Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 8092 Guj
Judgement Date : 9 July, 2021
C/SCA/7162/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2021
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7162 of 2009
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE: Sd/-
HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE A. P. THAKER
================================================================
1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed No
to see the judgment ?
2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ? Yes
3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy No
of the judgment ?
4 Whether this case involves a substantial question No
of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution
of India or any order made thereunder ?
================================================================
STATE OF GUJARAT & 1 other(s)
Versus
SARDARSINH SABURSINH BARIYA
================================================================
Appearance:
MR SOAHAM JOSHI AGP (1) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1,2
MR PH PATHAK(665) for the Respondent(s) No. 1
MR RC PATHAK(666) for the Respondent(s) No. 1
RULE SERVED(64) for the Respondent(s) No. 1
================================================================
CORAM:HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE A. P. THAKER
Date : 09/07/2021
ORAL JUDGMENT
1. The present petition is filed under Articles 16, 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for the following prayers.
a. Be pleased to quash and set aside the award
C/SCA/7162/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2021
passed by the Learned Judge of Labour Court, Dahod in Reference I.C.B. No.59 of 2008 dated 6-11-08 by which the present petitioners directed to reinstate the workman - Orig.
respondent with 40% of back wages, other eligible benefits, with continuity of the services and pay Rs.3000/- as reference expenditure.
b. Be pleased to hold that the present petitioner institute does not fall under the definition of the industries as per the section 2(J) of the Industrial Disputes Act therefore there is no relationship of employer and employee between the present petitioner and respondent -
workman.
c. Pending hearing, admission of the present petition, your lordship may be pleased to grant stay of execution, implementation and operation of the operation of the order passed by the Learned Judge of the Labour Court, Dahold dated 6-11-2008 in Reference L.C.B. Case No.59/2008.
d. Be pleased to grant in other and further relief in the interest of justice.
2. Short facts leading to the present petition are that respondent herein has preferred the reference raising his grievance that he was retrenched by the petitioner - authority without giving notice or notice pay or retrenchment compensation. It was the stand of the workman that he was working in the department and he was carrying out the work permanent in nature even though his service was terminated. The workman has submitted that he was watchman and the service of 8 hours being taken from him and he was paid minimum wages. It was his grievance that no appointment letter or Identity Card or pay slip was issued to him. It was his
C/SCA/7162/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2021
allegation that he was working since 01.02.1988 and worked for more than 240 days in a year. According to him, the petitioners have terminated his service w.e.f. 17.07.1997 without paying any notice pay or retrenchment allowance or serving any notice. On all these basis, the workman has claimed for reinstatement along with continuity of service with full back wages.
3. The petitioners have contested the same on the grounds that the workman was taken as and when the work was available and he has not completed 240 days in the preceding year. It was contended that the work was not of a permanent in nature and the workman was working as daily wager and he was being paid daily wage. It is also the stand of the petitioners that on completion of work, he was relieved from the services. The other stand of the petitioners that it is not an industry and, there was no relationship between the petitioners and respondent as of employer and employee. The other contention of the petitioners was that the workman himself stopped to come on service.
4. After completion of evidence, the Labour Court passed the award dated 06.11.2008 in Reference (L.C.T.) No.59 of 2008 (Old) (New No. Reference (L.C.G.) No.507 of 2008) and directed the petitioners to reinstate the workman on his original post with continuity of service and also directed to pay 40% back wages with other eligible benefits, with continuity of the services and R.3000/- as cost.
5. Heard Mr.Soaham Joshi, learned Assistant Government Pleader for the petitioners and Ms.Reema Kamani, learned
C/SCA/7162/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2021
advocate with Mr.P. H. Pathak, learned advocate for the respondent at length through video conferencing.
