[Cites 7, Cited by 0]
Delhi High Court
Surampal Singh vs State Nct Of Delhi And Ors on 24 March, 2026
$~24
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision: 24.03.2026
+ W.P.(C) 12427/2022
SURAMPAL SINGH .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Rakesh Kumar, Mr. Ujjwal
K. Priyadarshi, Mr. Rishit
Kumar, Mr. Harshit Sharma
and Mr. Aashish Kumar, Advs.
versus
STATE NCT OF DELHI AND ORS .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Yeeshu Jain, ASC along
with Ms. Jyoti Tyagi, Ms.
Vishruti Pandey and Mr. Sachin
Garg, Advs. for R - 1 to 4.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN
J U D G M E N T (ORAL)
AMIT MAHAJAN, J.:
1. Through the present petition, the Petitioner has challenged the
correctness of the order dated 11.07.2022 (hereafter 'impugned
order'), passed in OA No. 1725/2022, whereby the learned Central
Administrative Tribunal rejected the Petitioner's prayer for grant of
back wages.
2. Briefly stated, the Petitioner was employed as a Trained
Graduate Teacher in the Directorate of Education of GNCTD. By way
of order dated 18.01.2011, the Petitioner was placed under suspension
from 24.11.2010 pursuant to his arrest in FIR No. 35/2008, registered
at Police Station Gulawati Buland Sahar, Uttar Pradesh, for offences
under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860. The Petitioner was convicted by the learned Sessions
Court on 18.06.2013 and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment
for a period of one year and six months and to pay a fine of ₹1000/-
for the offences under Sections 307/149 of the IPC. The Petitioner was
further awarded rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year for the
offence under Section 506 of the IPC. As a consequence of his
conviction, the competent authority imposed a penalty of dismissal
from service on the Petitioner.
3. The Petitioner filed an appeal challenging his conviction before
the Hon'ble High Court of Allahabad, which was allowed by way of
judgment dated 25.02.2019. Thereafter, the Petitioner submitted an
application dated 18.02.2019 with a prayer to revoke the order of
dismissal and to extend the benefit of salary and pension as he had
attained the age of superannuation on 30.04.2018. Due to delay in
adjudication of his representation, the Petitioner preferred OA bearing
no. 45/2020, which was disposed of with a direction to pass a
speaking order. By way of order dated 07.07.2021, the Petitioner's
dismissal was set aside and he was reinstated in service by the
Competent Authority. It was found that the Petitioner was entitled to
subsistence allowance for the period of suspension, however, he was
not entitled to back wages. By way of the said order, the Petitioner
was also asked to submit a representation regarding entitlement of pay
and admissible allowances for the period of suspension and dismissal,
which was to be treated as period not spent on duty.
4. Following the same, the Petitioner preferred a detailed
representation in this respect on 05.08.2021. Being aggrieved by the
same not being considered, the Petitioner filed OA No. 290/2022,
which was disposed of with directions to pass a speaking order. In
compliance thereof, by way of order dated 24.03.2022, the Competent
Authority ordered as under:
"i) For the period of suspension w.e.f. 24.11.2010 to 20.05.2014,
the said Shri Suram Pal Singh shall be entitled for pay and
admissible allowance equal to subsistence allowance, subject
to adjustment of the amount of subsistence allowance already
paid to him for the period of suspension.
ii) The said Shri Suram Pal Singh shall not be entitled for any
back-wages/ arrears of the pay for the period of dismissal
w.e.f. 21.05.2014 to 30.04.2018 i.e. date on which he attained
age of superannuation.
iii) The period from 24.11.2010 to 30.04.2018 in respect of the said
Shri Suram Pal Singh shall be counted for pensionary
purposes only."
5. The said order was upheld by the learned Tribunal by way of
the impugned order.
