Delhi High Court
Om Prakash Chautala vs The State (Nct Of Delhi) on 18 December, 2019
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ W.P.(CRL) 1221/2019
OM PRAKASH CHAUTALA ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. N. Hariharan, Senior Advocate
with Mr. Amit Sahni, Mr. Anshul
Bajaj, Ms. Sonali Tiwary, Mr. Jasman
Singh Sethi, Mr. Aditya Chandra and
Mr. Sunil Gulia, Mr. Sharang Dhulia,
Mr. Varun Deswal, Ms. Pooja B. Soni
and Mr. Prateek Bhalla, Advocates.
versus
THE STATE (NCT OF DELHI) ..... Respondent
Through: Mr.Rahul Mehra, Standing Counsel
(Crl.) with Mr. Chaitanya Gosain,
Advocate for State.
Mr. Amresh AS (Legal) Prison Dept.
Reserved on: 26th November, 2019
% Date of Decision: 18th December, 2019
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANMOHAN
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL
JUDGMENT
MANMOHAN, J:
1. Present petition has been filed by the petitioner seeking issuance of
a writ in the nature of habeas corpus and a direction to set aside the order
dated 3rd April, 2019 passed by the respondent-State whereby his case for
early release was rejected. The petitioner further seeks a direction that he
is entitled to an early release on the ground that he qualifies under clause
(c) and (d) of Special Remission Notification dated 18th July, 2018 issued
by Government of India.
BRIEF FACTS
2. Since the respondent-State had not considered petitioner's
application dated 6th December, 2018 for special remission, the petitioner
had filed an earlier writ petition being W.P. (Crl) 550/2019, which was
disposed of by the learned predecessor Bench of this Court vide order
dated 20th February, 2019 with a direction to the respondent-State to
determine the representation of the petitioner for special remission as
expeditiously as possible and positively within a period of four weeks.
3. Thereafter, petitioner's application for special remission was
rejected vide order dated 03rd April, 2019 by respondent-State under the
signature of Deputy Secretary (Home). The relevant portion of the said
order is reproduced hereinbelow:-
"It is clear that prisoners convicted under the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 are not to be granted special remission
under the scheme and the fact that the convict has undergone
any amount of sentence under the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988 does not hold any good as he has been convicted
under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
Perusal of Ld. Trial Court order dated 22.01.2013 makes it
clear that convict has been sentenced for terms of 7 years
rigorous imprisonment and a fine in the sum of Rs.1,000/- each
u/s 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and rigorous
imprisonment for 10 years and a fine in the sum of Rupees
1000/- each u/s 120-B IPC r/w section 418/467/471 IPC r/w
section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and as such
both these sentences are to be read along with Section 13(2) of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
Further, the offences constitute part of the same transaction
and cannot be bifurcated for the purpose of extending the
benefit of special remission under guidelines notified by Govt.
of India. Therefore, the ground taken by the convict that he has
already undergone a period of 7 years under the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 and should be considered for special
remission does not hold good.
Further, no such prisoner has been considered by the
committee for grant of remission under this scheme if he falls
under any of the categories mentioned in para 4 of the
guidelines circulated by Govt. of India. Considering the
aforesaid aspect, the case was earlier not placed before the
committee by the Prison Department for consideration as it
does not fall within the ambit of the guidelines. Prison
Department has also again reiterated that the case of convict
may not be eligible for Special Remission in view of abovesaid
Para 4 of the guidelines whereby Special Remission cannot be
granted in cases of prisoners convicted under the Prevention of
Corruption Act.
Whereas, after taking into account all the facts and guidelines
of MHA, GoI and the recommendation of Prison Department,
the Committee decided not to recommend the case of convict
Om Prakash Chautala s/o Late Sh.Devi Lal for grant of special
remission at this stage.
Whereas, the Hon'ble Lt. Governor, Delhi has accepted the
recommendation of Sate Level Committee. Accordingly, the
petition of convict Om Prakash Chautala s/o Lt. Sh. Devi Lal
for considering his case to grant Special Remission on the
occasion of 150th Birth Anniversary of Mahatma Gandhi as
notified by the Government of India is hereby rejected.
