Gauhati High Court

Page No.# 1/13 vs Agarwal Tea Company And Ors on 13 October, 2025

Page No.# 1/13

GAHC010007792010

2025:GAU-AS:13613

THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)

Case No. : CRP/420/2010

AMARAWATI TEA COMPANY LIMITED
REGD. OFFICE AT INDIA EXDCHANGE PLACE, KOLKATA-700001 AND
LOCAL OFFICE AT DULIABAM TEA ESTATE, KHOWANG IN DIBRUGARH
DISTRICT, ASSAM.

VERSUS

AGARWAL TEA COMPANY and ORS.
HEAD OFFICE AT MARWARIPATTY, JORHAT, ASSAM.

2:ON DEATH OF SAILENDRA KR. SAIKIA HIS LEGAL HEIRS
21. SMTI. ARUNA SAIKIA
W/O. LT. SAILENDRA KUMAR SAIKIA
BUNGLOW
DULIAJAN TEA ESTATE
P.O. KHOWANG
DIST. DIBRUGARH
ASSAM. 22. SMT. LIPIKA SAIKIA
D/O. LT. SAILENDRA KUMAR SAIKIA
BUNGLOW
DULIAJAN TEA ESTATE
P.O. KHOWANG
DIST. DIBRUGARH
ASSAM. 23. SMT. TULIKA SAIKIA
D/O. LT. SAILENDRA KUMAR SAIKIA
BUNGLOW
DULIAJAN TEA ESTATE
P.O. KHOWANG
DIST. DIBRUGARH
ASSAM.

3:SARAT CH. SAIKIA
Page No.# 2/13

S/O LT. LALIT CH. SAIKIA
KHOWANG VILLAGE
PO. KHOWANGHAT
P.S. KHOWANG
DIST. DIBRUGARH
ASSAM

4:ON THE DEATH OF VIJAN SAIKIA HIS LEGAL HEIRS
NAMELY

4.1:SMT. ANUPAMA SAIKIA
W/O LATE VIJAN SAIKIA
KUSHAL NAGAR
MORAN
DIST.- DIBRUGARH
ASSAM.

4.2:MISS. NIMISA SAIKIA
D/O LATE VIJAN SAIKIA
KUSHAL NAGAR
MORAN
DIST.- DIBRUGARH
ASSAM.

4.3:MR. VARDAAN SAIKIA
S/O LATE VIJAN SAIKIA
KUSHAL NAGAR
MORAN
DIST.- DIBRUGARH
ASSAM.

5:SHRI PRASANTA SAIKIA
S/O LATE LALIT CHANDRA SAIKIA

C/O- SHRI L.N. BHARALI

TILOY GRAMYA BAZAR
P.O- TILOI
DISTRICT- DIBRUGARH
ASSAM.

6:KAKOLI SAIKIA

W/O LT. NIRANJAN SAIKIA
BUNGLOW
DULIABAM TEA ESTATE
PO. KHOWANG
Page No.# 3/13

DIST. DIBRUGARH
ASSAM

7:ON DEATH OF KUMBHA KANTA SAIKIA HIS LEGAL HERIS NAMELY
7(A) SMT. HIRANYA SAIKIA
W/O. LT. KUMBHA KANTA SAIKIA
R/O. MANCOTTA ROAD CHOWKIDINGHEE
P.O. DIBRUGARH
DIST. DIBRUGARH
ASSAM. 7(B) SMT. BITHI SAIKIA
D/O. LT. KUMBHA KANTA SAIKIA
W/O. DR. TAPAN SAIKIA
R/O. PRINCE ALI KHAN HOSPITAL
NESBIT ROAD
MAZAGAON
MUMBAI-400010 7(C) SMT. GITI NIJAN
D/O. LT. KUMBHA KANTA SAIKIA
W/O. SHRI SHAHID NIJAN
R/O. KHELGAON
NEW DELHI.

8:ATANU SAIKIA

S/O KUMBHA KANTA SAIKIA
R/O MANCOTTA ROAD
CHOWKIDINGI
PO/DIST. DIBRUGARH-1
ASSAM

9:EASTERN TEA BORKERS P LTD.

