Kalotara Jagdishbhai Alias Jaga ... vs Gujarat Sheep And Wool ...
2021 Latest Caselaw 7486 Guj

     C/SCA/4415/2010                             JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2021




             IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD


               R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 4415 of 2010
                                   With
               R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 9581 of 2010


FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE: Sd/-


HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE A. P. THAKER


================================================================

1     Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed                 No
      to see the judgment ?

2     To be referred to the Reporter or not ?                          No

3     Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy                No
      of the judgment ?

4     Whether this case involves a substantial question                No
      of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution
      of India or any order made thereunder ?

================================================================
       KALOTARA JAGDISHBHAI ALIAS JAGA LAXAMNSINH RABARI
                             Versus
     GUJARAT SHEEP AND WOOL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LTD
================================================================
Appearance:
MR MUKESH H RATHOD(2432) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
MS SONA SAGAR(1778) for the Respondent(s) No. 1
================================================================

    CORAM:HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE A. P. THAKER

                             Date : 02/07/2021

                            ORAL JUDGMENT

1. The workman has preferred Special Civil Application

No.4415 of 2010 under Articles 14, 16, 226 and 227 of the

C/SCA/4415/2010 JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2021

Constitution of India against the award dated 31.08.2009 passed

by the Labour Court, Rajkot in Reference (LCR) No.238 of 1995.

Whereas, the employer has preferred Special Civil Application

No.9581 of 2010 against the same award granting lump sum

amount of Rs.20,000/- in lieu of reinstatement to the workman.

2. For the sake of brevity and convenience, the parties are

referred to as the "workman" and the "employer".

3. Since both the petitions have arisen out of the same award,

both the petitions has been ordered to be clubbed and Special

Civil Application No.9581 of 2010 was ordered to be heard with

Special Civil Application No.4415 of 2010. The facts of both the

petitions are common.

4. It is the case of the workman that he has preferred the

reference before the Labour Court on the ground that he was

working as a Shepherd with the employer since 1986 and he has

worked for more than 240 days in each year and he was getting

minimum wages on monthly basis. It is also the case of the

workman that he came to be orally terminated without following

the mandatory procedure of law contemplated under Section 25-

F, G and H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter be

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referred to as the "I.D. Act."). It is contended by the workman

that he has filed Statement of Claim and produced necessary

documentary evidence and the deposition as well as also filed its

reply and also produced oral evidence thereupon. It is contended

that the Labour Court has not considered the oral evidence.

Ultimately, the Labour Court has passed the award directing the

employer to pay lump sum amount of compensation of

Rs.20,000/- instead of granting reinstatement and back wages of

interim period. According to him, there is evidence on record to

show that the work is available with the employer and at the

time of termination, the other person was continued in service

for the same work and new persons were appointed in his place

and, therefore, the Labour Court ought to have granted

reinstatement with all back wages.

5. The employer has categorically submitted that it is not an

"industry" and, therefore, the Industrial Act would not apply to

the facts of the present case. It is contended that there was a

delay of almost seven years in filing the reference before the

Labour Court and, therefore, the award ought to have been

passed in favour of the employer. It is contended that since, the

employer does not fall within the definition of the 'industry', the

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same does not apply to the facts of the present case and,

therefore, the observation of the Labour Court in granting lump

sum amount of compensation is not in consonance with the law

and it ought to have rejected the claim of the workman. It is

contended that the workman was not recruited in a regular

manner and he was working as daily wager as Shepherd but he

did not hold any sanctioned post and he has worked as a daily

wager for less than 240 days. According to the employer, the

award passed by the Labour Court is ex facie illegal and

improper and, therefore, it is required to be interfered with by

this Court.

6. Heard Mr.Mukesh Rathod, learned advocate for the

workman and Ms.Sona Sagar, learned advocate for the employer

at length through video conferencing.

