[Cites 18, Cited by 0]
Delhi High Court
State vs Ram Parkash S/O Shri Ganeshi Lal on 16 March, 2026
Author: Navin Chawla
Bench: Navin Chawla
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Reserved on: 21st January 2026
Pronounced on: 16th March 2026
+ CRL.A. 135/2003
STATE .....Appellant
Through: Mr.Aman Usman, APP with
Mr.Manvendra Yadav and Insp.
Sanjay Kumar, PS Sultan Puri
versus
RAM PARKASH S/O SHRI GANESHI LAL .....Respondent
Through: Mr.Sahil Jain, Adv. along with
respondent in person.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN CHAWLA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVINDER DUDEJA
JUDGMENT
RAVINDER DUDEJA, J.
1. State takes exception to the judgment dated 07th December,
1999, whereby respondents Om Prakash and Ram Prakash have been
acquitted of all the charges levelled against them.
2. Respondent Om Prakash has since expired during the pendency
of the present appeal, and therefore, the proceedings qua him stand
abated.
3. The brief facts of the case, as noted by the learned Trial Court,
are as under:-
"On 15th March, 1996, Smt. Saroj Devi (PW-
6), lodged a complaint at PS Sultan Puri that
her husband Ram Prakash (PW-11) had gone
missing after telephoning her on the previous
night around 9.00 pm that he was at the house
of her brother Sharvan Kumar and would
return shortly, but did not turn up. Despite
efforts to trace him, he could not be found.
PW-6 made complaint to the police. An FIR
was registered under Section 365/506 IPC. On
21stMarch,1996, PW-6 produced two ransom
letters to the police, wherein, Rs. 15 lakhs
were demanded for the production of Ram
Prakash. Section 364-A/506 IPC were invoked.
Trap was laid at the places where the amount
was to be delivered, but none turned up.
Thereafter, two more ransom letters were
received, in which, the name of Om Prakash
figured. He was accordingly arrested on
23rdMarch, 1996. Another trap was laid at
Fatehganj, Bareily, There also, none turned
up. On 06thApril, 1996, Ram Prakash, son of
Ganeshi Lal (respondent) surrendered in court
and his police custody remand was obtained.
Upon interrogation, he disclosed that he along
with his co-accused Om Prakash, Sukhbir and
Madhu had kidnapped PW-16 and had
confined him at Madhya Pradesh. A raid was
conducted to recover PW-16, but he could not
be traced.
On 16thApril, 1996, an information was
received that PW-16 was present at PS
Fatehganj, Bareily, UP. PW-16 was brought to
Delhi. His statements under Section 161 Cr.
PC and 164 Cr. PC were got recorded,
wherein, he stated that he was abducted by
respondents Om Prakash, Ram Prakash and
their three associates. The other three
associates of the respondents could not be
traced. Statements of witnesses were recorded,
and upon completion of investigation, charge
sheet was filed against the respondents."
4. Charge under Section 364-A Indian Penal Code 1860 ["IPC"]
was framed against the respondents, to which, they pleaded not guilty
and claimed trial.
5. In order to bring home the guilt against the respondents, the
prosecution examined 15 witnesses in all. Statements of respondents
were recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
["Cr. P.C."]. The stand of both the respondents was one of total denial,
and according to them, they were innocent and were falsely implicated
by PW-11 because of a land dispute. They did not lead defence
evidence before the learned Trial Court.
6. After considering the evidence on record and hearing rival
submissions, the learned Trial Court vide judgment dated 07th
December, 1999, acquitted the respondents.
7. Mr. Usman, learned Additional Public Prosecutor ["APP"] for
the State, submitted that the impugned judgment passed by the learned
Trial Court is manifestly erroneous, contrary to law and against the
facts and evidence on record. It was submitted that the prosecution's
case stood fully established through the testimony of PW-11, who
unequivocally supported the prosecution's version and duly
corroborated his earlier statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C
before the learned Magistrate. It was argued that the learned Trial
Court fell into grave error in discarding the testimony of PW-11 on the
basis of minor contradictions and alleged improvements, which were
natural and insignificant, particularly when the witness had
consistently maintained that he was abducted by the respondents for
ransom.
