Delhi High Court
Seema Kukreja vs State Of Nct & Anr. on 3 November, 2020
$~24
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Judgment: 03rd November, 2020
+ W.P.(CRL) 1230/2020 & CRL.M.A. 10902/2020
SEEMA KUKREJA ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr Siddharth Luthra, Senior
Advocate, Mr N. Hariharan,
Senior Advocate with Mr
Manik Dogra, Mr Gautam
Khazanchi, Mrs Sonali Jaitley
Bakhshi, Mr Jaiyesh Bakhshi,
Mr Palash Singhai, Mr Pallav
Pandey, Ms Rini Badoni, Ms
Radhika Malik, Mr Sheezan
Hashmi, Mr Anmol Kheta, Mr
Kumar Vaibhaw, Mr Samarth K
Luthra, Mr Vaibhav Dubey, Mr
Siddharth S Yadav, Advocates.
versus
STATE OF NCT & ANR. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr Rahul Mehra, Standing
Counsel for State.
Mr Sandeep Sethi, Senior
Advocate and Mr Vikas Pahwa,
Senior Advocate with Mr
Abhimanyu Mahajan, Mr
Dhruva Bhagat and Anubha
Goel, Advocate for R-2.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIBHU BAKHRU
VIBHU BAKHRU, J
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Signed By:Dushyant
Rawal
Signing Date:03.11.20
1. The petitioner has filed the present petition, inter alia, praying
that the FIR bearing No. 339/2020 under Sections 420/468/471 & 34
of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter „IPC‟) registered with PS
Hauz Khas be quashed.
2. The said FIR was registered at the instance of respondent no.2,
who is the father of the petitioner.
3. The FIR in question was registered on 05.08.2020. This was
pursuant to several complaints made by respondent no.2. The first
such complaint was made on 31.10.2019. In his complaint,
respondent no.2 stated that he owned 25% shares in Hotel Colonia
Santa Maria, Calangute, Goa [Sic Rect. Colonia Santa Maria Hotels
Pvt. Ltd. - hereafter „CSM‟]. He alleged that the said shares had been
forcibly taken away by his daughter - Mrs Seema Kukreja (the
petitioner herein). He alleged that his daughter had "coercively,
aggressively and deceitfully obtained my [his] signature on blank
sheets of papers / printed sheets of papers and taken away my [his]
shares". He alleged that the petitioner used to come to his residence
and his office and forcefully take away his share certificates,
documents and other valuable papers. He stated that he was going to
file a case for recovery of his share certificates in respect of 25% of
the total equity of CSM. He also stated that he had a flat in London
and the same had been coercively taken away from him by his
daughter by forcing him to sign a gift deed. In addition, he stated that
the petitioner had also taken away by force and deceit his ancestral
jewellery including several diamond sets; twenty-five ancient silver
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coins and a rare Indian Dollar coin. He stated that he had a bank
account with Coutts Bank Ltd. in London which had over 20 lacs GBP
but the account had been frozen due to wrong and wilfully misleading
representation made by his daughter.
4. Respondent no.2 sent another letter dated 01.02.2020 to the
SHO, PS Hauz Khas, in furtherance of his complaints made earlier. He
alleged that he was being harassed and tortured by his daughter, her
husband and his wife, who he claimed had been brain washed by his
daughter and son-in-law. He alleged that they had illegally grabbed
his assets and were making further efforts to fraudulently grab more of
his assets. He alleged that the petitioner had a history of forging his
signatures and she had "forcibly/ coercively/ stealthily" taken away
his shares in CSM in active connivance with her husband. He stated
that his wife (Mrs Daya Prakash) had keys to all the cupboards of the
house, where the valuables and documents are kept. He stated that
"on basis of forged and fabricated signatures my [his] shares were
forcibly/ deceitfully transferred in the name of Mrs Seema Kukreja".
He also alleged that they had grabbed his other assets in London and
elsewhere.
5. Respondent no.2 states that on 04.02.2020, he filed yet another
complaint alleging that the petitioner had forged documents to transfer
his shares in CSM in her name. He alleged that he had become aware
that his signatures were forged on (i) the gift deed; (ii) the rear side of
the share certificates bearing no. 2524, 2526, 2503, 2505, 2504, 2506
and 2507 endorsing the transfer of the said share certificates in favour
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of the petitioner; and (iii) the share transfer forms.
6. The initial complaint made by respondent no.2 was entered as
DD No. 35B, with PS Hauz Khas. On 09.07.2020, the concerned
police official from PS Hauz Khas issued a notice to the petitioner
calling upon her to provide self-attested copies of (i) share transfer
deed from respondent no.2 to her; (ii) gift deed in respect of the share
transferred; and (iii) share certificates of respondent No.2 bearing his
signatures and endorsement on the rear side. It was stated that the said
notice was issued in view of respondent no.2‟s complaint that the
petitioner had committed acts of cheating/forgery causing wrongful
loss to the complainant.
