Delhi High Court
Department Of ... vs Tata Teleservices Limited on 12 January, 2018
$~S-1
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ O.M.P. (COMM.) 90/2017
DEPARTMENT OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr Vinod Diwakar, CGSC.
versus
TATA TELESERVICES LIMITED ..... Defendant
Through
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIBHU BAKHRU
ORDER
% 12.01.2018
VIBHU BAKHRU, J
REVIEW PET.18/2018 & IA No.301/2018
1. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner seeking review of
a judgment dated 11.05.2017 passed by this Court rejecting the petitioner‟s
application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
(hereafter „the Act‟) for setting aside the Arbitral Award dated 13.10.2016.
2. A plain reading of the petition indicates that the petitioner is seeking
to virtually re-agitate the issues once again. According to the petitioner, this
Court has erred in appreciating the facts while passing the order dated
11.05.2017. Plainly, this does not afford the petitioner any ground to review
the judgement.
3. It is also seen that the present petition was filed on 20.12.2017 and the
same is highly belated. The application seeking condonation of delay filed
along with the review petition makes interesting reading. The reasons
provided for the inordinate delay in filing the review petition are briefly
indicated hereafter:
3.1 It is claimed that after the pronouncement of order dated 11.05.2017,
the complete case file was prepared and "brought to the notice of the
Administrator on 26.05.2017 and to that effect the file was submitted to the
JS&LA for giving its opinion over the said judgment on 31.05.2017".
3.2 It is stated that "on 06.06.2017, JS&LA sent the file to Law Secretary,
Ministry of Law and Justice to CAS to the examine the file. That on
12.07.2017 CAS (ASG Supreme Court) with his observation marked the file
to ASG High Court for his opinion". Thus, it took two months for the file to
travel to the ASG for his opinion.
3.3 It is further stated that on 23.08.2017 - which is about a month and
half later - the learned ASG gave his opinion not to file an appeal.
3.3 It is claimed that "on 28.08.2017, the above stated matter was brought
to the notice of the Administrator and decided to go for appeal against the
said impugned order".
3.4 It is claimed that thereafter on 27.09.2017 - that is, after a month after
the Administrator had decided to appeal against the order dated 11.05.2017
- "the file for the case was again sent to the Law Secretary, Ministry of Law
and Justice to CAS to examine the file and simultaneously to the JS&LA of
the department. And the file was discussed in detail for the course of action
to be taken in regard to the impugned judgment dated 11.05.2017 on
09.10.2017".
3.5 It is claimed that, thereafter, "on 10.10.2017, JS&LA of the
Department communicated her suggestion that in the interest of the
department, the views of the Government Counsel who appeared in the
matter may be obtained for filling review petition".
3.6. It is claimed that thereafter the legal opinion of the counsel was
sought on 12.10.2017, and on 24.10.2017, the counsel opined that there were
sufficient grounds for filing a review petition.
3.7 The matter was thereafter once "sent to JS&LA of the Department
again for the examination and consideration as per the legal opinion
obtained".
3.8. The file was finally marked to the counsel for preparation and filing
the review petition on 01.11.2017. The present review petition was filed
more than a month and a half later and was moved before this Court today.
4. In view of the above, the petitioner claims that the delay "is neither
deliberate nor intentional but due to the administrative and procedural
reasons". Plainly, the said contention is unacceptable. The facts as stated
above clearly indicate that there was no sense of urgency in proceeding with
the matter. The specified period for filing the review petition had expired
twice over by the time the matter was marked for the opinion of the learned
ASG. It took more than two months to mark the file to the counsel to file the
review petition after the Administrator had decided to file an appeal. And, it
took more than a month and a half thereafter for the review petition to be
drafted and filed.
5. The Supreme Court in the case of Post Master General and Ors. v.
Living India Media Ltd.& Anr : (2012) 3 SCC 563 had observed as under:-
"29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the
government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that
unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the
delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept
the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several
months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape
in the process. The government departments are under a special
obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence
and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and
should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government
departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and
should not be swirled for the benefit of a few."
6. In view of the above, this Court is not persuaded to accept that there
are any valid grounds for condoning the delay. Merely, because the
applicant has taken its own time to deliberate the issue is no ground for
condoning such an inordinate delay. It is also relevant to mention that the
Act provides a inflexible period for filing an application to challenge an
arbitral award. In terms of Section 34(3) of the Act, an application for
setting aside an arbitral award cannot be made after a period of three months
after receipt of the arbitral award. The said time is extendable for a further
period of 30 days, provided the party satisfies the Court that it was
prevented from filing the application for sufficient cause. This Court has
taken a view that while considering the question whether to condone delay
in re-filing an application for setting aside an arbitral award, due regard must
be given to the legislative intent of restricting the period of limitation for
filing an application under section 34 of the Act. Thus, an inordinate delay
in re-filing the application cannot be condoned.
7. The object is clearly to reduce the time within which resolution of
disputes by arbitration attain finality. This intent is also reflected by
enactment of Section 34(6) of the Act, which requires an application under
section 34 to be disposed of within a period of one year. In the present case,
the delay in filing the review petition exceeds the maximum time available
to the petitioner to file an application under Section 34 of the Act. Thus, this
Court is of the view that condoning such inordinate delay would effectively
frustrate the legislative intention of restricting the time frame within which
the resolution of disputes by arbitration must attain finality.
8. In view of the above, the present petition is dismissed on account of
delay as well as on merits.
VIBHU BAKHRU, J
JANUARY 12, 2018
MK