8. The learned APP further submitted that the Trial Court gave
undue importance to the alleged enmity between the parties on
account of the property dispute, overlooking the settled principle that
enmity may also furnish a motive for the commission of the offence. It
was further argued that the finding of the learned Trial Court
regarding the absence of medical evidence is wholly misconceived, as
for the offence under Section 364-A IPC, medical evidence is not a
sine qua non and the credible oral testimony of the victim alone is
sufficient to sustain a conviction. It was, thus, submitted that the
acquittal of the respondent in a serious offence involving abduction for
ransom has resulted in a grave miscarriage of justice, and therefore,
the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside.
9. Per contra, the learned counsel for respondent Ram Prakash
submitted that the prosecution's case entirely rests upon the testimony
of PW-11 Ram Prakash, but his evidence suffers from material
contradictions, inconsistencies and substantial improvements, going to
the very root of the case. The learned Trial Court, after an elaborate
appreciation of evidence, has meticulously recorded numerous
contradictions between the statements of PW-11 recorded under
Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. and his deposition before the Court. It
was submitted that the strained relations between the families of the
respondents and PW-11, owing to a long-standing property dispute,
materially affected the credibility of PW-11 and is rightly weighed by
the learned Trial Court. It was further argued that PW-11 made
statements contrary to the basic facts, including the identity and name
of his brother-in-law, whom he referred to as "Subhash Kumar",
whereas, as per the prosecution narration, the brother-in-law of PW-11
residing at Rohini, Delhi was "Sharvan Kumar", thereby, rendering his
testimony wholly unreliable.
10. It was further submitted that PW-11 made material
improvements and embellishments in his deposition before the Court,
which were conspicuously missing in his earlier statements to the
police and the Magistrate, including the alleged rate of the plot
transaction, the sequence of events preceding the alleged kidnapping,
the manner of abduction, the alleged weapons used, threats extended,
confinement, escape and duration of detention. The learned counsel
further submitted that the essential ingredients of Section 364-A IPC
were not proved, as the prosecution failed to establish any credible
threat or demand of ransom attributable to the respondents. The
alleged ransom calls were not proved, the purported recipient was not
examined, the ransom letters were not subjected to handwriting
examination and thus not connected to the respondents by cogent
evidence.
11. It was further submitted that PW-11 is a person with criminal
antecedents, inasmuch as, he himself was facing criminal prosecutions
under Sections 376 IPC and 365 IPC. It was, thus, contended that in
the absence of reliable ocular testimony, corroborative medical
evidence, proof of ransom demand or linkage of the accused with the
alleged offence, the learned Trial Court rightly extended the benefit of
doubt and acquitted the respondents and the well-reasoned judgment
warrants no interference by this Court.
12. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties, who have
taken us through the evidence recorded during the trial. We have also
given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions made before us.
13. The scope of interference by the Appellate Court, while dealing
with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 Cr.P.C., is well
settled and circumscribed by self-imposed restraints. An acquittal
reinforces the presumption of innocence, and unless the findings of the
Trial Court are perverse, manifestly illegal or wholly unreasonable,
interference therewith is not warranted. In the present case, the learned
Trial Court has undertaken a detailed and meticulous appreciation of
the entire evidence on record. The conclusions drawn are based on
cogent reasons and supported by the material available. Merely
because another view is possible, this Court cannot substitute its own
opinion for that of the Trial Court.
14. Before we deal with the rival submissions of the learned
counsels for the parties, we deem it appropriate to refer to the
testimonies of some of the material witnesses in detail. The case of the
prosecution rests on the testimonies of PW-4 Yograj, PW-5 Phool
Singh, PW-6 Smt. Saroj, PW-7 Smt. Raj Kumari, PW-10 Smt. Anita
and PW-11 Ram Prakash.
15. PW-11 Ram Prakash, in his testimony deposed that he was
doing the job of a property dealer, and that on 11th March, 1996, a
person by the name Arvind, came to his office and made an enquiry
for the purchase of a 100 sq. yard plot. He showed him the plot and a
deal was struck for the purchase of plot at the rate of Rs. 1600/- per sq.
yard. Arvind told him to collect the earnest money on 14th March,
1996 from his house. On 14th March, 1996, he reached the house of
Arvind at Mangol Puri at 8.30 p.m., but found the house locked. On a
query from the neighbours, it was revealed that no such person was
residing at that address. While on his way back to his house, he went
to the house of his brother-in-law Subhash at Sector 20, Rohini. From
there, he rang up in the neighbourhood of his house. He told his wife
on the telephone that he would be coming in 15-20 minutes. He
deposed that the wife of his brother-in-law Subhash met him, who
offered him tea but he just took a glass of water and left. On the way
near plots of 22 yards, at about 9.00 pm, he noticed that a van was
going ahead of him and a two-wheeler scooter was coming from
behind. The two-wheeler scooter hit his scooter from behind. The
persons who were on the scooter and two persons from the van, came
to him. One of them caught hold of his hair and other of his collar and
dragged him towards the van. One of them was having a revolver and
the other, who was having a knife, said "Pet Phaad Denge". They
forced him into the van. Respondents were already sitting in the van.