7. Mr.Mukesh Rathod, learned advocate for the workman has

vehemently submitted that though there is an ample evidence

on record to show that the workman was serving with the

employer and before termination of his service, no any legal

procedure was followed by the employer and, therefore, in view

of Section 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the I.D. Act, the Labour Court

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ought to have passed an order for reinstatement of the workman

with full back wages. While referring to the documentary

evidence of the workman, he has submitted that the employer

has neither produced oral evidence nor documentary evidence

though it was specifically demanded. He has submitted that

before filing the reference, there is conciliation proceeding

initiated, but, no settlement was arrived at between the parties

and, thereafter, the workman has filed the reference and for that

purpose, whatever delay is occurred, has no bearing on the

evidence of the workman that he was working with the employer.

He has submitted that the Labour Court has given contradictory

reasoning in its award. He has submitted that the Labour Court

has granted lump sum amount of compensation of Rs.20,000/-

which is not in consonance with the facts and circumstances of

the case.

7.1 Mr.Rathod, learned advocate for the workman has relied

upon the following decisions for his arguments for granting

reinstatement with full back wages to the workman.

(1) Ajaib Singh Vs. Sirhind Cooperative Marketing-Cum-

Processing Service Society Limited and another,

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(1999) 6 SCC 82;

(2) Jasmer Singh Vs. State of Haryana and another,

(2015) 4 SCC 458;

7.2 Mr.Rathod, learned advocate for the workman has prayed

to allow the petition filed by the workman.

8. Per contra, Ms.Sona Sagar, learned advocate for the

employer has vehemently submitted that the workman was

working as a daily wager and he has worked less than 240 days

and his entire service is only one and half years. She has

submitted that the service of the workman came to an end on

25.04.1988 and he has sought reference in the year 1995. She

has submitted that thus, there is much delay in preferring the

reference which ought to have been rejected by the concerned

Labour Court. She has submitted that the employer does not fall

within the meaning of "industry" and it is only a Government

undertaking. She has submitted that there is "seasonal" work

available with the employer. She has submitted that the

employer is receiving grant from the Government. She has

submitted that the workman does not fulfill the definition of the

"workman" as provided in Section 2(5) of the I.D. Act. While

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relying upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of

Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur Vs.

Shri Phool Chand (Dead) Through Legal Heirs rendered in

Civil Appeal No.1756 of 2010 dated 20.09.2018, she has

submitted that since, the workman has worked only one and half

years and that too, as a daily wager, the Labour Court ought not

to have granted lump sum amount of compensation of

Rs.20,000/- as there was huge delay in filing the reference. She

has submitted that the employer has filed Special Civil

Application No.9581 of 2010 for setting aside the impugned

award and, therefore, the same may be allowed and Special Civil

Application No.4415 of 2010 filed by the workman may be

dismissed.

9. In the case of Ajaib Singh (supra), the Supreme Court has

dealt with the point of delay and latches in para-10, which reads

as under:-

"10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and hot as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

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existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages. Reliance of the learned counsel for the respondent- management on the full bench judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ram Chander Morya v. State of Haryana, (1999) 1 SCT 141 is also of no help to him. In that case the High Court nowhere held that the provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Actwere applicable in the proceedings under the Act. The Court specifically held "neither any limitation has been provided nor any guidelines to determine as to what shall be the period of limitation in such cases." However, it went on further to say that

"reasonable time in the cases of labour for demand of reference or dispute by appropriate government to labour tribunals will be five years after which the government can refuse to make a reference on the ground of delay and latches if there is no explanation to the delay."

We are of the opinion that the Punjab and Haryana High Court was not justified in prescribing the limitation for getting the reference made or an application under Section 37-C of the Act to be adjudicated. It is not the function of the court to prescribe the limitation where the Legislature in its wisdom had, though if fit not to prescribe any period. The courts admittedly interpret law and do not make laws. Personal views of the Judges presiding the court cannot be stretched to authorise them to interpret law in such a manner which would amount to legislation intentionally left over by the Legislature. The judgment of the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court has completely ignored the object of the Act and various pronouncements of this Court as noted hereinabove and thus is not a good law on the point of the applicability of the period of limitation for the purposes of invoking the jurisdiction of the courts/ boards and tribunal under the Act.

