Citation : 2017 Latest Caselaw 3482 Del
Judgement Date : 21 July, 2017
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ FAO Nos. 303/2017 & 305/2017
% 21st July, 2017
+ FAO No. 303/2017
ORIENTAL BANK OF COMMERCE ..... Appellant
Through: Mr. S.A. Khan, Advocate.
versus
HARMINDER SINGH & ORS ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Amulya Dhingra, Advocate
for R-1.
+ FAO No. 305/2017
ORIENTAL BANK OF COMMERCE ..... Appellant
Through: Mr. S.A. Khan, Advocate.
versus
HARMINDER SINGH & ORS ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Amulya Dhingra, Advocate
for R-1.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VALMIKI J.MEHTA
To be referred to the Reporter or not?
VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J (ORAL)
C.M. Appl. No. 25464/2017 (for exemption) in FAO No. 303/2017 C.M. Appl. No. 25630/2017 (for exemption) in FAO NO. 305/2017
Exemptions allowed, subject to all just exceptions.
The applications stand disposed of.
FAO No. 303/2017 and C.M. Appl. No. 25462/2017 (for stay) FAO No. 305/2017 and C.M. Appl. No. 25629/2017 (for stay)
1. These two appeals, being FAO Nos. 303/2017 and
305/2017 are filed by the defendant no. 3 in the suit, Oriental Bank of
Commerce, impugning the order dated 15.5.2017 by which the trial
Court has allowed the application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) filed by the respondent
no. 1/plaintiff and directed that the respondent no. 1/plaintiff will not
be dispossessed from the suit property during the pendency of the suit.
The suit properties are bearing DDA Flat No. 781, ground floor,
Pocket GH-13, G-17 Area category II (MIG), Paschim Vihar, New
Delhi and SFS Flat No. 1104, third floor (with scooter garage), Pocket
GH-13, G-17, Area Paschim Vihar, New Delhi. For the sake of
convenience I am referring to the facts in the case of FAO No.
303/2017 for the disposal of both the appeals. The limited issue in the
appeals is that the impugned orders are to be sustained but with the
modification that dispossession of the respondent no.1/plaintiff is
stayed not till the disposal of the suit but dispossession is not to take
place without due process of law. The modification is sought because
of entitlement of the appellant/defendant no.3 to get the issue as
regards validity of mortgage in its favor by the tribunal/authority/court
under the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions
Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as 'the RDDBFI Act') and/or the
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and
Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as
'the SARFAESI Act'). In view of the limited issue required to be
decided there is no need to grant adjustment as prayed by the counsel
for the respondent no.1/plaintiff.
2. The facts of the case are that respondent no. 1/plaintiff
pleaded that he had purchased the suit property by means of registered
documents dated 21.8.2012 from the respondent no.2/defendant no. 1.
Originally both, defendant nos. 1 and 2, were owners of the suit
property but respondent no.3/defendant no. 2 had released his share in
the suit property in favour of respondent no.2/defendant no. 1 vide
Release Deed dated 27.7.2012. Respondent no. 1/plaintiff pleaded
that he had possession of all the original title documents of the suit
property after purchase of the property on 21.8.2012. It was further
pleaded in the plaint that it was only in the month of April 2013 that
the respondent no. 1/plaintiff came to know that the suit property had
been mortgaged with the appellant/defendant no. 3. It was further
pleaded that the documents in favour of the respondent no. 1/plaintiff
were valid documents and there was no valid mortgage in favour of
the appellant/defendant no.3 and therefore it made no difference to the
rights of the respondent no.1/plaintiff that mortgage of the suit
property with the appellant/defendant no.3 is of 27.3.2012 i.e prior to
21.8.2012.
3. The case of the appellant/defendant no. 3 was that the suit
property was already mortgaged with the appellant/Bank on 27.3.2012
i.e prior to the execution of the title documents in favour of respondent
no. 1/plaintiff on 21.8.2012. Accordingly, it was stated that rights of
the respondent no. 1/plaintiff will be secondary to the prior mortgagee
rights of the appellant/defendant no. 3 and that action may be taken by
the appellant/defendant no. 3 under the SARFAESI Act.