7. The petitioner responded to the said notice and forwarded
copies of the relevant documents. She alleged that the complaint filed
by her father (respondent no.2) was false. In her reply, she further
stated that respondent no.2 had executed a gift deed dated 03.02.2016
and out of love and affection, he had gifted her 25 lac equity shares of
₹10 each held by him in CSM. She claimed that pursuant thereto, he
had also executed the relevant Securities Transfer Forms. She claimed
that his signatures were tallied on the said Securities Transfer Forms
by the approving authority and her name was entered in the Register
of Shares maintained by the said company (CSM). She stated that
after her father had gifted his shares in CSM to her in 2016, her
mother (Mrs Daya Prakash) also gifted the shares held by her in CSM.
She stated that her father (respondent No. 2) continued to remain the
Managing Director cum Chairman of CSM till July 2019 and in his
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capacity, he had signed all financial documents, bank documents,
cheques relating to CSM till 2019. He had also signed the statutory
records submitted with the Registrar of Companies till 2019.
8. The status report filed by the SHO, PS Hauz Khas indicates that
during the course of investigation, inquiries were made from the
complainant (respondent no.2) and he alleged that he had never
executed any gift deed in favour of his daughter and that she had
forged the gift deed and transferred the subject shares in her favour.
In view of the allegations made by respondent no.2 and the inquiries
made, the FIR in question was registered on 05.08.2020. Thereafter,
the petitioner was issued a notice to join the investigation and produce
the original documents. However, in the meanwhile, the petitioner
filed the present petition and further investigation proceedings were
interdicted.
Submissions
9. Mr Luthra, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner
assailed the impugned FIR on several fronts. First, he submitted that
the FIR did not reveal any cognizable offence and was a blatant
attempt on the part of respondent no.2 to maliciously represent civil
disputes with regard to the family business as alleged criminal
offences. Second, he submitted that the FIR is vexatious and has been
filed with a view to arm-twist the petitioner and her mother to coerce
them from claiming the value of their shares in the said business.
Third, he stated that the allegations made by respondent no.2 in the
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FIR were mutually destructive with the averments made by him in
different proceedings. Although, there were civil disputes pending
between the family members in various fora, respondent no.2 had not
made any allegation in any of the pleadings that his signatures had
been forged on any of the documents. On the contrary, he had alleged
that his signatures were obtained deceitfully and coercively on blank
sheets of papers and the same were used to transfer his assets. In
certain proceedings, he had alleged that he was emotionally
blackmailed by the petitioner into parting with his assets. Fourth, he
submitted that respondent no.2 had suppressed various documents. He
stated that although, respondent no.2 had alleged that his signatures on
the gift deed and other documents used for transferring his shares in
CSM to the petitioner had been forged, there is no allegation that his
signatures on the final accounts of the company are forged and the
annual report of the company, which admittedly bears his signatures,
clearly reflects that his shares were transferred to the petitioner.
10. Mr. Luthra relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in All
Cargo Movers (I) Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. v. Dhanesh Badarmal Jain and
Anr.: (2007) 14 SCC 776. He drew the attention of the this Court to
paragraph 16 of the said judgment and on the strength of the same,
contended that in cases where civil suit is pending and a complaint is
filed subsequently, the Court would take into consideration the
averments made in the civil suit and the correspondence exchanged
between the parties, in order to ascertain whether the allegations made
in the complaint are prima facie tenable. He further submitted that a
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distinction is required to be drawn between a civil dispute and an
allegation of a criminal offence. He submitted that in the present case,
respondent no.2 may be desirous of obtaining his shares or contesting
the gift made by him, however, it is not open for him to level
allegations of any forgery or contest the documents of transfer of
shares as false documents, after the same have been acknowledged by
him in various other documents and contemporaneous
correspondence.
11. Next, Mr Luthra also relied on the decision of the Supreme
Court in Rajeshbhai Muljibhai Patel and Anr. v. State of Gujarat
and Anr: (2020) 3 SCC 794. He drew the attention of this Court to the
observations made by the Court in paragraph 20 of the said decision to
the effect that when the issues as to the genuineness of documents are
pending in a civil suit, the FIR ought not to be allowed to continue, as
the same would prejudice the interest of parties and the stand taken by
them in the civil suit. He contended that in the present case, the issue
regarding the transfer of shares of CSM by respondent no.2 to the
petitioner is pending before the National Company Law Tribunal
(NCLT) and the FIR, which questions the documents pertaining to
transfer of the equity shares in question, ought not to be permitted to
be continued.
