Citation : 2017 Latest Caselaw 3662 Del
Judgement Date : 27 July, 2017
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of decision: 27th July, 2017.
+ RC.REV. No.134/2016 & CM No.7208/2016 (for stay)
PARVEEN KUMAR WADHWA & ORS ..... Petitioners
Through: Ms. Shalini Kapoor, Ms. Ruhini Dey
& Mr. Dikshant Khanna, Advs.
Versus
RAM MEHAR TYAGI & ORS ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Gaurav Tyagi R-1(g) in person.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
1. This Rent Control Revision Petition under Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 impugns the order (dated 23rd December, 2015 in E.No.237/2011 of the Court of Additional Rent Controller (ARC) (West), Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi) of dismissal of the application filed by the petitioners for leave to defend the petition for eviction filed by the respondents under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act and the consequent order of eviction of the petitioners from two shops situated on the ground floor of property no.WZ-1 / WZ-4A being part of Khasra No.4027/2785/734/2 min of Village Basai Darapur, New Delhi - 110 015.
2. The petition was entertained and notice thereof issued and vide ad interim order dated 26th February, 2016 execution of the order of eviction stayed. Vide subsequent order dated 3rd August, 2016, stay of the order of eviction was made conditional on deposit by the petitioners of a sum of Rs.22,000/- per month. Vide yet subsequent order dated 7th December, 2016,
the monies so deposited were ordered to be released to the respondents subject to the final orders in this petition. Vide yet subsequent order dated 14th March, 2017, the petitioners were directed to pay the use and occupation charges directly to the respondents.
3. The counsels have been heard and the Trial Court record requisitioned perused.
4. The counsel for the petitioners states that the petitioners are not disputing that the respondents are the owners of the shops in the tenancy of the petitioners and that there exists a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. Thus the discussion hereunder would be confined to the aspects of, whether the petitioners in their application for leave to defend disclosed any such facts qua the bona fide requirement by the respondents of the premises in the tenancy of the petitioners and availability of alternate suitable accommodation to the respondents, which if proved would disentitle the respondents from an order of eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act.
5. The three respondents, namely Ram Mehar Tyagi, Satish Tyagi and Dr. Harish Tyagi instituted the petition for eviction pleading (i) that the premises were let-out, in the year 1982, to the predecessor of the petitioners / tenants and the petitioners / tenants were paying a rent of Rs.1,331/- per month therefor; (ii) that the respondent no.3 Harish Tyagi is a doctor by profession and has no place to practice medicine and the shop in the tenancy of the petitioners situated on the main road, at a prime location, is required by him to set-up his practice of medicine; (iii) that the grandson Gaurav Tyagi of the respondent no.1 (the respondent no.1 has since died and Gaurav Tyagi and his other siblings have been impleaded in his place) is an
Advocate by profession and also has no place to set-up his office as an Advocate and is using the Chambers of his friends and colleagues in the Court and is facing grave hardship and inconvenience; and, (iv) that the shops in the tenancy of the petitioners are the only commercial space available to the respondents to cater to their said needs/requirement.
6. The petitioners / tenants sought leave to defend pleading (i) that the respondents / landlords had not disclosed the accommodation available to them at the address of which they are shown resident of; (ii) that the respondent no.3 Dr. Harish Tyagi is a Senior Resident in Kolmet Hospital, Pusa Road, New Delhi and inspite of being registered as a medical practitioner since 5th January, 1983, had never practised medicine on his own and is a whole time Consultant in Kolmet Hospital and not entitled to have his private practice while in the employment of the Hospital; (iii) that the respondent / landlords also own property no.WZ-506, Basai Dara Pur, Delhi, shops on the ground floor whereof had been let-out at a rent of Rs.30,000/- per month and upper floor whereof was also let-out to another tenant in 2011; (iv) property no.WZ-506, Basai Dara Pur, Delhi is constructed over land ad measuring 450 sq. yds. and having nine shops on the ground floor;
(v) six of the said shops were still lying vacant with the board of „To-Let‟ with the telephone numbers of the respondents/landlords; (vi) Gaurav Tyagi aforesaid has his office at 4, DLF Area, near Metro Station, Moti Nagar, New Delhi but has recently closed the same and opened a Reebok showroom in place thereof and shifted his office to property No.WZ-505, Basai Darapur, Delhi; (vii) that the premises in the tenancy of the petitioners / tenants has roof of asbestos sheets and is in a dilapidated condition and the petitioners / tenants are using the same for factory purposes and the said
premises can by no stretch of imagination be used for opening a clinic or a lawyer‟s office; (viii) Gaurav Tyagi also has Chamber No.112, Civil Wing, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi.
