[Cites 23, Cited by 0]
Delhi High Court
National Insurnace Co Ltd vs Laxmi Bisht & Ors on 17 March, 2026
$~10
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of decision: 17th March 2026
+ MAC.APP. 793/2018 & CM APPL. 35938/2018
NATIONAL INSURNACE CO LTD .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Zorawar Singh, Mr. Jayant
Rastogi, Advocates.
versus
LAXMI BISHT & ORS .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Diwan Singh Chauhan,
Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANISH DAYAL
JUDGMENT
ANISH DAYAL, J (ORAL)
1. This appeal has been filed by the Insurance Company assailing the
Award dated 9th July 2018 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal,
Shahdara District, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi ['MACT'] in MACP
No.1157/2016, whereby compensation of Rs.48,96,000/- along with interest
at the rate of 9% per annum was granted.
2. On 9th June 2013, Balwant Singh Bisht (deceased) was riding his
motorcycle from Dilshad Garden towards Ghaziabad when a bus bearing
number UP-15AT-4990 ['offending vehicle'] struck his motorcycle, causing
fatal injuries which resulted in his demise. A criminal case being FIR
No.744/2013 under Section 279/338/304A/427 of the Indian Penal Code
1860, was registered against the driver [respondent no.3 herein] of the
offending vehicle and a chargesheet was filed against him. The offending
vehicle was insured by the appellant/Insurance Company. Balwant Singh
Bisht (deceased) was aged about 26 years and was a bachelor at the time of
the accident. He was working as a 'Lecturer' with Lovely Professional
University and was drawing a salary of Rs.30,435/- per month.
Analysis
3. Mr. Jayant Rastogi, counsel for appellant/Insurance Company, assails
the award on two main grounds: firstly, that there was no concrete proof of
the accident having occurred and it was the duty of the claimants [respondent
no.1 & 2 herein] to prove negligence of driver/respondent no.3 of the
offending vehicle. He places his reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in
Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Meena Variyal & Ors. 2007 (5) SCC 428.
4. As per as counsel for appellant, the MACT has solely relied upon the
testimony of the Investigating Officer ('I.O.') S.I Vimal Kumar [PW-3]. In
the cross-examination, he stated that he could not say whether the accident
occurred due to the negligence of the driver. Further, there was no eyewitness
to the accident.
5. Counsel for respondent/claimants countered this by stating that the
MACT was not bound by strict rules of evidence and that the proceedings
before the MACT are in the nature of an inquiry based on a finding of
negligence on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities.
6. The Court has perused the documents on record, in particular, the
testimony of PW-3. He categorically states that, "during investigation, he
had found that an accident had taken place in which motorcyclist was hit
from behind by the bus. The offending vehicle was found on the spot and its
driver had already fled leaving the bus unattended". He further stated that
the "motorcycle was found under the front wheel of the bus and the driver
was arrested later on, who was subsequently charge sheeted". He had filed
a copy of the chargesheet as Exhibit PW3/2 and prepared the site plan,
which was exhibited as Exhibit PW3/3. He stated that the motorcyclist was
on his correct left-hand side and that the accident had taken place due to the
rash and negligent driving of the driver of the bus in question.
7. In cross examination, PW-3 stated he "could not remember who had
given the information about the accident and that no witness was available".
He denied the suggestion that he had falsely implicated the driver. The
portion of the cross examination on which the counsel for appellant relies is
merely a denial of the suggestion whether the accident had occurred due to
the negligence of the driver of the offending bus or the driver of the
motorcycle. The MACT, in its Award, assessed this as part of Issue No.1
["Whether Balwant Singh Bisht suffered fatal injuries in the accident
occurred on 09/06/2013 due to rash and negligent driving of vehicle no. UP-
15-AT-4990 (Tata Bus) being driven by respondent no.1? OPP"], and noted
the existence of the criminal proceedings.
8. The MACT noted the testimony of the PW-3 to the extent that he had
deposed that the owner [respondent no.4 herein] of the offending vehicle
disclosed that the driver/respondent no.3 in question was driving the vehicle
at the time of the accident and that the fact of his having been charge sheeted
was not disputed. The driver/respondent no.3 chose not to contest the case to
support the plea of false implication. There is nothing else on record to
support the plea of the appellant/ Insurance Company that negligence was
not proved.