12. Mr Hariharan, learned senior counsel supplemented the
contentions advanced by Mr Luthra. He referred to the complaint
made by respondent no.2 on 31.10.2019 and pointed out that the said
complaint did not contain any allegations of forgery. On the contrary,
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Signing Date:03.11.20
he alleged that his daughter had deceitfully obtained his signatures on
blank sheets of papers/printed sheets of papers and had taken away his
shares. He had claimed that the petitioner had come to his residence
and had forcefully taken away his share certificates, documents and
other valuable papers and he was going to file a case for recovery of
his share certificates constituting 25% of the equity in CSM. He
submitted that on the basis of the said complaint, an FIR for
commission of an offence, under Sections 468/471 of the IPC, could
not have been registered.
13. Next, he contended that the FIR in question is ex facie vexatious
and respondent no.2 had made the allegations of forgery after he had
not succeeded to obtain any interim orders regarding the said
shareholding of CSM from the NCLT. He further referred to the
decision of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana And Ors. v.
Bhajan Lal And Ors.: 1992 Supp 1 SCC 335 and contented that an
FIR, which has been filed within mala fide purpose of harassing the
accused, could be quashed by the High Court under Section 482 of the
CrPC.
14. Mr Vikas Pahwa, learned senior counsel appearing for
respondent no.2 earnestly contested the contention that the FIR did not
disclose any cause of action. He submitted that respondent no.2 had
made specific allegations that his signatures on the gift deed dated
03.02.2016, purportedly transferring his 25% equity shares of CSM in
favour of the petitioner is forged. He submitted that he made similar
allegations regarding his signatures being forged on (i) the minutes of
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the meeting of the Board of Directors of CSM purportedly held on
25.02.2016; (ii) the rear side of the share certificates endorsing the
transfer of the same in favour of the petitioner; and (iii) on the transfer
forms. He submitted that the said forgeries came to light only after the
said documents were inspected pursuant to an order passed by the
NCLT. He stated that prior to that respondent no.2 did not know the
manner in which the petitioner had transferred the shares. The
petitioner had deceitfully obtained his signatures on several documents
and he believed that the same had been used for transferring his shares
of CSM and therefore, had contested the transfer on such basis. On
inspection of the said documents, he became aware that the signatures
on the gift deeds and other documents used by the petitioner to effect
the transfer of CSM shares in her favour were not signed by him. He
contended that therefore, the contention that the FIR ought to be
quashed as the allegations made by the petitioner and the averments
made by him in other proceedings are mutually destructive, ought to
be rejected. He stated that respondent no.2 had not filed any
proceedings after 29.01.2020 (the date on which the inspection of the
documents was taken), claiming that his signatures on the documents
effecting the transfer of shares had been obtained deceitfully.
15. Mr Pahwa further submitted that respondent no.2 is not
disputing his signatures on the final accounts of CSM. The notes to the
financial statements for the year ending 31.03.2016 reflect that
respondent no 2‟s shareholding of 25 lac shares constituting 25% of
the total outstanding equity capital had reduced to Nil during the said
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period and the shareholding of the petitioner had correspondingly
increased. He submitted that it is obvious that the said notes to
accounts escaped respondent no.2‟s attention.
16. He stated that while the notes to accounts for the financial year
ending after 31.03.2016, reflect that respondent no.2 did not have any
shares in CSM, the returns filed with the ROC do not capture any such
reduction in his shares. He submitted that it is obvious that the notes to
accounts had been deceitfully changed, while respondent no.2‟s shares
continued to be reflected at its current value in other records. In
addition, Mr Pahwa referred to the declarations made by the petitioner
to the Board of Directors of ANI Media Pvt. Ltd. disclosing her
shareholdings in other companies, firms and Association of
Individuals. In the said declaration, she had reflected her shareholding
in CSM at 5% and further declared that the same has remained
unchanged since 27.07.2006. He stated that the petitioner continued to
make such declarations till the year 2018.
17. Mr Pahwa referred to the decision in Bhajan Lal (supra) and
contended that none of the grounds as indicated in the said decision,
for quashing an FIR, were available in the present case. He earnestly
contended that there were several contentious issues between the
parties and a writ petition seeking quashing of the FIR in the aforesaid
background was not maintainable.
18. He also referred to the decisions of the Supreme Court in
Kamladevi Agarwal v. State of W.B. and Ors.: (2002) 1 SCC 555;
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Mahesh Chaudhary v State of Rajasthan and Anr.: (2009) 4 SCC
439 and Mushtaq Ahmad v. Mohd. Habibur Rehman Faizi and Ors.:
(1996) 7 SCC 440, in support of his contention that an FIR or a
complaint with regard to forgery cannot be quashed in exercise of
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC.
19. At a hearing held on 22.10.2020, Mr Sethi, learned senior
counsel appeared for respondent no.2. He reiterated the contentions
advanced earlier. He also referred to the decision of the Supreme
Court in Kamladevi Agarwal (supra). He emphasized in detail,
respondent no.2‟s explanation for not making any allegation of forgery
prior to 22.01.2020.
