Delhi High Court
Shri Chand vs Delhi Development Authority on 21 October, 2016
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on : 04.10.2016
Judgment delivered on : 21.10.2016
+ W.P.(C) 8307/2016 & C.M. Nos.34426-34429/2016
SHRI CHAND ..... Petitioner
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ W.P.(C) 9059/2016 & C.M. Nos.36712-14/2016
SANJEEV CHAUHAN ..... Petitioner
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ W.P.(C) 9063/2016 & C.M. Nos.36718-20/2016
BUDH RAM ..... Petitioner
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ W.P.(C) 9064/2016 & C.M. Nos.36721-23/2016
RAJENDER ..... Petitioner
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY .... Respondent
+ W.P.(C) 9065/2016 & C.M.Nos.36724-26/2016
LAXMI NARAIN ..... Petitioner
W.P.(C)Nos.8307/2016, 9059/2016, 9063/2016 to 9065/2016, 9085/2016 to 9087/2016, 9105/2016,
9110/2016, 9111/2016, 9113/2016, 9117/2016, 9118/2016, 9119/2016, 9121/2016, 9122/2016, 9137/2016,
9139/2016, 9140/2016 & 9143/2016 Page 1 of 20
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ W.P.(C) 9085/2016 & C.M. Nos.36762-64/2016
GULLU ..... Petitioner
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ W.P.(C) 9086/2016 & C.M. Nos.36765-67/2016
RAJ PAL ..... Petitioner
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ W.P.(C) 9087/2016 & C.M. Nos.36768-70/2016
ARJUN SINGH ..... Petitioner
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ W.P.(C) 9105/2016 & C.M. Nos.36871-73/2016
CHIDDA RAM ..... Petitioner
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ W.P.(C) 9110/2016 & C.M. Nos.36878-80/2016
GOPI CHAND ..... Petitioner
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
W.P.(C)Nos.8307/2016, 9059/2016, 9063/2016 to 9065/2016, 9085/2016 to 9087/2016, 9105/2016,
9110/2016, 9111/2016, 9113/2016, 9117/2016, 9118/2016, 9119/2016, 9121/2016, 9122/2016, 9137/2016,
9139/2016, 9140/2016 & 9143/2016 Page 2 of 20
+ W.P.(C) 9111/2016 & C.M. Nos.36881-83/2016/2016
RAM SINGH SAINI AND ANR ..... Petitioner
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ W.P.(C) 9113/2016 & C.M. Nos.36885-87/2016
RAM BHOOLI ..... Petitioner
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ W.P.(C) 9117/2016 & C.M. Nos.36918-20/2016
KAILASH CHAND ..... Petitioner
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ W.P.(C) 9118/2016 & C.M. Nos.36921-23/2016
CHHATAR SINGH ..... Petitioner
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ W.P.(C) 9119/2016 & C.M. Nos.36924-26/2016
HARI CHAND ..... Petitioner
versus
DDA ..... Respondent
+ W.P.(C) 9121/2016 & C.M. Nos.36930-32/2016
SOHAN SINGH ..... Petitioner
W.P.(C)Nos.8307/2016, 9059/2016, 9063/2016 to 9065/2016, 9085/2016 to 9087/2016, 9105/2016,
9110/2016, 9111/2016, 9113/2016, 9117/2016, 9118/2016, 9119/2016, 9121/2016, 9122/2016, 9137/2016,
9139/2016, 9140/2016 & 9143/2016 Page 3 of 20
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ W.P.(C) 9122/2016 & C.M. Nos.36933-35/2016
GIAS RAM AND ORS ..... Petitioner
versus
DDA ..... Respondent
+ W.P.(C) 9137/2016 & C.M. Nos.36981-83/2016
JAIPAL SINGH ..... Petitioner
versus
DDA ..... Respondent
+ W.P.(C) 9139/2016 & C.M. Nos.36985-87/2016
MOHAN LAL ..... Petitioner
versus
DDA ..... Respondent
+ W.P.(C) 9140/2016 & C.M. Nos.36988-90/2016
DINESH CHAND ..... Petitioner
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ W.P.(C) 9143/2016 & C.M. Nos.36994-96/2016
ANOOP SINGH ..... Petitioner
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
W.P.(C)Nos.8307/2016, 9059/2016, 9063/2016 to 9065/2016, 9085/2016 to 9087/2016, 9105/2016,
9110/2016, 9111/2016, 9113/2016, 9117/2016, 9118/2016, 9119/2016, 9121/2016, 9122/2016, 9137/2016,
9139/2016, 9140/2016 & 9143/2016 Page 4 of 20
Mr.Amit Kumar, Mr.Shaurya Sahay, and Mr.Avijit
Mani Tripathi, Advocates for petitioner in all
petitions.
