[Cites 23, Cited by 0]
Gauhati High Court
Crl.A./149/2023 on 6 April, 2026
Author: Michael Zothankhuma
Bench: Michael Zothankhuma
GAHC010085452023
2026:GAU-AS:4956
IN THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM & ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
CRL.A. NO. 149 OF 2023
Hasanur Rahman
S/o- Late Muzammel Hoque
R/o- Village Dampur,
P.S- Kazigaon,
District- Kokrajhar, Assam.
.......Appellant
-Versus-
1. State of Assam.
Represented by the Public Prosecutor,
Assam.
2. Naosad Ali
S/o- Badsha Ali,
R/o- Anthaibari,
P.S- Gossaigaon,
District- Kokrajhar, Assam, Pin- 783360
....... Respondents
-BEFORE-
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MICHAEL ZOTHANKHUMA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KAUSHIK GOSWAMI
For the Appellant(s) : Mr. A. Ahmed, Advocate.
For the Respondent(s) : Ms. A. Begum, Additional Public
Prosecutor for respondent No. 1.
Page 1 of 22
Mr. B. Haldar, Advocate for respondent
No.2.
Date on which judgment
is reserved : N/A.
Date of pronouncement
of judgment : 06.04.2026
Whether the pronouncement
is of the operative part
of the judgment? : No.
Whether the full judgment
has been pronounced : Yes.
JUDGMENT & ORDER (ORAL)
(Kaushik Goswami, J)
Heard Mr. A. Ahmed, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant. Also heard Ms. A. Begum, learned Additional Public
Prosecutor appearing for the State respondent, and Mr. B.
Haldar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2.
2] This criminal appeal is directed against the judgment
dated 20.02.2023 and the order of sentence dated
21.02.2023 passed by the learned District & Sessions Judge,
Kokrajhar (hereinafter referred to as the "trial court") in
Sessions Case No. T1/19/2019, whereby the
accused/appellant was convicted under Sections 302 and 498-
A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and sentenced to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for life along with fine.
3] The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 16.03.2018,
information was received at Kazigaon Police Station that the
deceased had allegedly committed suicide by hanging. Upon
receipt of such information, a G.D. entry was made and the
police visited the place of occurrence, where the dead body
was found lying on the veranda of the house.
4] Subsequently, an FIR was lodged by the father of the
deceased, leading to registration of Kazigaon P.S. Case No.
16/2018 under Sections 498-A/302 of the Indian Penal Code,
186 (hereinafter referred to as the "IPC"). Upon completion of
investigation, a charge-sheet was submitted and the accused
was put to trial.
5] Charges under Sections 498-A and 302 of the IPC were
framed by the trial court against the accused/appellant, to
which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
6] The prosecution examined six witnesses and one court
witness. After closure of the prosecution evidence, the
statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the
"Cr.P.C.") was recorded. The accused denied the incriminating
circumstances and took the plea of suicide.
7] Mr. A. Ahmed, learned counsel for the appellant,
contends that the entire case rests on circumstantial evidence
and that the prosecution has failed to establish a complete
chain of circumstances consistent only with the guilt of the
accused. He submits that there is no evidence whatsoever to
show that the accused/appellant strangulated the deceased to
death. Mere occurrence of death in the matrimonial home, by
itself, is insufficient to sustain conviction. It is further
contended that unless the prosecution establishes the
incriminating circumstances, no burden arises upon the
accused to explain the cause of death. In cases based on
circumstantial evidence, unless the chain is complete and
excludes every hypothesis except guilt, conviction cannot be
sustained. In support of his submissions, reliance is placed on
the following decisions.
(i) Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar, reported in AIR
Online 2021 SC 710,
(ii) Manoj Alias Munna v. State of Chhattisgarh,
reported in AIR 2026 SC 241,
(iii) Reena Hazarika v. State of Assam, reported in
(2019) 13 SCC 289,
(iv) Rejina Karmakar v. The State of Assam and
Anr., in Crl.A.(J) No. 11/2021.
