Citation : 2016 Latest Caselaw 6355 Del
Judgement Date : 4 October, 2016
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ RSA No. 39/2016
% 4th October, 2016
M/S TEXMODE ..... Appellant
Through: Mr. Venkat Subramium and Mr. Rahat
Bansal, Advocates.
versus
M/S SANA OVERSEAS INC & ANR ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. M. Salim, Advocate. CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VALMIKI J.MEHTA To be referred to the Reporter or not? VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J (ORAL)
RSA No.39/2016 and C.M. Appl. No. 3971/2016 (for stay under Order XLI Rule 5 read with Section 151 CPC)
1. This Regular Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) is filed by defendant no. 1 in the suit against the
impugned Judgment of the First Appellate Court dated 19.12.2015 by which the
first appellate court has dismissed the first appeal as being barred by time. Trial
court by its Judgment dated 12.2.2015 had decreed the suit of the respondent
no.1/plaintiff for recovery of a sum of Rs.2,51,500/- jointly and severally
against the appellant/defendant no. 1 and respondent no. 2/defendant no. 2. The
number of days of delay which have to be condoned is not mentioned in the
condonation of delay application, however, the delay for which condonation
will be sought would be from 13.2.2015 till 16.12.2015 when the application for
condonation of delay was filed. I may also at the outset state that the present
case is not a simple case of condonation of delay in filing the first appeal,
inasmuch as, the appellant as defendant no. 1 had appeared in the suit, filed his
written statement-cum-counter claim, but thereafter had not appeared in the suit
as a result of which he was proceeded ex parte vide Order dated 25.4.2005.
Appellant/defendant no. 1 had moved an application for setting aside the ex
parte proceedings against him but that application has been dismissed right till
the Supreme Court. The Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court was
dismissed vide Order dated 7.10.2013 in default.
2. The respondent no.1/plaintiff filed the subject suit against two
defendants. Appellant was defendant no. 1 and defendant no. 2 was a Canadian
buyer with respect to the subject textile products. In the suit plaint, the
respondent no. 1/plaintiff in addition to pleading that the appellant/defendant
no. 1 placed order for the respondent no. 2/defendant no. 2, further pleaded in
the plaint that appellant/defendant no. 1 gave an assurance that in case the
Canadian buyer/respondent no. 2/defendant no. 2 failed to make the payment
then the appellant/defendant no.1 will be liable to make the payment. After the
appellant/defendant no. 1 was proceeded ex parte, respondent no.1/plaintiff has
led evidence. Respondent no.1/plaintiff has filed the affidavit by way of
evidence of its partner Md. Sheikh Naqi and it has been reiterated in this
affidavit by way of evidence that appellant/defendant no. 1 agreed to make the
payment in case of default of respondent no. 2/defendant no. 2/Canadian buyer.
Accordingly, the trial court decreed the suit by its Judgment dated 12.2.2015
jointly against both the defendants, i.e, appellant as defendant no. 1 and
respondent no. 2 as defendant no. 2 for a sum of Rs.2,51,500/- along with
pendente lite and future interest at the rate of 10% per annum. The issue in the
present second appeal is that whether there is sufficient cause for condonation
of delay from 13.3.2015 till 16.12.2015 because a period of thirty days is
provided for filing of first appeal against the Judgment dated 12.2.2015 and
consequently delay will have to be counted as commencing from 13.3.2015 as
the Judgment of the Trial Court is dated 12.2.2015.
3. The reasons given in the application for condonation of delay filed
by the appellant/defendant no. 1 before the first appellate court were that he was
not aware of the proceedings in the civil suit and came to know of the same
when he received notice of the execution proceedings in October, 2015
whereafter he told his counsel to take out the relevant documents/orders.
However, paragraph 6 of the application destroys the case of the
appellant/defendant no. 1 of coming to know of the decreeing of the suit only in
October, 2015, inasmuch as, in this paragraph 6 of the application for seeking
condonation of delay the appellant/defendant no. 1 states that he had sent one
official to keep on overseeing the suit/matter but which could not be prosecuted
properly. Neither is the name given by the appellant/defendant no. 1 of this
official nor can this be a reason for condonation of delay from 13.3.2015 to
16.12.2015 because such official if he was overseeing the suit proceedings on
behalf of the appellant/defendant no. 1, he would actually know or would be
deemed to know the Judgment and Decree dated 12.2.2015. In any case, the
appellant/defendant no. 1 can be said to have deemed knowledge of the
Judgment and Decree dated 12.2.2015, inasmuch as, he had appeared in the suit
and was proceeded ex parte way back on 25.4.2005. Therefore, the application
for condonation of delay was misconceived because knowledge was wrongly
alleged from receiving of the notices in execution proceeding in October, 2015,
inasmuch as, appellant/defendant no. 1 had appeared in the suit and was
proceeded ex parte, and therefore, is deemed to have knowledge of the
Judgment and Decree dated 12.2.2015 on 12.2.2015 itself. Also as already
stated above even the application seeking condonation of delay makes
averments against the appellant/defendant no. 1 itself because it is said that
there was an official of the appellant/defendant no. 1 to oversee the suit
proceedings. I note that appellant/defendant no.1 cannot always keep on laying
blame at the door of his counsels either for being proceeded ex parte or the
Supreme Court Special Leave Petition being dismissed for non-prosecution or
the Advocate not telling about the Judgment and Decree dated 12.2.2015. All in
all there is no ground for condonation of the delay for non-filing of the first
appeal from 13.3.2015 till 16.12.2015 in the facts and circumstances of the
present case.
4. Counsel for the appellant/defendant no.1 sought to argue on merits
that respondent no.1/plaintiff cannot be said to have proved his case against the
appellant/defendant no. 1 as the appellant/defendant no. 1 was an agent
however, I cannot agree to this argument because both in the plaint filed by the
respondent no.1/plaintiff and in the affidavit by way of evidence filed by the
plaintiff of its partner Md. Sheikh Naqi, there is pleading and deposition to the
fact of the appellant/defendant no. 1 agreeing to pay the liability respondent no.
2/defendant no. 2/Canadian buyer in case of default by such Canadian buyer.
As the appellant/defendant no. 1 was ex parte, there is no cross-examination of
Md. Sheikh Naqi and therefore the respondent no.1/plaintiff can be said to have
proved its case on joint liability of respondent no. 2/defendant no. 2/Canadian
buyer with the appellant/defendant no. 1, because appellant/defendant no.1 had
agreed to make the necessary payment for goods supplied in case of default
committed by respondent no. 2/defendant no. 2/Canadian buyer.
5. In view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, I do
not see any reason to interfere with the judgment of the first appellate court
dismissing the first appeal as barred by limitation, and therefore, this Regular
Second Appeal does not raise any substantial question of law, and is
accordingly dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
OCTOBER 04, 2016 VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J AK
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