6. It is the case of the Petitioner that once the order of his
dismissal from service is set aside, it is not proper to hold that the
Petitioner was not on duty. It is submitted that the Petitioner was
falsely implicated on the basis of enmity. It is submitted that the
disciplinary action against the Petitioner was based solely on the basis
of the criminal proceeding against him and he ought not to be
penalised after he has been acquitted on merits. It is submitted that the
Department had no substantial reason to suspend the Petitioner or to
continue his suspension during the period when the case was under
investigation. During the course of arguments, reliance has been
placed on the judgments in Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior
Adhyapal Mahavidyalaya and Ors.: (2013) 10 SCC 324 and Raj
Narain v. Union of India : (2019) 5 SCC 809.
7. On the other hand, it is argued on behalf of the Respondents
that the impugned order suffers from no infirmity and the judgments
relied upon by the Petitioner do not help his case.
8. We have heard the counsel and perused the record.
9. The limited grievance agitated by the Petitioner is in relation to
his entitlement to back wages for the entire duration of his suspension
and dismissal, that is, from 24.11.2010 (that is, date from when the
Petitioner was suspended) to 30.04.2018 (that is, date on which the
Petitioner attained the age of superannuation).
10. Although the Petitioner has not been granted back wages for the
said period, pursuant to his acquittal, the Competent Authority has
revoked the dismissal order and ordered that the period from
24.11.2010 to 30.04.2018 shall be counted for pensionary purposes.
11. A bare perusal of the order dated 24.03.2022 as well as the
impugned order indicate that the Competent Authority as well as the
learned Tribunal have duly considered the issue of back wages, and
they were compelled to deny the same on being weighed by the
decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore
v. Gujrat Electricity Board, Himmatnagar : (1996) 11 SCC 603. In
that matter, the Petitioner therein had been dismissed from his post of
Junior Clerk as he had been convicted in case for the offence of
murder. Subsequently, the Petitioner was acquitted and he was
reinstated into the service with continuity of service, but he was
denied back wages. The following observations were made by the
Hon'ble Apex Court in such circumstances in relation to back wages:
"3. The reinstatement of the petitioner into the service has already
been ordered by the High Court. The only question is whether he is
entitled to back wages. It was his conduct of involving himself in
the crime that was taken into account for his not being in service of
the respondent. Consequent upon his acquittal, he is entitled to
reinstatement for the reason that his service was terminated on the
basis of the conviction by operation of proviso to the statutory
rules applicable to the situation. The question of back wages
would be considered only if the respondents have taken action by
way of disciplinary proceedings and the action was found to be
unsustainable in law and he was unlawfully prevented from
discharging the duties. In that context, his conduct becomes
relevant. Each case requires to be considered in its own backdrop.
In this case, since the petitioner had involved himself in a crime,
though he was later acquitted, he had disabled himself from
rendering the service on account of conviction and incarceration in
jail. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to
payment of back wages. The learned Single Judge and the Division
Bench have not committed any error of law warranting
interference."