6. Mr.Soaham Joshi, learned Assistant Government Pleader for the petitioners has vehemently submitted that the respondent - workman was working as watchman on need basis and the work was not of permanent in nature. He has submitted that the workman has not completed 240 days in a calendar year. He has submitted that the work was being on seasonal basis and he was never appointed on regular basis and the workman was daily wager. According to him, the workman has also admitted that he was working on daily wager. According to the learned Assistant Government Pleader, if the version of the workman that he was relieved in the year 1997 is believed, even then, there is huge delay in filing the alleged reference which has been filed in the year 2008. According to him, thus, there is delay of almost 11 years and, therefore, the award passed by the Labour Court is not factually and legally tenable. He has submitted that since there is huge delay and workman himself has stopped in coming to service, the Labour Court ought to have dismissed the reference instead of granting permanency. While relying upon the decision in the case of Prabhakar Vs. Joint Director, Sericulture Department and another, (2015) 15 SCC 1, he has prayed to allow the present petition and to quash and set aside the impugned award passed by the Labour Court.
7. Per contra, Ms.Reema Kamani, learned advocate with Mr.P. H. Pathak, learned advocate for the respondent has submitted
C/SCA/7162/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2021
that the Labour Court has properly appreciated the evidence on record and has come to the right conclusion. She has submitted that though there is delay of 11 years in preferring the reference, the workman is entitled to get reinstatement as the present petitioners have not followed the legal provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. She has submitted that now, it is well settled that the Forest Department is an industry and, therefore, the stand of the petitioners that it is not an industry and there is no relationship between the petitioners and respondent as employer and employee is devoid on merits. She has submitted that the decision relied upon by the learned Assistant Government Pleader is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. She has submitted that the stand taken by the petitioner herein regarding illegal appointment of the workman is concerned, the same was not pleaded before the Labour Court and, therefore, this ground cannot be considered at this stage. She has urged to dismiss the present petition and confirm the award passed by the Labour Court. She has relied upon the following decisions:-
a. Harjinder Singh Vs. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, (2010) 3 SCC 192;
b. Anoop Sharma Vs. Executive Engineer,
Public Health Division No.1, Panipat
(Haryana), (2010) 5 SCC 497;
c. Devinder Singh Vs. Municipal Council,
Sanaur, (2011) 6 SCC 584;
d. Deepali Gundu Surwase Vs. Kranti Junior
C/SCA/7162/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2021
Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.ED.) and
others, (2013) 10 SCC 324;
8. In the case of Prabhakar (supra), the Apex Court, while dealing with the scope of Section 10(1) and 2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, has observed that whether dispute is alive or it has become stale/non-existent at the time when the workman approaches the appropriate Government is an aspect which would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and there cannot be any hard and fast rule regarding the time for making the order of reference can be laid down. It was also observed therein that relief can be denied on the ground of unexplained delay and laches and/or on the presumption that such person has waived his right or acquiesced and also to safeguard industrial peace. It was further observed that where the Court finds existence of dispute still existed, though raised belatedly, it is always open to the court to take the aspect of delay into consideration and mould the relief accordingly. In such cases, it is still open for the court to either grant reinstatement without back wages or lesser back wages or grant compensation instead of reinstatement. It was also observed therein that the law of limitation does not apply to the industrial dispute. That the Limitation Act does not apply to the proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act and under the Industrial Disputes Act no period of limitation is prescribed. It was also observed that in some decisions where the reference was made after a lapse of considerable period, the Court did not set aside the reference but moulded the relief by either granting reinstatement but denying
C/SCA/7162/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2021
back wages, fully or partially, or else granted compensation, denying reinstatement.
9. In the case of Harjinder Singh (supra), the Apex Court has observed that if there is no pleadings regarding initial appointment being illegal, the same cannot be considered by the High Court. It is observed in para-16 that it is settled law that for attracting the applicability of Section 25-G of the Act, the workman is not required to prove that he had worked for a period of 240 days during twelve calendar months preceding the termination of his service and it is sufficient for him to plead and prove that while effecting retrenchment, the employer violated the rule of `last come first go' without any tangible reason.
9.1 The Apex Court has observed in the aforesaid decision in para-17 as under:-
"17. In Central Bank of India v. S. Satyam, (1996) 5 SCC 419, this Court considered an analogous issue in the context of Section 25-H of the Act, which casts a duty upon the employer to give an opportunity to the retrenched workmen to offer themselves for re- employment on a preferential basis. It was argued on behalf of the bank that an offer of re-employment envisages in Section 25-H should be confined only to that category of retrenched workmen who are covered by Section 25-F and a restricted meaning should be given to the term "retrenchment" as defined in Section 2(oo)."