7. The respondents / landlords, in their reply to the application for leave to defend, pleaded that i) respondent No.1 Ram Mehar Tyagi is residing in property No.WZ-505, Basai Darapur, Delhi; the respondents no.2 and 3 viz. Satish Tyagi and Dr. Harish Tyagi are residing in property No.E-10, Mansarover Garden, New Delhi, as disclosed in the petition for eviction also;
ii) both the aforesaid premises are situated in residential localities where no commercial activities can be carried on; iii) on the contrary, the premises in the tenancy of the petitioners / tenants are located in a commercial area; iv) that the requirement of the respondents / landlords, on account of which the petition for eviction had been filed, was for commercial purposes; v) that the respondent no.3 Dr. Harish Tyagi is serving with Kolmet Hospital on freelance basis and is not on the pay roll of the said hospital; he is merely a consultant and wants to start his own practice; that there is no restriction by the Kolmet Hospital or otherwise on the respondent no.3 Dr. Harish Tyagi from so setting up his practice; vi) property No.WZ-506, Basai Darapur, Delhi is a joint family property of the respondents / landlords and is situated in an industrial village and does not even have a proper approach road and the same cannot be used for opening any clinic; no ambulance or car can easily approach the said property; vii) the ground floor of the said property had not been let out at a rent of Rs.30,000/-; viii) the respondents / landlords have also not let out the first floor of the said property as alleged and no such person as claimed was in possession of the said property; ix) property No.WZ-506, Basai Darapur, Delhi is constructed over 450 sq. yds. of land
and the construction thereof is very old with two halls on the ground floor, two halls on the first floor and two halls on the second floor and all the said halls are under occupation of various old tenants; x) no boards of „To Let‟ with phone numbers of the respondents / landlords have been put up on the said property and the petitioners / tenants have created and fabricated photographs in this regard; xi) Gaurav Tyagi, Advocate has got nothing to do with property No.WZ-506, Basai Darapur, Delhi; xii) Gaurav Tyagi, Advocate never had his office at 4, DLF Area, Near Metro Station, Moti Nagar, New Delhi and is also not having his office in property No.WZ-505, Basai Darapur, Delhi; xiii) from shop No.4, DLF Area, near Metro Station, Moti Nagar, New Delhi business in the name and style of Moti Nagar Shoes Store is being run since the year 1958 by the family members of respondents no.1&2 viz. Ram Mehar Tyagi and Satish Tyagi and the said shop is on rent with the said family members and landlord thereof has already filed a petition for eviction against Moti Nagar Shoes Store on the ground of bona fide requirement and which petition is also pending adjudication; xiv) Gaurav Tyagi aforesaid has no connection with the business of Moti Nagar Shoes Store and had / has no title to the shop from where the said business is being carried on, to set up his office therein; xv) the shops in the tenancy of the petitioners / tenants were not let out for use as factory and were let out for carrying on trading business and are not situated in a commercial area and are most suitable for opening of a clinic by the respondent No.3 Dr. Harish Tyagi and for setting up of law office by Gaurav Tyagi, Advocate aforesaid; xvi) chamber No.112, Civil Wing, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi does not belong to Gaurav Tyagi Advocate; xvii) property No.WZ-505, Basai Darapur, Delhi is a residential HUF property where all family members are
residing in different portions and the same cannot be used for commercial purposes; and, xviii) chamber No.112, Civil Wing, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi belongs to Sh. Rajinder Kumar Bedi, Advocate.