HAVING ITS REGD. OFFICE AT 191 MANIRAM DEWAN PATH
GHY-3
ASSA

Advocate for the Petitioner : MR.A K GUPTA, MR.P J SAIKIA

Advocate for the Respondent : MS.J GOGOIR- 3,5and6, MR. A DHAR (R-3,4.1,4.2,4.3,5,6),MS. A
VERMA(R-3,4.1,4.2,4.3,5,6),MR.U BHATTACHARYA(R- 3,5&6),MR.D C C PHUKAN(R- 3,5&6)
Page No.# 4/13

BEFORE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ROBIN PHUKAN

ORDER

Date : 13.10.2025

Heard Mr. P.J. Saikia, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. A.K. Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. K. Agarwal, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. N. Deka, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1; and Mr. A. Dhar, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 3, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 5 and 6. None appears for the respondent Nos. 2, 7, 8 and 9.

2. In this petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 07.07.2010, passed by the learned Civil Judge, Dibrugarh ('Trial Court', for short), in Title Suit No. 40/2008.

3. The issue, to be decided in this revision petition, is whether a stranger to an agreement for a specific performance of contract can be arrayed in a title suit filed for specific performance of contract, under Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act.

4. Mr. Saikia, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner herein, as plaintiff, has instituted a title suit, being Title Suit No. 40/2008, for specific performance of the contract, vide agreement dated 16.12.2005, between the plaintiff and proforma respondent Nos. 2 to 9 (main defendants in the suit). Mr. Saikia also submits that the present respondent No. 1 also instituted a suit, being Title Suit No. 3/2006, praying for a declaration that the agreement dated 16.12.2005, is illegal, inoperative and void, and also praying for cancellation of the same and for granting injunction, wherein the present petitioner was impleaded as party.

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4.1. Further submission of Mr. Saikia is that the learned trial Court, vide impugned order dated 07.07.2010, in Title Suit No. 40/2008, had allowed impleadment of the respondent No. 1 as defendant in the said title suit. Mr. Saikia further submits that the suit was for specific performance of contract and Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act governs the same. And by referring to a decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kasturi vs. Iyyamperumal, reported in (2005) 6 SCC 733, Mr. Saikia submits that in the said case, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that a stranger to the agreement is not entitled to be impleaded as a party defendant in the suit. Mr. Saikia submits, by allowing a stranger to the agreement to be impleaded as a party in a suit, the learned trial Court had committed grave illegality and as such, the same requires interference of this Court, and therefore, it is contended to allow this petition by setting aside the impugned order.

5. Per contra, Mr. Agarwal, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent No. 1, by referring to a decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mumbai International Airport Private Limited vs. Regency Convention Centre and Hotels Private Limited and Ors., reported in (2010) 7 SCC 417, submits that Hon'ble Supreme Court has clarified the decision in the case of Kasturi (supra). By referring to another four decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and Ors., reported in (1992) 2 SCC 524; Sumtibai and Ors. vs. Paras Finance Co. Regd. Partnership Firm Beawer (Raj.), reported in (2007) 10 SCC 82; Subodh Kumar Gupta and Ors. vs. Alpana Gupta and Ors., reported in (2005) 11 SCC 578 and Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai and Ors., reported in (2003) 6 SCC 675, Mr. Agarwal submits that though no relief is being claimed against the Page No.# 6/13

respondent No. 1 herein by the petitioner in Title Suit No. 40/2008, yet the respondent No. 1 herein had instituted a title suit, being Title Suit No. 3/2006, for declaration that the agreement dated 16.12.2005, is illegal, inoperative and void and also prayed for cancellation of the same and for injunction, and if specific performance of the said agreement is allowed and even if a decree is granted in Title Suit No. 3/2006, then the decree could not be executed in view of the said agreement, by which the suit property is sold by the respondents in Title Suit No. 40/2008, and as such, though no relief is being claimed against the present respondent No. 1 and though he is a stranger to the agreement for specific performance of contract, for which Title Suit No. 40/2008, had been instituted, and though he is not a necessary party as no relief is being claimed against him, yet he is a proper party to the proceeding, and as such, the impugned order for impleadment of the respondent No. 1 in Title Suit No. 40/2008, suffers from no infirmity or illegality or impropriety requiring any interference of this Court, and under such circumstances, Mr. Agarwal has contended to dismiss this petition.

6. Mr. Dhar, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 3, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 5 and 6, on the other hand, has also subscribes the submission, so advanced by Mr. Agarwal, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent No. 1. Mr. Dhar also submits that the impugned order suffers from no illegality or infirmity requiring any interference of this Court, and under such circumstances, Mr. Dhar has contended to dismiss this petition.