9.2 The Apex Court has, while dealing with distinction between Section 25-F and 25-G of the Act, observed in para-20 as under:-
C/SCA/7162/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2021
20. The distinction between Section 25-F and 25-G of the Act was recently reiterated in Bhogpur Coop. Sugar Mills Ltd v. Harmesh Kumar, (2006) 13 SCC 28, in the following words: (SCC p.31, para 9)
"9. We are not oblivious of the distinction in regard to the legality of the order of termination in a case where Section 25-F of the Act applies on the one hand, and a situation where Section 25-G thereof applies on the other. Whereas in a case where Section 25-F of the Act applies the workman is bound to prove that he had been in continuous service of 240 days during twelve months preceding the order of termination; in a case where he invokes the provisions of Section 25-G and Section 25-H thereof he may not have to establish the said fact. See: Central Bank of India v. S. Satyam, (1996) 5 SCC 419, Sasmishta Dube v. City Road, Etawah, (1999) 3 SCC 14, SBI v. Rakesh Kumar Tewari, (2006) 1 SCC 530 and Jaipur Development Authority v. Ramsahai, (2006) 11 SCC 684."
10. In the case of Anoop Sharma (supra), regarding non- compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Apex Court has observed in paras-16 to 20 as under:-
"16. An analysis of the above reproduced provisions shows that no workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer can be retrenched by that employer until the conditions enumerated in Clauses
(a) and (b) of Section 25-F of the Act are satisfied. In terms of clause (a), the employer is required to give to the workman one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment or pay him wages in lieu of the notice. Clause (b) casts a duty upon the employer to pay to the workman at the time of retrenchment, compensation equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months.
C/SCA/7162/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2021
17. This Court has repeatedly held that Section 25- F(a) and (b) of the Act is mandatory and non- compliance thereof renders the retrenchment of an employee nullity - State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1960 SC 610, Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay, AIR 1964 SC 1617, SBI v. N. Sundara Money, (1976) 1 SCC 822, Santosh Gupta v. State bank of Patiala, (1980) 3 SCC 340, Mohan Lal v. Bharat Electronics Ltd., (1981) 3 SCC 225, L. Robert D'Souza v. Southern Railway, (1982) 1 SCC 645, Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour, (1980) 4 SCC 443, Gammon India Ltd. v. Niranjan Dass, (1984) 1 SCC 509, Gurmail Singh v. State of Punjab, (1991) 1 SCC 189 and Pramod Jha v. State of Bihar, (2003) 4 SCC
619.
18. This Court has used different expressions for describing the consequence of terminating a workman's service/employment/ engagement by way of retrenchment without complying with the mandate of Section 25-F of the Act. Sometimes it has been termed as ab initio void, sometimes as illegal per se, sometimes as nullity and sometimes as non est. Leaving aside the legal semantics, we have no hesitation to hold that termination of service of an employee by way of retrenchment without complying with the requirement of giving one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof and compensation in terms of Section 25-F (a) and (b) has the effect of rendering the action of the employer as nullity and the employee is entitled to continue in employment as if his service was not terminated.
19. The question whether the offer to pay wages in lieu of one month's notice and retrenchment compensation in terms of Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25-F must accompany the letter of termination of service by way of retrenchment or it is sufficient that the employer should make a tangible offer to pay the amount of wages and compensation to the workman before he ask to go was considered in National Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. State of W.B., AIR 1967 SC 1206. The facts of that case were that the workman was given notice dated 15.11.1958 for termination of his service with effect from 17.11.1958.
C/SCA/7162/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2021
In the notice, it was mentioned that the workman would get one month's wages in lieu of notice and he was asked to collect his dues from the cash office on 20.11.1958 or thereafter during the working hours. The argument of the Additional Solicitor General that there was sufficient compliance of Section 25-F was rejected by this Court by making the following observations:
"9. The third point raised by the Additional Solicitor- General is also not one of substance. According to him, retrenchment could only be struck down if it was mala fide or if it was shown that there was victimisation of the workman etc. Learned counsel further argued that the Tribunal had gone wrong in holding that the retrenchment was illegal as Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act had not been complied with. Under that section, a workman employed in any industry should not be retrenched until he had been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice had expired, or the workman had been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice. The notice in this case bears the date November 15, 1958. It is to the effect that the addressee's services were terminated with effect from 17th November and that he would get one month's wages in lieu of notice of termination of his service. The workman was further asked to collect his dues from the cash office on November 20, 1958 or thereafter during the working hours. Manifestly, Section 25-F, had not been complied with under which it was incumbent on the employer to pay the workman, the wages for the period of the notice in lieu of the notice. That is to say, if he was asked to go forthwith he had to be paid at the time when he was asked to go and could not be asked to collect his dues afterwards. As there was no compliance with Section 25-F, we need not consider the other points raised by the learned counsel."