Respondent Ram Prakash hit him on his forehead and said "Teri Lugai
10-20 Lakh Rupaye Aur Degi Aur Tere Maas Ko Machchliyon Ko
Khilayenge". Then he was forcibly made to eat 2 ½ pieces of Burfi.
After having the Burfi, he lost consciousness. When he regained his
consciousness, he found himself lying on the floor. His hands and legs
were tied and there was a patti on his eyes. After sometime, a person
came and opened the ties on his hands and legs. For 10-12 days, he
was kept there on the floor. Thereafter, for 8-9 days, he was kept in
the field of sugarcane. Then, for 8-9 days, he was kept in the heap of
grain. Throughout that period, his eyes were closed with patti. He was
given severe beatings. Those persons were saying that they had
already killed his sons and will kill him now, and that whenever they
ask for money, his family members used to bring the police. He
further deposed that on 14th April, 1996, he was taken in the van where
two persons were sitting upon him. Upon regaining consciousness, he
told them that he wanted to ease out himself. They then removed patti
from his eyes and was taken by one of them by the side of the road to
ease out there. He managed to reach near the water pond and picked
up a stone and gave a blow with the stone to one of the persons and
ran away. He reached at a hotel but the hotel people did not listen to
him and made him run away from there. He then went to another hotel
and begged for help. The hotel persons hid him behind a coal bag and
on 15th April, 1996, he was sent to police post on a cycle. From where,
he was sent to Kotwali Police Station Bareilly. There his statement
was recorded. At about 10.00 am, the S.P. of the area came and he
also recorded his statement. He was sent for medical examination and
information was sent at his residence at Delhi. He was kept at PS
Bareilly for two days and two nights, and thereafter, the police
officials of PS Sultanpuri brought him to Delhi. On 23rdApril, 1996,
his statement Ex. PW-11/A was recorded under Section 164 Cr. P.C.
by the Magistrate.
16. The learned Trial Court noted contradictions and improvements
in the testimony of PW-11 Ram Prakash, in paragraphs No. 30 & 31
of the judgment, which are reproduced below:-
"30. The contention of ld. Counsel for the
accused is that the statement of PW11 Ram
Prakash is not only contradictory on material
points but also consists of improvements
rendering his version doubtful. In his initial
statement to the police of P.S. Fateh Ganj,
Bareilly on 15-4-96, PW11 Ram Prakash
stated that he was surrounded by the persons
near the jhuggies of Pooja Kalan but in the
statement before the Magistrate Ex. PW11/A
he stated that when he reached near the plots
of 22 yards a maruti van was going ahead of
him and a scooter which came from his back
hit him. In his such initial statement made to
the police of P.S. Fateh Ganj, Bareilly, he
referred to a white maruti car from which the
persons came and surrounded him but in his
statement to the Magistrate Ex. PW11/A and in
Court he referred to a white maruti van. As per
the prosecution case kidnapped Ram Prakash
had gone to the house of his brother-in-law
namely Sharvan Kumar at sector-20, Rohini.
PW6 Smt. Saroj, the wife of kidnapped Ram
Prakash, also stated that her brother Sharvan
Kumar is living in sector-20, Rohini. PW7 Raj
Kumari, the wife of said Sharvan Kumar also
stated that kidnapped Ram Prakash came to
her house but strangely enough PW11 Ram
Prakash in his statement in Court stated that
he had gone to the house of his brother-in-law
Subhash as he was to deliver some message to
him. He clarified in his cross-examination that
he had five cousin brothers-in-law out of
which two are Subhash and the name of his
wife is Raj Kumari. Further, as per the
complaint Ex. PW6/A, on enquiry by Smt.
Saroj from her sister-in-law at Rohini she
came to know that her husband Ram Prakash
had left the house after taking tea but PW6
Smt. Saroj as well as PW11 Ram Prakash
stated that he left the house of his brother-in-
law at Rohini after taking water, so all this
creates a doubt whether, in fact, PW11 Ram
Prakash visited the house of his brother-in-law
at Rohini. Moreover, it can hardly be believed
that he would not know the name of his
brother-in-law. He categorically stated in his
cross-examination that he did not remember
the name of his other brother-in-law except
Subhash, so how residing in Delhi whose
residence in Delhi brother-in-law by the name
of Subhash is residing because as per the
complaint and the case of the prosecution the
alleged brother-in-law residing at Rohini was
Sharvan Kumar and not Subhash.
