Jagdishkumar Kantilal Soni vs State Of Gujarat
2021 Latest Caselaw 18555 Guj

     R/CR.A/2416/2005                              JUDGMENT DATED: 20/12/2021




        IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

                 R/CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2416 of 2005

FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE ASHOKKUMAR C. JOSHI

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       Whether Reporters of Local             Papers   may be
 1                                                                        NO
       allowed to see the judgment ?

 2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ?                                NO

       Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy
 3                                                                        NO
       of the judgment ?
   Whether this case involves a substantial question
 4 of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution                    NO
   of India or any order made thereunder ?

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                JAGDISHKUMAR KANTILAL SONI
                             Versus
                STATE OF GUJARAT & 1 other(s)
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Appearance:
MR JV JAPEE(358) for the Appellant(s) No. 1
HCLS COMMITTEE(4998) for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 2
MRS REKHA H KAPADIA(2246) for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s)
No. 2
MS MOXA THAKKAR, APP (2) for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s)
No. 1
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 CORAM:HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE ASHOKKUMAR C. JOSHI

                          Date : 20/12/2021

                          ORAL JUDGMENT

1. Present appeal has been filed by the appellant - original complainant under Section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 challenging the judgment and order dated

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31.07.2004, passed in Criminal Case No. 273 of 1999 by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Idar, recording the acquittal.

2. The facts, in brief, are that complainant - Jagdishkumar Kantilal Soni, resident of Taluka: Idar, lodged a complaint before the Court that the respondent No. 2 herein had borrowed Rs.31,000/- from him and to repay the same, he issued a Cheque bearing No. 407131 dated 10.09.1998 drawn on The Sabarkantha District Central Coop. Bank Ltd., Badoli, which, the complainant presented in bank, but the same was returned by the bank with an endorsement "insufficient fund" and hence, the complainant issued a legal notice dated 04.02.1999 to the respondent No. 2 through his advocate by RPAD, however, since the respondent No. 2 did not repay the said amount, the complainant was constrained to file complaint before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Idar under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (herein after referred to as "the NI Act").

2.1 Upon such complaint being filed and subsequent service of summons upon the respondent No. 2, he appeared before the Court. Since the accused did not plead guilty, trial was proceeded against him. Vide impugned judgment and order dated 31.07.2004, the learned trial Judge acquitted the accused person. Being aggrieved by the same, the appellant - original complainant has preferred the present appeal.

3. Heard, learned advocate Mr. Himanish J. Japee for learned advocate Mr. J. V. Japee for the appellant - original complainant, learned advocate Ms. Rekha H. Kapadia for the respondent No. 2 and learned APP Ms. Moxa Thakkar for the respondent No. 1 - State.

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3.1 Learned advocate Mr. Japee for the appellant - original complainant has mainly contended that the learned trial Judge ought to have convicted the accused inasmuch as issued, cheque in question was duly signed by the respondent No. 2 and came to be dishonoured when presented before the bank for insufficiency of fund. Furthermore, in his submission, the learned trial Judge ought to have appreciated the fact that the cheque was issued for discharge of legal liability towards complainant and has erred in not believing the said aspect of the matter. Further, it is submitted that the learned trial Judge ought to have held that legal notice upon the respondent No. 2 was issued within the stipulated time and that, all the requirements under the provisions of Section 138 of the NI Act were fulfilled. Further, in his submission, the learned trial Judge ought to have held in view of the evidence on record that the accused had failed to rebut the onus of proof and statutory presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act against him.

3.2 The learned advocate, taking this Court through the oral as well as the documentary evidence on record, submitted that though the case against the accused was proved beyond reasonable doubt, however, the learned trial Judge has not properly appreciated the evidence on record and thereby, has committed an error in recording acquittal and therefore, the impugned judgment and order suffers from material illegality, perversity and contrary to the facts and evidence on record. Accordingly, he urged that present appeal may be allowed by quashing and setting aside the impugned judgment and order of acquittal.

3.3 In support, the learned advocate for the appellant has relied upon following decisions:

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i) Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197;

ii) Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel v. State of Gujarat and Another, (2019) 18 SCC 106.