20. In SBI v. N. Sundara Money, the Court emphasised that the workman cannot be retrenched without payment, at the time of retrenchment, compensation computed in terms of Section 25-F(b)."
C/SCA/7162/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2021
10.1 The Apex Court has further observed in paras-21 and 25 as under:-
21. The legal position has been beautifully summed up in Pramod Jha v. State of Bihar, (supra) in the following words: (SCC pp. 624-25, para 10)
"10....The underlying object of Section 25-F is twofold. Firstly, a retrenched employee must have one month's time available at his disposal to search for alternate employment, and so, either he should be given one month's notice of the proposed termination or he should be paid wages for the notice period. Secondly, the workman must be paid retrenchment compensation at the time of retrenchment, or before, so that once having been retrenched there should be no need for him to go to his employer demanding retrenchment compensation and the compensation so paid is not only a reward earned for his previous services rendered to the employer but is also a sustenance to the worker for the period which may be spent in searching for another employment. Section 25-F nowhere speaks of the retrenchment compensation being paid or tendered to the worker along with one month's notice; on the contrary, clause
(b) expressly provides for the payment of compensation being made at the time of retrenchment and by implication it would be permissible to pay the same before retrenchment. Payment or tender of compensation after the time when the retrenchment has taken effect would vitiate the retrenchment and non-compliance with the mandatory provision which has a beneficial purpose and a public policy behind it would result in nullifying the retrenchment."
22. If the workman is retrenched by an oral order or communication or he is simply asked not to come for duty, the employer will be required to lead tangible and substantive evidence to prove compliance of Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25-F of the Act.
23. The stage is now set for considering whether the respondent had offered compensation to the appellant
C/SCA/7162/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2021
before discontinuing his engagement/employment, which amounts to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Act. In his statement, the appellant categorically stated that before discontinuing his service, the respondent did not give him notice pay and retrenchment compensation. Shri Ram Chander, who appeared as the sole witness on behalf of the respondent stated that the compensation amounting to Rs.5,491/- was offered to the appellant along with letter Ext. M-1, but he refused to accept the same. The respondent did not examine any other witness to corroborate the testimony of Ram Chander and no contemporaneous document was produced to prove that the compensation was offered to the appellant on 25.4.1998. Not only this, the respondent did not explain as to why the demand draft was sent to the appellant after more than three months of his alleged refusal to accept the compensation on 25.4.1998.
24. If there was any grain of truth in the respondent's assertion that the compensation was offered to the appellant on 25.4.1998 and he refused to accept the same, there could be no justification for not sending the demand draft by post immediately after the appellant's refusal to accept the offer of compensation. The minimum which the respondent ought to have done was to produce the letter with which draft was sent at the appellant's residence. The contents of that letter would have shown whether the offer of compensation was made to the appellant on 25.4.1998 and he refused to accept the same. However, the fact of the matter is that no such document was produced. Therefore, we are convinced that the finding recorded by the Labour Court on the issue of non- compliance of Section 25-F of the Act was based on correct appreciation of the pleadings and evidence of the parties and the High Court committed serious error by setting aside the award of reinstatement.
25. The judgment of the Constitution Bench in Secretary, State of Karnataka vs. Uma Devi (supra) and other decisions in which this Court considered the right of casual, daily wage, temporary and ad hoc employees to be regularised/continued in service or
C/SCA/7162/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2021
paid salary in the regular time scale, appears to have unduly influenced the High Court's approach in dealing with the appellant's challenge to the award of the Labour Court. In our view, none of those judgments has any bearing on the interpretation of Section 25-F of the Act and employer's obligation to comply with the conditions enumerated in that section.