10. In the case of Jasmer Singh (supra) wherein the aforesaid

decision of Ajaib Singh has been taken note of, it was referred to

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in para-15 thereof. The Apex Court has held that there is no

limitation to the proceedings in the Act. While referring to the

decision of Harjinder Singh Vs. Punjab State Warehousing

Corporation, (2010) 3 SCC 192, the Apex Court has observed in

para-19 as under:-

"Further in the case of Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corpn, (2010) 3 SCC 192, wherein this Court opined on the exercise of power by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India as under:-

"21. Before concluding, we consider it necessary to observe that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution in matters like the present one, the High Courts are duty bound to keep in mind that the Industrial Disputes Act and other similar legislative instruments are social welfare legislations and the same are required to be interpreted keeping in view the goals set out in the preamble of the Constitution and the provisions contained in Part IV thereof in general and Articles 38, 39(a) to (e), 43 and 43A in particular, which mandate that the State should secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people, ensure equality between men and women and equitable distribution of material resources of the community to sub-serve the common good and also ensure that the workers get their dues. More than 41 years ago, Gajendragadkar, J, opined that:-

"10...... the concept of social and economic justice is a living concept of revolutionary import; it gives sustenance to the rule of law and meaning and significance to the ideal of welfare State.' (State of Mysore v. Workers of Gold Mines, AIR 1958 SC 928, para 10)"

C/SCA/4415/2010 JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2021

11. In the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport

Corporation, Jaipur (supra), the Apex Court has observed in

paras-11, 12, 13 and 14 as under:-

"11. In our considered opinion, the Courts below completely failed to see that the back wages could not be awarded by the Court as of right to the workman consequent upon setting aside of his dismissal / termination order. In other words, a workman has no right to claim back wages from his employer as of right only because the Court has set aside his dismissal order in his favour and directed his reinstatement in service.

12. It is necessary for the workman in such cases to plead and prove with the aid of evidence that after his dismissal from the service, he was not gainfully employed anywhere and had no earning to maintain himself or/and his family. The employer is also entitled to prove it otherwise against the employee, namely, that the employee was gainfully employed during the relevant period and hence not entitled to claim any back wages. Initial burden is, however, on the employee.

13. In some cases, the Court may decline to award the back wages in its entirety whereas in some cases, it may award partial depending upon the facts of each case by exercising its judicial discretion in the light of the facts and evidence. The questions, how the back wages is required to be decided, what are the factors to be taken into consideration awarding back wages, on whom, the initial burden lies etc. were elaborately discussed in several cases by this Court wherein the law on these questions has been settled. Indeed, it is no longer res integra. These cases are, M. P. State Electricity Board vs. Jarina Bee (Smt.) (2003) 6 SCC 141, G. M. Haryana Roadways vs. Rudhan Singh, (2005) 5 SCC 591, U. P. State Brassware Corporation vs. Uday Narain Pandey, (2006) 1 SCC 479, J. K. Synthetics Ltd. vs. K. P. Agrawal & Anr., (2007) 2 SCC 433, Metropolitan Transport Corporation vs. V. Venkatesan, (2009) 9 SCC 601, Jagbir Singh vs. Haryana State Agriculture Marketing Board & Anr., (2009) 15 SCC 327) and Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed) & Ors, (2013) 10 SCC 324.

C/SCA/4415/2010 JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2021

14. The Court is, therefore, required to keep in consideration several factors, which are set out in the aforementioned cases, and then to record a finding as to whether it is a fit case forward of the back wages and, if so, to what extent."