9. The Supreme Court has consistently held that negligence in motor
accident claims is to be assessed on the touchstone of preponderance of
probabilities and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. Relevant decisions are
mentioned below:
1. Bimla Devi & Ors. v. Himachal Road Transport Corporation & Ors.
(2009) 13 SCC 530:
"11. While dealing with a claim petition in terms of
Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, a Tribunal
stricto sensu is not bound by the pleadings of the parties;
its function being to determine the amount of fair
compensation in the event an accident has taken place
by reason of negligence of that driver of a motor vehicle.
It is true that occurrence of an accident having regard
to the provisions contained in Section 166 of the Act is a
sine qua non for entertaining a claim petition but that
would not mean that despite evidence to the effect that
death of the claimant's predecessor had taken place by
reason of an accident caused by a motor vehicle, the
same would be ignored only on the basis of a post
mortem report vis-`-vis the averments made in a claim
petition.
.........
13. The learned Tribunal, in our opinion, has rightly
proceeded on the basis that apparently there was
absolutely no reason to falsely implicate the respondent
Nos.2 and 3. Claimant was not at the place of
occurrence. She, therefore, might not be aware of the
details as to how the accident took place but the fact that
the First Information Report had been lodged in relation
to an accident could not have been ignored.
14. Some discrepancies in the evidences of the
claimant's witnesses might have occurred but the core
question before the Tribunal and consequently before
the High Court was as to whether the bus in question
was involved in the accident or not. For the purpose of
determining the said issue, the Court was required to
apply the principle underlying burden of proof in terms
of the provisions of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence
Act as to whether a dead body wrapped in a blanket had
been found at the spot at such an early hour, which was
required to be proved by the respondent Nos.2 and 3.
15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly
taken a holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to
be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused
by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be
possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were
merely to establish their case on the touchstone of
preponderance of probability. The standard of proof
beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied.
For the said purpose, the High Court should have taken
into consideration the respective stories set forth by both
the parties.
16. The judgment of the High Court to a great extent is
based on conjectures and surmises. While holding that
the police might have implicated the respondents, no
reason has been assigned in support thereof. No
material brought on record has been referred to for the
said purpose."
(emphasis added)
2. Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz (2013) 10 SCC 646:
"7. It would hardly need a mention that the plea of
negligence on the part of the first respondent who was
driving the pick-up van as set up by the claimants was
required to be decided by the learned Tribunal on the
touchstone of preponderance of probability and
certainly not on the basis of proof beyond reasonable
doubt. [Bimla Devi & Ors. Vs. Himachal RTC (2009) 13
SCC 530].
(emphasis added)
3. Mangla Ram v. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. & Ors. (2018) 5
SCC 656:
"24. It will be useful to advert to the dictum in N.K.V.
Bros. (P) Ltd. Vs. M. Karumai Ammal and Ors.16,
wherein it was contended by the vehicle owner that the
criminal case in relation to the accident had ended in
acquittal and for which reason the claim under the
Motor Vehicles Act ought to be rejected. This Court
negatived the said argument by observing that the
nature of proof required to establish culpable rashness,
punishable under the IPC, is more stringent than
negligence sufficient under the law of tort to create
liability. The observation made in paragraph 3 of the
judgment would throw some light as to what should be
the approach of the Tribunal in motor accident cases.
The same reads thus:
"3. Road accidents are one of the top killers in our
country, specially when truck and bus drivers
operate nocturnally. This proverbial recklessness
often persuades the courts, as has been observed
by us earlier in other cases, to draw an initial
presumption in several cases based on the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur. Accidents Tribunals must take
special care to see that innocent victims do not
suffer and drivers and owners do not escape
liability merely because of some doubt here or
some obscurity there. Save in plain cases,
culpability must be inferred from the circumstances
where it is fairly reasonable.
The court should not succumb to niceties,
technicalities and mystic maybes. We are
emphasizing this aspect because we are often
distressed by transport operators getting away
with it thanks to judicial laxity, despite the fact that
they do not exercise sufficient disciplinary control
over the drivers in the matter of careful driving.
The heavy economic impact of culpable driving of
public transport must bring owner and driver to
their responsibility to their neighbour. Indeed, the
State must seriously consider no fault liability by
legislation.
A second aspect which pains us is the inadequacy
of the compensation or undue parsimony practised
by tribunals.
We must remember that judicial tribunals are State
organs and Article 41 of the Constitution lays the
jurisprudential foundation for State relief against
accidental disablement of citizens. There is no
justification for niggardliness in compensation. A
third factor which is harrowing is the enormous
delay in disposal of accident cases resulting in
compensation, even if awarded, being postponed
by several years. The States must appoint sufficient
number of tribunals and the High Courts should
insist upon quick disposals so that the trauma and
tragedy already sustained may not be magnified by
the injustice of delayed justice. Many States are
unjustly indifferent in this regard."