4. Per contra, learned advocate Ms. Rekha Kapadia for the respondent No. 2 - accused, while supporting the impugned judgment and order of the trial Court, submitted that the learned trial Judge has, after due and proper appreciation and evaluation of the evidence on record, has come to such a conclusion and has acquitted the accused, which is just and proper. The learned advocate submitted that it is trite law that if two views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. Further, while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal, the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality.

4.1 The learned advocate for the respondent No. 2 - accused submitted that for invoking the provisions of Section 138 of the NI Act, the debt or other liability means a legally enforceable debt or other liability, which the complainant has failed to prove and accordingly, the learned trial Judge has rightly recorded the acquittal.

4.2 The learned advocate for the respondent No. 2 has heavily submitted that the ingredients of the offence alleged against the accused are not proved beyond reasonable doubt and therefore, the learned trial Judge has rightly acquitted the accused of the charges levelled against him.

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4.3 The learned advocate for the respondent No. 2 - accused further submitted that the learned trial Judge has rightly acquitted the accused as the complainant failed to bring home the charge against the accused. Accordingly, it is requested that no interference is required at the hands of this Court and eventually, it is urged that the present appeal may be dismissed.

5. Heard the learned advocates for the respective parties and gone through the impugned judgment and order of the trial Court as well as the material on record. Before adverting to the facts of the case, it would be worthwhile to refer to the scope of interference in acquittal appeals. It is well settled by catena of decisions that an appellate Court has full power to review, re- appreciate and consider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. However, the Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is prejudice in favour of the accused, firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court.

5.1 Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. Further, while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal, the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrive at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person, and therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse.

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5.2 Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. That the duty is cast upon the appellate Court, in such circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether the accused is connected with the commission of the crime with which he is charged.

5.3 In Mallikarjun Kodagali (Dead) represented through Legal Representatives v. State of Karnataka and Others, (2019) 2 SCC 752, the Apex Court has observed that, "The presumption of innocence which is attached to every accused gets fortified and strengthened when the said accused is acquitted by the trial Court. Probably, for this reason, the law makers felt that when the appeal is to be filed in the High Court it should not be filed as a matter of course or as matter of right but leave of the High Court must be obtained before the appeal is entertained. This would not only prevent the High Court from being flooded with appeals but more importantly would ensure that innocent persons who have already faced the tribulation of a long drawn out criminal trial are not again unnecessarily dragged to the High Court".

5.4 Yet in another decision in Chaman Lal v. The State of Himachal Pradesh, rendered in Criminal Appeal No. 1229 of 2017 on 03.12.2020, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 988 the Apex Court has observed as under:

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"9.1 In the case of Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189), this Court had reiterated the principles to be followed in an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 Cr.P.C. In paragraphs 12 to 19, it is observed and held as under:

12. This Court time and again has laid down the guidelines for the High Court to interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court. The appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be the more probable one. While dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject-matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. (Vide Balak Ram v. State of U.P (1975) 3 SCC 219, Shambhoo Missir v. State of Bihar (1990) 4 SCC 17, Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P (2003) 1 SCC 761, Narendra Singh v. State of M.P (2004) 10 SCC 699, Budh Singh v. State of U.P (2006) 9 SCC 731, State of U.P. v. Ram Veer Singh (2007) 13 SCC 102, S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy (2008) 5 SCC 535, Arulvelu v. State (2009) 10 SCC 206, Perla Somasekhara Reddy v. State of A.P (2009) 16 SCC 98 and Ram Singh v. State of H.P (2010) 2 SCC 445)

13. In Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor AIR 1934 PC 227, the Privy Council observed as under: (IA p. 404) "... the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses."

14. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently been followed by this Court. (See Tulsiram Kanu v. State AIR 1954 SC 1, Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 216, M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1963 SC 200,

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Khedu Mohton v. State of Bihar (1970) 2 SCC 450, Sambasivan v. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412, Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P(2002) 4 SCC 85 and State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran (2007) 3 SCC 755)

15. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415, this Court reiterated the legal position as under: (SCC p. 432, para 42)

"(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.

(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.

(3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.

(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court."

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16. In Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P (2008) 10 SCC 450, this Court reiterated the said view, observing that the appellate court in dealing with the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted the accused, should bear in mind that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. The appellate court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court as the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.

17. In State of Rajasthan v. Naresh (2009) 9 SCC 368, the Court again examined the earlier judgments of this Court and laid down that: (SCC p. 374, para 20) "20. ... an order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if the court believes that there is some evidence pointing out the finger towards the accused."