8] Per contra, Ms. A. Begum, learned Additional Public
Prosecutor, submits that since the death occurred in the
matrimonial home and the defence of suicide stands ruled out
by medical evidence, the burden shifts upon the accused
under Section 106 of the Evidence Act. His failure to explain
the circumstances constitutes an additional link completing
the chain of circumstances. Reliance is placed on Balvir
Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, reported in 2023 16 SCC
575.
9] We have given our prudent consideration to the
arguments advanced by the learned counsels appearing for
both the parties and have also perused the material available
on record. We have also duly considered the case laws cited
at the bar.
10] The principal question that arises for consideration is:
Whether the prosecution has succeeded in
establishing a complete chain of circumstances,
consistent only with the guilt of the accused and
excluding every hypothesis consistent with
innocence?
11] PW-1 (Md. Nowsad Ali) deposed that he is the
complainant of the case, and the accused is his son-in-law.
The incident took place about 1 year ago. About 10 years
ago, the accused/appellant married his daughter, and two
children were born out of their wedlock. Since the marriage,
the accused/appellant used to torture his daughter,
demanding dowry, and two days prior to the incident when
his daughter and the accused/appellant had come to his
house, he demanded money. After staying two days, his
daughter returned; however, on the following day, the
younger brother of the accused telephonically informed him
that she died due to a stroke. Upon receiving the information,
he, along with some co-villagers, went to the house of the
accused/appellant; he saw a large number of people gathered
there along with police. Upon enquiry, he came to know from
the police that his daughter did not hang herself but was
murdered. He saw blood coming from her ear and also
noticed scratch marks near her mouth. Upon police informing
him of the murder of his daughter, he filed the F.I.R. against
the accused/appellant and his mother and two brothers. It is
also deposed that on the date of the incident the marriage
party of the younger brother of the accused/appellant was
going on in the house of the accused/appellant.
11.1] During cross-examination it was clarified that out of
the two children of the accused/appellant and his daughter,
the elder one, aged 8 years 6 months, stays with him, while
the younger one, aged 2 years, stays with the
accused/appellant. It was further clarified that within 10 years
of the marriage of his daughter with the accused/appellant,
on several occasions, she visited his house, and the
accused/appellant also sometimes accompanied her, and that
though the accused/appellant used to demand money or
dowry, neither he nor his daughter lodged any case or
complaint before any authority whatsoever. It was further
clarified that after their marriage, he used to visit the house
of the accused/appellant to meet his daughter and his grand-
daughters. It was further clarified that it was due to his son's
wedding that the accused and his daughter had come to his
house to attend the marriage; however, due to some
unavoidable reasons, the marriage was cancelled, and
accordingly, his daughter and the accused/appellant returned
back. It was further clarified that he had arranged ornaments
and clothes for his would-be daughter in law. Though a
suggestion was made that he had proposed to give one gold
earring to his daughter at the time of his son's wedding, as he
could not give it to her during the time of her marriage, and
since he did not give the same as proposed, the deceased
quarreled and left the house out of anger, by saying that she
would never return during her lifetime. However, he denied
the said suggestion.
12] PW-2 (Md. Zakir Hussain), who is the VDP
Secretary, deposed that at about 3-3.30 pm on the day of
occurrence, the younger brother of the accused/appellant
called him to their house, and upon reaching there, he saw
the dead body of the deceased. It was further deposed that
the brother of the accused/appellant informed him that the
deceased committed suicide by hanging herself. He
accordingly informed the jurisdictional police station. His
cross-examination was declined.
13] PW-3, (Musstt. Sahera Bibi), who is the next-door
neighbour of the accused/appellant, stated that on the day of
the incident in the morning, the deceased came to her house
and told her that she would never go to her parental house,
as her father did not give her a gold earring as promised
earlier. Later on, when she was in her workplace, she came to
know that the deceased committed suicide by hanging and
accordingly rushed to the house of the accused/appellant,
where she saw the dead body of the deceased.