Mr.Arun Birbal, Advocate for DDA in WP(C) No.
W.P.(C) Nos.8307/2016, 9059/2016, 9064/2016,
9065/2016, 9085/2016, 9086/2016, 9111/2016,
9113/2016, 9117/2016, 9119/2016, 9121/2016,
9122/2016, 9137/2016, 9139/2016, 9140/2016,
9143/2016
Mr.Dhanesh Relan, Advocate for DDA in in
WP(C) No. W.P.(C) 9063/2016, 9087/2016,
9105/2016, 9118/2016
Ms.Shobhna Takiar, Advocate for DDA in WP(C)
No. 9110/2016
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE INDERMEET KAUR
INDERMEET KAUR, J.
1. There are 21 petitioners before this Court. The averments in all the
writ petitions are almost identical. Accordingly, case of Shri Chand being
Writ Petition No.8307/2016 is treated as the lead case.
2 The facts which emanates from the petitions disclose that petitioner
no.1 was the member of petitioner no.2 (the Delhi Peasants Cooperative
Multipurpose Society Ltd.) In 1949, petitioner no.2 was allotted agricultural
land on either side of the river Yamuna being 13,344 bighas of land in
Village Patparganj Shamspur, Jatwara Kalan South, Gaonwala, Mohammad
W.P.(C)Nos.8307/2016, 9059/2016, 9063/2016 to 9065/2016, 9085/2016 to 9087/2016, 9105/2016,
9110/2016, 9111/2016, 9113/2016, 9117/2016, 9118/2016, 9119/2016, 9121/2016, 9122/2016, 9137/2016,
Khan Wala, Jhilnmil Tahirpur South, Jhilmil Tahirpur North and Murgi
Khana (hereinafter referred to as the said land) on lease hold basis for a
period of five years. This lease was executed between the Delhi
Improvement Trust (predecessor of the DDA) and petitioner no.2. Petitioner
no.2 had thereafter allotted this land to its members for cultivation. The
lease was extended in 1956 and thereafter in 1961. The DDA sought
cancellation of the lease deed (qua certain bighas of land on 06.10.1967 and
31.7.1967 respectively) qua petitioner no.2 requiring them to hand over the
possession of the land. On 30.4.1973 Resolution No.6 was passed by the
DDA proposing to execute the lease deed with the individual cultivators.
Demand letter was issued to petitioner no.2 to clear all arrears of rent.
Relevant would it be to note that this demand letter was issued to petitioner
no.2 i.e. the Society and not to the individual cultivator (like the present
petitioner). This demand was met with by petitioner no.2. Lease money was
paid by petitioner no.2 to the DDA which amount was accepted by the DDA
without any reservation.
3 Further averments in the petition disclose that thereafter notices under
the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971
(hereinafter referred to as the said Act) were issued by the Estate Officer of
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the DDA to the individual cultivator. Proceedings under the Public Premises
Act were held and eviction orders were passed by the Estate Officer. This
was in 1991-92. These orders were challenged before the Appellate Body
i.e. Court of learned Additional District Judge. This was on 02.4.1992.
Matter was remanded back to the Estate Officer for a decision afresh.