31. Apart from all this, PW11 Ram Prakash
gave an improved version in Court. He stated
many facts in Court, which were not told by
him either to the police u/s 161 Cr.P.C. or to
the Magistrate in his statement u/s 164 Cr.P.C.
He did not state to the police that the deal of
the plot was settled at Rs. 1600/- per sq. yard.
He did not state to the police that he had gone
to the house of his brother-in-law Subhash. He
did not state to the police that he had shown a
plot to the person at 22 yards and that Pintu
told him that on 14-4-96 he may collect the
earnest money from his house. He stated that
the two-wheeler scooter hit him from behind
and he stopped the scooter and asked that
person if the driver of the scooter had fallen
when the statement Ex. PW11/DA was
confronted to him the words "scooter" were
not mentioned. Again, he stated that two
persons, one of them caught hold of him from
his hair and the other from his collar, dragged
him to the van but when his statement Ex.
PW11/DA was confronted, the person catching
hold of him from his hair and the other from
his collar was not found mentioned. He stated
that one person was having revolver and the
other was having knife and one said that "tera
pet phaddenge", but these words again were
not found mentioned when his statement
PW11/DA was confronted. He also stated that
Om Prakash sitting in the van pulled him in
the van by catching him from his hair but this
fact again was not found mentioned in his
statement PW11/DA when confronted. He also
stated that his legs were also tied but this fact
was also not found mentioned in his statement
Ex. PW11/DA. Again the fact that someone
came and opened his hands and legs was also
not found mentioned in his such statement. It
was also not found mentioned in his statement
that he told those persons that if he was
released he would provide them whatever they
wanted. The fact that on 14-4-96 when he was
in van two persons were sitting on his rear was
also not found mentioned in his statement
PW11/DA. The fact that when he reached near
the pond he picked up the stone and while
running he had fallen in a pit was also not
found mentioned in his statement PW11/DA.
The fact that he reached the road and through
the nearby park he reached the hotel and the
owner of the hotel did not listen to him and
then he had gone to another hotel was also not
found mentioned in the statement PW11/DA. In
his statement to the police he stated that he
was kept for 10/12 days on the floor but in his
statement PW11/DA 5/7 days were mentioned.
All these improvements would show that he
concocted some version which he did not
prefer to reveal in his earlier statements to the
police and to the Magistrate."
17. The above-mentioned contradictions and inconsistencies are not
minor or peripheral, but strike at the core of the prosecution narrative
relating to the manner of abduction, detention, threats and escape. The
extensive improvements introduced for the first time during the trial
clearly create serious doubt regarding the veracity of the witness. In
such circumstances, the Trial Court was justified in treating his
testimony as unreliable.
18. The existence of admitted enmity between the parties arising
from a long-standing property dispute further weakens the
prosecution's case. The previous enmity is a double-edged weapon.
While enmity can indeed be a motive for committing an offence, it can
equally furnish a motive for false implication, especially where the
evidence is otherwise shaky. The Trial Court has rightly taken this
factor into consideration while assessing the credibility of PW-11.
Additionally, the incorrect narrative of PW-11 of basic facts including
the identity of his own brother-in-law, significantly erodes confidence
in his testimony. These infirmities cannot be brushed aside as trivial.
19. It is evident from the testimony of PW-11 that after he regained
consciousness, the ties on his hands and legs were opened. PW-11
remained in confinement at different places for more than a month.
However, it is not explained whether PW-11 made any effort to
escape. Investigation is silent as to whether any effort was made to
identify the places of confinement. There is nothing on record to
indicate as to if any investigation was made at the place from where
PW-11 was abducted. No witness has deposed about the recovery of
the two-wheeler scooter of PW-11 and how it was recovered.The
seizure memo of the scooter of PW-11 is neither on record nor proved
by any witness. If the testimony of PW-11 is to be believed, he made
multiple statements at PS Bareilly, but no such statement is part of the
record. No witness from PS Bareilly has been examined to corroborate
the testimony of PW-11. The investigation is therefore deficient on
material aspects.