11. In the case of Devinder Singh (supra), the Apex Court has observed in paras-17, 18 and 19 as under:-
"17. Section 25-F is couched in a negative form. It impose a restriction on the employer's right to retrench a workman and lays down that no workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched until he has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has also been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months and notice in the prescribed manner has been served upon the appropriate Government or the authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.
18. This Court has repeatedly held that the provisions contained in Sections 25-F(a) and (b) are mandatory and termination of the service of a workman, which amounts to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) without giving one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof and retrenchment compensation is null and void / illegal / inoperative. State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1960 SC 610, Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay, AIR 1964 SC 1617, SBI v. N. Sundara Money, (1976) 1 SCC 822, Santosh Gupta v. State bank of Patiala, (1980) 3 SCC 340, Mohan Lal v. Bharat Electronics Ltd., (1981) 3 SCC 225, L. Robert D'Souza v. Southern Railway, (1982) 1 SCC 645, Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central
C/SCA/7162/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2021
Govt. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour, (1980) 4 SCC 443, Gammon India Ltd. v. Niranjan Dass, (1984) 1 SCC 509, Gurmail Singh v. State of Punjab, (1991) 1 SCC 189 and Pramod Jha v. State of Bihar, (2003) 4 SCC 619.
19. In Anoop Sharma v. Public Health Division, the Court considered the effect of violation of Section 25- F, referred to various precedents on the subject and held the termination of service of a workman without complying with the mandatory provisions contained in Sections 25-F(a) and (b) should ordinarily result in his reinstatement.
12. In the case of Deepali Gundu Surwase (supra), the Apex Court has, while dealing with the reinstatement, observed in para-22 as under:-
22. The very idea of restoring an employee to the position which he held before dismissal or removal or termination of service implies that the employee will be put in the same position in which he would have been but for the illegal action taken by the employer. The injury suffered by a person, who is dismissed or removed or is otherwise terminated from service cannot easily be measured in terms of money. With the passing of an order which has the effect of severing the employer employee relationship, the latter's source of income gets dried up. Not only the concerned employee, but his entire family suffers grave adversities. They are deprived of the source of sustenance. The children are deprived of nutritious food and all opportunities of education and advancement in life. At times, the family has to borrow from the relatives and other acquaintance to avoid starvation. These sufferings continue till the competent adjudicatory forum decides on the legality of the action taken by the employer. The reinstatement of such an employee, which is preceded by a finding of the competent judicial/quasi judicial body or Court that the action taken by the employer is ultra vires the relevant statutory provisions or the
C/SCA/7162/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2021
principles of natural justice, entitles the employee to claim full back wages. If the employer wants to deny back wages to the employee or contest his entitlement to get consequential benefits, then it is for him/her to specifically plead and prove that during the intervening period the employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same emoluments. Denial of back wages to an employee, who has suffered due to an illegal act of the employer would amount to indirectly punishing the concerned employee and rewarding the employer by relieving him of the obligation to pay back wages including the emoluments.
12.1 In the said decision, the Apex Court has also culled out the preposition for deciding the issue of the back wages and has observed as under:-
The propositions which can be culled out from the aforementioned judgments are:
i) In cases of wrongful termination of service, reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages is the normal rule.
ii) The aforesaid rule is subject to the rider that while deciding the issue of back wages, the adjudicating authority or the Court may take into consideration the length of service of the employee/workman, the nature of misconduct, if any, found proved against the employee/workman, the financial condition of the employer and similar other factors.
iii) Ordinarily, an employee or workman whose services are terminated and who is desirous of getting back wages is required to either plead or at least make a statement before the adjudicating authority or the Court of first instance that he/she was not gainfully employed or was employed on lesser wages.