Further averments in the petition disclose that thereafter DDA again started
eviction proceedings against the petitioner; this was in the year 2004. On
01.8.2007 an eviction order was passed qua the petitioner directing the
petitioner to vacate the portion of the land which was under his occupation.
This order was challenged before the Court of the learned Additional District
Judge. At one stage the matter was again remanded back to the Estate
Officer. The final orders were passed by the Estate Officer on 31.01.2014,
03.02.2014, 06.02.2014, 07.02.2014, 18.02.2014, 03.4.2014, 24.3.2014,
04.4.2014, 24.6.2014 respectively which were challenged before the District
Judge under Section 9 of the said Act. The appeals were dismissed on
01.4.2014, 31.3.2014, 04.7.2014, 15.9.2014, 16.9.2014, 07.10.2014,
14.10.2014 respectively. These are the orders now impugned.
4 At the outset this Court notes that the present petitions have been filed
on 06.5.2016 and 26.7.2016 respetively i.e. after a delay of almost or more
W.P.(C)Nos.8307/2016, 9059/2016, 9063/2016 to 9065/2016, 9085/2016 to 9087/2016, 9105/2016,
9110/2016, 9111/2016, 9113/2016, 9117/2016, 9118/2016, 9119/2016, 9121/2016, 9122/2016, 9137/2016,
than 1½ years respectively after 14.10.2014. The counsel in all these
petitions is the same. These petitions were listed before this Court for the
first time only on 03.10.2016; they were lying under objection at the filing
counter and in all these five months no steps were taken to remove those
objections.
5 On a query put to the learned counsel for petitioner on this score he
has no answer. His submission is that connected writ petitions were listed
before another Bench of this Court and although some of those petitions
have been dismissed by the Division Bench yet another Division Bench of
this Court is seized of some of these petitions which are yet pending before it
and those orders were being awaited.
6 This Court is not particularly happy with this explanation tendered by
the learned counsel for the petitioner. A person aggrieved by an order has to
approach the Court to get his grievance addressed within a particular time
frame. Although there is no specific period of limitation to prefer a writ
petition against the orders passed on 01.4.2014, 31.3.2014, 04.7.2014,
15.9.2014, 16.9.2014, 07.10.2014 and 14.10.2014 yet this unjustifiable delay
in approaching this Court (more than two years) for which again there
appears to be no explanation; the obvious presumption being that the
W.P.(C)Nos.8307/2016, 9059/2016, 9063/2016 to 9065/2016, 9085/2016 to 9087/2016, 9105/2016,
9110/2016, 9111/2016, 9113/2016, 9117/2016, 9118/2016, 9119/2016, 9121/2016, 9122/2016, 9137/2016,
petitioners probably have no grievance as had they been aggrieved they
would have rushed to the Court much earlier. This Court notes this delay in
approaching this Court. However, since arguments have been addressed on
merits this Court would not like to dismiss the petitions on the ground of
laches.
7 On advance notice, counsel for respondents have put in appearance
and have assisted this Court.
8 Record shows that a bunch of connected petitions have been disposed
of by one Division Bench of this Court on 17.11.2015. The Division Bench
had upheld the order of the Single Judge dated 19.5.2015 which also related
to similarly placed persons. They were also members of the petitioner no.2
society i.e. the Delhi Peasants Cooperative Multi-purpose Society. On a
query put to the learned counsel for petitioners as to how these petitions are
maintainable as similarly placed members of the petitioner no.2 society have
already been denied relief by the Division Bench; submission is that question
of jurisdiction had not been considered before the Division Bench.