DY. SECRETARY (HOME)
GOVT. OF N.C.T. OF DELHI
Ph. NO.-011-23392071"
4. The present writ petition challenges the aforesaid order.
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
5. Mr. N. Hariharan, learned senior counsel for the petitioner stated
that the petitioner is aged about eighty-three years and is suffering from
disability. He further stated that the sentence awarded by the Court under
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as "PC
Act") was seven years rigorous imprisonment - which he had already
undergone.
6. He submitted that though the petitioner had also been awarded a
sentence of ten years under Section 120B IPC read with Sections
418/467/471 IPC and Section 13(2) of PC Act, yet as the maximum
sentence prescribed under PC Act, at the relevant time, was seven years,
the incarceration under Section 120B IPC read with PC Act in petitioner's
case cannot exceed seven years.
7. He contended that the respondent-State vide its order dated 03rd
April, 2019 had erroneously rejected the petitioner's representation for
pre-mature release thereby accepting the recommendations of State Legal
Committee dated 19th March, 2019 that as the petitioner had been
convicted under the PC Act he cannot be granted special remission in
view of the paragraph no. 4 of the Notification dated 18th July, 2018,
which states "special remission will not be given to.....convicts involved in
serious and heinous crimes......and convicted under.....Prevention of
Corruption Act etc."
8. He submitted that post completion of seven years, the paragraph no.
4 to the Notification dated 18th July, 2018 was not applicable to the case
of the petitioner and the petitioner deserved to be released by granting
special remission because the convict/petitioner was no longer involved in
any offence under PC Act (having completed seven years of
incarceration) and the petitioner was presently undergoing incarceration
under Section 467 IPC. In support of his submission, he relied upon the
judgment of the Madras High Court in P. Veera Bhaarathi vs. The State
of Tamil Nadu & Ors., 2016 SCC OnLine Mad 33615 and the Supreme
Court judgment in The State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. vs. P. Veera
Bhaarathi, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 324.
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT-STATE
9. Per contra, Mr. Rahul Mehra, learned Standing counsel for the
respondent-State stated that special remission cannot be granted in cases
of prisoners convicted under the PC Act and he placed reliance on
paragraph No.4 of the Notification dated 18th July, 2018. He emphasised
that no prisoner had been considered by the Committee for grant of
remission under the scheme if he fell under any of the categories
mentioned in paragraph no. 4 of the Notification dated 18th July, 2018
circulated by the Government of India.
10. Mr. Rahul Mehra stated that the petitioner had been sentenced to
rigorous imprisonment for seven years and a fine in the sum of Rs.1,000/-
under Section 13(2) of PC Act and further sentenced to rigorous
imprisonment for ten years and a fine in the sum of Rs. 1,000/- under
Section 120B IPC read with Sections 418/467/471 IPC and Section 13(2)
of PC Act. He submitted that the sentence of ten years is to be read with
PC Act as the offences constitute part of the same transaction and they
cannot be separated for the purpose of extending the benefit of special
remission under the guidelines notified by the Government of India. He
reiterated that the Court cannot assume that the sentence of ten years is
without the force of PC Act in the present case. Therefore, according to
him, the ground taken by the petitioner that he had already undergone his
sentence under the PC Act and should be considered for special remission
did not hold good.
11. Learned standing counsel for the respondent-State stated that during
the total period of incarceration undergone by the petitioner till 30th July,
2019, the petitioner had availed two interim bails, seven paroles and eight
furloughs.
12. Learned Standing counsel for the respondent-State contended that
the judgments relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner
have no application to the facts of the present case. He pointed out that
the judgments relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner
pertained to provisions of IPC, whereas in the present case the sentence
had been awarded under a combination of provisions of two separate
statutes. He emphasized that in P. Veera Bhaarathi (supra), there was a
clarification from the State in terms of the letter of the Director General of
Prisons, which had supported the case of the petitioner. He further
pointed out that in the present case, the State level Committee had decided
against recommending the petitioner's case for special remission and the
same had been accepted by the Lt. Governor as well.
13. Learned Standing counsel for the respondent-State lastly contended
that the present petition had become infructuous inasmuch as the complete
cycle of awarding remission on the occasion of 150th birth anniversary of
Mahatma Gandhi had already been completed on 2nd October, 2019.