7. Having heard the submissions of learned counsel for both the parties, I have carefully gone through the petition and the document placed on record, and perused the impugned order, dated 07.07.2010, by which the respondent No. 1 had been impleaded as party, and gone through the decisions, so Page No.# 7/13

referred by learned counsel for both the parties.

8. The basic facts, herein this case, are not in dispute. The Title Suit No. 40/2008, was filed by the petitioner as plaintiff for specific performance of contract of the agreement being agreement dated 16.12.2005, entered into by the plaintiff and the proforma respondent Nos. 2 to 9. It is also not in dispute that the respondent No. 1 herein had also instituted Title Suit No. 3/2006, for a declaration that the agreement dated 16.12.2005, is illegal, inoperative and void and prayed for cancellation of the same and for injunction. Admittedly, the respondent No. 1 is not a party to the agreement dated 16.12.2005, for specific performance of which the Title Suit No. 40/2008, was instituted. Further, no relief is being claimed by the petitioner herein/plaintiff of Title Suit No. 40/2008, against the respondent No. 1 herein.

9. In the case of Kasturi (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court has dealt with the issue of impleadment of a third party to a contract as under:

"15. As discussed herein earlier, whether Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 were proper parties or not, the governing principle for deciding the question would be that the presence of Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 before the court would be necessary to enable it effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. As noted herein earlier, in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale, the issue to be decided is the enforceability of the contract entered into between the appellant and Respondents 2 and 3 and whether contract was executed by the appellant and Respondents 2 and 3 for sale of the contracted property, whether the plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract and whether the appellant is entitled to a decree for specific performance of a contract for sale against Respondents 2 and Page No.# 8/13

3. It is an admitted position that Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 did not seek their addition in the suit on the strength of the contract in respect of which the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale has been filed. Admittedly, they based their claim on independent title and possession of the contracted property. It is, therefore, obvious as noted herein earlier that in the event, Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 are added or impleaded in the suit, the scope of the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale shall be enlarged from the suit for specific performance to a suit for title and possession which is not permissible in law. In the case of Vijay Pratap v. Sambhu Saran Sinha [(1996) 10 SCC 53] this Court had taken the same view which is being taken by us in this judgment as discussed above. This Court in that decision clearly held that to decide the right, title and interest in the suit property of the stranger to the contract is beyond the scope of the suit for specific performance of the contract and the same cannot be turned into a regular title suit. Therefore, in our view, a third party or a stranger to the contract cannot be added so as to convert a suit of one character into a suit of different character. As discussed above, in the event any decree is passed against Respondents 2 and 3 and in favour of the appellant for specific performance of the contract for sale in respect of the contracted property, the decree that would be passed in the said suit, obviously, cannot bind Respondents 1 and 4 to 11. It may also be observed that in the event, the appellant obtains a decree for specific performance of the contracted property against Respondents 2 and 3, then, the Court shall direct execution of deed of sale in favour of the appellant in the event Respondents 2 and 3 refusing to execute the deed of sale and to obtain possession of the contracted property he has to put the decree in execution. As noted herein earlier, since Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 were not Page No.# 9/13

parties in the suit for specific performance of a contract for sale of the contracted property, a decree passed in such a suit shall not bind them and in that case, Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 would be at liberty either to obstruct execution in order to protect their possession by taking recourse to the relevant provisions of CPC, if they are available to them, or to file an independent suit for declaration of title and possession against the appellant or Respondent 3. On the other hand, if the decree is passed in favour of the appellant and sale deed is executed, the stranger to the contract being Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 have to be sued for taking possession if they are in possession of the decretal property."

9.1. Also, the same view is reiterated by a two Judges Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gurmit Singh vs. Kiran Kant Robinson and Ors., reported in AIR 2019 SC 3577.

10. Notably, the decision in Kasturi (supra), is a decision of a three Judges Bench. The principle that can be deduced from Kasturi (supra) and Gurmit Singh (supra), is that following two tests are to be satisfied for determining the question as to who is a necessary party, and the tests are:

(i) there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the controversies involved in the proceedings;

(ii) no effective decree can be passed in the absence of such party.

11. Further, in the case of Vidur Impex & Traders (P) Ltd. vs. Tosh Apartments (P) Ltd., reported in (2012) 8 SCC 384, Hon'ble Supreme Court has dealt with the issue as under:-

"41. Though there is apparent conflict in the observations made in some of the aforementioned judgments, the Page No.# 10/13

broad principles which should govern disposal of an application for impleadment are:-

41.1. The court can, at any stage of the proceedings, either on an application made by the parties or otherwise, direct impleadment of any person as party, who ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant or whose presence before the court is necessary for effective and complete adjudication of the issues involved in the suit.