20. The essential ingredients of Section 364-A IPC, as elucidated
by the Supreme Court in Shaik Ahmed v. State of Telangana (2021) 9
SCC 59, have also not been satisfactorily established by the
prosecution. There is no reliable evidence to prove a credible threat,
demand of ransom, or conduct giving rise to reasonable apprehension
of death or hurt attributable to the respondents. As per prosecution
narrative, the ransom call of Rs. 12 lakh was received by Chhatar
Singh for the release of PW-11 and PW-6 Saroj came to know about
the same from Chhatar Singh. However, Chhatar Singh, who received
the ransom call, has not been examined by the prosecution for the
reasons best known. PW-10 Smt. Anita, daughter of Chhatar Singh,
deposed that on 16th March, 1996, she received a telephone call, and
someone on telephone told her that money should be arranged and that
they will inform later on where to deliver the money. The caller
sought confirmation from her as to whether it was the house of
Pahalwan. After she confirmed in affirmative, the caller disconnected
the phone. She categorically stated that she does not know as to who
had given that call. She was declared hostile and was cross examined
by the learned APP with the permission of the Court, but such cross
examination did not yield anything. PW-10 nowhere stated that the
person on telephone had enquired about Ram Prakash. In Mark
PW10/A, a statement made by her to the police, she had stated that the
caller had threatened that two persons who had been arrested be
released or they would kill Ram Prakash. She denied having stated
that the caller told her on the phone that Rs. 12 lakhs be arranged.
Thus, the ransom call, relied upon by the prosecution, is not duly
proved.
21. Prosecution also strongly relies upon the ransom letters Ex.
PW-6/B & Ex. PW-6/C dated 18th March, 1996, received by Saroj on
21st March 1996 and Ex. PW-6/E & Ex. PW-6/F received on 02nd
April, 1996. However, no specimen handwriting of the respondents
was obtained for comparison with the writing on the ransom letters.
The ransom letters are, thus, not connected with the respondents by
any scientific or independent evidence. It is, therefore, not proved that
any ransom demand was made by the respondents. The lack of
corroborative material assumes greater significance when the sole
ocular testimony itself is doubtful.
22. The deposition of PW-4 Yograj, the hotel owner, merely proved
that PW-11 approached him for his safety, telling him that some
persons were trying to kill him and that he escaped from their clutches
to attend the call of the nature. However, he does not say if PW-11 had
named the respondents as the persons who had abducted him. The
testimony of PW-4 Yograj is, therefore, also of no help to the
prosecution in establishing the guilt of the respondents.
23. Even though, PW-11 deposed in his testimony that he was
beaten up by the abductors, there is no medical evidence proved on
record to corroborate such a version. The contention of the State that
medical evidence is not sine qua non for the offence under Section
364-A IPC, is legally correct but factually material in the present case.
Where the oral testimony of the victim is found to be unreliable, the
absence of medical or other corroborative evidence becomes material.
Moreover, the Trial Court has not acquitted the respondents solely on
account of absence of medical evidence, but on a cumulative
assessment of multiple serious deficiencies in the prosecution case.
The reasoning adopted is neither perverse nor contrary to law.
Therefore, no case for appellate interference is made out.
24. In Mohan v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 12 SCC 619, the
Supreme Court inter alia held as under;
"20. Section 378CrPC enables the State to
prefer an appeal against an order of acquittal.
Section 384CrPC speaks of the powers that
can be exercised by the appellate court. When
the trial court renders its decision by
acquitting the accused, presumption of
innocence gathers strength before the
appellate court. As a consequence, the onus
on the prosecution becomes more
burdensome as there is a double presumption
of innocence. Certainly, the court of first
instance has its own advantages in delivering
its verdict, which is to see the witnesses in
person while they depose. The appellate court
is expected to involve itself in a deeper, studied
scrutiny of not only the evidence before it, but
is duty-bound to satisfy itself whether the
decision of the trial court is both possible and
plausible view. When two views are possible,
the one taken by the trial court in a case of
acquittal is to be followed on the touchstone
of liberty along with the advantage of having
seen the witnesses. Article 21 of the
Constitution of India also aids the accused
after acquittal in a certain way, though not
absolute. Suffice it is to state that the
appellate court shall remind itself of the role
required to play, while dealing with a case of
an acquittal."
