M/S Shri Sai Nath Enterprises & ... vs North Delhi Municipal ...
2016 Latest Caselaw 978 Del

*      IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

%                          Judgment pronounced on: 9th February, 2016

+                     CS (COMM.) No.11/2016

       M/S SHRI SAI NATH ENTERPRISES & ORS. ..... Plaintiffs
                      Through Mr.A.S.Chandhiok, Sr.Adv. with
                              Mr.Rajesh Gupta and
                              Mr.Harpreet Singh, Advs.

                             versus

       NORTH DELHI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION & ANOTHER
                                            ..... Defendants
                    Through Mr.Ravi Gupta, Sr.Adv. with
                             Mr.Mukesh Gupta and
                             Ms.Bhoomija Verma, Advs.

+                     CS (COMM.) No.12/2016

       M/S SHRI SAI NATH ENTERPRISES & ORS. ..... Plaintiffs
                      Through Mr.A.S.Chandhiok, Sr.Adv. with
                              Mr.Rajesh Gupta and
                              Mr.Harpreet Singh, Advs.

                             versus

       NORTH DELHI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION & ANOTHER
                                            ..... Defendants
                    Through Mr.Ravi Gupta, Sr.Adv. with
                             Mr.Mukesh Gupta and
                             Ms.Bhoomija Verma, Advs.

       CORAM:
       HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE MANMOHAN SINGH




CS(COMM.) Nos.11/2016 & 12/2016                              Page 1 of 20
 MANMOHAN SINGH, J.

I.A. No. 243/2016 (u/o XXXIX R 1 & 2 CPC) in CS(COMM) No.11/2016 and

I.A. No. 247/2016 (u/o XXXIX R 1 & 2 CPC) in CS(COMM) No.12/2016

1. By this common order, I propose to decide the abovementioned two applications under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC filed by the plaintiffs, who are seeking urgent interim orders against the defendants.

2. The prayers made in the said applications are strongly opposed by Mr.Ravi Gupta, learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the defendants who states that both the suits filed by the plaintiffs are an abuse of the process of the Court and are not maintainable and in any case, the injunction applications filed by the plaintiffs are liable to be dismissed. Learned Senior counsel has referred the written statement already filed in the earlier suits, however, in order to oppose the prayers of the present injunction applications, short affidavit has been filed by the defendants.

Both the parties have made their submissions in the interim applications.

3. It is pertinent to mention here that prior to the filing of the present suits, earlier the same very plaintiffs had filed two suits being CS(OS) Nos.3397/2014 and 3460/2014 titled as M/s Sai Nath Enterprises & Ors. v. North Delhi Municipal Corporation &

Another. An ex-parte interim order was also passed in their favour. After a long hearing, this Court by a common judgment dated 23rd December, 2015 disposed of eight applications pending in the said suits. The interim orders were also vacated. As a matter of fact, both the plaints were rejected, mainly, on the reason that the suits of the plaintiffs were barred for non-compliance of the provisions of Section 69(2) of the Partnership Act and once the suits were barred by law and were not maintainable, the plaints were liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC.

4. While rejecting the plaints of the earlier suits, after discussing the submissions of the parties, this Court had come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs had also concealed the material facts about the termination letters of the contracts issued by the defendants prior to the filing of the said suits. Paras 57 and 58 of the said judgment are read as under:-

"57. In view of the settled principles of law, a presumption under Section 16 and 114 of the Evidence Act is liable to be drawn against the plaintiffs regarding the issue of knowledge of the said emails as they themselves had given the said email address of plaintiff No.1 in the tender form, thus the plaintiffs had concealed the factum of receipt of the said emails from this Court on 17th November, 2014. At least on that date the plaintiff admittedly received the termination letter, still they have chosen not to disclose the same in the second suit. It is also pertinent to mention that the plaintiffs had the knowledge about the termination on 14th November, 2015 still they kept quite not to amend the plaint for couple of months. They sought the amendment after raising the defence by the defendants.