8. The learned ARC, in the impugned order, has found / observed / held that i) no rejoinder had been filed by the petitioners/tenants to the reply of the respondents/landlords to the leave to defend application; ii) the petitioners / tenants cannot dictate to the respondents / landlords to use residential premises for commercial requirement; iii) the fact that the respondents / landlords are rich and having several properties does not make their requirement mala fide; iv) the respondents / landlords have absolute discretion to decide, which of their properties they want to use for their clinic / law office and the respondents / landlords had given cogent reasons for property No.WZ-506, Basai Darapur, Delhi being not suitable for the subject requirement owing to having no proper approach road; v) once that was so, the letting out, even if any by the respondents / landlords of any portion of the property No.WZ-506, Basai Darapur, Delhi could not deprive them from seeking eviction of the petitioners/tenants from shops in their tenancy; vi) the disclosure by the petitioners / tenants in their leave to defend application of other properties thus did not disentitle the respondents / landlords from obtaining an order of eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act; vii) it is the right of every person to excel in life and if the respondents / landlords are of the opinion that they would be better off in life by the respondent no.3 Dr. Harish Tyagi setting up his private clinic and by Gaurav Tyagi having his law office from the premises in the tenancy of the petitioners / tenants, neither the petitioners / tenants nor the Court could ask the respondents / landlords to give up their said dreams of excelling in life and to establish
their clinic / law office from a joint property; viii) the respondents / landlords had also placed documents on record to show that respondent no.3 Harish Tyagi is merely a consultant at Kolmet Hospital; ix) even if it were to be held that the respondent No.3 Harish Tyagi was in full time employment of Kolmet Hospital, nothing in law can stop him from giving up his service and setting up his own clinic; x) the plea of the petitioners / tenants of Gaurav Tyagi having Chamber No.112, Civil Wing, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi available to him was evidently false and it has been held by this Court in Rajender Kumar Sharma Vs. Leela Wati 155 (2008) DLT 383 that where the landlord shows the affidavit filed by the tenant in support of an application for leave to defend to be false, on the basis of such false averments leave to defend cannot be granted and that mere assertions by the tenant in respect of landlord‟s ownership of other buildings and in respect of alternate accommodation are not to be considered sufficient for grant of leave to defend; xi) judicial notice can also be taken of the fact that a chamber in a Court is small and does not fulfil the need for a full fledged law office; xii) that it was not open to the petitioners as tenants to interfere with the choice of the respondents / landlords of the suitability of the property for setting up of a medical clinic / law office. Needless to state, the learned ARC has supported his findings / reasons aforesaid with plethora of case law.
9. The counsel for the petitioners argued that the learned ARC erred in refusing leave to defend when the petitioners / tenants had disclosed a number of other properties available to the respondents / landlords and which would fulfil the requirement claimed by the respondents / landlords. It is contended that thus triable issues arise. It is yet further contended that the
respondents/landlords concealed all the said properties from the petition for eviction and that the petitioners / tenants disclosed the same in the application for leave to defend; the explanation furnished by the respondents / landlords therefor was not sufficient and proper to deny leave to defend to the petitioners / tenants.
10. The counsel for the petitioners / tenants has in Court handed over a tabulation with respect to each of the properties along with reference to the pages and paragraphs of the leave to defend application and the reply thereto.
11. It is argued that the respondents/ landlords in the petition for eviction did not disclose properties No.WZ-505, Basai Darapur, Delhi and E-10, Mansarover Garden, New Delhi and did not disclose the accommodation therein.
