Delhi High Court
Rishabh Singh vs State & Anr on 23 January, 2019
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Order: January 23, 2019
+ CRL.M.C. 345/2019 & CRL.M.As. 1511-12/2019
RISHABH SINGH .....Petitioner
Through: Ms. Rita Kumar and Ms. Anita
Verma, Advocates
versus
STATE AND ANR .....Respondents
Through: Ms. Neelam Sharma, Additional
Public Prosecutor for respondent-
State with SI Sunil Kumar
Mr. Swapnil Vashishtha, Advocate
with respondent No. 2 in person
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL GAUR
ORDER
(ORAL)
Quashing of FIR No. 520/2014, under Sections 279/337 of IPC &
under section 3 r/w 181 and u/s 146/194 of Motor Vehicle Act, 1988,
registered at police station Govind Puri, Delhi is sought on the ground that
the accident in question had taken place due to bona fide error of judgment.
Upon notice, Ms. Neelam Sharma, learned Additional Public
Prosecutor for respondent-State submits that respondent No.2, present in the
Court is the complainant/first informant of FIR in question and she has been
identified to be so, by SI Sunil Kumar, on the basis of identity proof
produced by her.
Respondent No.2, present in the Court, supports this petition and
affirms the contents of her affidavit and further submits that she has been
duly compensated and so, the proceedings arising out of the FIR in question
be brought to an end.
Supreme Court in Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai
Vs. State of Gujarat (2017) 9 SCC 641 has reiterated the parameters for
exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of
FIR / criminal complaint, which are as under:-
"16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on
the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions:
16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court
to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the
ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only
recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court.
16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash
a first information report or a criminal proceeding on the ground
that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the
victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the
purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an
offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of
Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power
to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-
compoundable.
16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or
complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of
justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power.
16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit
and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the ends of
justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court.
16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first information
report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and
victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and
circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of
principles can be formulated.
16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while
dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High
Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the
offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity
or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot
appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the
victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking,
not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The
decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the
overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for
serious offences.
16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be
criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant
element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar
as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned.
16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from
commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar
transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate
situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute.
16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal
proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants,
the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a
criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and
16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in
propositions 16.8. and 16.9. above. Economic offences involving
the financial and economic well-being of the State have
implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute
between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in
declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity
akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The
consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or
economic system will weigh in the balance."
In the facts and circumstances of this case, I find that continuation of
proceedings arising out of FIR in question would be an exercise in futility.
Accordingly, this petition is allowed subject to costs of `10,000/-
to be deposited by petitioner with Prime Minister's National Relief Fund
within four weeks from today. Upon placing on record the receipt of
deposit of costs within two weeks thereafter, FIR No. 520/2014, under
Sections 279/337 of IPC & under section 3 r/w 181 and u/s 146/194 of
Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, registered at police station Govind Puri, Delhi
and the proceedings emanating therefrom shall stand quashed qua
petitioner.
This petition and the applications are accordingly disposed of.
Dasti.
(SUNIL GAUR)
JUDGE
JANUARY 23, 2019
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