58. Prima-facie, it appears to the Court that the plaintiffs had received the office orders intimating about the termination of the contract and deregistration of the plaintiff firm vide emails on 12th November, 2014 and vide speed post on 14th November, 2014 (the date as admitted by the plaintiffs in the replication) but the plaintiffs had failed to disclose the letter of termination in the second suit as well. The justification given on behalf of the plaintiffs is an after-thought. The said decisions referred by her are directly applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. With regard to fresh four applications filed by the plaintiffs two under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC and two fresh applications filed under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC, as to whether the same are to be considered at this stage or not, the fate of the same depend upon the main objection raised by Ms. Acharya about the maintainability of the suits. If the suits filed by the plaintiffs are maintainable in view of the main objection raised by the defendants, then the issue of fresh applications for injunction and the applications for amendment of the plaints would be considered."

5. There is no material on record to show that the said judgment dated 23rd December, 2015 has been challenged by the plaintiffs, as no intimation was given by the plaintiffs during the hearing. As a matter of fact, the abovementioned fresh suits and injunction applications have been filed by the same very plaintiffs on the pretext that the plaintiff-firm was registered during the pendency of the earlier two suits.

6. In the present suits, the plaintiffs have also challenged the termination letters issued by the defendants on many grounds, although in the earlier suits, the Court came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs were aware about the termination letters but the same

were not disclosed by the plaintiffs at the time of obtaining the interim orders from the Court.

7. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs has referred various paras of the plaint in order to show that the de-registration of the two parking contracts is done contrary to the material available on record. Counsel has referred paras 51 to 59 of the present suit in this regard. The same are read as under:-

"51. Defendants claim to have de-registered the plaintiff- firm as its parking contractor in term of purported decision taken -by the competent authority on 07.11.2014, and claim to have communicated the said de-registration to the plaintiff-firm by office order No. DC/RP Cell/NDMC/2014/D- 585 dated 11.11.2014. Likewise, defendants also claim to have cancelled the allotment of the subject parking site by the competent authority on 07.11.2014, and claim to have communicated the said de-registration to the plaintiff-firm by office order No. DC/RP Cell/NDMC/2014/D-586dated 11.11.2014.

52. The said claim of the defendants apart from being unjust, arbitrary, mala fide and dishonest, is also is under serious doubt. Plaintiff claims that it had no knowledge of the said purposed communications dated 11.11.2014 at the time when plaintiff filed previous suit [i.e. C.S. (OS) No. 3397/2014], and for which reason the plaintiff did not incorporate the said communications in its pleadings nor sought any relief against it. Plaintiff was alarmed when the defendant pleaded about the said communications in its written statement, and then sought to incorporate the plea and relief quo the said communication by amendment in I.A. No. 25380/2014 and I.A. No. 1468/2015, wherein due reason was furnished for not pleading the communication in original plaint. Defendants however attributed mala fide in plaintiff having not pleaded the said communications in the original plaint on assertion that plaintiff was aware of

the said communication on 12.11.2014. Be that as it may, there was no reason for plaintiff to avoid pleading the said communication, and by pleading the said communications plaintiff would have provided strength to its case, but in fact plaintiff genuinely missed out and it skipped attention of the plaintiff at the appropriate time. However, nothing turns on that as the Hon'ble Court in its Order dated 23.12.2015 rejecting the suit, had not taken any final decision on the said aspect, and disposed the application without adjudication as consequence of rejection of the plaint. Now, when the plaintiff is entitled to file the fresh suit, the said issue has been rendered in-fructuous. However, unfairness and dishonesty is writ large in the very action of the defendants, which is elaborated thus:

(i) Purported Order dated 07.11.2014 seemingly passed by the Competent Authority of the defendant has not seen the light of the day as yet. The said purported order has never been communicated to the plaintiff. In fact, the said order was not even filed by the defendant in previous suit [i.e. C.S. (OS) No. 3397/2014].

