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Gauhati High Court
Page No.# 1/7 vs Ikbal Hussain Laskar on 7 January, 2026
Page No.# 1/7
GAHC010061592025
2026:GAU-AS:229
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : WA/361/2025
THE STATE OF ASSAM AND ORS.
REPRESENTED BY THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY-CUM-CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, ASSAM STATE DISASTER MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY TO THE
GOVT. OF ASSAM, REVENUE AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT
DEPARTMENT, DISPUR, GUWAHATI - 781006
2: THE JOINT SECRETARY AND STATE PROJECT COORDINATOR
ASSAM STATE DISASTER MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY
DISPUR
GUWAHATI-781006
3: THE DISTRICT COMMISSIONER -CUM- CHAIRMAN
DISTRICT DISASTER MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY
HAILAKANDI
DIST. HAILAKANDI
ASSAM
PIN-788151
VERSUS
IKBAL HUSSAIN LASKAR
S/O KABIR UDDIN LASKAR R/O VILL- AND P.O. KANAKPUR, PART-II P.S.
SILCHAR, DIST. CACHAR, ASSAM, PIN - 788005.
Advocate for the Petitioner : JOGEN HANDIQUE,
Advocate for the Respondent : , MD. A J ATIA,MS A H ATIA
Page No.# 2/7
BEFORE
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. ASHUTOSH KUMAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN DEV CHOUDHURY
ORDER
07.01.2026
(A.D.Choudhury, J).
1. We have heard Mr. J. Handique, learned State Counsel for the
appellants. Also heard Mr. P. K. Roychoudhury, learned counsel for
the respondent.
2. By this intra-court appeal, a challenge has been made against
the judgment and order dated 10.09.2024, passed in WP(C) No.
3/2019, wherein the learned Single Judge has interfered with the
order of termination of service of the respondent dated 17.11.2018,
impugned in the said writ petition. The learned Single Judge further
directed the appellants to reinstate the respondent within two weeks
from the date of passing of the judgment with a liberty to the
appellants to proceed against the writ petitioner afresh in
accordance with law, or to take a fresh decision on the renewal of
his contract, if so advised.
3. The fact, in a nutshell, is that the respondent/writ petitioner, a
Project Officer (Disaster Management) working on a fixed-term
contractual basis under the Assam State Disaster Management
Authority (ASDMA) since December 2000, was posted at Hailakandi
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DDMA. In August 2018, his father fell seriously ill. The respondent
verbally informed his superiors and left for home, intending to submit
a formal leave application later. He remained absent from 21 st
August 2018. The appellants/authorities treated the same as
unauthorised absence. A show-cause notice was issued on
04.09.2018, asking as to why his contract should not be terminated for
gross indiscipline. His reply was found unsatisfactory, and his contract
was terminated with effect from 11.11.2018 under the order
impugned in the writ petition dated 17.11.2018.
4. The respondent challenged the termination order dated
17.11.2018 before the learned Single Judge by filing the writ petition
being WP(C) No. 3/2019, claiming that although he was working on a
contractual basis, his engagement letter specifically made him
subject to the Assam Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1964
(hereinafter referred to as Rules, 1964). It was further contended that
termination, being a major penalty under Rules, 1964, could only be
imposed in terms of Rule 9 by initiating a departmental inquiry, which
was never conducted.
5. Thereafter, the learned Single Judge under its order dated
10.09.2024, allowed the aforesaid writ petition by holding that, since
the contract itself incorporated a clause making the Rules, 1964,
applicable, the authorities were bound to follow the procedure for
imposing a major penalty before terminating him from service. Simple
termination by treating it as an end-of-contract was not permissible
in the given facts of the case. Accordingly, the direction as recorded
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hereinabove was issued.
6. The State/ASDMA has now filed this writ appeal against the
judgment impugned, basically arguing that the employee was
purely engaged on a contractual basis and that the Rules, 1964, do
not apply in full rigour to contractual employees, and therefore, the
termination was perfectly valid under the terms of the contract and
settled proposition of law in this regard.