12. The respondents / landlords, in the petition for eviction, have disclosed themselves to be resident of aforesaid two properties. It is thus not as if the respondents / landlords can be said to have concealed the said properties from the petition for eviction. Further, on the petitioners / tenants in the leave to defend application pleading the said properties as alternate suitable accommodation available to the respondents / landlords for the requirement pleaded, the respondents / landlords did not deny possession of the said properties but explained that they were both residential properties being used for residential purpose. I have during the hearing also enquired from the counsel for the petitioners / tenants, whether the petitioners / tenants admit the respondents / landlords to be residing in the said properties. The counsel for the petitioners / tenants has fairly admitted that the respondents / landlords are residing in the said two properties. Once the requirement
pleading which the eviction of the petitioners / tenants was sought is of accommodation for setting up of a medical clinic / law office, in my opinion, there was no need for the respondents / landlords to, in the petition for eviction, disclose details of the residential accommodation available to them.
13. Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja Vs. United India Insurance Company Ltd. (1998) 8 SCC 119, held that when the landlord shows a prima facie case, it is open to the Rent Controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide; it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else the landlord can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises; while deciding the question of bona fides of the requirement of the landlord, it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself. In Ragavendra Kumar Vs. Firm Prem Machinery & Co. (2000) 1 SCC 679, after noticing that though the landlord had admitted that there were a number of shops and houses belonging to him but had made a categorical statement that his said houses and shops were not vacant and the premises, with respect to which petition for eviction was filed, was suitable for his business purposes, it was held to be settled proposition of law that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement for residential or business purposes and he has got complete freedom in the matter. Accordingly, it was held that the landlord having wanted eviction of the tenant from the subject premises for starting his business as it was suitable, could not be faulted. Again, in P.S. Pareed Kaka Vs. Shafee Ahmed Saheb (2004) 5 SCC 241 it was held that if the landlord chooses to use a particular property for residential purpose, the tenant cannot say that he cannot do so and should continue to use the premises for commercial purposes. In Sait Nagjee Purushotham & Co. Ltd.
Vs. Vimalabai Prabhulal (2005) 8 SCC 252 it was held that the fact that a landlord is already having one premises did not prevent the landlord from seeking eviction of tenant from another premises as it is always the prerogative of the landlord that if he requires the premises in question for his bona fide use for expansion of business, this is no ground to say that the landlord is already having his business at another place and therefore it is not genuine need. The same ratio is also to be found in Anil Bajaj Vs. Vinod Ahuja (2014) 15 SCC 610 where it was held that the fact that the landlord is doing business from various other premises cannot foreclose his right to seek eviction from the tenanted premises so long as he intends to use the said tenanted premises for his own business.
14. This Court in Girdhari Lal Goomer Vs. P.P. Gambhir 2011 SCC OnLine Del 832 (SLP(C) No.10938/2011 whereagainst was dismissed on 29th April, 2011) also held that the requirement of the landlord for commercial use cannot be denied for the reason of availability of residential property. Similarly, in Kanta Sachdeva Vs. A.D. Choudhary 2012 SCC OnLine Del 5320 (SLP(C) No.989/2013 whereagainst was dismissed on 24th January, 2013) also, the plea of the tenant of availability of other premises was held to be not entitling the tenant to leave to defend; it was reasoned that the said other properties were residential, while the requirement was for commercial use. In Ram Kishore Patel @ R K Patel Vs. Dr. Jaswant Singh 2014 SCC OnLine Del 2492 also, the tenant was held to be not entitled to leave to defend the petition for eviction for use of the premises for clinic purpose, on the plea of it being possible to set up the clinic at home. With the same ratio, in Naveen Arora Vs. Suresh Chand 2014 SCC OnLine Del 2625 also, leave to defend was declined. Recently, in Vinod Kumar
Aggarwal Vs. Ritu 2016 SCC OnLine Del 5720 also, the plea of it being open to fulfil the commercial requirement from the space available in residence was held to be not entitling the tenant to leave to defend.