(ii) There is a serious and genuine doubt that the Competent Authority at all passed any Order of de- registration and cancellation on 07.11.2014 and/or the purported order of competent authority is mala fide ante-dated. If it was not so, there is no reason why it was not communicated to the plaintiff immediately on 07.11.2014 and/or immediately thereafter.

(iii) There is no logical reason for communicating the order(s) belatedly by letter dated 11.11.2014 (posted on 12.11.2014). The defendants had expressed real urgency and seriousness vis-à-vis its purported action as reflected in the previous suit proceedings [i.e. C.S. (OS) No. 3397/2014]. The purported seriousness of defendant does not match its conduct in issuing communications dated

11.11.2014. Curiously, that urgency is missing between 07.11.2014 to 12.11.2014, and which really casts serious doubts on the action of the defendant. Moreover, why order dated 07.11.2014 should at all be concealed.

(iv) Doubt is also created by action of the defendants in hastily serving the following documents on the plaintiffs:

(i) Show Cause Notice No. DC(RPC)/2014/D-581 dated 11.11.2014;

(ii) Office Order No. DC/RP Cell/NDMC/2014/D-

585 dated 11.11.2014;

(iii) Office Letter No. DC/RP Cell/NDMC/2014/D-

586 dated 11.11.2014.

All the said documents are issued and signed same officer of the defendant.

(v) There is an apparent mis-match and/or conflict in the very action of the defendant in issuing the aforesaid three communications. The communications are mutually destructive of each other, and existence of one nullifies the other.

Documents at sr. no. (i) is a show-cause notice and operative portion thereof reads thus :

"Therefore, you are asked to show-cause why not your allotment of this parking site be cancelled with immediate effect and Earnest Money Deposit and Security Deposit in the shape of Bank Guarantee/FD should be forfeited and your registration should be cancelled. If the payment is not received within seven days of issue of this notice this department will proceed

to take further action in the matter without any further communication to you.

Sd/-

Supdt.(RPC)/North DMC Therefore, document at sr. no. (i) contemplated action of termination of subject parking-site and cancellation of registration (de-registration), if within 7 days of receipt of show-case requisition made therein is not fulfilled. In other words, the contract/Agreement as well as the registration of plaintiff was alive as on 11.11.2014 , and could have been terminated/cancelled after 7 days (i.e. not before 19th or 20th November 2014).

Documents at sr. no. (ii) & (iii) are communicatory office- orders, former communicates plaintiff's de-registration as parking contractor on 07.11.2014, while later communicates cancellation of parking contract on 07.11.2014. In any event, the said communications are self-defeated besides being arbitrary and perverse by a show-cause notice dated 11.11.2014.

53. The plaintiff have duly replied to by the plaintiffs by their letter dated 20.11.2014.

54. Ex-facie, actions of the defendants in concealing purported Order dated 07.11.2014 and then sending three mutually conflicting communications dated 11.11.2014 is far from being fair, reasonable and justified. There is no question of termination of Agreement dated 01.07.2014, and there is no reason for the same either. Also, as pleaded above, there is no reason at all for de-registration of the plaintiff as parking contractor. Therefore, the purported order dated 07.11.2014 itself is defective, null and void on the touchstone of fairness and reasonableness, that apart it violates principles of natural justice.

55. The said actions of the defendants are mala fide as the defendants is adopting unfair strategy to wriggle out of a

binding contract. Unfairness is apparent and writ large on the actions of the defendants, in as much as, the defendants had on 05.11.2014 tendered the subject parking-site for re-allotment, when the Agreement dated 01.07.2014 was alive and active. It seems that the defendants realized its folly and adopted unfair means to camouflage its mis-doings, which has resulted in issuance of communications dated 11.11.2014.

56. It may be appreciated that the institution called property guards, the troubled boundary between the individuals and the states. Apart from the substantial rights, in running the parking sites the most common form of protection is procedural, coupled with an insistence that government actions be based on standards that are not arbitrary or unauthorized. In the present case they are not only authorized but also arbitrary. The plaintiffs have no other applications remedy but to seek protection against the ruthless pressures of the defendants. The defendants are not and cannot be equated even in the regime of contracts as two private individuals entering into a contract. They are subjected to restrain inherent in the position in a democratic society. Their actions cannot be at their sweet will, like a private individual but must be in confirmative with tradition, rule of law and cannot be irrational or irrelevant. Any departure by the defendants for any of the settled principles of law would render their action as non-est. In the present case the action on the face of it is non-est.