41.2. A necessary party is the person who ought to be joined as party to the suit and in whose absence an effective decree cannot be passed by the court. 41.3. A proper party is a person whose presence would enable the court to completely, effectively and properly adjudicate upon all matters and issues, though he may not be a person in favour of or against whom a decree is to be made.

41.4. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the court does not have the jurisdiction to order his impleadment against the wishes of the plaintiff.

41.5. In a suit for specific performance, the court can order impleadment of a purchaser whose conduct is above board, and who files application for being joined as party within reasonable time of his acquiring knowledge about the pending litigation. 41.6. However, if the applicant is guilty of contumacious conduct or is beneficiary of a clandestine transaction or a transaction made by the owner of the suit property in violation of the restraint order passed by the court or the application is unduly delayed then the court will be fully justified in declining the prayer for impleadment."

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12. Admittedly, in the instant case, no relief is being claimed against the respondent No. 1 herein, by the petitioner herein, in Title Suit No. 40/2008, and admittedly, he is not a necessary party in the said proceeding.

13. Now, the question is whether the respondent No. 1 is a proper party as contended by Mr. Agarwal, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent No. 1.

13.1. It is however, well settled in the case of Vidur Impex & Traders (P) Ltd. (supra), especially in paragraph No. 41.3, a proper party is a person whose presence would enable the Court to completely, effectively and properly adjudicate upon all matters and issues, though he may not be a person in favour of or against whom a decree is to be made.

14. In the instant case, admittedly the respondent No. 1 is a stranger to the agreement dated 16.12.2005, for specific performance, of which Title Suit No. 40/2008, had been instituted and applying the proposition of law laid down in paragraph No. 14.3 of Vidur Impex & Traders (P) Ltd. (supra), to the given facts and circumstances on the record, it can safely be concluded that the respondent No. 1 is not a proper party in the said proceeding as specific performance of contract as entered into by the parties in Title Suit No. 40/2008, can completely, effectively and properly be adjudicated upon all matters involved therein without the respondent No. 1 being impleaded as a party.

15. Over and above, as held by a three Judges Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kasturi (supra), to decide the right, title and interest in the suit property of the respondent No.1 herein to the contract is beyond the scope of the suit for specific performance of the contract. And a suit for specific performance of the contract cannot be turned into a regular title suit.

15.1. As discussed above, in the event any decree is being passed against Page No.# 12/13

other respondents and in favour of the petitioner for specific performance of the contract for sale in respect of the contracted property, the decree that would be passed in the said suit, obviously, cannot bind respondent No. 1.

16. I have also carefully gone through the decisions, so referred by Mr. Agarwal, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent No. 1, and this Court is unable to record concurrence to his submission for the reason aforesaid. The only apprehension of the respondent No. 1, as submitted by Mr. Agarwal, is that if the specific performance of contract entered into by the parties, vide agreement dated 16.12.2005, is allowed, then the decree granted in Title Suit No. 3/2006, could not be executed. But there are specific provision in the CPC to deal with such a situation, including the provision for attachment before judgment, under Order XXXVIII, Rule 5(1) CPC, which he may invoke in the Title Suit No.03/2006, so filed by him.

17. Furthermore, in the case of Kasturi (supra), it has been held that a decree passed in such a suit shall not bind them and in that case, respondent No. 1 would be at liberty either to obstruct execution in order to protect their possession by taking recourse to the relevant provisions of CPC, if they are available to him, or to file an independent suit for declaration of title and possession against the present petitioner. Admittedly, an independent suit, being Title Suit No. 3/2006, for a declaration that the agreement dated 16.12.2005, is illegal, inoperative and void and prayed for cancellation of the same and for injunction, is instituted by the respondent No.1.

18. Under, the given facts and circumstances, I find sufficient merit in this petition and accordingly, the same stands allowed. The impugned order, dated 07.07.2010, impleading the respondent No. 1, in Title Suit No. 40/2008, stands Page No.# 13/13

set aside and quashed.

19. Since the matter is pending for a long time, the learned trial Court is requested to proceed with the matter expeditiously and to dispose of the same as soon as practicable, preferably within a period of four months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order.

20. The petitioner shall obtain a certified copy of this order and place the same before the learned trial Court within a week from today.

21. In terms of above, this revision petition stands disposed of.

22. Registry shall send back the TCR by special messenger forthwith.

JUDGE

Comparing Assistant