15. The choice of the landlord in this regard is supreme. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that setting up of a clinic / law office at residence, even if accommodation therefor is available in residence, lead to disturbance of peace and tranquillity and privacy of residents and if the landlord whose requirement for accommodation for clinic / law office is not disputed does not want to set up the same at his residence, the said choice of the landlord has to be respected. In this state of law, it cannot be said that the petitioners / tenants were entitled to leave to defend for the reason of having disclosed the said two properties. Leave to defend has to be granted only where disputed facts which can be adjudicated only by examination and cross-examination of witnesses arise. If the facts as disclosed by the tenant in the application for leave to defend though disputed by the landlords even if correct and believed, would not disentitle the landlords from obtaining an order of eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act, leave to defend cannot be granted.
16. The next property in the tabulation handed over by the counsel for the petitioners / tenants is, property No.WZ-506, Basai Darapur, Delhi which is also not disputed by the respondents / landlords. The explanation of the respondents / landlords, for the same being not alternate suitable accommodation is, that the property is situated in an industrial village and does not have a proper approach road and no car or ambulance can access the same. The counsel for the petitioners / tenants has argued that the
tenancy premises are also in the same village. However on further prodding, the counsel for petitioners/tenants states that while the tenancy premises are on the main road, property No.WZ-506, Basai Darapur, Delhi is in the interior of the village. It is further contended that the respondents / landlords have recently let out portions of the said property and have even now displayed the boards of "To Let" for letting out of the other portions of the property.
17. As far as the aspect of suppression with respect to the said property is concerned, Supreme Court in Ram Narain Arora Vs. Asha Rani (1999) 1 SCC 141 held that the non-disclosure of accommodation which the Court also agrees cannot be alternate suitable accommodation, cannot be fatal to the petition for eviction. I have also in judgment dated 12th January, 2009 in RC (R) No.78-79/2005 titled Mumtaz Begum Vs. Mohd. Khan held that non-disclosure of other accommodation available is not always fatal. To the same effect are Surinder Singh Vs. Jasbir Singh (2010) 172 DLT 611, Sukhbir Singh Vs. Dr. I.P. Singh (2012) 193 DLT 129, Manju Devi Vs. Pratap Singh (2015) 219 DLT 260 and Hameeda Shahzad Vs. Shahjahan Khatoon 2017 SCC OnLine Del. 7203. I have recently in Sunil Kumar Goyal Vs. Harbans Singh 2017 SCC OnLine Del. 9289, referring to earlier judgments, also held that once the facts have come before the Court and the Court has, after dealing therewith held in favour of landlord, the petition for eviction cannot be dismissed on ground of concealment.
18. Mention may also be made of Mukesh Kumar Vs. Rishi Prakash (2010) 174 DLT 64 (SLP(CC) No.2968/2010 whereagainst was dismissed on 8th March, 2010) holding that a landlord is not obliged to make disclosure of
properties which are not available for the requirement pleading which eviction of the tenant is sought. It was expressly held that the landlord is not required, while seeking eviction of a tenant from commercial premises, to disclose residential premises available to him. Mention may also be made of S. Harbant Singh Sahni Vs. Smt. Vinod Sikari (2012) 189 DLT 215 holding that unless and until, there is a concealment of fact which is so vital to the bearing of the petition in issue, it would not amount to a concealment. Concealment of accommodation which cannot be used for the purpose required was held to be not capable of resulting in dismissal of the petition for eviction.
19. It has also been held in Shiv Sarup Gupta Vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta (1999) 6 SCC 222, Ragavendra Kumar supra, Chandrika Prasad Vs. Umesh Kumar Verma (2002) 1 SCC 531, Om Prakash Bajaj Vs. Chander Shekhar 2003 (67) DRJ 674, Labhu Lal Vs. Sandhya Gupta 2010 (119) DRJ 599 and in Anil Bajaj supra that the landlord, when owns several properties, has an absolute choice as to which of the property to occupy for fulfilling his requirement and the tenant cannot interfere with the said choice of the landlord. Seen in this light, the choice made by the respondents / landlords in the present case of the premises in the tenancy of the petitioners / tenants over property No.WZ-506, Basai Darapur, Delhi when admittedly the premises in the tenancy of the petitioners / tenants are situated on the main road and property No.WZ-506, Basai Darapur is in the interiors, cannot be said to be mala fide and the respondents / landlords cannot be accused of having created artificial paucity of accommodation.