12. Having considered the submissions of both the sides

coupled with the legal provisions as referred to hereinabove and

the materials placed on record, it is crystal clear that there is

dispute as to the facts that the workman was working with the

employer and the service of the workman was of one and half

years. It also appears from the record that the service of the

workman was terminated on 25.04.1988. It also appears from

the record that the reference in question has been filed after

seven years i.e. in the year 1995.

13. It appears from the record that it is the case of the

workman that he was working with the employer since last

sixteen years as Shepherd and was performed his duty with

utmost sincerity and he was getting daily wage. According to the

workman, on 25.04.1988, his service was terminated without

any notice or notice pay or retrenchment allowance. It is the

case of the workman that his junior has been retained in service

and, thereafter, without affording any opportunity to him, the

employer has also appointed other persons and thus, the action

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on the part of the employer in terminating him from the service

is bad in law. The prayer of the workman is to direct the

employer to reinstate him in service with full back wages.

14. Against the demand of the workman, the employer has

filed its reply at Exhibit 10 before the Labour Court and has

contended that the reference has been filed after a long delay

and he does not fall with in the definition of the "workman"

under Section 2(s) of the I.D. Act and the employer is also not an

"industry" within the definition of Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act.

According to the employer, it is a statutory undertaking of the

Government and is dependent on 100% grant which has been

financed by the State Government. The employer has denied the

factual averments of the workman and has submitted that the

workman was never terminated by the employer, but, he himself

has voluntarily abandoned the job. According to the employer, in

the year 1986-1987 the workman attended 42½ days and,

thereafter, he left the job. It is also stated that the employer has

not made any recruitment after abandonment of the job by the

workman.

15. It appears from the impugned award that at the instance of

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the workman, the employer has filed necessary documents

thereof. It also appears that both the sides has produced the oral

evidence before the Labour Court and after hearing both the

sides, the Labour Court has passed the impugned award granting

lump sum amount of compensation of Rs.20,000/- only to the

workman.

16. The definition of 'industry' as well as 'workman' is provided

in Section 2(j) and 2(s) of the I.D. Act. Section 2(j) and 2(s) of the

I.D. Act reads as under:-

2(j) "industry" means any systematic activity carried on by co-operation between an employer and his workmen (whether such workmen are employed by such employer directly or by or through any agency, including a contractor) for the production, supply or distribution of goods or services with a view to satisfy human wants or wishes (not being wants or wishes which are merely) spiritual or religious in nature), whether or not, -

(i) any capital has been invested for the purpose of carrying on such activity; or

(ii) such activity is carried on with a motive to make any gain or profit, and includes -

(a) any activity of the Dock Labour Board established under section 5A of the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948 (9 of 1948);

(b) any activity relating to the promotion of sales or business or both carried on by an establishment,

but does not include -

(1) any agricultural operation except where such agricultural operation is carried on in an integrated manner with any other activity (being any such activity as is referred to in the foregoing provisions of this clause) and such other activity is the predominant one.

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Explanation. - For the purposes of this sub-clause, "agricultural operation" does not include any activity carried on in a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951); or

(2) hospitals or dispensaries; or (3) educational, scientific, research or training institutions; or (4) institutions owned or managed by organisations wholly or substantially engaged in any charitable, social or philanthropic service; or (5) khadi or village industries; or (6) any activity of the Government relatable to the sovereign functions of the Government including all the activities carried on by the departments of the Central Government dealing with defence research, atomic energy and space; or (7) any domestic service; or (8) any activity being a profession practised by an individual or body of individuals, if the number of persons employed, by the individual or body of individuals in relation to such profession is less than ten; or (9) any activity, being an activity carried on by a co-

operative society or a club or any other like body of individuals, if the number of persons employed by the co-operative society, club or other like body of individuals in relation to such activity is less than ten,'

2(s) "workman" means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person-

(i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957); or

(ii) who is employed in the police service or as an

C/SCA/4415/2010 JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2021

officer or other employee of a prison; or

(iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or

(iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding [ten thousand rupees] per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature.].