COURT'S REASONING
THE CONTENTION OF THE STATE THAT THE PRESENT PETITION
HAS BECOME INFRUCTUOUS IS UNTENABLE IN LAW INASMUCH
AS THE PETITIONER HAD FILED THIS WRIT PETITION WELL
BEFORE THE LAST PHASE OF RELEASE AS PROVIDED UNDER
THE NOTIFICATION i.e. 02nd OCTOBER, 2019. IT IS SETTLED LAW
THAT NO PARTY CAN SUFFER DUE TO AN ACT OF THE COURT.
14. The petitioner herein had been convicted and sentenced by the Trial
Court vide order dated 22nd January, 2013 which was upheld by this Court
vide order dated 5th March, 2015 in Rekha Sharma Vs. Central Bureau
of Investigation, 2015 SCC OnLine Del 7796. Even the Special Leave
Petition, being SLP (Crl.) 4658/2015, filed challenging the said order of
the High Court was dismissed by the Supreme Court vide order dated 03rd
August, 2015. Consequently, the sentence awarded to the petitioner has
attained finality and the same is reproduced hereinbelow:-
"12. xxx xxx xxx
(i) .....rigorous imprisonment for 7 years and a fine in the
sum of Rs.1,000/- each u/s 13(2) of Prevention of
Corruption Act. In default of payment of fine, they shall
undergo simple imprisonment for six months each
(ii) ...........rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and a fine in
the sum of Rs.1,000/- each u/s 120-B IPC r/w Section
418/467/471 IPC r/w Section 13(2) of Prevention of
Corruption Act. In default of payment of fine, they shall
undergo simple imprisonment for six months each."
(emphasis supplied)
15. The total period undergone in custody, as on 30th November, 2019,
by the petitioner is as follows:-
Period including under- Years Months Days
trial and as convict
Actual Period 05 11 06
Remission Earned 02 03 26
Total Period Including 08 03 02
Remission
Unexpired portion of 01 08 28
sentence
16. The Union of India vide Notification dated 18th July, 2018 had
approved special remission to prisoners on the occasion of 150th Birth
Anniversary of Mahatma Gandhi. The relevant portion of the said
Notification is reproduced hereinbelow:-
"Cabinet approves Special Remission to Prisoners on the
occasion of 150th Birth Anniversary of Mahatma Gandhi.
The Union cabinet chaired by the Prime Minister Shri
Narendra Modi has today given its approval to grant Special
Remission to Prisoners as part of commemoration of 150th Birth
Anniversary of Mahatma Gandhi.
As part of commemoration of 150th Birth Anniversary of
Mahatma Gandhi, the following categories of prisoners will be
considered for special remission and released in three phases.
In Phase-I, the prisoners will be released on 2nd October, 2018
(Birth Anniversary of Mahatma Gandhi), in Phase-II prisoners
will be released on 10th Aprtil, 2019 (Anniversary of
Champaran Satyagrah) and in Phase-III, prisoners will be
released on 2nd October, 2019 (Birth Anniversary of Mahatma
Gandhi):-
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Male convicts of 60 years of age and above, who have
completed 50% of their actual sentence period.
(d) Physically challenged/disabled convicts with 70%
disability and more who have completed 50% of their actual
sentence period.
xxx xxx xxx
Special remission will not be given to prisoners who have been
convicted for an offence for which the sentence is sentence of
death or where death sentence, has been commuted to life
imprisonment: Cases of convicts involved in serious and
heinous crimes like Dowry death, Rape, Human Trafficking and
convicted under POTA, UAPA, TADA, FICN, POCSO Act,
Money Laundering, FEMA, NDPS, Prevention of Corruption
Act, etc."
(emphasis supplied)
17. At the outset, this Court is of the view that the contention of the
learned Standing counsel for the respondent-State that the present petition
had become infructuous is untenable in law inasmuch as the petitioner had
filed this writ petition well before the last phase of release as provided
under the Notification dated 18th July, 2018 i.e. 02nd October, 2019. It is
settled law that no party can suffer due to an act of the Court.