.........
27. Another reason which weighed with the High Court
to interfere in the first appeal filed by Respondents 2 &
3, was absence of finding by the Tribunal about the
factum of negligence of the driver of the subject jeep.
Factually, this view is untenable. Our understanding of
the analysis done by the Tribunal is to hold that Jeep No.
RST 4701 was driven rashly and negligently by
Respondent 2 when it collided with the motorcycle of the
appellant leading to the accident. This can be discerned
from the evidence of witnesses and the contents of the
charge-sheet filed by the police, naming Respondent 2.
This Court in a recent decision in Dulcina Fernandes
[Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz, (2013) 10
SCC 646, noted that the key of negligence on the part of
the driver of the offending vehicle as set up by the
claimants was required to be decided by the Tribunal on
the touchstone of preponderance of probability and
certainly not by standard of proof beyond reasonable
doubt. Suffice it to observe that the exposition in the
judgments already adverted to by us, filing of charge-
sheet against Respondent 2 prima facie points towards
his complicity in driving the vehicle negligently and
rashly. Further, even when the accused were to be
acquitted in the criminal case, this Court opined that the
same may be of no effect on the assessment of the
liability required in respect of motor accident cases by
the Tribunal."
(emphasis added)
4. Sunita & Ors. v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation
(SRTC) & Ors. (2020) 13 SCC 486:
"22. It is thus well settled that in motor accident claim
cases, once the foundational fact, namely, the actual
occurrence of the accident, has been established, then
the Tribunal's role would be to calculate the quantum of
just compensation if the accident had taken place by
reason of negligence of the driver of a motor vehicle
and, while doing so, the Tribunal would not be strictly
bound by the pleadings of the parties. Notably, while
deciding cases arising out of motor vehicle accidents,
the standard of proof to be borne in mind must be of
preponderance of probability and not the strict standard
of proof beyond all reasonable doubt which is followed
in criminal cases."
(emphasis added)
5. Anita Sharma & Ors. v. New India Assurance Company Ltd. & Anr.
(2021) 1 SCC 171:
"21. Equally, we are concerned over the failure of the
High Court to be cognizant of the fact that strict
principles of evidence and standards of proof like in a
criminal trial are inapplicable in MACT claim cases.
The standard of proof in such like matters is one of
preponderance of probabilities, rather than beyond
reasonable doubt. One needs to be mindful that the
approach and role of Courts while examining evidence
in accident claim cases ought not to be to find fault with
non-examination of some best eye-witnesses, as may
happen in a criminal trial; but, instead should be only
to analyze the material placed on record by the parties
to ascertain whether the claimant's version is more
likely than not true."
(emphasis added)
10. In view of the same, the Court is not inclined to upset the finding of
the MACT in this regard.
11. Secondly, counsel for appellant/Insurance Company further contends
that that the benchmark income assessed by the MACT is erroneous on the
ground that it has included an increment of Rs.4,200/- w.e.f. 1st August 2013,
whereas the accident took placed on 9th June 2013. In this regard, the
MACT's assessment in paragraph 7.4 of the Award deserves consideration.
For ease of reference, said paragraph is extracted as under:
"7.4. Determination of Income of deceased/injured: After
deciding the age and multiplier, the income of the deceased
has to be determined. The deceased was a lecturer with
Lovely Professional University and PW2 has proved his
salary slip for the month of May, 2013, as per which, he
was drawing a salary of Rs.30,435/- pm including Laptop
Allowance of Rs. 335/-. PW2 has also proved the job
documents of deceased Ex.PW2/2 to Ex.PW2/7 to prove the
job record. Document Ex,PW2/6 has proved that the
deceased was likely to receive his assured increment of
Rs.4200/- w.e.f 01/08/2013 which is also liable to be
included. Though it was discretion of management, yet
there is no record that it was not likely to be granted. As
such, it is considered and to be added to his income. Form
16 of deceased which is EX.PW2/7 has proved that the
annual income of the deceased was Rs. 3,56,905/- per
annum after deducting the conveyance allowance of Rs.
9600/- per annum for the financial years 2012-2013.