13.1] During cross-examination, PW-3 clarified that she
had cordial relations with the family members of the
accused/appellant and that the deceased used to visit her
house as they were adjacent neighbours. She further stated
that she had never heard any quarrel between the accused
and the deceased, nor had she heard of any demand for
dowry. On the contrary, she stated that the accused loved his
wife and that they were a good couple. She further stated
that the deceased had gone to her parental home on the
previous day to attend her brother's marriage but returned
the next day. According to her, the deceased had quarreled
with her father over a gold earring that he had allegedly
promised but did not give. She suspected that the deceased
may have committed suicide due to this quarrel.
14] PW-4 (Md. Azlar Rahman), who is another
neighbour of the accused/appellant, also deposed that he had
heard that the deceased had committed suicide by hanging,
and upon rushing to the house of the accused, he saw the
body of the deceased.
14.1] During cross-examination, he similarly clarified that
he had never heard there being any quarrel between the
accused and his wife nor heard of any demand for dowry
being made by the accused/appellant from the deceased.
15] PW-5 (Dr. Pranab Pegu) is the doctor who
conducted the postmortem over the deceased, deposed that
he found "Rigor mortis present. Mucous seen on right nostril.
Postmortem hypostasis is present and fixed at the back.
Valva, vagina and anus healthy. A transverse continuous
ligature mark is present at the neck below the level of thyroid
cartilage. Externally the ligature mark is dry and depressed.
Internally, on dissection the tissues are pale and glistening
along with ligature at various places. Hyoid bone fractured
from inside. Thyroid cartilage intact. Abrasion of size 6x1 cm
is present transversely over the neck 1 cm below the chin
starting from 1 cm right to midline 5 cm left to the midline
with underlying bruising of the area". It was opined that
death was due to asphyxia as a result of antemortem
strangulation. He accordingly exhibited the postmortem report
and his signature.
15.1] During cross-examination, he clarified that although
the inquest report suggested death by hanging, in cases of
hanging, fracture of the hyoid bone is generally not observed.
16] PW-6 (ASI Suni Ch. Roy), who is the Investigating
Officer, deposed that it was the VDP Secretary who initially
informed him over the telephone that the deceased
committed suicide by hanging, and upon receiving the
aforesaid telephonic information, a G.D. entry was made, and
accordingly, they proceeded to the place of occurrence,
wherein the body of the deceased was found lying on the
veranda of the house. He accordingly conducted the
investigation, examined the witnesses, arrested the
accused/appellant, had the inquest done, sent the body for
postmortem, and upon completion of the investigation,
submitted the charge-sheet.
16.1] During cross-examination, he clarified that he did not
examine the brother of the informant as a witness.
17] The trial court having called an expert medical
witness, Prof. (Dr.) Gunajit Das, Professor of Forensic
Medicine, Dhubri Medical College & Hospital, deposed as a
court witness, CW-1. CW-1 deposed that the postmortem
report indicated that the hyoid bone was fractured inside out
besides other injuries, i.e., "(i) abrasion 6 cm x 1 cm
transversely present over the neck 1 cm below the chin, (ii)
abrasion 6 cm x 1 cm over the neck 1 cm below the previous
injury". It was deposed that in the event there is a ligature
mark in the neck, in order to determine whether death is
suicidal or homicidal strangulation, three factors are required
to be considered, i.e., (i) Non continuity of ligature mark, (ii)
Obliquity of the ligature mark and (iii) Placement of the
ligature mark on the neck. It was further deposed that in case
of suicidal hanging, the ligature mark becomes continuous,
transverse and placed at the middle of the neck, either at the
level of cricoids cartilage, thyroid cartilage or below it.
However, in the present case the ligature mark was found
transverse, continuous and also below the thyroid cartilage,
all three going in favour of homicidal ligature strangulation.
This particular finding is also supported by fracture of the
hyoid bone, which is never found in victims of suicidal
hanging below the age of 40 years. In the present case, the
victim is aged 28 years, and there is a fracture of the hyoid
bone, which means that there was continuous pressure and
manipulation in the area around the hyoid bone. Further, the
two injuries found below the chin suggest an attempt by the
victim to free herself from the ligature on her neck with her
hands, the assailant being positioned behind the victim.