18. In State of U.P. v. Banne (2009) 4 SCC 271, this Court gave certain illustrative circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. The circumstances include: (SCC p. 286, para 28) "(i) The High Court's decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position;

(ii) The High Court's conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record;

(iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice;

(iv) The High Court's judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case;

(v) This Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court;

(vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal." A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Dhanapal v. State (2009) 10 SCC 401.

19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling

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circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference."

9.2 When the findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse has been dealt with and considered in paragraph 20 of the aforesaid decision, which reads as under:

"20. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is "against the weight of evidence", or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn (1984) 4 SCC 635, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312, Triveni Rubber & Plastics v.

CCE 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 665, Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad (2001) 1 SCC 501, Aruvelu v. State (2009) 10 SCC 206 and Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P (2009) 10 SCC

636)." (emphasis supplied)

9.3 It is further observed, after following the decision of this Court in the case of Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police (1999) 2 SCC 10, that if a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with.

9.4 In the recent decision of Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 5 SCC 436, this Court again had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 378 Cr.P.C. and the interference by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal. This Court considered catena of decisions of this Court right from 1952 onwards. In paragraph 31, it is observed and held as under:

"31. An identical question came to be considered before this Court in Umedbhai Jadavbhai (1978) 1 SCC 228. In the

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case before this Court, the High Court interfered with the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court on re- appreciation of the entire evidence on record. However, the High Court, while reversing the acquittal, did not consider the reasons given by the learned trial court while acquitting the accused. Confirming the judgment of the High Court, this Court observed and held in para 10 as under: (SCC p.

233)

"10. Once the appeal was rightly entertained against the order of acquittal, the High Court was entitled to reappreciate the entire evidence independently and come to its own conclusion. Ordinarily, the High Court would give due importance to the opinion of the Sessions Judge if the same were arrived at after proper appreciation of the evidence. This rule will not be applicable in the present case where the Sessions Judge has made an absolutely wrong assumption of a very material and clinching aspect in the peculiar circumstances of the case."

31.1. In Sambasivan v. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412, the High Court reversed the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court and held the accused guilty on re- appreciation of the entire evidence on record, however, the High Court did not record its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable. Confirming the order passed by the High Court convicting the accused on reversal of the acquittal passed by the learned trial court, after being satisfied that the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court was perverse and suffered from infirmities, this Court declined to interfere with the order of conviction passed by the High Court.

While confirming the order of conviction passed by the High Court, this Court observed in para 8 as under: (SCC p. 416)

"8. We have perused the judgment under appeal to ascertain whether the High Court has conformed to the aforementioned principles. We find that the High Court has not strictly proceeded in the manner laid down by this Court in Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225 viz. first recording its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was

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patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable, which alone will justify interference in an order of acquittal though the High Court has rendered a well-considered judgment duly meeting all the contentions raised before it. But then will this non-compliance per se justify setting aside the judgment under appeal? We think, not. In our view, in such a case, the approach of the court which is considering the validity of the judgment of an appellate court which has reversed the order of acquittal passed by the trial court, should be to satisfy itself if the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or conclusions arrived at by it are demonstrably unsustainable and whether the judgment of the appellate court is free from those infirmities; if so to hold that the trial court judgment warranted interference. In such a case, there is obviously no reason why the appellate court's judgment should be disturbed. But if on the other hand the court comes to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial court does not suffer from any infirmity, it cannot but be held that the interference by the appellate court in the order of acquittal was not justified; then in such a case the judgment of the appellate court has to be set aside as of the two reasonable views, the one in support of the acquittal alone has to stand. Having regard to the above discussion, we shall proceed to examine the judgment of the trial court in this case."

31.2. In K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of Kerala (1999) 3 SCC 309, after observing that though there is some substance in the grievance of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused that the High Court has not adverted to all the reasons given by the trial Judge for according an order of acquittal, this Court refused to set aside the order of conviction passed by the High Court after having found that the approach of the Sessions Judge in recording the order of acquittal was not proper and the conclusion arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge on several aspects was unsustainable. This Court further observed that as the Sessions Judge was not justified in discarding the relevant/material evidence while acquitting the accused, the High Court, therefore, was fully entitled to reappreciate the evidence and record its own conclusion. This Court scrutinised the evidence of the eyewitnesses and opined that reasons adduced by the trial court for

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discarding the testimony of the eyewitnesses were not at all sound. This Court also observed that as the evaluation of the evidence made by the trial court was manifestly erroneous and therefore it was the duty of the High Court to interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge.