4. The court below has found that there is a triable issue
which requires decision, inasmuch as, in the criminal complaint case
filed with respect to validity/invalidity of the documents dated
21.8.2012 in favor of the respondent no.1/plaintiff and the genuineness
of the title documents of the suit property in possession of the
respondent no.1/plaintiff (FIR No. 180/13 in Mianwali Nagar Police
Station), a CFSL report was filed that the original title documents of
the suit property with the respondent no. 1/plaintiff are genuine
documents and those with the appellant/Bank are not genuine title
documents. Accordingly, the injunction application was allowed by
restraining the defendants in the suit, including appellant/defendant
no. 3 from dispossessing the respondent no. 1/plaintiff from the suit
property during the pendency of the suit.
5. In my opinion, the only limited modification which is
required in the impugned order is in its para 16 containing the
operative portion of the order which states that the respondent no.
1/plaintiff will not be dispossessed from the suit property during the
pendency of the suit. Actually the injunction which should have been
granted was that the respondent no. 1/plaintiff will not be dispossessed
without due process of law. This is because the jurisdiction of a civil
court is barred by virtue of Section 34 of the RDDBFI Act and Section
34 of the SARFAESI Act. A civil court cannot decide any issue which
will come up for decision before the Debt Recovery Tribunal/authority
under the two Acts with respect to the issues involving loans granted
by the Bank. As per Section 17 of the RDDBFI Act it is the Debt
Recovery Tribunal as well as the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal
under the RDDBFI Act which has the authority to decide applications
of banks and therefore all issues arising thereunder. Section 34 of the
SARFAESI Act also provides that civil court will not have jurisdiction
to entertain any suit or proceedings in respect of which the Debt
Recovery Tribunal or a Debt Recovery Appellate tribunal is
empowered under the SRFAESI Act to determine.
6. The issue which requires determination between the
parties is that whether a valid equitable mortgage was created in
favour of the appellant/Bank or that there was no valid mortgage and
therefore the respondent no. 1/plaintiff has a valid title to the property.
Since with respect to this issue, decision can only be of the authorities
as prescribed under the RDDBFI Act and the SARFAESI Act, in view
of the provisions of Sections 34 of both the Acts and which bar the
jurisdiction of the civil courts, it is hence not open to the civil court,
before whom the subject suit is pending to decide the issues which are
directly or incidental to deciding the issues of recoveries filed by the
banks and actions taken by the banks under the RDDBFI Act and the
SARFAESI Act.
7. Learned counsel for the respondent no.1/plaintiff very
vehemently argued that a civil court has jurisdiction and in fact the
trial court has already dismissed an application under Order VII Rule
11 CPC filed by the appellant/defendant no. 3 that the civil court has
no jurisdiction, however, while deciding the application under Order
VII Rule 11 CPC, the decision which is taken is only a decision at an
interim stage and there is no final judgment with respect to existence
or otherwise of jurisdiction of the civil court because the issue of
jurisdiction of the civil court has to be decided finally and ordinarily at
the stage of framing of issues (as it was a legal issue), and therefore I
do not think that the decision of the earlier civil court dismissing the
application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC will have any bearing on the
present judgment for modifying the impugned judgment to the extent
that the entitlement of the respondent no. 1/plaintiff not to be
dispossessed is not till the disposal of the suit but only till the disposal
of the proceedings under the RDDBFI Act and/or SARFAESI Act in
case it is held by the Tribunal/authorities under the Acts that there
exists a valid mortgage in favor of the appellant/defendant no.3
created on 27.3.2012.
8. The order under Order VII Rule 11 CPC should have
been before this Court, but none of the counsels for the parties are able
to show the same, however, it is trite that the decision under Order VII
Rule 11 CPC is not a final judgment with respect to decision of the
lack of jurisdiction of the civil court in view of Sections 34 of the
RDDBFI Act and the SARFAESI Act.
9. I may note and I take on record the statement of the
counsel for the appellant/Bank that the appellant/Bank had filed a case
under the RDDBFI Act, which has been decreed, and presently
recovery proceedings are going on before the Recovery Officer
wherein the respondent no. 1/plaintiff is appearing, and the issue
which arises with respect to validity or otherwise mortgage in favour
of the appellant/Bank is also very much in lis and alive in terms of the
objections filed by the respondent no. 1/plaintiff before the Recovery
Officer.
10. In view of the above discussion these appeals are
disposed of by modifying the operative para 16 of the impugned order
and observing that it is not that the respondent no. 1/plaintiff will not
be dispossessed from the suit property during the pendency of the suit
but the respondent no. 1/plaintiff will not be dispossessed form the suit
property except in accordance with law i.e subject to the decision in
the proceedings pending under the RDDBFI Act and/or the
SARFAESI Act. Parties are left to bear their own costs.
JULY 21, 2017 VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J AK
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