However, an amount of Rs. 4200/- pm has to be added to
the salary of the deceased in view of his assured increment
and his net salary comes to Rs. 34,300/- pm. Annual
income comes to Rs. 4,07,305/- per annum after deducting
his conveyance allowance. The income of the deceased
was covered under 10% income tax slab and 10% earning
of the deceased has to -be deducted towards, his tax
liability after deduction of standard exempted earning of
Rs. 2,00,000/- per annum. The total tax liability of
deceased Comes to Rs 25680/- which is to be deducted out
of his earning. As such, annual income comes to
Rs.3,81,625/-per annum."
12. The MACT relied upon the document Exhibit PW2/6, which was
proved by PW-2, a summoned witness and an official [Senior Accountant]
of the Lovely Professional University, wherein Late Balwant Singh Bisht was
working as a 'Lecturer'. PW-2 denied the suggestion that this document was
false and fabricated. No suggestion was put to PW-2 to counter the issue of
the increment. For ease of reference, said document, Exhibit PW2/6, is
extracted as under:
13. In this respect, the issue arises that whether the principle of
considering benchmark income is based on the actual income which the
deceased was earning at the date of accident. In this regard, counsel for
appellant relies upon the Constitution Bench judgment in National
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680. Relevant paragraph
relied upon is paragraph 31, which is extracted as under:
"31. Though we have devoted some space in analysing
the precedential value of the judgments, that is not the
thrust of the controversy. We are required to keenly dwell
upon the heart of the issue that emerges for
consideration. The seminal controversy before us relates
to the issue where the deceased was self-employed or
was a person on fixed salary without provision for
annual increment, etc., what should be the addition as
regards the future prospects. In Sarla Verma [Sarla
Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ)
770 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1002] , the Court has made it
as a rule that 50% of actual salary could be added if the
deceased had a permanent job and if the age of the
deceased is between 40-50 years and no addition to be
made if the deceased was more than 50 years. It is
further ruled that where deceased was self-employed or
had a fixed salary (without provision for annual
increment, etc.) the courts will usually take only the
actual income at the time of death and the departure is
permissible only in rare and exceptional cases involving
special circumstances."
(emphasis added)
14. Counsel for respondent, however, points out that the document
Exhibit PW2/6, which stood proved by PW-2, specifically stated that
periodic increments were being granted and that the deceased was assured
an increment w.e.f. 1st August 2013 of Rs.4,200/-. Therefore, he contends that
benchmark income ought to take that into account as an exceptional situation
since the increment was only two months away and the employer, of Lovely
Professional University, had confirmed that his entitlement was in order.
15. In this regard, counsel for respondent draws attention to the sentence
emphasized in extract above in paragraph 13 from the Constitution Bench
judgement in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi (supra), wherein
the Supreme Court noted that the rationale was derived from the principle
stated in Sarla Verma v. DTC (2009) 6 SCC 121.
16. In the present case, the increment of Rs.4,200/- w.e.f. 1st August 2013
stood duly established on record through Exhibit PW2/6 proved by PW-2,
an official witness from the employer institution, who confirmed that the
deceased was entitled to periodic increments in the ordinary course of service
and that the said increment had already been assured prior to the accident.
The effective date of increment being barely two months after the accident
and the entitlement thereto remaining unchallenged in cross-examination,
the same cannot be treated as a speculative future advancement but
constituted a definite and ascertainable component of income. The present
case therefore falls within the category of "rare and exceptional cases
involving special circumstances" contemplated in National Insurance Co.
Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi (supra), where departure from strict reliance on income
as on the date of accident is permissible. In that context, the beneficial nature
of the Motor Vehicles Act, as noticed in the decisions referred to hereafter,
further supports adoption of an interpretation which ensures award of just
compensation.
17. The Motor Vehicles Act is a "beneficial" legislation enacted with the
primary objective of providing a statutory framework for awarding
compensation to victims of motor vehicle accidents or to their family
members who are rendered helpless and disadvantaged due to the untimely
death or injury of a family member, provided the claim is found to be
genuine. There is a catena of judgments which have consistently held that
the Motor Vehicles Act is a "beneficial piece of legislation". Reference in
this regard may be drawn to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Helen C.
Rebello (Mrs.) & Ors. v. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation
& Anr. (1999) 1 SCC 90, which held as under:
"36. As we have observed, the whole scheme of the Act,
in relation to the payment of compensation to the
claimant, is a beneficial legislation. The intention of the
legislature is made more clear by the change of
language from what was in the Fatal Accidents Act,
1855 and what is brought under Section 110-B of the
1939 Act. This is also visible through the provision of
Section 168(1) under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and
Section 92-A of the 1939 Act which fixes the liability on
the owner of the vehicle even on no fault. It provides that
where the death or permanent disablement of any
person has resulted from an accident in spite of no fault
of the owner of the vehicle, an amount of compensation
fixed therein is payable to the claimant by such owner of
the vehicle. Section 92-B ensures that the claim for
compensation under Section 92-A is in addition to any
other right to claim compensation in respect whereof
(sic thereof) under any other provision of this Act or of
any other law for the time being in force. This clearly
indicates the intention of the legislature which is
conferring larger benefit on the claimant. Interpretation
of such beneficial legislation is also well settled.