12. A similar view has been taken by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
Union of India v. Jaipal Singh : (2004) 1 SCC 121, wherein it was
held that when a public servant is implicated in a criminal case and,
upon trial, is convicted by the competent court, the department is
legally bound to keep such an employee out of service. It was held
that the department cannot be made liable for payment of back-wages
for the period during which they could not avail the services of the
employee. The relevant extract of the aforesaid judgment is
reproduced herein below:
"4. On a careful consideration of the matter and the materials on
record, including the judgment and orders brought to our notice,
we are of the view that it is well accepted that an order rejecting a
special leave petition at the threshold without detailed reasons
therefor does not constitute any declaration of law by this Court or
constitute a binding precedent. Per contra, the decision relied
upon by the appellant is one on merits and for reasons specifically
recorded therefor it operates as a binding precedent as well. On
going through the same, we are in respectful agreement with the
view taken in Ranchhodji [(1996) 11 SCC 603 : 1997 SCC (L&S)
491] . If prosecution, which ultimately resulted in acquittal of the
person concerned was at the behest of or by the department itself,
perhaps different considerations may arise. On the other hand, if
as a citizen, the employee or a public servant got involved in a
criminal case and if after initial conviction by the trial court, he
gets acquittal on appeal subsequently, the department cannot in
any manner be found fault with for having kept him out of
service, since the law obliges a person convicted of an offence to
be so kept out and not to be retained in service. Consequently, the
reasons given in the decision relied upon, for the appellants are
not only convincing but are in consonance with reasonableness as
well. Though exception taken to that part of the order directing
reinstatement cannot be sustained and the respondent has to be
reinstated in service, for the reason that the earlier discharge was
on account of those criminal proceedings and conviction only,
the appellants are well within their rights to deny back wages to
the respondent for the period he was not in service. The
appellants cannot be made liable to pay for the period for which
they could not avail of the services of the respondent. The High
Court, in our view, committed a grave error, in allowing back
wages also, without adverting to all such relevant aspects and
considerations. Consequently, the order of the High Court insofar
as it directed payment of back wages is liable to be and is hereby
set aside."
(emphasis supplied)
13. Suffice to say, it is evident from the aforesaid judgments that
even if the conviction is ultimately overturned, no fault can be
attributed to the employer for exclusion of the employee from service
since the law mandates that a person convicted of an offence be kept
out of service. The present case is not one where the Respondents
illegally prevented the Petitioner from discharging his duties, but
rather, he was dismissed after his conviction. The record does not
indicate that the Petitioner ever endeavored to join the service during
the pendency of the criminal proceedings before the Trial Court by
laying a challenge to his suspension prior to his acquittal in appeal. In
such circumstances, even if the Petitioner may have been falsely
implicated, applying the principle of "no work no pay", the
Respondents cannot be asked to pay the Petitioner's wages for the
period for which he had admittedly not served the department.
14. As rightly appreciated by the learned Tribunal, the judgment in
Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapal Mahavidyalaya
and Ors. (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case. In
that case, the Petitioner therein had challenged her suspension and her
case was that she was being forcibly kept out of service by the
management. Therein, the suspension and termination was found to be
illegal due to violation of statutory provisions as well as principles of
natural justice due to which it was directed that the Petitioner be
reinstated to her original post, however, the High Court ordered that
no back wages were to be awarded. In such circumstances, the
Hon'ble Apex Court observed that in a case of wrongful termination
of service, grant of back wages is the normal rule. The present case
does not relate to any mala fide or wrong termination on part of the
Department.
15. Further, the Petitioner has relied on the judgment in Raj Narain
v. Union of India (supra), where the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as
under:
"The observation made in the judgment in Union of India and
Others v. Jaipal Singh (supra) has to be understood in a manner
in which the department would become liable for back wages in the
event of a finding that the initiation of the criminal proceedings
was mala fide or with vexatious intent. In all other cases, we do not
'see any difference between initiation of the criminal proceedings
by the department vis-a-vis a criminal ease lodged by the police."
16. The observations made in the said case are also of no benefit to
the Petitioner. In that case, it was the case of the Petitioner therein that
he was entitled to back wages after being acquitted in appeal as the
subject criminal proceedings, in which he was initially convicted by
the Trial Court, had been initiated at the behest of the employer.
Noting the endeavour of the Petitioner to distinguish proceedings
launched by police and those initiated at the behest of an employer,
the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that the employer would become
liable for back wages if it is found that the proceedings were launched
with a mala fide intent. Although it is stressed by the Petitioner that
the criminal proceedings against him were based on false allegations,
no liability or fault can be ascribed to the Respondents for dismissing
him when the proceedings were admittedly not launched at their
instance.
17. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds no reason to
interfere with the impugned order.
18. The present petition is dismissed in the aforesaid terms.
AMIT MAHAJAN, J.
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.
MARCH 24, 2026