7. Mr. J. Handique, learned counsel for the appellants, submits that
the learned Single Judge has completely ignored the contractual
nature of the employment. Even if the Service Rules are made
applicable in the contract, the full rigour of Rule 9 of the Rules, 1964,
is not applicable to contractual employees.
8. Mr. Handique, learned counsel, further submits that the renewal
of the contract every year was discretionary and based on
performance and satisfaction of the concerned authority. The
employee was a habitual absentee and insincere, and therefore,
termination was bona fide. He, relying on the judgments of the
Hon'ble Apex Court GRIDCO Ltd. -Vs- Sabananda Doloi & Ors
reported in (2011) 15 SCC 16, contends that, in pure contractual
employment, no disciplinary enquiry is required before termination.
Accordingly, he contends that the direction of reinstatement passed
by the learned Single Judge is erroneous because the contract has
naturally come to an end.
9. Having given our anxious consideration to the rival submissions,
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we are unable to persuade ourselves to take a view different from
that taken by the learned Single Judge.
10. At the outset, it is not in dispute that the respondent was engaged
on a fixed-term contractual basis. Equally undisputed, however, is the
fact that the very terms of engagement expressly subjected the
respondent to the Rules 1964.
11. Once the employer, by a conscious contractual stipulation,
chooses to incorporate Statutory Service Rules governing discipline
and penalties, it cannot thereafter be heard to contend that such
Rules would apply only selectively or in a truncated manner.
12. Incorporation of Rules, 1964, into the contract is not an empty
formality; it has binding legal consequences for both the contracting
parties.
13. Rule 9 of the Rules, 1964 clearly contemplates that imposition of a
major penalty can only be preceded by a regular departmental
enquiry, which includes framing of definite charges affording
reasonable opportunity of defence and adherence to the principles
of natural justice.
14. Termination of service, on the ground of "gross indiscipline" or
"unauthorised absence" howsoever is, worded, is punitive in nature
and carries civil consequences; such termination cannot be
camouflaged as a mere non-renewal or secession of the contract,
particularly when the foundation of the action is alleged misconduct.
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15. The contention advanced on behalf of the appellants that the
Rules 1964, do not apply in their full rigour to contractual employees
cannot be accepted in the given facts of the present case. The issue
here is not whether contractual employees, as a class, are entitled to
protection of statutory Service Rules, but whether the employer,
having voluntarily extended the applicability of those Rules by
contract, can unilaterally resile from them when it comes to imposing
a major penalty. In our considered view, the answer must be in
negative.
16. The reliance placed by the appellants on the decision holding that
no enquiry is required for pure contractual employment is misplaced.
Those authorities apply to situations where the contract permits
termination simpliciter without attributing misconduct and where no
statutory or contractual obligation to follow disciplinary rules exists.
17. In the present case, the termination was based on an allegation of
unauthorised absence and indiscipline and hence, the governing
contract expressly attracted the Rules, 1964. The factual and legal
matrix is therefore clearly distinguishable.
18. We also find no substance in the submission that reinstatement
ought not to have been directed as the contract period has expired.
The learned Single Judge has carefully balanced the equities by
granting reinstatement with liberty to the authorities to either initiate
disciplinary proceedings strictly in accordance with law or take a
fresh decision regarding the renewal of the contract. Such a
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direction neither confers any indefeasible right of continuation nor
forecloses the employer's legitimate authority. It merely ensures that
adverse action is taken in a manner consistent with the contractual
terms and the principle of fairness.
19. In any view of the matter, we find no infirmity, legal or otherwise, in
the judgment and order dated 10.09.2024 passed by the learned
Single Judge in WP(C) No. 3/2019. The reasoning adopted is sound,
the conclusions drawn are well supported by the record, and no
case for inference in intra-court appellate jurisdiction is made out.
20. Accordingly, the writ appeal is dismissed. The impugned judgment
and order dated 10.09.2024, passed in WP(C) No. 3/2019 by the
learned Single Judge, is affirmed.
21. There shall be no order as to cost.
JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE
Comparing Assistant