20. It has been held in Uday Shankar Upadhyay Vs. Naveen Maheshwari
(2010) 1 SCC 503 and Dhannalal Vs. Kalawatibai (2002) 6 SCC 16 that the tenant cannot tell the landlord to occupy upper floors for his commercial needs as judicial notice can be taken of the fact that the profitability from trade or business is dependent upon the location of the trade and business and the landlord for the sake of continuing with the tenant cannot be directed to occupy a premises carrying on business wherefrom would be less profitable. Once it is so, there is no need to put to trial the dispute whether the respondents / landlords, shortly prior to institution of the petition for eviction, have let out portions of property No.WZ-506, Basai Darapur, Delhi or not or are still offering portions of WZ-506, Basai Darapur, Delhi on rent or not. The reasoning of the learned ARC in this respect that the said controversy is not relevant, is in accordance with law and does not require any interference in exercise of powers under Section 25B(8) of the Act.
21. The next in the tabulation handed over by the counsel for the petitioners / tenants is, shop No.4, DLF Area, near Metro Station, Moti Nagar, New Delhi. However, the counsel for the petitioners / tenants being not in position to dispute that the said shop is in the tenancy of the respondents / landlords, has merely contended that it is to be proved in trial pursuant to grant of leave to defend. I am unable to agree. If it were to be held that a tenant, merely by making assertions, in the application for leave to defend, without any basis and without disclosing the requisite particulars, is entitled to leave to defend, then the same would defeat the legislative intent in providing for summary procedure with respect to petitions for eviction on the ground of personal requirement of the landlord as then in all cases leave to defend will have to be granted and the stage of leave to defend would merely serve the purpose of delaying the filing of the written
statement by the tenant and the trial to follow, thereby making the procedure for eviction on the ground of requirement for self-use of the tenant longer than the procedure prescribed for adjudication of the petitions for eviction on other grounds of eviction prescribed in the Act.
22. In a leave to defend application, per Section 25B(5) of the Act, facts which when proved, would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act have to be disclosed. Contents of leave to defend thus have to be materially different from contents of a written statement. While in a written statement, the defendant by specific denial can put the plaintiff to proof of any fact on the basis of which relief is claimed, it is not so in the case of leave to defend application. A leave to defend application, merely denying each and every averment in the petition for eviction and putting the landlord to proof thereof, without disclosing any facts as aforesaid would not entitle the tenant to leave to defend. Thus when the petitioners / tenants plead shop No.4, DLF Area, near Metro Station, Moti Nagar, New Delhi to be alternate suitable accommodation, it was incumbent on them to plead particulars of title of the respondents / landlords to the said accommodation. I have recently in judgment dated 24th July, 2017 in RC.REV. No.112/2016 titled Ram Saroop Vs. Viney Kumar Mahajan discussed in detail on the said aspect. An accommodation on rent with the landlord and from which the landlord can at any time be evicted, cannot be suitable accommodation within the meaning of Section 14(1)(e) of the Act and the need of the landlord for the premises pleading which the petition for eviction has been filed is to be considered bona fide. Reference in this regard can be made to Rahul Int. Mkting P. Ltd Vs. Jai Gopal MANU/DE/0966/1995, Sita Ram Verma Vs. Saraswati (1991) 43 DLT 629,
Dhannalal supra, Dinesh Kumar Vs. Yusuf Ali (2010) 12 SCC 740 and Krishna Kumar Rastogi Vs. Sumitra Devi (2014) 9 SCC 309.
23. The counsel for the petitioners / tenants even till date, being unable to place any fact showing the respondents / landlords to be the owners of the said shop, cannot contend for grant of leave to defend on such ground.