Consequently, this Court is of the opinion that the rights of the petitioner
cannot be prejudiced on account of the pendency of the petition before
this Court. The Supreme Court in Rajesh D. Darbar and Ors. vs
Narasingrao Krishnaji Kulkarni and Ors. (2003) 7 SCC 219 has held as
under:-
"6. ........There can be no quarrel with the proposition as noted
by the High Court that a party cannot be made to suffer on
account of an act of the court. There is a well-recognised maxim
of equity, namely, actus curiae neminem gravabit which means
an act of the court shall prejudice no man. This maxim is founded
upon justice and good sense which serves a safe and certain
guide for the administration of law. The other maxim is, lex non
cogit ad impossibilia i.e. the law does not compel a man to do
that what he cannot possibly perform. The applicability of the
abovesaid maxims has been approved by this Court in Raj
Kumar Dey v. Tarapada Dey, Gursharan Singh v. New Delhi
Municipal Committee and Mohd. Gazi v. State of M.P."
(emphasis supplied)
18. The aforesaid principle has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in
a recent judgement in Odisha Forest Development Corporation Ltd. vs.
M/s Anupam Traders and Anr. C.A. No. 9083/2019 decided on 28th
November, 2019.
THE PETITIONER HAS PRAYED FOR REMISSION OF SENTENCE
IMPOSED FOR THE IPC OFFENCES READ WITH SECTION 120B
IPC, AND NOT UNDER SECTION 13(2) OF THE PC ACT AS HE HAS
UNDERGONE THE MAXIMUM IMPRISONMENT OF SEVEN YEARS
UNDER SECTION 13(2) PC ACT.
19. The case of the petitioner is not barred by paragraph no. 4 of the
Notification dated 18th July, 2018, as he has already served the first part of
his sentence of seven years under Section 13(2) of the PC Act.
20. The submission of the learned Standing counsel for the respondent-
State that the second part of the sentence of ten years awarded under
Section 120B IPC should be read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act is
untenable in law as the maximum punishment that could be awarded
under Section 13(2) of the PC Act, at the relevant time, was seven years.
This Court is of the opinion that the maximum sentence that can be
awarded under Section 120B IPC is the maximum sentence that can be
awarded for the substantive offence that is clubbed with Section 120B
IPC. Consequently, the punishment awarded under Section 120B IPC in
conjunction with Section 13(2) of the PC Act, at that relevant time, could
not exceed seven years. Accordingly, the petitioner has already served
out his sentence under the PC Act as he has undergone the maximum
imprisonment of seven years under Section 13(2) PC Act.
21. Keeping in view the aforesaid, this Court is of the view that the
petitioner has prayed for remission of sentence imposed for the IPC
offences read with Section 120B IPC, and not under the PC Act.
THE ARGUMENT OF LEARNED STANDING COUNSEL FOR
RESPONDENT-STATE THAT THE PETITIONER WAS INELIGIBLE TO
AVAIL BENEFITS UNDER THE NOTIFICATION DATED 18th JULY,
2018 ON ACCOUNT OF HIS CONVICTION UNDER THE PC ACT IS
UNTENABLE IN LAW IN VIEW OF THE DECISIONS OF MADRAS
HIGH COURT AND SUPREME COURT IN P. VEERA BHAARATHI
(SUPRA)
22. Though the argument of learned Standing counsel for respondent-
State that the petitioner was ineligible to avail benefits under the
Notification dated 18th July, 2018 on account of his conviction under the
PC Act is very appealing at first blush, yet this issue is no longer res
integra in view of the decisions of Madras High Court in P. Veera
Bhaarathi (supra) and Supreme Court in The State of Tamil Nadu & Ors.
vs. P. Veera Bhaarathi (supra). The Madras High Court, in P. Veera
Bhaarathi (supra), has in the context of a similar prison rule, held as
under:-
"16. Rule 341 of the Rules, which is very important for the
issues involved in the present Habeas Corpus Petition, states as
follows:--
"(1) The sentences of all prisoners sentenced to
imprisonment for life or to more than twenty years
imprisonment in the aggregate or imprisonment for life
and imprisonment for terms exceeding in the aggregate
twenty years shall, for the purpose of this rule, be deemed
to be sentences of imprisonment for twenty years.