Submission is that jurisdiction is an issue which goes to the root of the
matter and all proceedings which are without the inherent jurisdiction of the
Court are to be treated as void ab initio. Learned counsel for petitioners has
W.P.(C)Nos.8307/2016, 9059/2016, 9063/2016 to 9065/2016, 9085/2016 to 9087/2016, 9105/2016,
9110/2016, 9111/2016, 9113/2016, 9117/2016, 9118/2016, 9119/2016, 9121/2016, 9122/2016, 9137/2016,
placed reliance upon a judgment of the Apex Court in Jagmittar Sain Bhagat
and Ors. Vs. Director, Health Services, Haryana and Ors. reported as (2013)
10 SCC 136 as also upon another judgment of the Apex Court in Band Box
Private Limited Vs. Estate Officer, Punjab and Sind Bank and Another
reported as (2014) 16 SCC 321 to support this submission. Argument being
that a Court passing a decree having no jurisdiction in the matter would be a
decree in nullity; such an issue can be raised at any stage of the proceedings;
a Tribunal which lacks inherent jurisdiction, the Court cannot derive
jurisdiction in such an eventuality. It is pointed out that the property in
question is not covered under the said Act. The Supreme Court in Suhas
H.Pophale Vs.Oriental Insurance Company Limited and Its Estate Officer
(2014) 4 SCC 657 in para 59 had noted that for any premise to become a
"public premises" within the meaning of the said Act the relevant date would
be 16.9.1958; premises being occupied prior thereto would not come within
the ambit of the said Act. Additional submission being that the petitioner
was never an "unauthorized occupant" within the meaning of the said Act.
All proceedings culminating into the order passed by the District Judge on
01.4.2014, 31.3.2014, 04.7.2014, 15.9.2014, 16.9.2014, 07.10.2014 and
14.10.2014 respectively are thus without any jurisdiction and are to be
W.P.(C)Nos.8307/2016, 9059/2016, 9063/2016 to 9065/2016, 9085/2016 to 9087/2016, 9105/2016,
9110/2016, 9111/2016, 9113/2016, 9117/2016, 9118/2016, 9119/2016, 9121/2016, 9122/2016, 9137/2016,
treated as a nullity. For the same proposition reliance has also been placed
upon (2012) 12 SCC Cantonment Board and Another Vs. Church of North
India. Reliance has also been placed upon (2016) 7 SCC 572 Shyam Lal Vs.
Deepa Dass Chela Ram Chela Garib Dass to support an argument that
where the petitioner (as is so in the instant case) is a deemed tenant and is
protected under a tenancy law, he cannot be evicted. Section 116 of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 would confer legitimacy to the possession of
a tenant even after the termination of his lease.
9 Arguments have been refuted. It is pointed out that the question of
jurisdiction is a question which was never raised earlier before any Court;
this wrong proposition has been latched upon only to buy time.
Additionally, it is pointed out that the submission of the petitioner that he is a
tenant under the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 was also never a ground taken by
him before any court below. This argument has appeared for the first time
before this Court. The submission of the petitioner that he is a deemed
tenant under the provisions of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 is an argument
not available to him as Section 1(2) of the said Act is applicable to that part
of the Union Territory of Delhi which is described in Schedule A of the
Delhi Laws Act of 1912. Attention has been drawn to Schedule A of Delhi
W.P.(C)Nos.8307/2016, 9059/2016, 9063/2016 to 9065/2016, 9085/2016 to 9087/2016, 9105/2016,
9110/2016, 9111/2016, 9113/2016, 9117/2016, 9118/2016, 9119/2016, 9121/2016, 9122/2016, 9137/2016,
Laws Act of 1912; 65 villages are enumerated therein. It is pointed out that
none of the aforenoted villages (subject matter of these petitions) fall within
Schedule A. Thus even on merits, the submission of the petitioner that he is
protected under the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 is not available to him.
10 Arguments have been heard. Record has been perused.
11 Record discloses that even as per the case of the petitioner a lease
deed had been entered into between the Trust (predecessor-in-interest of the
DDA/respondent) and petitioner no.2. Petitioner no.2 was the lessee. The
DDA vide its letters dated 06.10.1967 and 31.7.1967 had called upon the
petitioner no.2 cancelling the lease which had even otherwise expired by
efflux of time. The first lease (of the year 1949) between the Trust and
petitioner no.2 was for five years. The second lease was also for the same
period. Thus even by efflux of time, the lease stood determined.