Accordingly, he opined that the present case is of homicidal
ligature strangulation and not a case of suicidal hanging. It
was further opined that death was caused by asphyxia due to
strangulation. Upon a specific query posed by the trial court,
it was clarified that due to continuous manipulation and
pressure applied to the neck, the hyoid bone fractured inside
out, and hence, it is due to ligature strangulation and not
suicide.
18] The present case is admittedly based on
circumstantial evidence. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v.
State of Maharashtra, reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116, the
Apex Court laid down the five golden principles (Panchsheel)
governing cases based on circumstantial evidence, namely:
(i) The circumstances must be fully established;
(ii) They must be consistent only with the hypothesis of
guilt;
(iii) They must be conclusive in nature;
(iv) They must exclude every possible hypothesis except
guilt;
(v) There must be a complete chain of evidence.
19] The said principles have been consistently followed
and reiterated in subsequent decisions. It is now well settled
that suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of
proof, and each link in the chain must be firmly established
20] The following circumstances stand established:
(i) The death of the deceased was homicidal;
(ii) The death occurred in the matrimonial home;
(iii) The defence of suicide stands disproved.
21] The question is whether these circumstances form a
complete chain. A careful evaluation of the evidence reveals
the following deficiencies:
(i) Presence of the Accused Not Established
There is no reliable evidence to establish that the
accused was present at the place of occurrence at the
relevant time.
(ii) Presence of Other Persons
The evidence indicates that:
(a) the accused was not the sole occupant;
(b) family members were present; and
(c) a marriage ceremony was ongoing, suggesting the
presence of several persons.
(iii) Non-examination of Material Witness
The younger brother, who first reported the incident,
was not examined. This omission is significant and
warrants an adverse inference.
(iv) Weak Motive
Independent witnesses negate allegations of cruelty and
dowry demand.
22] The non-examination of a material witness is not, by
itself, invariably fatal to the prosecution case; however, its
effect depends upon the facts and circumstances of each
case. As held by the Apex Court in Deny Bora v. State of
Assam, reported in (2014) 14 SCC 42, where the evidence
on record is otherwise reliable and trustworthy, non-
examination of a witness may not be of consequence;
however, if such omission gives rise to a gap or infirmity in
the prosecution case, the Court would be justified in drawing
an adverse inference. Relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid
decision of the Apex Court read as under:
"9. The question that arises for consideration is
whether the prosecution has been able to establish
the involvement of the appellant in the crime in
question. As is manifest, neither the wife nor the
daughter of the deceased has been examined.
Submission of Mr Goswami is that they are natural
witnesses and no explanation has been given for their
non-examination and hence, adverse inference
against the prosecution deserves to be drawn. He has
drawn inspiration from the authority in Surinder
Kumar v. State of Haryana wherein it has been held,
though in a different context, that a failure on the part
of the prosecution in non-examining the two children.
aged about six and four years respectively, when both
of them were present at the site of the crime,
amounted to failure on the part of the prosecution. In
this context, reference to the decision in State of H.P.
v. Gian Chand would be profitable. The Court while
dealing with non-examination of material witnesses
has expressed that: (SCC p. 81. para 14)
„14. Non-examination of a material witness is again not a
mathematical formula for discarding the weight of the
testimony available on record, howsoever natural,
trustworthy and convincing it may be. The charge of
withholding a material witness from the court levelled
against the prosecution should be examined in the
background of the facts and circumstances of each case
so as to find whether the witnesses were available for
being examined in the court and were yet withheld by the
prosecution.‟
The three-Judge Bench further proceeded to observe
that the court is required first to assess the
trustworthiness of the evidence available on record
and if the court finds the evidence adduced worthy of
being relied on. then the testimony has to be accepted
and acted upon though there may be other witnesses
available who could also have been examined but
were not examined.