17. Now, as per the evidence of the employer's witness, the

undertaking is engaged in the work of breeding schemes. It also

appears from the record that the Corporation engages the

agricultural labourers, shepherds and casual workers for the said

purpose. It also appears that the Corporation employed the

persons on daily wages depending upon the increase and

decrease in the number of sheep on its farms. The activities

carried out by the Corporation is definitely comes within the

definition of "industry". Further, it also appears that due to the

dispute raised by the workman, initially conciliation proceedings

under the I.D. Act was carried out and due to failure thereof, the

Assistant Labour Commissioner has made reference under the

I.D. Act to the Labour Court. All these suggest that the

Corporation comes within the definition of "industry".

17.1 In view of the definition of "industry", it is clear that there

must be any systematic activity carried on by co-operation

between an employer and his workmen. There is no need of

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direct employer with the employee itself. Further such activity

must be for supply or distribution of goods or services which

satisfies human wants or wishes, which, may not be wants or

wishes which are merely spiritual or religious in nature. The

definition also enumerates that certain undertakings will not be

an industry which are referred to above within the meaning of

the section..

17.2 Now, in the present case, the stand of the Corporation -

employer is to the effect that this is a Public Limited Company

and having majority of its shares held by the Government of

Gujarat and is established with a view to breed sheep and help

the wool industry in the State of Gujarat. It is the case of the

employer that it is dependent on 100% finance provided by the

Central Government or the State Government for different

schemes. It is also contended by the Corporation that the

agricultural labourers, shepherds and casual workers are being

engaged on need basis. Thus, according to the Corporation, it is

not an industry. However, in view of Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act as

amended in the year 1982, whether or not any capital has been

invested for the purpose of carrying on various activities as

reflected in the definition itself, the stand taken by the

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Corporation that due to finance by the Government, it is not an

industry, is devoid of merits.

17.3 It is pertinent to note that the Labour Court has, on the

basis of the evidence on record, clearly held that the Corporation

is an industry and this finding of facts is legally tenable.

18. In the case of Deputy Executive Engineer v. Kuberbhai

Kanjibhai, AIR 2019 SC 517, the Apex Court, while referring to

the it's earlier decision in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam

Limited Vs. Bhurumal, AIR 2014 SC 1188, has reproduced

paras-33, 34 and 35 which read as under:-

"33. It is clear from the reading of the aforesaid judgments that the ordinary principle of grant of reinstatement with full back wages, when the termination is found to be illegal is not applied mechanically in all cases. While that may be a position where services of a regular/permanent workman are terminated illegally and/or mala fide and/or by way of victimisation, unfair labour practice, etc. However, when it comes to the case of termination of a daily-wage worker and where the termination is found illegal because of a procedural defect, namely, in violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, this Court is consistent in taking the view that in such cases reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and instead the workman should be given monetary compensation which will meet the ends of justice. Rationale for shifting in this direction is obvious.

34. The reasons for denying the relief of reinstatement in such cases are obvious. It is trite law that when the termination is found to be illegal because of non-payment of retrenchment compensation and

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notice pay as mandatorily required under Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, even after reinstatement, it is always open to the management to terminate the services of that employee by paying him the retrenchment compensation. Since such a workman was working on daily-wage basis and even after he is reinstated, he has no right to seek regularisation [see State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1 : (AIR 2006 SC 1806)]. Thus when he cannot claim regularisation and he has no right to continue even as a daily-wage worker, no useful purpose is going to be served in reinstating such a workman and he can be given monetary compensation by the Court itself inasmuch as if he is terminated again after reinstatement, he would receive monetary compensation only in the form of retrenchment compensation and notice pay. In such a situation, giving the relief of reinstatement, that too after a long gap, would not serve any purpose.