12 Resolution No.6 dated 30.4.1973 passed by the DDA was to the
following effect:
"Resolved that pending decision in the case Jhil Khuranja
Co-operative Society, the members of the Delhi Peasants multipurpose
Co-operative Society may be charged rent on the old rates and lease
extended provided they clear all the outstanding dues against them."
13 The Estate Officer had considered the submission of the petitioner that
Resolution No.6 had impliedly extended their lease. It was also noted that
W.P.(C)Nos.8307/2016, 9059/2016, 9063/2016 to 9065/2016, 9085/2016 to 9087/2016, 9105/2016,
9110/2016, 9111/2016, 9113/2016, 9117/2016, 9118/2016, 9119/2016, 9121/2016, 9122/2016, 9137/2016,
the original lease deed was for a period of five years. However, since this
Resolution was never acted upon, the Estate Officer had concluded that
Resolution No.6 did not confer any right, title or interest upon the petitioner.
Moreover, as the wording of the resolution itself suggested that it appeared
to be only an interim arrangement pending the decision in the case of Jhil
Khuranja Milk Producers' Co-operative Society Ltd.; in terms thereof
petitioner no.2 society may be charged rent at the old rates.
14 Admittedly, the land in question belongs to the DDA. It falls within
the definition of "Public Premise" as contained in Section 2(e) of the said
Act. There is no dispute to this proposition. In fact, learned counsel for the
petitioner admits this factum. His vehement contention (as noted supra) is
on the lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Estate Officer and the
subsequent lack of jurisdiction qua the Appellate Body i.e. the District Judge
and as such both orders passed by the Estate Officer and the District Judge
be declared a nullity.
15 At the cost of repetition, this Court notes that this question of
jurisdiction (which has now sought to be raised) was never an issue before
any other court. There is also no doubt to the settled legal proposition that
jurisdiction is an issue which goes to the root of the matter. The connected
W.P.(C)Nos.8307/2016, 9059/2016, 9063/2016 to 9065/2016, 9085/2016 to 9087/2016, 9105/2016,
9110/2016, 9111/2016, 9113/2016, 9117/2016, 9118/2016, 9119/2016, 9121/2016, 9122/2016, 9137/2016,
argument on this score that the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized
Occupants) Act, 1971 would not be applicable to the case of the petitioner
and he is protected as a deemed tenant under the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887'
was also never an argument/submission before any fact finding court. It was
never the case of the petitioner that he qualified as a tenant under the Punjab
Tenancy Act, 1887. It has been admitted by the petitioner that this argument
was never raised either before the Estate Officer or before the District Judge.
There is a categorical denial by the respondent qua the protection sought by
the petitioner under the Punjab Tenancy Act. This being a writ Court a new
fact cannot be urged as it is not for the writ Court to allow the parties to lead
evidence. This Court thus cannot allow this ground to be urged at this stage.
Moreover, this Court also notes that these proceedings arise out of land
falling in Village Patparganj Shamspur, Jatwara Kalan South, Gaonwala,
Mohammad Khan Wala, Jhilmil Tahirpur South, Jhilmil Tahirpur North and
Murgi Khana, which villages do not fall within the 65 villages enumerated in
Schedule A of the Delhi Laws Act, 1915 to which alone the Punjab Tenancy
Act, 1887 is applicable. Section 2(i) of the Punjab Tenancy Act clearly states
that the said Act is applicable only to those areas/land which are mentioned
in Schedule A of the Delhi Laws Act. Thus, even if this proposition is
W.P.(C)Nos.8307/2016, 9059/2016, 9063/2016 to 9065/2016, 9085/2016 to 9087/2016, 9105/2016,
9110/2016, 9111/2016, 9113/2016, 9117/2016, 9118/2016, 9119/2016, 9121/2016, 9122/2016, 9137/2016,
examined on merits it would be of no help to the petitioner as he would not
be covered under the Punjab Tenancy Act.