10. In Takhaji Hiraji v. Thakore Kubersing
Chamansing the Court has ruled that: (SCC p. 155,
para 19)
„19.... It is true that if a material witness, who would
unfold the genesis of the incident or an essential part of
the prosecution case, not convincingly brought to fore
otherwise, or where there is a gap or infirmity in the
prosecution case which could have been supplied or
made good by examining a witness who though available
is not examined, the prosecution case can be termed as
suffering from a deficiency and withholding of such a
material witness would oblige the court to draw an
adverse inference against the prosecution by holding that
if the witness would have been examined it would not
have supported the prosecution case. On the other hand
if already overwhelming evidence is available and
examination of other witnesses would only be a repetition
or duplication of the evidence already adduced, non-
examination of such other witnesses may not be material.
In such a case the court ought to scrutinise the worth of
the evidence adduced. The court [should pose the
question] whether in the facts and circumstances of the
case, it was necessary to examine such other witness, and
if so, whether such witness was available to be examined
and yet was being withheld from the court? If the answer
be positive then only a question of drawing an adverse
inference may arise. If the witnesses already examined
are reliable and the testimony coming from their mouth is
unimpeachable the court can safely act upon it.
uninfluenced by the factum of non-examination of other
witnesses‟"
23] Similarly, in Ram Prasad v. State of U.P., reported in
(1974) 3 SCC 388, it has been held that the prosecution is
duty-bound to bring forth all material evidence necessary for
unfolding the narrative, and where a material witness, who
could have thrown light on crucial aspects of the case, is
withheld without any plausible explanation, the Court may
legitimately draw an adverse inference against the
prosecution.
24] In the present case, the younger brother, who first
reported the incident and was a crucial link in the chain of
circumstances, has not been examined. This omission
assumes significance inasmuch as the prosecution case is
otherwise not supported by cogent evidence establishing the
presence of the accused at the relevant time. Consequently,
the non-examination of the said material witness creates a
serious dent in the prosecution case and warrants drawing an
adverse inference.
25] The prosecution relies on Section 106 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as the "Evidence
Act"). In Nagendra Sah (supra) the Apex Court held that:
(i) Section 106 does not relieve the prosecution of its
primary burden;
(ii) False explanation can only be an additional link;
(iii) It cannot substitute proof of a complete chain.
26] In Deonandan Mishra v. State of Bihar, reported in
1955 SCR (2) 570, it has been held that a false defence may
serve as an additional link only when the prosecution has
otherwise established the chain of circumstances. Similarly, in
Balvir Singh (supra), particularly the Apex Court reiterated
that where the death occurs within the matrimonial home,
and the prosecution establishes foundational facts indicating
homicidal death, an adverse inference may arise if the
accused fails to offer a plausible explanation. However, such
an inference cannot substitute the requirement of proving a
complete chain of circumstances. The relevant paragraphs of
the aforesaid judgment read as under: -
"56. In our view, the aforesaid passage applies with
great force to the facts and circumstances of the
present case.
57. Even where there are facts especially within the
knowledge of the accused, which could throw a light
upon his guilt or innocence, as the case may be, the
accused is not bound to allege them or to prove them.
But it is not as if the section is automatically
inapplicable to the criminal trials, for, if that had been
the case, the Legislature would certainly have so
enacted. We consider the true rule to be that Section
106 does not cast any burden upon an accused in a
criminal trial, but that, where the accused throws no
light at all upon the facts which ought to be especially
within his knowledge, and which could support any
theory of hypothesis compatible with his innocence,
the Court can also consider his failure to adduce any
explanation, in consonance with the principle of the
passage in Deonandan Mishra (supra), which we have
already set forth. The matter has been put in this
form, with reference to Section 106 of the Evidence
Act, in Smith v. R. reported in 1918 A.I.R. Mad. 111,
namely, that if the accused is in a position to explain
the only alternative theory to his guilt, the absence of
explanation could be taken into account. In the
present case, taking the proved facts together, we are
unable even to speculate about any alternative theory
which is compatible with the innocence of the
accused.