31.3. In Atley v. State of U.P. AIR 1955 SC 807, in para 5, this Court observed and held as under: (AIR pp. 80910) "5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the judgment of the trial court being one of acquittal, the High Court should not have set it aside on mere appreciation of the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution unless it came to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial Judge was perverse. In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417 Cr.P.C came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order.

It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, of course, keeping in view the well-established rule that the presumption of innocence of the accused is not weakened but strengthened by the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court which had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses whose evidence have been recorded in its presence.

It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of innocence with which the accused person starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order of acquittal.

If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated. (See in this connection the very cases cited at the Bar, namely, Surajpal Singh v. State AIR 1952 SC 52; Wilayat Khan v. State of U.P AIR 1953 SC 122) In our opinion, there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the

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appellant that the High Court was not justified in reviewing the entire evidence and coming to its own conclusions.

31.4. In K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. (1979) 1 SCC 355, this Court has observed that where the trial court allows itself to be beset with fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy evidence for slender reasons and takes a view of the evidence which is but barely possible, it is the obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in the interest of justice, lest the administration of justice be brought to ridicule."

(emphasis supplied)."

6. In the aforesaid backdrop, if Section 138 of NI Act is seen, it speaks as under:

"138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account. -- Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provisions of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may be extended to one year.

Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless--

(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;

(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, [within thirty days] of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and

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(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.

Explanation.-- For the purposes of this section, "debt or other liability" means a legally enforceable debt or other liability.]

6.1 Thus, in the case under NI Act, the cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. Further, explanation to this section defines the debt and other liability to mean a legally enforceable debt or other liability. In this context, after due appreciation and evaluation of the evidence on record, the learned trial Judge has come to such a conclusion that the debt cannot be said to be legally enforceable debt and the complainant has failed to prove otherwise. In this regard, wife of the complainant - Kamlaben Jagdishbhai Soni is examined at Exh. 42, who has deposed to state that from her savings from the amount received towards household expenses, her husband had given some cash to the accused, however, she did not know as to what amount had been given to the respondent No. 2, however, she has deposed that against goods for business purpose, the said amount was given to the respondent - accused. Further, the complainant also, in his deposition Exh. 30 has stated that from the savings of her wife, he had lent money to the respondent No. 2, however, he has denied in his cross-examination the fact of lending money for goods, which is contrary to the version of his wife. The learned trial Judge has considered the factual position as was emerged from the evidence on record that the cheque in question was in the handwriting of 3 different persons and it transpired to be written on different dates and different time. Further, the name

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of complainant, "Soni Jagdish Kantilal" appeared to be overwritten in the cheque. Besides, there appeared to be interpolation also in the same also. Accordingly, the learned trial Judge has come to the conclusion that if at all the signature of the respondent No. 2 is believed to be true on the cheque in question, nonetheless, the other details are not in the handwriting of the accused. Besides, as said earlier, the details appeared to be filled up at different time and dates and were in different handwriting. It is observed that, a specific defence had been taken by the respondent No. 2 - accused that he had given the cheque in consideration for the goods purchased by him from the complainant, however, the complainant had neither sent the goods nor had returned the cheque. In the overall facts and circumstances of the case, the learned trial Judge has come to the conclusion that the debt cannot be said to be the legally enforceable debt, which is sine qua non in such matters and the complainant has failed to prove the same by any cogent material.

6.2 Further, under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the NI Act, there are provisions as regards presumption. At this juncture, a beneficial reference may be made to a decision of the Apex Court in Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa, MANU/SC/0502/2019 : (2019) 5 SCC 418, wherein, the Court has observed as under:

"23. We having noticed the ratio laid down by this Court in the above cases on Sections 118(a) and 139, we now summarise the principles enumerated by this Court in following manner:

23.1. Once the execution of cheque is admitted Section 139 of the Act mandates a presumption that the cheque was for the discharge of any debt or other liability.

23.2. The presumption Under Section 139 is a rebuttable presumption and the onus is on the

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Accused to raise the probable defence. The standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities.