If the employer wants to avoid payment of full back
C/SCA/7162/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2021
wages, then it has to plead and also lead cogent evidence to prove that the employee/workman was gainfully employed and was getting wages equal to the wages he/she was drawing prior to the termination of service. This is so because it is settled law that the burden of proof of the existence of a particular fact lies on the person who makes a positive averments about its existence. It is always easier to prove a positive fact than to prove a negative fact. Therefore, once the employee shows that he was not employed, the onus lies on the employer to specifically plead and prove that the employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same or substantially similar emoluments.
iv) The cases in which the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal exercises power under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and finds that even though the enquiry held against the employee/workman is consistent with the rules of natural justice and / or certified standing orders, if any, but holds that the punishment was disproportionate to the misconduct found proved, then it will have the discretion not to award full back wages. However, if the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal finds that the employee or workman is not at all guilty of any misconduct or that the employer had foisted a false charge, then there will be ample justification for award of full back wages.
v) The cases in which the competent Court or Tribunal finds that the employer has acted in gross violation of the statutory provisions and/or the principles of natural justice or is guilty of victimizing the employee or workman, then the concerned Court or Tribunal will be fully justified in directing payment of full back wages. In such cases, the superior Courts should not exercise power under Article 226 or 136 of the Constitution and interfere with the award passed by the Labour Court, etc., merely because there is a possibility of forming a different opinion on the entitlement of the employee/workman to get full back wages or the employer's obligation to pay the same. The Courts must always be kept in view that in the
C/SCA/7162/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2021
cases of wrongful / illegal termination of service, the wrongdoer is the employer and sufferer is the employee/workman and there is no justification to give premium to the employer of his wrongdoings by relieving him of the burden to pay to the employee/workman his dues in the form of full back wages.
vi) In a number of cases, the superior Courts have interfered with the award of the primary adjudicatory authority on the premise that finalization of litigation has taken long time ignoring that in majority of cases the parties are not responsible for such delays. Lack of infrastructure and manpower is the principal cause for delay in the disposal of cases. For this the litigants cannot be blamed or penalised. It would amount to grave injustice to an employee or workman if he is denied back wages simply because there is long lapse of time between the termination of his service and finality given to the order of reinstatement. The Courts should bear in mind that in most of these cases, the employer is in an advantageous position vis-à-vis the employee or workman. He can avail the services of best legal brain for prolonging the agony of the sufferer, i.e., the employee or workman, who can ill afford the luxury of spending money on a lawyer with certain amount of fame. Therefore, in such cases it would be prudent to adopt the course suggested in Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd., (1979) 2 SCC 80.
vii) The observation made in J. K. Synthetics Ltd. Case, (2007) 2 SCC 433 that on reinstatement the employee/workman cannot claim continuity of service as of right is contrary to the ratio of the judgments of three Judge Benches referred to hereinabove and cannot be treated as good law. This part of the judgment is also against the very concept of reinstatement of an employee/workman.
12.2 In the said decision, the Apex Court, while referred to the decision rendered by the three Judges Bench in the case of Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd v. Employees, (1979) 2 SCC
C/SCA/7162/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2021
80, has observed in para-23 as under:-
"23. A somewhat similar issue was considered by a three Judge Bench in Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. v.
Employees, (1979) 2 SCC 80 in the context of termination of services of 56 employees by way of retrenchment due to alleged non-availability of the raw material necessary for utilization of full installed capacity by the petitioner. The dispute raised by the employees resulted in award of reinstatement with full back wages. This Court examined the issue at length and held: (SCC pp. 85-86, paras 9 and 11)
"9. It is no more open to debate that in the field of industrial jurisprudence a declaration can be given that the termination of service is bad and the workman continues to be in service. The spectre of common law doctrine that contract of personal service cannot be specifically enforced or the doctrine of mitigation of damages does not haunt in this branch of law. The relief of reinstatement with continuity of service can be granted where termination of service is found to be invalid. It would mean that the employer has taken away illegally the right to work of the workman contrary to the relevant law or in breach of contract and simultaneously deprived the workman of his earnings. If thus the employer is found to be in the wrong as a result of which the workman is directed to be reinstated, the employer could not shirk his responsibility of paying the wages which the workman has been deprived of by the illegal or invalid action of the employer. Speaking realistically, where termination of service is questioned as invalid or illegal and the workman has to go through the gamut of litigation, his capacity to sustain himself throughout the protracted litigation is itself such an awesome factor that he may not survive to see the day when relief is granted. More so in our system where the law's proverbial delay has become stupefying. If after such a protracted time and energy consuming litigation during which period the workman just sustains himself, ultimately he is to be told that though he will be reinstated, he will be denied the back wages which would be due to him, the workman would be subjected to a sort of penalty for no fault of his and it is wholly undeserved. Ordinarily, therefore, a workman whose service has been illegally terminated would be entitled to full back wages except to the extent he was gainfully employed during the enforced idleness. That is the normal rule. Any other view would be