58. In the aforesaid context, we may also refer to and
rely on a decision of this Court in Kalu alias
Laxminarayan v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in
(2019) 10 SCC 211, wherein this Court after referring
to its various other decisions on the applicability of
Section 106 of the Evidence Act observed as under:
(SCC p. 218, para 16)
„16. In view of our conclusion that the prosecution has
clearly established a prima facie case, the precedents
cited on behalf of the appellant are not considered
relevant in the facts of the present case. Once the
prosecution established a prima facie case, the appellant
was obliged to furnish some explanation under Section
313 CrPC with regard to the circumstances under which
the deceased met an unnatural death inside the house.
His failure to offer any explanation whatsoever therefore
leaves no doubt for the conclusion of his being the
assailant of the deceased.‟
59. We should also look into the decision of this Court
in the case of Sawal Das v. State of Bihar reported in
(1974) 4 SCC 193. In the said case the trial court had
come to the conclusion that, upon the established
circumstances listed above, no other inference was
left open to the Court except that the appellant and his
father and stepmother had conjointly committed the
murder of the deceased Smt. Chanda Devi on the
morning of 28.05.1965 and that the appellant and his
father had then hastily and stealthily disposed off the
body in order to conceal the commission of the offence.
It had also taken into account, in coming to this
conclusion, the fact that the appellant had
unsuccessfully set up a plea, in his written statement,
that, Smt. Chanda Devi, who was alleged by him to be
wearing a nylon Saree said to have caught fire
accidentally while she was using a kerosene stove in
her room, and kept bad health due to frequent
pregnancies and was also suffering from asthma, a
weak heart, and abdominal complaints. She had
given birth to six children. died of extensive burns on
her body and collapsed. The appellant had alleged
that Smt. Chanda Devi was debilitated and kept bad
health due to frequent pregnancies and was also
suffering from asthma, a weak heart, and abdominal
complaints. She had given birth to six children.
60. In view of the aforesaid facts, this Court held as
under: (SCC pp. 196-97, paras 8-10)
„8. We think that the burden of proving the plea that Smt.
Chanda Devi died in the manner alleged by the appellant
lay upon the appellant. This is clear from the provisions
of Sections 103 and 106 of the Indian Evidence Act. Both
the trial Court and the High Court had rightly pointed
out that the appellant had miserably failed to give
credible or substantial evidence of any facts or
circumstances which could support the pleas that Smt.
Chanda Devi met her death because her Nylon Saree had
accidentally caught fire from a kerosene stove. The trial
Court had rightly observed that the mere fact that some
witnesses had seen some smoke emerging from the room,
with a kitchen nearby at a time when food was likely to
be cooked, could not indicate that Smt. Chanda Devi's
saree had caught fire. Neither the murdered woman nor
the appellant nor any member of his family was shown to
have run about or called for help against a fire.
9. Learned Counsel for the appellant contended that
Section 106 of the Evidence Act could not be called in aid
by the prosecution because that section applies only
where a fact relating to the actual commission of the
offence is within the special knowledge of the accused,
such as the circumstances in which or the intention with
which an accused did a particular act alleged to
constitute an offence. The language of Section 106 of the
Evidence Act does not, in our opinion, warrant putting
such a narrow construction upon it. This Court held in
Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1956 SC 460 :
(1956) Cri LJ 827] that the burden of proving a plea
specifically set up by an accused, which may absolve him
from criminal liability, certainly lies upon him. It is a
different matter that the quantum of evidence by which he
may succeed in discharging his burden of creating a
reasonable belief, that circumstance, absolving him from
criminal liability may have existed, is lower than the
burden resting upon the prosecution to establish the guilt
of an accused beyond reasonable doubt.
10. Neither an application of Section 103 nor of 106 of
the Evidence Act could, however, absolve the prosecution
from the duty of discharging its general or primary
burden of proving the prosecution case beyond
reasonable doubt. It is only when the prosecution has led
evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or,
which makes out a prima facie case, that the question
arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof
may lie upon the accused. The crucial question in the
case before us is : Has the prosecution discharged its
initial or general and primary burden of proving the guilt
of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt?‟ (Emphasis
supplied)
61. We also pose the very same question like the one
posed in Sawal Das (supra) referred to above, 'has the
prosecution discharged its initial or general and
primary burden of proving the guilt of the appellants
beyond reasonable doubt?'