35. We would, however, like to add a caveat here. There may be cases where termination of a daily- wage worker is found to be illegal on the ground that it was resorted to as unfair labour practice or in violation of the principle of last come first go viz. while retrenching such a worker daily wage juniors to him were retained. There may also be a situation that persons junior to him were regularised under some policy but the workman concerned terminated. In such circumstances, the terminated worker should not be denied reinstatement unless there are some other weighty reasons for adopting the course of grant of compensation instead of reinstatement. In such cases, reinstatement should be the rule and only in exceptional cases for the reasons stated to be in writing, such a relief can be denied."

18.1 The said decision has been followed by the Apex Court in

the case of Deputy Executive Engineer v. Kuberbhai

Kanjibhai, AIR 2019 SC 517.

18.2 The Apex Court has awarded the lump sum amount of

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Rs.1,00,000/- though the workman has filed reference after

almost 15 years of his termination.

19. On perusal of the materials placed on record of Special Civil

Application No.9581 of 2010 which includes oral evidence of the

parties, it appears that during the cross-examination, the

workman has admitted that he has produced documents to show

that he has continuously worked with the employer. He has

denied that he has filed the reference after 6 to 7 years after his

termination. It is his admission that he was working as daily

wager and he has been paid the salary by obtaining his signature

in the muster roll. There is admission on his part that after his

termination, he was doing labour work and was earning Rs.600/-

to Rs.700/- per month.

20. It also appears from the evidence of the employer side i.e.

Dr.Yograjsinh Dharmasinh Solanki at Exhibit 25 that the

workman has worked for 42 ½ days in the year 1986-1987 and

during 1987-1988, the workman has worked for 84 days. He has

stated that the necessary documents have been produced.

According to him, the work is in the nature of seasonal nature.

He has also admitted that the work which the workman was

C/SCA/4415/2010 JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2021

doing is still continued. During his cross-examination, he has

admitted that the necessary record of the year 1988 has not

been produced. He has contended that the muster roll as well as

salary record has not been produced in the case. He has

admitted that after leaving the job by the workman, he was not

called upon by writing any letter to him. That no departmental

inquiry was held against the workman and no notice or notice

pay or retrenchment allowance is paid to the workman. He has

admitted that the work is still going on and same is being taken

through other daily wagers. He has admitted that they have not

shown the days of work prior to May 1987 which was attended

by the workman.

21. On perusal of the impugned award, it clearly transpires that

in view of the evidence on record, the Labour Court has come to

the conclusion that there was a breach of Section 25-F of the

I.D. Act and non-payment of notice pay or retrenchment

allowance, and the work was still going on. However, considering

the delay in filing the reference it has not allowed the prayer of

reinstatement and full back wages and granted only lump sum

amount of Rs.20,000/-. In view of the oral evidence of the

employer's witness, after termination of the service of the

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workman, the work is still going on and he was never called for

and the work has been taken through the other daily wagers. In

view of the oral evidence of the employer side, there is a breach

of not only Section 25-F of the I.D. Act, but there is also a breach

of Section 25-G and H of the I.D. Act, therefore, the order of

reinstatement was required to be passed. But considering the

facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that the workman

has hardly work for one and half years and considering the fact

that he has filed reference after almost eight years after his

termination, in view of the decision of the Apex Court in the case

of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. Bhurumal (supra)

which has been referred to recently by the Apex Court in the

case of Deputy Executive Engineer v. Kuberbhai

Kanjibhai, AIR 2019 SC 517, this Court is of the considered

opinion that the Labour Court has not committed any error of

facts and law in awarding lump sum compensation. Further,

since, the workman has served only 1½ years, the amount

awarded by the Labour Court is just and proper.

22. In view of the aforesaid discussions, both the Special Civil

Applications deserve to be dismissed. Accordingly, both the

petitions are hereby dismissed. The impugned award dated

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31.08.2009 passed by the Labour Court, Rajkot in Reference

(LCR) No.238 of 1995 is hereby confirmed.

23. Rule is discharged. No order as to costs.

Sd/-

(DR. A. P. THAKER, J) V.R. PANCHAL