20. Mr Rahul Mehra, learned standing counsel appeared for
respondent no.1. He submitted that the investigation was at a nascent
stage and there was sufficient material to investigate further whether
the documents regarding the transfer of shares had been forged. He
submitted that at this stage, it be necessary that the original copies of
the said documents be sent for forensic examination. However, the
same could not be sent as this Court had interdicted further
investigation. He referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in
Sanapareddy Maheedhar Seshagiri v. State of A.P.: (2007) 13 SCC
165 and on the strength of the said decision, contended that the Court
should be extremely cautious and slow in interfering with the
investigation and/or trial of criminal cases. Such investigation can be
injuncted only if the Court is convinced beyond any doubt that the FIR
does not disclose commission of any offence or the allegations do not
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constitute any cognizable offence. He contended that if the allegations
contained in the FIR disclose commission of some offence, the
investigation agency must be allowed to complete the investigation,
without any impediment.
21. In rejoinder to the submissions made by Mr Pahawa and Mr
Sethi, Mr Hariharan submitted that the explanation provided by
respondent no.2 for not making any allegations of forgery prior to
January, 2020, is wholly untenable. He submitted that although the
NCLT had directed inspection of documents, the copies of the same
were not provided to respondent no.2 and he personally did not
undertake any inspection. He stated that the documents were inspected
by his son and therefore, the question of respondent no.2 discovering
that his signatures had been forged, did not arise. He stated that a
comparison of the admitted signatures of respondent no.2 with the
allegedly forged signatures indicates that it is not possible to conclude
that the allegedly forged signatures are not that of respondent no.2 as
they appear to be similar to the naked eye. He contended that this was
important because respondent no.2‟s son could not possibly have
concluded that the signatures were forged. He reiterated that the facts
clearly established that the FIR is vexatious and filed with the sole
purpose of pressurizing the petitioner to surrender her rights.
Reasons and conclusion
22. The first and foremost question to be addressed is whether the
FIR discloses a cognizable offence. A plain reading of the said FIR
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indicates that it does. The FIR in question clearly discloses that
respondent no.2 had alleged that his shares in CSM were
forcefully/deceitfully transferred in the name of the petitioner "on the
basis of forged and fabricated signatures". It is not disputed that CSM
was incorporated as a company under the Companies Act, 1956 on
28.06.2006. Thereafter, on 14.08.2006, 49,90,000 equity shares were
allotted to various shareholders including 12,45,000 shares to
respondent no.2. The said shareholding was, thereafter, increased and
as on 31.08.2008, respondent no.2 held 25,00,000 (twenty five lac)
equity shares in CSM which constitutes 25% of the issued and paid up
equity share capital of the company. Admittedly, respondent no.2‟s
shares are now being reflected as Nil. According to the petitioner, the
same were gifted to her and stand transferred to her in the books of
CSM. She also possesses the share certificates with an endorsement
on the rear recording her name as the subsequent holder of the said
shares. If the allegation made in the FIR that the transfer was effected
on the basis of forged and fabricated signatures is accepted to be
correct, it would undoubtedly disclose an offence under Sections
468/471/420 of the IPC. Apart from the allegation that the shares had
been transferred on the basis of forged and fabricated signatures,
respondent no.2 has also alleged that the petitioner had forcibly,
coercively and stealthily taken away his shares in CSM in active
connivance with her husband. The FIR also indicates that inquires
were made and photocopies of the documents such as the share
transfer deeds, gift deeds and share certificates etc. were shown to
respondent no.2 and he denied that the signatures appearing on those
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documents were his. He reiterated his complaint and his signatures
had been forged and fabricated. Mr Hariharan is correct that the
complaint dated 31.10.2019 made by respondent no.2 did not contain
any allegation that respondent no.2‟s signatures had been forged. In
his complaint, he had alleged that his daughter had coercively,
aggressively and deceitfully obtained his signatures on blank sheets of
papers/printed sheets of papers and had taken away his shares.
However, in his complaint made on 01.02.2020, he had expressly
alleged that his daughter had in active connivance with her husband
and his wife taken away his shares in CSM. He further alleged that
she had on the basis of forged and fabricated signatures forcefully and
deceitfully transferred the same in her name. The FIR in question has
been registered not only on the basis of the complaint made on
31.10.2019 but also on the subsequent complaint made on 01.02.2020.
Thus, this Court is unable to accept the contention that the FIR in
question could not have been registered. More so, when subsequent
inquiries clearly established that it is respondent no.2‟s allegation that
his signatures on the documents used to transfer his shares in CSM,
are forged.