62. We are of the view that the circumstances
narrated by us in para 28 of this judgment constitute
more than a prima facie case to enable the
prosecution to invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act
and shift the burden on the accused husband to
explain what had actually happened on the date his
wife died.
63. These appeals remind us of what this Court
observed in the case of Dharam Das Wadhwani v.
State of Uttar Pradesh: (SCC pp. 272-73, para 14)
"14....The rule of benefit of reasonable doubt does not
imply a frail willow bending to every whiff of hesitancy.
Judges are made of sterner stuff and must take a
practical view of legitimate inferences flowing from
evidence, circumstantial or direct."
The role of courts in such circumstances assumes
greater importance and it is expected that the courts
would deal with such cases in a more realistic manner
and not allow the criminals to escape on account of
procedural technicalities, perfunctory investigation or
insignificant lacunas in the evidence as otherwise the
criminals would receive encouragement and the
victims of crime would be totally discouraged by the
crime going unpunished. The courts are expected to be
sensitive in cases involving crime against women.
27] Applying the aforesaid settled principles to the facts of
the present case, this Court finds that although the homicidal
nature of death stands firmly established by the medical
evidence, the prosecution has failed to prove the remaining
essential links constituting a complete and unbroken chain of
circumstances. In particular, there is no reliable evidence
establishing the presence of the accused at the place of
occurrence at the relevant time, nor any material to indicate
that he had exclusive access or opportunity to commit the
offence. On the contrary, the evidence on record indicates
that the premises were accessible to multiple persons,
especially in the backdrop of the marriage ceremony in the
household, thereby leaving open reasonable hypotheses
inconsistent with the guilt of the accused. Significantly, the
initial version of the incident, as reported by the younger
brother of the accused, was that the deceased had committed
suicide by hanging, which version was accepted and acted
upon by the neighbours as well as the police at the earliest
point of time. It is only upon receipt of the postmortem report
that the homicidal nature of death came to light. In such
circumstances, the possibility that the accused, like other
witnesses, initially believed the death to be suicidal, based on
the information so disseminated, cannot be ruled out,
particularly when the prosecution has failed to establish his
presence at the time of occurrence or any conduct
inconsistent with such belief.
28] Thus, although the medical evidence belies the plea of
suicide, the explanation furnished by the accused cannot be
said to be demonstrably false in the sense required in law so
as to constitute an additional incriminating link in the chain of
circumstances. A false explanation assumes significance only
when it is shown to be consciously false and incompatible
with proved facts, after the prosecution has established a
complete chain. In the present case, the explanation appears
to be reasonably compatible with the initial version of events
and the surrounding circumstances, and therefore, does not
advance the prosecution case. Further, the non-examination
of the younger brother, who was the first informant and a
vital link in unfolding the genesis of the occurrence, creates a
material gap in the prosecution case. This omission, coupled
with the absence of proof of exclusive presence, renders the
chain of circumstances incomplete. Consequently, the
foundational facts themselves remaining unestablished, the
principle under Section 106 of the Evidence Act cannot be
invoked to cure such deficiencies.
29] The evidence on record gives rise to more than one
plausible hypothesis, including that of the accused/appellant
not being involved in the commission of the offence. It is a
settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that where two
views are possible, the one favouring the accused must be
adopted. In the present case, the benefit of doubt must
necessarily enure to the accused/appellant, and the only
legally permissible course is to record an order of acquittal.
30] In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds
that:
(i) The chain of circumstances is incomplete;
(ii) The possibility of involvement of other persons
cannot be ruled out;
(iii) The prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond
reasonable doubt.
31] The findings of the trial court are, therefore,
unsustainable and liable to be set aside. Accordingly, the
appeal is allowed.
32] The conviction and sentence of the accused/appellant
are hereby set aside.
33] The accused/appellant is acquitted of all charges and
shall be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.
34] Let the trial court records be returned.
JUDGE JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
Pranab Digitally signed
by Pranab
Chand Chandra Das
Date: 2026.04.06
ra Das 16:40:03 +05'30'