(2) The cases of prisoners undergoing imprisonment for life
shall, ordinarily be placed before the Advisory Board as
constituted for consideration as to whether their parole will
be recommended, on completion of ten years of actual
imprisonment :
Provided that by virtue of provision contained in section 433-
A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Central Act 2 of
1974), the cases of prisoners sentenced to imprisonment for
life on or after 18th December 1978 for an offence for which
death is one of the punishments provided by law, or in whose
case a sentence of death imposed has been commuted under
section 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(Central Act 2 of 1974) into one of the imprisonment for life,
shall be placed before the Advisory Board only if they have
served at least fourteen years of imprisonment.....
(3) The cases of prisoners sentenced to more than three years,
excepting lifers to whom sub-rule (2) applies, shall be placed
before the Advisory Board if they have served two thirds of
their sentence including remission:
Provided that prisoners of the following categories who have
been sentenced to imprisonment for more than three years or
imprisonment for life shall not be eligible for premature release
under the Advisory Board Scheme :--
(i) Prisoners convicted of rape, dacoity, terrorist crimes,
offences against the State or prisoners sentenced under
section 224, 376, 396 to 400, 402, 467, 471, 472, 474, 489-A,
489-B and 489-D of the Indian Penal Code (Central Act XLV
of 1860);........
17. A close reading of sub-rule (2) and sub-Rule (3) of the Rules
would make it ipso facto clear that the case of a life convict
shall be considered for premature release only on his
completing ten years of actual imprisonment, [as per Rule
433(A) - 14 years], whereas, in case of convict other than a life
convict, his case shall be considered for remission on his
completing 2/3rd of the sentence, including the remission. A
plain reading of the proviso to sub-Rule (3) would again make it
manifestly clear that the prisoners convicted of rape, forgery,
dacoity, terrorist crimes, offences against the State and
prisoners sentenced under Sections 224, 376, 396 to 400, 402,
467, 471, 472, 474, 489-A, 489-B, and 489-D of the Indian
Penal Code, shall not be eligible for being considered for
premature release as provided in Sub-Rule(3), which means
they are not eligible for being considered on their completing
2/3rd of their sentences. It goes without any doubt that they can
be considered only on their completing 14 years of
imprisonment as provided in Sub-Rule (2). Sub-Rule (2) does
not exclude a life convict, who has been convicted for any
offence like an offence under Section 376 of the Indian Penal
Code. Irrespective of the nature of the offence committed, if he
is a life convict, he will be eligible for consideration for
premature release on his completing 14 years of actual
imprisonment.
xxx xxx xxx
19. The petitioner assails the impugned order from a different
angle also. According to him, assuming that sub-Rule 3 of the
Rules, including the proviso is applicable, even then, he is
entitled for being considered for premature release. According
to him, while he has already served out the entire sentence
imposed on him for the offence under Section 376 of the Indian
Penal Code, he does not pray for any remission in respect of the
sentence for the said offences. In the proviso to Sub-Rule 3 of
Rule 341 of the Rules, Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code has
not been included. In the instant case, according to the
petitioner, since he prays for remission of sentence imposed on
him only for the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal
Code and not for the offence under Section 376 of the Indian
Penal Code, the said proviso shall not be a bar for his case
being considered for premature release. As we have already
held that the petitioner is eligible for being considered under
Sub-Rule 2 of Rule 341 of the Rules for premature release, any
further discussion in respect of the proviso to Sub-Rule 3 of
Rule 341 of the Rules, shall only be a mere academic exercise.
Since it has been argued by the petitioner as well as the learned
Public Prosecutor, we wish to go into the said academic debate
also.
20. The learned Public Prosecutor would submit that if a person
has been convicted for any offence, besides the offences
enumerated in the proviso to Sub-Rule 3 of Rule 341 of the
Rules, then, even in respect of the punishment for other offence,
he is not eligible for premature release. The learned Public
Prosecutor has, however, been very fair in bringing to our
notice a clarification issued by the Director General of Prisons
in No. 14189, dated 04.11.1989, wherein he clarified that in a
case, where a convict is undergoing imprisonment for life for
the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and has
also been convicted and sentenced for the offences under
Sections 376 and 396 of the Indian Penal Code, if the sentences
were ordered to run concurrently, after he had served out the
sentence for the offence under Sections 376 and 396 of the
Indian Penal Code, he would be eligible for being considered
for premature release in respect of the life sentence for the
offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code."
