2A of 'the Act' for filing direct Reference to the Labour Court for

individual industrial dispute. From the facts narrated in para-5 of the

aforesaid decision, it is clear that dispute was referred to the

Presiding Officer of the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court at Rohtak

on raising demand under Section 2A of 'the Act' before the Labour-

cum-Conciliation Officer. Limited issue involved in that case before

the Supreme Court was with regard to whether the grant of full back

wages was justified in the facts and circumstances of the case.

Therefore, it is clear that said case is not an authority on the point in

issue and therefore, the reliance placed by the petitioner on it, is

misplaced.

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24. Decision in the case of Singareni Collieries Company Ltd.

(supra) is not an authority on the issue of limitation determined by

the Supreme Court as provided in Sub-Section (3) of Section 2A of 'the

Act'. Since the workman therein was tossed from pillar to post from

the State Labour Court to Central Labour Court and 12 years elapsed

since dismissal of the workman on the ground of jurisdiction to

entertain the Reference, therefore, on conclusion, without going into

the wider question of applicability of Section 2-A Sub-Section (2) of

the Act as amended by the Andhra Pradesh State Legislature and

whether under the said amended provision a direct application would

lie to the State Labour Court by an employee of a company like the

workman, adjudication was entrusted to the Central Labour Court

functioning at Hyderabad. Further, it is directed by the Supreme Court

to dispose of the proceedings sent to the Central Labour Court,

Hyderabad on merits after hearing the parties at the earliest, making

it clear that it should be determined on merit without considering the

question of any delay in filing the proceedings. Such direction of the

Supreme Court appears to be under Article 142 of the Constitution of

India, jurisdiction for which is not given to this Court and therefore,

even relying on the said decision, it cannot be held that Reference

was within the period of limitation or it should be extended. Hence,

the aforesaid decision is also of no help to the petitioner.

C/SCA/6449/2021 JUDGMENT DATED: 24/06/2021

25. At any rate, I see no reason to interfere with the well reasoned

judgment and award and therefore, the Labour Court has rightly

rejected the Reference filed at the instance of petitioner under

Section 2A of 'the Act' beyond period of limitation irrespective of

retrospective or prospective operation of it. Therefore, this petition

fails and it is hereby summarily rejected.

(UMESH A. TRIVEDI, J) ASHISH M. GADHIYA