25. The Supreme Court, in a subsequent judgment in Arulvelu &
Anr. v. State Represented by the Public Prosecutor & Anr., (2009) 10
SCC 206, it was inter alia held as under;
"40. Unquestionably, the appellate court has
power to review and re-appreciate the entire
evidence on record. The appellate court would
be justified in reversing the judgment of
acquittal only if there are substantial and
compelling reasons and when the judgment of
the trial court is found to be perverse
judgment. Interfering in a routine manner
where other view is possible is contrary to the
settled legal position crystallized by
aforementioned judgments of this Court. The
accused is presumed to be innocent until
proven guilty. The accused possessed this
presumption when he was before the trial
court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the
presumption that he is innocent. This
fundamental principle must be kept in view
while dealing with the judgments of acquittal
passed by the trial court."
26. Similarly, in Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P, (2008) 10 SCC 450,
the Supreme Court, inter alia, held as under;
"69. The following principles emerge from the
cases above:
1. The appellate court may review the evidence
in appeals against acquittal under Sections
378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code,
1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide
and the appellate court can reappreciate the
entire evidence on record. It can review the
trial court's conclusion with respect to both
facts and law.
2. The accused is presumed innocent until
proven guilty. The accused possessed this
presumption when he was before the trial
court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the
presumption that he is innocent.
3. Due or proper weight and consideration
must be given to the trial court's decision. This
is especially true when a witness' credibility is
at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to
take a different view of the evidence. There
must also be substantial and compelling
reasons for holding that the trial court was
wrong.
70. In light of the above, the High Court and
other appellate courts should follow the well-
settled principles crystallised by number of
judgments if it is going to overrule or
otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal:
1. The appellate court may only overrule or
otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it
has "very substantial and compelling
reasons" for doing so.
A number of instances arise in which the
appellate court would have "very substantial
and compelling reasons" to discard the trial
court's decision. "Very substantial and
compelling reasons" exist when:
(i) The trial court's conclusion with regard
to the facts is palpably wrong;
(ii) The trial court's decision was based on
an erroneous view of law;
(iii) The trial court's judgment is likely to
result in "grave miscarriage of justice";
(iv) The entire approach of the trial court in
dealing with the evidence was patently illegal;
(v) The trial court's judgment was
manifestly unjust and unreasonable;
(vi) The trial court has ignored the evidence
or misread the material evidence or has
ignored material documents like dying
declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc.
(vii) This list is intended to be illustrative,
not exhaustive.
2. The appellate court must always give proper
weight and consideration to the findings of the
trial court.
3. If two reasonable views can be reached--
one that leads to acquittal, the other to
conviction--the High Courts/appellate courts
must rule in favour of the accused."
27. Upon an overall consideration of the evidence and the
impugned judgment, this Court finds no infirmity in the reasoning or
conclusions arrived at by the learned Trial Court. The acquittal is
founded on a plausible and well-reasoned view of the evidence. The
prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the respondents beyond
reasonable doubt. The benefit of doubt extended by the Trial Court is
both justified and in accordance with settled legal principles.
Interference by this Court would amount to re-appreciation of
evidence without compelling reasons.
28. The testimony of PW-11, being the solitary foundation of the
prosecution's case, does not inspire confidence due to material
contradictions and substantial improvements. The Trial Court has
rightly concluded that such testimony cannot be safely relied upon to
record a conviction for a grave offence under Section 364-A IPC. The
alleged ransom demand and threats, which form the heart of the
offence, remain unproved. The prosecution's failure to produce
independent or corroborative evidence further weakens its case. In
criminal jurisprudence, suspicion, however strong, cannot take the
place of proof.
29. The principles governing appeals against acquittal mandate that
when two views are possible, the one favourable to the accused must
prevail. The Supreme Court in Samsul Haque v. State of Assam,
(2019)18 SCC 161 held that judgment of acquittal, where two views
are possible, should not be set aside, even if the view formed by
appellate court may be a more probable one. Interference with order of
acquittal can only be justified when it is based on a perverse view. In
the present case, the view taken by the Trial Court is not only possible
but reasonable. The impugned judgment does not suffer from
perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law. The learned APP has
been unable to demonstrate any grave miscarriage of justice
warranting interference. Consequently, the presumption of innocence
in favour of the respondents stands reinforced.
30. For the foregoing reasons, the present appeal is devoid of merit
and is accordingly dismissed. The impugned judgment vide which the
Respondents were acquitted is affirmed. The acquittal of the
respondents calls for no interference by this Court.
31. The Bail Bond and the Surety submitted by the respondent are
hereby discharged.
32. The present Appeal, alongwith any pending applications, if any,
stand disposed of.
RAVINDER DUDEJA, J.
NAVIN CHAWLA, J.
MARCH 16, 2026/na/RM/as
