Chiragbhai Virambhai Patel vs State Of Gujarat
2021 Latest Caselaw 12823 Guj

     R/CR.MA/13313/2021                                 ORDER DATED: 31/08/2021




             IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

             R/CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION NO. 13313 of 2021

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                          CHIRAGBHAI VIRAMBHAI PATEL
                                     Versus
                               STATE OF GUJARAT
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Appearance:
TORAL M RATHOD(7935) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MR KARAN VYAS for the Respondent(s) No. 2
MR PRANAV TRIVEDI, APP (2) for the Respondent(s) No. 1
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 CORAM:HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE GITA GOPI

                                Date : 31/08/2021
                                 ORAL ORDER

1. The respondent-complainant is present before the Court and is identified by learned advocate Mr. Karan Vyas. He is permitted to appear on behalf of respondent-complainant and to file his Vakalatnama with the Registry.

2.      Rule.        Learned APP and Mr. Karan Vyas, learned
advocate waives service of notice                 of rule on behalf of the

respective respondents. With consent of both the sides, the matter is heard finally.

3. By way of this petition filed under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the petitioner has prayed to quash and set aside, on the basis of settlement, the impugned complaint being FIR No.II-59 of 2019 registered with Talod Police Station, Sabarkantha for offences punishable under Sections 323, 504, 506(2) of the IPC and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)

(s) and 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, (for short, "the Atrocities

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Act") and all the consequential proceedings initiated in pursuance thereof.

4. Learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the parties have settled the dispute amicably outside the Court and therefore, there remains no ill-will or dispute between them. It was, therefore, prayed that the impugned complaint may be quashed on the basis of settlement between the parties.

5. The respondent-original complainant, who is present before the Court, has affirmed about the factum of settlement of dispute with the petitioner and has also filed an affidavit to that effect, which is on record. Before the Court and in affidavit also, he has consented to the quashment of the impugned complaint filed against the petitioner.

6. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that any first information report should be quashed in accordance with the guidelines framed by the Apex Court and the parameters laid down therein.

7. This Court heard learned advocates on both the sides and perused the material on record. The offence alleged against the petitioner is non-compoundable but, it could be compounded with the permission of the Court. In Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and another reported in 2012 (10) SCC 303, the Apex Court has set out the criteria wherein the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court could be exercised for quashing a First Information Report on the basis of settlement. In paragraph-61 of the said judgment, it has been

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observed thus:

"61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victims family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding."

8. In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan and others reported in (2019) 5 SCC 688, the Apex Court had the occasion to consider the issue as to whether a First Information Report lodged for the offences punishable under sections 307 and 34 IPC could be quashed on the basis of settlement between the parties. Para-13 reads

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thus:

"13. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and held as under: (i) that the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the noncompoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves; (ii) such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society; (iii) similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender;

(iv) offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra) should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove; (v) while exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious impart on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise etc."

9. It is required to be noted that the applicant had committed offences punishable under the Atrocities Act. However, none of the ingredients of the offences punishable under sections 3(1)(r) and 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act appear

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to be present in this case. The basic ingredients of the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Atrocities Act can be classified as

(i) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and (ii) in any place within public view. The offence under Section 3(1)(r) would indicate the ingredient of intentional insult and intimidation with an intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. All insults or intimidations to a person will not be an offence under the Atrocities Act unless such insult or intimidation is on account of victim belonging to Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. Another key ingredient of the provision is that the insult or intimidation should be in "any place within public view".

10. In Swaran Singh and others V. State, Through Standing Counsel and Others, [(2008) 8 SCC 435], the Apex Court has drawn distinction between the expression "public place" and "in any place within public view". It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building, eg. in a lawn outside a house and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends), then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view. As per the allegations made in the impugned complaint, the allegations of abusing the complainant were within the four walls of his house. It is not the case of the complainant that there was any member of the public (not merely relatives or friends) at the time of the incident in the house. Therefore, the basic ingredient that the

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words were uttered "in any place within public view" is not made out. For an offence under Section 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act, the essential ingredient is that the offence must have been committed on the ground that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. Knowledge that the person concerned belonged to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe is the essential ingredient so as to attract the provision of Section 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act. In the case on hand, none of the ingredients of the offences alleged against the applicants under the provisions of the Atrocities Act are made out even on a bare reading of the allegations in the impugned complaint.

11. In the case of Parthvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India and Others reported in [(2020) 4 SCC 727] while dealing with the constitutional validity of Section 18A of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, it was held as under:

"12. The Court can, in exceptional cases, exercise power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the cases to prevent misuse of provisions on settled parameter, as already observed while deciding the review petitions. The legal position is clear and no argument to the contrary has been raised."

12. In view of the discussions made hereinabove and in view of the settlement arrived at between the parties, there exists no scope for any further proceeding in the matter. The continuance of proceedings would lead to wastage of precious judicial time as there would remain no possibility of any conviction in the case. Hence, the Court is of the opinion that this is a fit case where the inherent powers of the Court under

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section 482 of the Cr.P.C. could be exercised for securing the ends of justice.

13. In the present case, the parties have settled the dispute outside the Court. Therefore, there exists no scope for further proceedings in the matter and the continuance of proceedings would lead to wastage of precious judicial time. Hence, the Court is of the opinion that this is a fit case where the inherent powers of the Court under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. could be exercised for securing the ends of justice.

14. In the result, the petition is allowed. The impugned complaint being FIR No.II-59 of 2019 registered with Talod Police Station, Sabarkantha for offences punishable under Sections 323, 504, 506(2) of IPC and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) and 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, (for short, "the Atrocities Act") and all the consequential proceedings initiated in pursuance thereof are quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute.

15. The respondent-complainant stated that he has received compensation money from the State. The complainant is willing to return the said amount. Thus, it is directed that within a period of four months, the complainant to deposit the said amount to the State.

( GITA GOPI, J ) ila