C/SCA/7162/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2021
a premium on the unwarranted litigative activity of the employer. If the employer terminates the service illegally and the termination is motivated as in this case viz. to resist the workmen's demand for revision of wages, the termination may well amount to unfair labour practice. In such circumstances reinstatement being the normal rule, it should be followed with full back wages. Articles 41 and 43 of the Constitution would assist us in reaching a just conclusion in this respect. By a suitable legislation, to wit, the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the State has endeavoured to secure work to the workmen. In breach of the statutory obligation the services were terminated and the termination is found to be invalid; the workmen though willing to do the assigned work and earn their livelihood, were kept away therefrom. On top of it they were forced to litigation up to the Apex Court now they are being told that something less than full back wages should be awarded to them. If the services were not terminated the workmen ordinarily would have continued to work and would have earned their wages. When it was held that the termination of services was neither proper nor justified, it would not only show that the workmen were always willing to serve but if they rendered service they would legitimately be entitled to the wages for the same. If the workmen were always ready to work but they were kept away therefrom on account of an invalid act of the employer, there is no justification for not awarding them full back wages which were very legitimately due to them.
* * *
11. In the very nature of things there cannot be a strait- jacket formula for awarding relief of back wages. All relevant considerations will enter the verdict. More or less, it would be a motion addressed to the discretion of the Tribunal. Full back wages would be the normal rule and the party objecting to it must establish the circumstances necessitating departure. At that stage the Tribunal will exercise its discretion keeping in view all the relevant circumstances. But the discretion must be exercised in a judicial and judicious manner. The reason for exercising discretion must be cogent and convincing and must appear on the face of the record. When it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authority, that something is to be done according to the Rules of reason and justice, according to law and not humour. It is not to be arbitrary, vague and fanciful but legal and regular." (emphasis supplied)"
C/SCA/7162/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2021
After enunciating the above-noted principles, this Court took cognizance of the appellant's plea that the company is suffering loss and, therefore, the workmen should make some sacrifice and modified the award of full back wages by directing that the workmen shall be entitled to 75 % of the back wages.
13. Having considered the submissions made by learned advocates for both the sides coupled with the aforesaid decisions relied upon by both the sides and the materials placed on record, it transpires that the workman has raised dispute on the ground that he was serving with the present petitioner - department and he was working honestly and sincerely in the department and worked for 240 days in a year and the work allotted to him is permanent in nature even though his services were terminated without giving any notice, notice pay or retrenchment compensation. It also appears that the dispute was initially considered by the conciliation proceedings but upon failure thereof, the same was referred to the Labour Court by the Labour Commissioner for reference wherein the petitioners herein have filed reply and have contended that the employee was not working in the department for whole period and he was being called as and when the work was available and he has not completed 240 days in a year. It is contended by the department that the work assigned to the workman was not permanent in nature and the activity was being of a daily wager and he was being paid the daily wage. It is contended by the department that after completion of the said work, the daily wagers are relieved from the service. It was one of the contention raised by the petitioner that "Forest Department" is not an Industry and
C/SCA/7162/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2021
there is no relationship between the parties that of employer and employee. The other contention raised by the department was that the workman himself stopped to come on work and, therefore, it was contended that the reference may be rejected. Further, it was also contended that the activity carried out by the department is seasonal work and not in permanent nature.
14. On perusal of the impugned award, it appears that the Labour Court has dealt with all the issues raised by the both the side and on the basis of the evidence on record has observed that there is no dispute between the parties that the workman was working as daily wager and the same fact has been supported by the statement produced at Exhibit 22. It is also pertinent to note that the department has not raised the dispute that the workman is not within the definition of Section 2(s) of the I.D. Act. On perusal of the materials placed on record, it clearly transpires that the workman covers within the definition of "workman" as defined in the I.D. Act.