24. The next property in the tabulation is, Chamber No.112, Civil Wing, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi. The argument of the petitioners / tenants is that the identity card of Gaurav Tyagi, Advocate gives the address of the said chamber. However, the counsel for the petitioners / tenants is unable to even today state whether the said chamber, in the records of the Delhi Bar Association, is allotted to Gaurav Tyagi or stands in the name of Rajinder Kumar Bedi, Advocate. The same again shows the recklessness in filing the application for leave to defend and in affirming on oath the affidavit accompanying the same. I may in this regard mention that the petitioners / tenants though before this Court have admitted ownership of the respondents / landlords of the premises in their tenancy and the relationship of landlord and tenant but in the leave to defend application sought to controvert the same also showing a tendency to, by taking reckless pleas, by hook or by crook, obtain leave to defend. The learned ARC has given cogent reasons for the petitioners being not entitled to leave to defend on the said ground either. The provision for lawyers‟ chambers within the court complex is made for the convenience of the advocates and to provide a space to them during court hours to meet their clients and to keep their files of the day etc. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that a lawyer, even if allotted a chamber, has no title thereto and merely has a right to use the same on the
terms prescribed and which right can be taken away at any time. Judicial notice can also be taken of the size of the said chambers which is only enough to fulfil the aforesaid limited purpose only. The said chambers are not meant to be a substitute for a proper office, though some lawyers owing to paucity of resources and unable to afford a proper office do indeed make such chambers as their office also. It has been held in Bansi Lal Vs. Ashok Bhardwaj (2012) 192 DLT 159 (SLP(C) No.38508/2012 preferred whereagainst was dismissed on 14th January, 2015) and Yash Pal Vs. Shri Gopal Singh Nim 2014 SCC OnLine Del 3817 (SLP(C) No.22262/2014 preferred whereagainst was dismissed on 29th August, 2014) that the said chambers cannot be alternate suitable accommodation for requirement pleaded.
25. The last property in the tabulation handed over by the counsel for the petitioners / tenants is property No.1504, Khasra No.732, Block WZ, near MCD School, Basai Darapur, Delhi. The said property admittedly did not find mention in the leave to defend application. The counsel for the petitioners / tenants states that the petitioners / tenants, at the time of filing the leave to defend application, were not aware of the said property and after the time stipulated for filing leave to defend sought to file an additional affidavit but which, vide order dated 29th August, 2013, was refused to be taken on record. It is further argued that the respondents / landlords, in reply filed to the application for taking the said additional affidavit on record, did not dispute ownership of the said property.
26. The learned ARC, in the order dated 29th August, 2013 refusing to take the additional affidavit on record, has relied on Madhu Gupta Vs.
Gardenia Estates (P) Ltd. 2011 (184) DLT 103, Prithipal Singh Vs. Satpal Singh (2010) 2 SCC 15, Iqbal Singh Narang Vs. Veeran Narang (2012) 2 SCC 60 and on Om Prakash Vs. Ashwani Kumar Bassi (2010) 9 SCC 183 to hold that if the leave to defend was allowed to be amended or additional affidavit taken, that would automatically extend the period of 15 days prescribed in Section 25B(4) for filing leave to defend application. I do not find any reason to, in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 25B(8), interfere with the said reasons and reference in this regard can also be made to Shiv Sarup Gupta supra and Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited Vs. Dilbahar Singh (2014) 9 SCC 78.
27. The counsel for the petitioners / tenants is also not correct in contending that the respondents / landlords, by not denying ownership / possession of the said property in the reply filed to the application for taking additional affidavit on record, are deemed to have admitted the same. The respondents / landlords in the reply were not required to admit or deny the additional facts sought to be pleaded and need wherefor would have arisen only if the application had been allowed.
28. No other argument has been raised.
29. There is no merit in the petition.
30. Dismissed.
No costs.
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
JULY 27, 2017 „pp/gsr/bs‟..
(corrected & released on 23rd October, 2017)
Publish Your Article
Campus Ambassador
Media Partner
Campus Buzz
LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026
LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!