Whenever there be two possible interpretations in such
statute, then the one which subserves the object of
legislation, viz., benefit to the subject should be
accepted. In the present case, two interpretations have
been given of this statute, evidenced by two distinct sets
of decisions of the various High Courts. We have no
hesitation to conclude that the set of decisions, which
applied the principle of no deduction of the life
insurance amount, should be accepted and the other set,
which interpreted to deduct, is to be rejected. For all
these considerations, we have no hesitation to hold that
such High Courts were wrong in deducting the amount
paid or payable under the life insurance by giving a
restricted meaning to the provisions of the Motor
Vehicles Act basing mostly on the language of English
statutes and not taking into consideration the changed
language and intents of the legislature under various
provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939."
(emphasis added)
18. Moreover, the Supreme Court in the case of Ningamma v. United
India Insurance Co. Ltd. (2009) 13 SCC 710, has also held that the Court is
duty-bound to award "just compensation", even if the same has not been
specifically pleaded by the claimant. Relevant part of the judgment is
extracted as under:
"25........Needless to say, the MVA is beneficial and
welfare legislation. In fact, the court is duty bound and
entitled to award "Just Compensation" irrespective of
the fact whether any plea in that behalf was raised by
the claimant or not......"
(emphasis added)
19. Further, the Supreme Court in paragraph 19 of Parminder Singh v.
Honey Goyal and Others 2025 INSC 361, held as under:
"19. It is also a fact that substantial amount of
compensation in motor accident cases remains
deposited in the Tribunal as the claimant(s) may not
have approached the Tribunal for release thereof for
various reasons. Delay for any reason in release of
compensation in motor accident cases by the Tribunal
to the claimant(s), where the amount is deposited in
Tribunal, as directed, results in loss of interest to the
claimant(s). In case the aforesaid process is followed,
the gap would be bridged. The real object of the
beneficial legislation, namely to compensate for the loss
of earning member of the family or for the injuries
suffered by the claimant(s), will be achieved and
compensation can be disbursed without any delay."
(emphasis added)
20. In the present case, the Court is of the opinion that, considering that
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is a "beneficial" legislation and aims to award
"just and reasonable compensation", there is no reason why benchmark
income should not include an assured increment which stood confirmed by
the employer and which was imminent for the deceased. Depriving him of
the assured increment would deprive the dependents of substantial amounts
which would have been available to them.
21. This does not overlap with the loss of future prospects, which relate to
the prospective enhancement of income and is to be computed on the basis
of the established income of the deceased at the relevant time. The deceased,
aged 26 years, and employed as a 'Lecturer' in a university, was on a
structured pay scale with regular increments duly proved on record.
Therefore, merely because the assured increment is taken into account for
determining the benchmark income, the addition towards future prospects in
terms of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi (supra) cannot be
denied. This approach is consistent with paragraph 31 of Pranay Sethi
(supra), which permits departure from strict reliance on income as on the
date of accident in rare and exceptional cases involving special
circumstances, while paragraphs 59.4 and 61(iv) clarify that addition
towards future prospects remains a distinct component based on the nature
of employment and age of the deceased.
22. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
23. Pending applications, if any, are rendered infructuous.
24. By order dated 20th November 2018, 50% of the awarded amount had
been released along with accrued interest. Since the appeal has been
dismissed, claimants shall be entitled to full amount of compensation along
with accrued interest which have been deposited before the Registry of this
Court vide order dated 04th September 2018. Same shall be released in favour
of claimants within a period of four weeks by the Registry of this Court.
25. It has been mentioned by counsel for claimants/respondent that the
father of the deceased, Mr. Harish Singh Bisht, passed away on 4th May 2021.
Needless to say that whatever amount of compensation, which was
apportioned in favour of the father, shall now enure to the benefit of his
estate, to which the legitimate successors would be entitled to.
26. Statutory deposit, if any, be refunded to appellant.
27. Judgment be uploaded on the website of this Court.
(ANISH DAYAL)
JUDGE
MARCH 17, 2026/ak/tk