23.3. To rebut the presumption, it is open for the Accused to rely on evidence led by him or the Accused can also rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise a probable defence. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials brought on record by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which they rely.

23.4. That it is not necessary for the Accused to come in the witness box in support of his defence, Section 139 imposed an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden.

24.5. It is not necessary for the Accused to come in the witness box to support his defence."

6.3 Thus, the presumption under Section 139 is a rebuttable presumption and the onus is on the accused to raise the probable defence. The standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities. In the instant case, the accused has succeeded in rebutting the presumption, showing preponderance of probability and hence, onus shifts upon the complainant to prove otherwise, however, as said earlier, the complainant has failed to prove that the cheque was drawn towards legally enforceable debt. Besides, as is laid down in the aforesaid decision, to rebut the presumption, it is open for the accused to rely on evidence led by him or the accused can also rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise a probable defence. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials brought on record by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which they rely. In the case on hand, after due appreciation of evidence on record, the learned trial Judge has come to the

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conclusion that the debt is not proved to be legally enforceable debt and has also doubted the veracity of the cheque itself and in the said circumstances, preponderance of probability can be drawn in favour of the accused. Thus, when the complainant has failed to prove the debt to the legally enforceable debt and when the respondent - accused has succeeded in rebutting the presumption, the learned trial Judge has rightly come to the conclusion that the said provision would be of no help to the complainant.

6.4 So far as the decisions relied upon by the learned advocate for the appellant are concerned, In Bir Singh (supra), the Court has held that, "Section 139 mandates that unless the contrary is proved, it is to be presumed that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138, for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. However, the presumption is rebuttable by proving to the contrary. Section 139 introduces and exception to the general rule as to the burden of proof and shifts the onus on the accused to prove by cogent evidence that there was no debt or liability. Mere denial or rebuttal by the accused was not enough". In the case on hand, when the debt in question is not proved to be the legally enforceable debt, besides, veracity of the cheque itself is in doubt, the aforesaid decision, would be of no help to the complainant.

6.5 It is also held in the said decision by the Apex Court that, "Further, it is immaterial that the cheque may have been filled in by any person other than the drawer, if the cheque is duly signed by the drawer". There cannot be any dispute with regard to the said proposition, however, in the case on hand, while it appeared to be in the handwriting of 3 different persons, there appeared

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interpolation also in the same and accordingly, the same may not be of any help to the appellant.

6.6 In Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel (supra), the Court has held that, "Presumption mandated by S. 139 does indeed include existence of legally enforceable debt or liability. It is open to accused to raise defence wherein existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. However, there can be no doubt that there is an initial presumption which favours complainant". Indisputably, initial presumption is in favour of the complainant, however, the Court has further held that, "To rebut statutory presumption, accused not expected to prove his defence beyond reasonable doubt as is expected of complainant in criminal trial. Accused may adduce direct evidence to prove that note in question was not supported by consideration and that there was no debt or liability to be discharged by him". It is also held that, "Apart from adducing direct evidence, accused may also rely upon circumstantial evidence. If circumstances so relied upon are compelling, burden may likewise shift against on to complainant". In the case on hand, as said earlier, on one hand the legal debt is not proved and on the other hand, the veracity of the cheque is in doubt and accordingly, in such circumstances, burden shifts on to the complainant, which he has failed to prove and hence, the aforesaid decision also, would be of no help to the complainant.

6.7 On re-appreciation and reevaluation of the ocular and the documentary evidence on record, it transpires that the complainant has failed to prove the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt inasmuch as the ingredients of the offence alleged are not fulfilled. The Court has gone through in detail the impugned judgment and order and found that the

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learned trial Judge has meticulously considered the depositions of all the witnesses and came to such a conclusion and in the considered opinion of this Court, the learned trial Judge has rightly come to such a conclusion, which do not call for any interference at the hands of this Court.

7. In view of the aforesaid discussion and observations, in the considered opinion of this Court, the complainant has failed to bring home the charge against accused for want of sufficient material. The findings recorded by the learned trial Judge do not call for any interference. Resultantly, in fleri, the appeal fails and is dismissed accordingly. Impugned judgment and order dated 31.07.2004, passed in Criminal Case No. 273 of 1999 by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Idar, recording the acquittal is confirmed. R&P, if received, be transmitted back forthwith.

[ A. C. Joshi, J. ] hiren