16 The Apex Court in AIR 2003 SC 2508 Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya Vs.
Anil Panjwani while dealing with an objection to jurisdiction which had been
raised at a later stage had inter alia held as follows:
"....An objection as to the exclusion of Civil Court's jurisdiction for
availability of alternative forum should be taken before the Trial Court and
at the earliest failing which the higher Court may refuse to entertain the plea
in the absence of proof of prejudice......
......An objection to the jurisdiction of the Trial Court was not taken before
the High Court in any of the civil revisions. It will be too late in the day to
permit such an objection being taken and urged at the hearing before this
Court. The plea as to want to jurisdiction in the Trial Court is devoid of any
merit and is, therefore, rejected."
17 In the instant case a half baked plea on the lack of jurisdiction which
has been set up at the conclusion of the proceedings leads the Court to
believe that this is nothing but a tactic to ward off an adverse order and to
delay the proceedings; this would be of no benefit to the petitioner; to press
and agitate the question of jurisdiction successfully the petitioner must
establish that he had suffered a prejudice on this count which at the cost of
repetition he has not been able to do so.
W.P.(C)Nos.8307/2016, 9059/2016, 9063/2016 to 9065/2016, 9085/2016 to 9087/2016, 9105/2016,
9110/2016, 9111/2016, 9113/2016, 9117/2016, 9118/2016, 9119/2016, 9121/2016, 9122/2016, 9137/2016,
18 The judgment of Suhas H Pophale (heavily relied upon by the
petitioner) in para 59 and 64 has inter alia noted as follows:
"59..............For any premises to become public premises, the relevant date
will be 16.9.1958 or whichever is the later date on which the premises
concerned become the public premises as belonging to or taken on lease by
LIC or the nationalised banks or the general insurance companies
concerned like the first respondent. All those persons falling within the
definition of a tenant occupying the premises prior thereto will not come
under the ambit of the Public Premises Act and cannot therefore, be said to
be persons in "unauthorised occupation". Whatever rights such prior
tenants, members of their families or heirs of such tenants or deemed tenants
or all of those who fall within the definition of a tenant under the Bombay
Rent Act have, are continued under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999.
If possession of their premises is required, that will have to be restored to by
taking steps under the Bombay Rent Act or the Maharasthra Rent Control
Act, 1999. If the person concerned has come in occupation subsequent to
such date, then of course the Public Premises Act, 1971 will apply.
64......... Thus there are two categories of occupants of these public
corporations who get excluded from the coverage of the Act itself. Firstly,
those who are in occupation since prior to 16.9.1958 i.e. prior to the Act
becoming applicable, are clearly outside the coverage of the Act. Secondly,
those who come in occupation, thereafter, but prior to the date of the premiss
concerned belonging to a government corporation or a company, and are
covered under a protective provisions of the State Rent Act, like the
appellant herein, also get excluded."
W.P.(C)Nos.8307/2016, 9059/2016, 9063/2016 to 9065/2016, 9085/2016 to 9087/2016, 9105/2016,
9110/2016, 9111/2016, 9113/2016, 9117/2016, 9118/2016, 9119/2016, 9121/2016, 9122/2016, 9137/2016,
19 It are these particular paragraphs of the judgment which have been
highlighted by the learned counsel for the petitioner to advance his argument
that the Public Premises Act would be inapplicable to him as in his case the
lease has been entered into prior to 1958.