23. The next question to be addressed is whether respondent no.2
has imputed that the petitioner is culpable in respect of on acts, which
are essentially disputes of civil nature. It is earnestly contended on
behalf of the petitioner that respondent no.2 is attempting to agitate
civil family disputes by instituting criminal proceedings. Mr Luthra
had contended that the issue whether the petitioner is the subsequent
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owner of 25% equity shares of CSM, which were earlier held by
respondent no.2, is the subject matter of proceedings before the
NCLT.
24. A plain reading of the reliefs sought by respondent no. 2 in his
petition filed before the NCLT indicates that he had sought a
declaration that the transfer of 25 lac equity shares held by him in
CSM to the petitioner is illegal and void ab initio. Respondent no.2
had also sought directions for rectification of Register of Members of
CSM and to take further steps to update the records of Registrar of
Companies.
25. Having stated the above, it is also well settled that causes that
have civil remedies do not necessarily exclude commission of criminal
offences, which may be subsumed in the said causes. Thus, merely
because civil proceedings are pending between the parties does not
necessarily exclude an aggrieved party from initiating criminal
proceedings. The question whether information discloses commission
of a cognizable offence must be viewed solely on the basis of the said
information irrespective of whether the same forms a part of cause of
action, which is being agitated in any civil proceedings. In Trisuns
Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal: (1999) 8 SCC 686, the
Supreme Court had observed as under: -
"7. Time and again this Court has been pointing out
that quashing of FIR or a commercial complaint in
exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court
should be limited to very extreme exceptions (vide
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State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal and Rajesh Bajaj v.
State NCT of Delhi).
8. In the last referred case, this court also pointed out
that merely because an act has a civil profile is not
sufficient to denude it of its criminal outfit...."
26. In cases pertaining to commercial transactions, it sometimes
becomes difficult to ascertain whether the cause of action arises solely
on account of a breach of commercial obligations or it also subsumes a
criminal offence of cheating on account of one party intentionally
deceiving the other to enter into such a transaction. In the aforesaid
context, in Rajesh Bajaj v. State (NCT of Delhi): (1999) 3 SCC 259
the Supreme Court referred to the earlier decision in the case of
Bhajan Lal (supra) and after noting that the Court had struck a note of
caution that the power to quash criminal proceedings should be used
very sparingly, had held as under:-
"10. It may be that the facts narrated in the present
complaint would as well reveal a commercial
transaction or money transaction. But that is hardly a
reason for holding that the offence of cheating would
elude from such a transaction. In fact, many a
cheatings were committed in the course of commercial
and also money transactions. One of the illustrations
set out under Section 415 of the Indian Penal Code
(illustrations f) is worthy of notice now:
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"(f) A intentionally deceives Z into a belief that A
means to repay any money that Z may lend to him and
thereby dishonestly induces Z to lend him money, A
not intending to repay it. A cheats."
11. The crux of the postulate is the intention of the
person who induces the victim of his representation
and not the nature of the transaction which would
become decisive in discerning whether there was
commission of offence or not. The complainant has
stated in the body of the complaint that he was
induced to believe that respondent would honour
payment on receipt of invoices, and that the
complainant realised later that the intentions of the
respondent were not clear. He also mentioned that
respondent after receiving the goods have sold them to
others and still he did not pay the money. Such
averments would prima facie make out a case for
investigation by the authorities.
12. The High Court seems to have adopted a
strictly hyper-technical approach and sieved the
complaint through a colander of finest gauzes for
testing the ingredients under Section 415 , IPC. Such
an endeavour may be justified during trial, but
certainly not during the stage of investigation. At any
rate, it is too premature a stage for the High Court to
step in and stall the investigation by declaring that it is
a commercial transaction simplicitor wherein no
semblance of criminal offence is involved."
27. However, in the facts of the present case, no such difficulty
arises as the allegation made by respondent no.2 is that of forgery.
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This is not a case where a commercial transaction is being imputed
with overtones of culpability. This is a case where the allegation is
that signatures on certain documents have been forged to deprive the
complainant of his valuable property. There is no commercial
transaction involved in this case. Even according to the petitioner, the
shares of CSM were transferred out of love and affection. Thus,
merely because the respondent no.2 has initiated an action of undoing
the alleged transfer and for rectification of the Register of Members of
CSM, it certainly does not in any manner preclude him from initiating
criminal proceedings alleging that the said transfer was effected on the
basis of forging his signatures on relevant documents.
28. There is no rule of law that proscribes that civil and criminal
proceedings cannot continue simultaneously. In Iqbal Singh Marwah
v. Meenakshi Marwah: (2005) 4 SCC 370, the Constitution Bench of
the Supreme Court had held in unambiguous terms that "there is
neither any statutory provision nor any legal principle that the
findings recorded in one proceedings may be treated as final or
binding in the other, as both the cases have to be decided on the basis
of the evidence adduced therein". In M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras:
AIR 1954 SC 397, the Supreme Court had after observing that as
between the civil and criminal proceedings, the criminal matter should
be given precedence. However, the Court had also observed that "no
hard and fast rule can be laid down but we do not consider that the
possibility of conflicting decisions in the civil and criminal Courts is a
relevant consideration." After having stated the same, the Court also
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observed that the special circumstances obtaining in a particular case
may make one course or the other more expedient. In that case, the
Court had stayed the civil suits till the criminal proceedings were
completed.