15. It is also pertinent to note that as per the defence raised by the department, the workman was working as daily wager and as and when the work was over his service came to an end. It is also stand of the department that the workman has stopped to come on service and the department has not terminated him from the service, whereas, as per the version of the workman, he has worked from 01.12.1988 to 17.07.1997 and has performed duty for 240 days in a calendar years. It also reveals from the documentary evidence produced by the department that the workman has worked from 1988 till 1997. This fact clearly
C/SCA/7162/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2021
established that the workman has worked for more than five years.
16. In catena of decisions, it is, now, well settled that the Forest Department is an industry within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act as the activity carried out by the Forest Department as alleged in the petition is definitely industrial activities. Therefore, the submissions made on behalf of the Forest Department is devoid of merits.
17. It also appears from the observations made by the Labour Court that the contradictory plea has been raised by the department. At one hand Department has stated that the workman was employed on need basis as daily wager. Whereas, on the other hand, it is alleged that workman voluntarily ceased to come on services. It also appears from the reasons that there is there is clear breach of Section 25-F of the I.D. Act as no notice or notice pay or retrenchment allowance was given / paid to the workman. In that view of the matter, the Labour Court has granted reinstatement with 40% back wages with continuity of service.
18. Now, so far as the observations of the Labour Court regarding the breach of Section 25-F of the I.D. Act is concerned, the same is sustainable in the eyes of law.
19. Considering the facts that the workman was terminated w.e.f. 17.07.1997 and he has preferred reference in the year 2008, there is delay of 11 years which has not been explained by
C/SCA/7162/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2021
the petitioners. Further, as observed by the Labour Court, there is breach of Section 25-F of the I.D. Act. In view of the provisions of Section 25-F of the I.D. Act, there is necessity of issuance of notice or notice pay or retrenchment allowance to the workman.
20. Further, it is pertinent to note that the Labour Court has granted 40% back wages only on the basis of the oral statement of the workman that during the interregnum period i.e. almost 11 years from the date of termination of service, he is unemployed. The same cannot be believed. It is well settled that so far as payment of back wages is concerned, it is not automatic. The workman has to lead some evidence in support thereof. It is not the duty of the employer to prove that the workman was serving elsewhere. It is for the workman prima facie, to lead evidence regarding his non-employment. But, during this case, except his bare words there is no evidence on record. Therefore, the order of the Labour Court granting the back wages is not in consonance with the law and same is erroneous one.
21. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the considered opinion that there is a breach of Section 25-F of the I.D. Act and as there is a delay of 11 years in preferring the reference, instead of granting reinstatement a lump sum amount as full and final settlement will serve the end of justice.
22. Now, admittedly, no notice or notice pay or retrenchment allowance has been given by the employer to the workman. However, though there is breach of the mandatory provisions of
C/SCA/7162/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2021
Section 25 of the I.D. Act, the regularization of service of the workman cannot be ipso facto. It is also pertinent to note that much time has already been passed and almost 24 years has passed from the date of retrenchment of the workman. In that view of the matter and considering the age of the workman, the possibility of his reaching superannuation cannot be ruled out. Therefore, considering the peculiar facts of this case and the observation made by the Apex Court in the case of Prabhakar Vs. Joint Director, Sericulture Department and another, (2015) 15 SCC 1, the order for reinstatement does not required to be passed. However, the workman can be awarded lump sum amount of compensation for non-observation of the mandatory provisions by the employer. Therefore, Considering the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Tapash Paul Vs. BSNL and another reported in 2016 (1) Scale 92 and BSNL Vs. Bhurumal reported in 2014 (7) SCC 177, this Court is of the view that in the facts of this case granting of relief of reinstatement after a gap of almost 24 years, no useful purpose will be served.
23. In view of the above, this Court deems fit it to grant of compensation of Rs.50,000/- as full and final settlement in lieu of the reinstatement. Such amount needs to be paid to the workman by the employer after proper verification of the identify by an account payee cheque / pay order within a period of three months from the date of receipt of this order, failing which the workman shall be entitled to get interest at the rate of 6% from today till the date of actual realization. It is observed that the aforesaid amount is in addition to whatsoever paid to him.
C/SCA/7162/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2021
24. With the aforesaid conclusion, the petition stands disposed of. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. No order as to costs.
Sd/-
(DR. A. P. THAKER, J) V.R. PANCHAL
Publish Your Article
Campus Ambassador
Media Partner
Campus Buzz
LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026
LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!