20 This submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is based on a
fallacy. The petitioner in the case of Suhas H. Pophale (supra) had raised
the contention of lack of jurisdiction right from the beginning; (reference
may be made to para 8 of the said judgment where it has been noted that the
appellant right from the inception stage of the proceedings was alleging that
his occupation was protected under the Bombay Rent Act); this is not so in
the instant situation. In the instant situation, after all proceedings have come
to a foreclose i.e. the order passed by the Estate Officer as also by the
District Judge, the question of jurisdiction has been raised. This is the clear
ploy on the part of the petitioner to bring this argument at this stage when the
connected petitions (other members of the petitioner no.2) have also been
decided by the Division Bench of this Court. A single Judge of this Court in
WP(C) No.4908/2015 titled Sukhpal Singh and Anr. Vs. Delhi Development
Authority & Anr. (decided on 19.5.2015) had dealt with all these issues
(now raised except the question of jurisdiction). It had dismissed the
W.P.(C)Nos.8307/2016, 9059/2016, 9063/2016 to 9065/2016, 9085/2016 to 9087/2016, 9105/2016,
9110/2016, 9111/2016, 9113/2016, 9117/2016, 9118/2016, 9119/2016, 9121/2016, 9122/2016, 9137/2016,
petition. The Division Bench in Brij Pal Vs. Delhi Development Authority
and Anr. In LPA Nos.810/2015 (on 17.11.2015) had endorsed the orders of
the Single Judge.
21 The petitioner before the Single Judge and the Division bench were
other members of the petitioner no.2 Society i.e. the Delhi Peasants Co-
operative Multipurpose Society. Their case is not different from the case of
the present petitioner. This fact is not disputed. Those appeals were
dismissed in limine on 17.11.2015. This Court has been informed that a
review petition had also been filed against that judgment dated 17.11.2015
which was also dismissed on the ground of laches.
The only surviving argument of the petitioner based on the issue of
jurisdiction premised on the judgment of Suhas H Pophale does not come
to his aid. At the cost of repetition that case the case of the petitioner all
along was that he was a tenant and protected under the Bombay Rent Act.
The Apex Court in para 60 (supra) had held that all those persons falling
within the definition of tenant protected under a State Rent Act and
occupying the premises prior to 16.9.1958 would not come within the ambit
of the Public Premises Act, 1971 and therefore cannot be held to be in
unauthorised occupation. It is not the case of the petitioner before any
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court below that he was a tenant under the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887.
This plea set is up before this writ Court which not being a fact finding
Court; this plea cannot be set up for the first time at this stage. The
judgment of Suhas H.Pophale (supra) does not come to his aid.
22 The petitioners are only buying time. They are not entitled to any
relief. They are holding on to Government land since the last several years
without any legal sanctity. The lease was even otherwise inter se the
Government and the petitioner no.2 Society and never with petitioner no.1.
This is also not the case of petitioner no.1. The lease granted to petitioner
No. 2 had come to an end long back. It had expired by efflux of time. The
DDA had asked the petitioner to vacate the said land. They did not do so.
The possession of the petitioners after 06.10.1967 and 31.7.1967 respectively
therefore become that of an unauthorized occupant within the meaning of
Section 2 of the said Act. The Estate Officer thus had a complete
jurisdiction in the matter.
23 These petitions are without any merit. This Court also notes that these
petitions were signed sometime in May, 2015. The petitioner appears to be
waiting orders of other Courts and after they had noted that similarly placed
persons had been granted interim protection (this Court has been informed
W.P.(C)Nos.8307/2016, 9059/2016, 9063/2016 to 9065/2016, 9085/2016 to 9087/2016, 9105/2016,
9110/2016, 9111/2016, 9113/2016, 9117/2016, 9118/2016, 9119/2016, 9121/2016, 9122/2016, 9137/2016,
that certain writ petitions are now coming up before this Court on
29.11.2016), the petitioners have taken a chance before this Court also
seeking an interim order in their favour. This appears to be a malafide
exercise on their part. These writ petitions are dismissed with costs
quantified at Rs.10,000/- each.
INDERMEET KAUR, J
OCTOBER 21st, 2016
ndn
W.P.(C)Nos.8307/2016, 9059/2016, 9063/2016 to 9065/2016, 9085/2016 to 9087/2016, 9105/2016,
9110/2016, 9111/2016, 9113/2016, 9117/2016, 9118/2016, 9119/2016, 9121/2016, 9122/2016, 9137/2016,