29. Mr Hariharan had in the passing also referred to the decision of
the Supreme Court in the case of Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat
Goldmines Ltd. and Anr.: AIR 1999 SC 1416 and contended that in
that case, the Court had not permitted parallel proceedings and had
held that the departmental proceedings ought to be stayed in cases,
where the same was premised on the allegations that were subject
matter of the criminal proceedings initiated against the allegedly
delinquent employee. This contention is insubstantial. The Supreme
Court had not laid down any proposition of law to the effect that
departmental proceedings were required to be stayed, if criminal
proceedings regarding the same subject matter, were pending. On the
contrary, the Supreme Court had referred to various earlier decisions
and concluded that departmental proceedings and proceedings in a
criminal case could proceed simultaneously and there was no bar in
doing so. However, the Court had also stated that in certain cases,
where department proceedings and criminal cases are based on
identical and similar sets of facts and the criminal case against the
delinquent employee is of a grave nature, which involves complicated
questions of law and fact, it may be desirable to stay the departmental
proceedings till the conclusion of the criminal case. This Court is of
the view that the said decision would have no relevance in the facts
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and circumstances of this case.
30. The only question that remains to be addressed is whether the
FIR in question should be quashed on the ground that the averments
made by respondent no.2 in various other fora as well as in the initial
complaint and the allegations made in the FIR are mutually
destructive. Mr Luthra had referred to the decision of the Supreme
Court in All Cargo Movers (India) Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and on the
strength of the said decision contended that if civil proceedings had
been initiated in respect of the subject disputes, the Courts would not
be precluded from examining the material placed in the said
proceedings, to determine the question whether the FIR ought to be
quashed. Mr Hariharan had also rightly pointed out that mutually
destructive pleadings and allegations would also indicate that the
allegations are mala fide and not for redressing a bona fide grievance.
31. Undisputedly, contrary pleadings made by a complainant in
other proceedings would require to be considered in determining
whether the criminal complaint made subsequently is vexations and
malafide. Clearly, a person cannot be permitted to run two mutually
exclusive cases simultaneously. In a case, where the court finds that a
litigant is running multiple proceedings on inconsistent and mutually
destructive averments, the courts may assume that the proceedings
initiated subsequently are an abuse of process of law, unless an
explanation is provided for it. In such cases where the same is
established and the court has no doubt regarding the same, the court
may in exercise of its plenary powers quash the said proceedings in
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the interest of justice. Thus, the principal question to be addressed in
this case is whether the averments made by respondent no.2 in various
proceedings are mutually destructive and whether in this case, it is
established that the FIR filed by respondent no.2 is mala fide and
constitutes an abuse of process of law.
32. There is merit in the petitioner's contention that the stands taken
by respondent no.2 in pleadings before various forums are not
consistent. In the petition filed before the National Company Law
Tribunal (NCLT) - which was filed on 25.11.2019 - respondent no.2
had alleged that the petitioner had taken possession of the original
share certificates from him and had compelled him to sign few
documents and blank and printed sheets. Thereafter, she had on
25.02.2016, illegally effected the transfer of 25 lacs equity shares held
by petitioner no.1 in CSM in her favour on the basis of false and
fabricated documents.
33. Subsequently, on 18.12.2019, respondent no.2 filed a petition
under Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act,
2007 before the Additional District Magistrate, District South, New
Delhi. In the said petition, respondent no.2 averred that he owned 25%
equity in CSM and the petitioner and her husband had in connivance
with the accountants and auditors of that company clandestinely,
deceitfully and coercively transferred his equity shares in CSM in
favour of the petitioner. He had alleged that the petitioner had
"coercively, deceitfully and forcefully obtained his signature on blank
and printed sheets of paper and deprived him of his assets".
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Respondent no.2 also filed a suit for declaration and permanent
injunction (being CS No.8/2020), in the Court of District and Sessions
Judge, Saket. inter alia, praying for a decree of declaration that he is
the real owner of the property bearing no. A-17, Gulmohar Park, New
Delhi. In his plaint, he averred that he had been forced by his daughter
(the petitioner herein) to transfer his shares in CSM. He alleged that
the transfer was made deceitfully, fraudulently by "exploiting the
emotions of the plaintiff".