(emphasis supplied)
23. The above-mentioned judgment was challenged by the State by
way of a Special Leave Petition. The Supreme Court in The State of
Tamil Nadu & Ors. vs. P. Veera Bhaarathi (supra) affirmed the view of
Madras High Court and held as under:-
"7. In other words, the argument on behalf of the appellants is
that if a person is to be convicted and sentenced under an
ineligible Section/ineligible offence he would not be entitled to
the benefit of early/premature release under the Prison Rules.
8. The operation of the Rules in the manner as suggested on
behalf of the appellants would result in a highly incongruous
situation which the rule making authority could not have been
understood to have contemplated or envisaged. Higher offences
involving sentence of imprisonment for life or even death
sentence commuted to life imprisonment, if not coupled with
convictions under the ineligible section(s), would entitle a
convict to consideration of his case for early release. But, if a
lifer is to be convicted for a much lesser offence, say, offences
under Section 224, 498A IPC, etc. and sentenced to small periods
of imprisonment, notwithstanding the fact that he had completed
more than 10 years of custody, he would still not be eligible for
early release. Such a situation, in our considered view, cannot be
allowed to prevail by understanding the operation of the Rules in
the manner suggested on behalf of the appellants.
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
13. The case of the Respondent will now be decided by the
Advisory Board in accordance with law. We make it clear that
we have not expressed any opinion on the entitlement of the
Respondent for early release."
(emphasis supplied)
24. In view of the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court, this Court is
of the opinion that if the submission of the learned Standing counsel for
respondent-State is to be accepted, it would result in a highly incongruous
situation inasmuch as a convict who had been sentenced for a higher
offence involving, say a sentence of ten years under the IPC and had not
been convicted under the ineligible Acts (like PC Act), would be entitled
to have his case considered for early release, but, a convict who had been
sentenced for lesser offences with shorter periods of imprisonment under
IPC and PC Act, say seven years under Section 420 IPC including three
years under the PC Act and had completed the sentence under the PC Act
would not be eligible for having his case considered for early release!
25. Also, the Supreme Court in The State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. vs. P.
Veera Bhaarathi (supra), as well as the High Court in P. Veera
Bhaarathi (supra), had decided the matter de hors the view taken by the
Inspector General of Prisons in his letter. Consequently, we find no merit
in the contention of learned Standing counsel for respondent-State that the
aforesaid judgments of the Madras High Court in P. Veera Bhaarathi
(supra) and the Supreme Court in The State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. vs. P.
Veera Bhaarathi (supra), will not be applicable to the present case on
account of the absence of letter/clarification from the Inspector General of
Prisons or the respondent-State.
26. It is pertinent to mention that the Supreme Court in State of
Haryana and Others Vs. Jagdish, (2010) 4 SCC 216 has held that if any
benefit of early release accrues in favour of the convict then the same has
to be construed liberally by the State. The relevant portion of the aforesaid
judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:-
"54. The State authority is under an obligation to at least
exercise its discretion in relation to an honest expectation
perceived by the convict, at the time of his conviction that his
case for premature release would be considered after serving the
sentence, prescribed in the short-sentencing policy existing on
that date. The State has to exercise its power of remission also
keeping in view any such benefit to be construed liberally in
favour of a convict which may depend upon case to case and for
that purpose, in our opinion, it should relate to a policy which, in
the instant case, was in favour of the respondent. In case a
liberal policy prevails on the date of consideration of the case of
a "lifer" for premature release, he should be given benefit
thereof."
(emphasis supplied)
27. In view of the aforesaid mandate of law and the fact that the
petitioner is aged about eighty-three years and has completed 50% of his
actual sentence period, this Court is of the opinion that the petitioner is
eligible to have his case considered by the State Committee for special
remission in terms of the guidelines prescribed under the Notification.
CONCLUSION
28. Consequently, the order dated 03rd April, 2019 passed by the
respondent-State is set aside and this Court directs that the case of the
petitioner should be decided afresh by the State Committee in accordance
with law. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion
on the entitlement of the petitioner for early release. With the aforesaid
direction, present writ petition stands disposed of.
MANMOHAN, J
SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL, J
DECEMBER 18, 2019
rn/js