34. Respondent no.2 had sought to explain his varying stands in his
counter affidavit. He claims that he was not aware of the documents,
on the basis of which the shares of CSM had been transferred in
favour of the petitioner and he had assumed that she had used
blank/printed papers on which she had deceitfully obtained his
signatures. He states that pursuant to the orders passed by the NCLT,
the records/documents of CSM were inspected and he became aware
that the signatures on the gift deed and share transfer forms for
transfer of the said shares were forged and fabricated. He states that
thereafter, he filed a complaint before the police on 04.02.2020,
clearly stating that the petitioner had forged the documents to transfer
his shares in CSM in her name.
35. Respondent no.2 also states that he became aware of the
Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors of CSM conducted
on 25.02.2016 and claims that he had never signed the said document
at any point of time. And, in fact, he was not even present at the
registered office of CSM on 25.02.2016.
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36. Thus, according to respondent no.2, the following documents
have been forged:
(a) Gift deed dated 03.02.2016 whereby respondent no.2 had
purportedly gifted his 25 lac equity shares in CSMHPL in
favour of the petitioner;
(b) Share Transfer Forms for effecting the transfer of the said
shares;
(c) Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors
purportedly held on 25.02.2016, where the resolution was
purportedly passed for transferring the 25 lac equity shares
held by respondent no.2 in favour of the petitioner;
(d) Signatures on the rear of the share certificates, endorsing the
transfer in favour of the petitioner purportedly entered on
25.02.2016; and
(e) Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors of CSM,
purportedly held on 14.10.2015.
37. It is seen from the above that although there can be no dispute
that the averments made by respondent no.2 in various pleadings are
not consistent with the allegation as articulated in his complaint dated
01.02.2020 (and as stated in the FIR) but respondent no.2 has provided
an explanation for the same.
38. At this stage, it would be relevant to examine the scope of this
Court‟s power under Section 482 of the CrPC, in order to ascertain
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whether this Court is required to evaluate the said explanation in these
proceedings.
39. In Bhajan Lal (supra), the Supreme Court had referred to its
earlier decisions - including most notably the decision in R.P. Kapur
v. State of Punjab: AIR 1960 SC 866 - and had set out the following
circumstances or cases, in which an FIR or a complaint could be
quashed:
"102.(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety
do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a
case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do
not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of
the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within
the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the
FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support
of the same do not disclose the commission of any
offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
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(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of
which no prudent person can ever reach a just
conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any
of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned
(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or
where there is a specific provision in the Code or the
Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to
spite him due to private and personal grudge."
40. The aforesaid decision has been consistently followed by Courts
in subsequent decisions. The Supreme Court has been consistent in its
view that the power to quash an FIR or complaint must be exercised in
extremely rare cases where there is no possible scope of entertaining
any doubt that the case falls within the seven exceptions as set out in
Bhajan Lal‟s case (supra).
41. In R. Kalyani v. Janak C. Mehta and Ors.: (2009) 1 SCC 516,
the Supreme Court had noted various earlier decisions and had
summarized the position of law as under:
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"15. Propositions of law which emerge from the said
decisions are:
(1) The High Court ordinarily would not exercise its
inherent jurisdiction to quash a criminal proceeding
and, in particular, a first information report unless the
allegations contained therein, even if given face value
and taken to be correct in their entirety, disclosed no
cognizable offence.
(2) For the said purpose the Court, save and except in
very exceptional circumstances, would not look to any
document relied upon by the defence.
(3) Such a power should be exercised very sparingly. If
the allegations made in the FIR disclose commission of
an offence, the Court shall not go beyond the same and
pass an order in favour of the accused to hold absence
of any mens rea or actus reus.
(4) If the allegation discloses a civil dispute, the same
by itself may not be a ground to hold that the criminal
proceedings should not be allowed to continue."
42. In Zandu Pharmaceuticals Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful
Haque: (2005) 1 SCC 122, the Supreme Court observed as under:
"11. ....The High Court being the highest court of a
State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie
decision in a case where entire facts are incomplete and
hazy, more so when the evidence has not been
collected and produced before the court and the issues
involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude
and cannot be seen in their true perspective without
sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule
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can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High
Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of
quashing the proceedings at any stage. It would not be
proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the
complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to
determine whether a conviction would be sustainable
and on such premises arrive at a conclusion that the
proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous
to assess the material before it and conclude that the
complaint cannot be proceeded with. In a proceeding
instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers
to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case
where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is
frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set
out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of
which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it
is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise
of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code.
It is not, however, necessary that there should be
meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find
out whether the case would end in conviction or
acquittal. The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it
appears that on consideration of the allegations in the
light of the statement made on oath of the complainant
that the ingredients of the offence or offences are
disclosed and there is no material to show that the
complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that
event there would be no justification for interference
by the High Court. When an information is lodged at
the police station and an offence is registered, then the
mala fides of the informant would be of secondary
importance. It is the material collected during the
investigation and evidence led in court which decides
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the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala
fides against the informant are of no consequence and
cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing the
proceedings.
[Emphasis supplied]
43. The scope of evaluating whether an FIR is mala fide is also
somewhat restricted and unless the court can conclude beyond
reasonable doubt that the FIR is frivolous and vexatious, without
undertaking a detailed evaluation regarding the truthfulness or the
evidentiary value of the material available on record, it would not be
apposite to quash the FIR. It certainly would be not permissible to
quash an FIR, which discloses a cognizable offence on the ground that
it is mala fide, at the threshold, without permitting the investigation
agency to coalesce all evidence/material.
44. In Sanapareddy Maheedhar Seshagiri and Anr. (supra), the
Supreme Court once took note of its earlier decisions and held as
under:
"31. A careful reading of the above noted judgments
makes it clear that the High Court should be extremely
cautious and slow to interfere with the investigation
and/or trial of criminal cases and should not stall the
investigation and/or prosecution except when it is
convinced beyond any manner of doubt that FIR does
not disclose commission of any offence or that the
allegations contained in FIR do not constitute any
cognizable offence or that the prosecution is barred by
law or the High Court is convinced that it is necessary
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to interfere to prevent abuse of the process of the
Court. In dealing with such cases, the High Court has
to bear in mind that judicial intervention at the
threshold of the legal process initiated against a person
accused of committing offence is highly detrimental to
the larger public and societal interest. The people and
the society have a legitimate expectation that those
committing offences either against an individual or the
society are expeditiously brought to trial and, if found
guilty, adequately punished. Therefore, while deciding
a petition filed for quashing FIR or complaint or
restraining the competent authority from investigating
the allegations contained in FIR or complaint or for
stalling the trial of the case, the High Court should be
extremely careful and circumspect. If the allegations
contained in FIR or complaint disclose commission of
some crime, then the High Court must keep its hands
off and allow the investigating agency to complete the
investigation without any fetter and also refrain from
passing order which may impede the trial. The High
Court should not go into the merits and demerits of the
allegations simply because the petitioner alleges malus
animus against the author of FIR or the complainant.
The High Court must also refrain from making
imaginary journey in the realm of possible harassment
which may be caused to the petitioner on account of
investigation of FIR or complaint. Such a course will
result in miscarriage of justice and would encourage
those accused of committing crimes to repeat the same.
However, if the High Court is satisfied that the
complaint does not disclose commission of any offence
or prosecution is barred by limitation or that the
proceedings of criminal case would result in failure of
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justice, then it may exercise inherent power under
Section 482 CrPC."
45. In the present case, it was pointed out on behalf of the petitioner
that the fact that transfer of shares of respondent no.2 held in CSM had
been transferred to the petitioner, had been accepted by all parties and
respondent no.2 had also signed the final accounts of CSM for the
financial years ending 31.03.2016; 31.03.2017 and 31.03.2018, which
clearly reflected the same. Undoubtedly, the fact that the final
accounts of CSM Ltd. for the said years admittedly bears the
signatures of respondent no.2 would be a vital piece of evidence in
support of the petitioner‟s claim that respondent no.2 had transferred
his shares in CSM to her and was fully aware of the same, however,
this is not un-rebuttable and the possibility that respondent no. 2 may
be in position to lead evidence to sufficiently explain the same, cannot
be ruled out, at this stage. Respondent no.2 has also produced copies
of declarations dated 31.3.2016; 31.3.2017; and 31.3.2018 made by
the petitioner to the Board of ANI Media Pvt. Ltd. declaring her
shareholding in CSM Hotels Pvt. Ltd. to be 5% of its issued equity
capital. According to the petitioner, the incorrect declarations had
been made on account of inadvertent errors. Some of the returns of
CSM Hotels Pvt. Ltd. filed with the ROC also reflect the shareholding
of the petitioner as 5% of the total issued equity capital. These are also
claimed as ex facie erroneous.
46. Clearly, this does present contentious issues. The question as to
how respondent no. 2 discovered that his signatures were forged is
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also a contentious issue. At this stage, this Court is neither in the
position to evaluate the entire evidence that may be led by the parties
nor is it apposite for this Court to venture to speculate in this regard.
47. The scope of the present proceedings is extremely limited and
unless this Court comes to a conclusion that the FIR is ex facie
frivolous and vexatious, the same cannot be quashed, more so as it
clearly discloses a cognizable offence.
48. In the given facts of this case, this Court is unable to conclude
that there is no doubt that the offence as alleged has not been
committed; that the allegations made by the respondents are bereft of
any substance or merit; and, there is no possibility of any evidence
being in existence, which could possibly dilute the said view.
49. In view of the above, this Court cannot accede to the prayers
made in this petition.
50. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed. The pending application
is also disposed of.
VIBHU BAKHRU, J
NOVEMBER 03, 2020
RK
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