57. As regards the show-cause dated 11.11.2014 for cancellation and for de-registration of the plaintiff as an authorized contractor and threatening to forfeit the bank guarantee on the ground of non-payment of penalty and other amounts, the purported action is highly arbitrary and unjustified. While amount of the penalty was specified namely Rs.4,04,500/- the only grievance made is that the next quarterly monthly license fee had not been deposited. The non-payment of these dues of Rs.47,84,973/- the show-cause notice was to cancel the contract, cancel the registration and encash the bank guarantee; while in the

same breath the defendant corporation has claimed to have passed an order of cancellation and de-registration. There could not be a better case of manifest perversity by the state then the case in-hand.

58. On the showing of the defendants, the bank guarantee was on the earnest money and once the contract is signed between the parties, earnest money loses its significance. In any event, the plaintiffs had on two hearings [i.e. C.S. (OS) No. 3397/2014] on 16.12.2014 & 22.12.2014 tendered the amount of license fee but the same was refused by the counsel appearing for Defendant No. 1. Since the defendants refused to accept the money tendered in this Hon'ble High Court the plaintiffs deposited the same with defendant no.1, and was accepted. This amount covered not only the parking site which is a subject matter of this suit but also the subject matter (Asaf Ali parking site) of Suit No.3460/2014. Thus, default if any, on payment of monthly license fee could be distinguished and/or did not subsist. The refusal was sought to be made that under the policy of the defendant no. 1 the license fee has to be 4 times the agreed amount. While what was being tendered was doubled the amount as original agreed.

59. Therefore, ex-facie the two office-orders i.e. Office Order No. DC/RP Cell/NDMC/20i4/D-585 dated 11.11.2014; and Office Letter No. DC/RP Cell/NDMC/2014/D-586 dated 11.11.2014, and Show Cause Notice No. DC(RPC)/2014/D-581 dated 11.11.2014, are all inconsequential, dishonestly and arbitrary issued and are null and void ab-initio, and as such are liable to be declared to be so."

8. Mr.Ravi Gupta, learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the defendants submits that there is no valid explanation given by the plaintiffs about the concealment of the fact made by them in the present suits, therefore, the plaintiffs are not entitled for

injunction on this ground alone in these applications. He says that the stand of the defendants on merits remains the same as stated in the written statement filed in the earlier suits that the office order dated 11th November, 2014 of the de-registration of parking contracts of plaintiff No.1 and cancellation of two parking sites was duly communicated to the contractor, i.e. plaintiffs who had the full knowledge about the same on 13th November, 2014. However, the factum of de-registration has not been challenged by the plaintiffs in the earlier suits. He further submits that the reason for de- registration of parking contracts is that plaintiff No.1 made the false and misleading declaration in the affidavit at the time of registration of the parking contracts. The said plaintiff had also given an undertaking dated 28th June, 2014 to the effect that he accepts the provision offer letter given by the Corporation for parking site at MLUG Asaf Ali Road as per terms and conditions and also undertakes to abide by unconditionally the outcome of any dispute/complaints/litigations/ Court case etc. and accordingly to settle the outstanding dues and matter and further undertakes that the provisional offer letter is issued with the condition that the allotment would be subject to the outcome of any litigations/Court case/dispute/complaint.

9. It is also the submission of Mr.Ravi Gupta that the defendants have already dealt with the case on merits in the written statement filed in earlier two suits to the effect that the competent authority considered the case in the light of the points taken in the reply and

concluded on the basis of record that Sh.Harish Chand Sharma was found to be a Director as well as a major share holder of the company and it was found that against Ms.Anuradha Sharma, another partner of Shri Sai Nath Enterprises, dues are still shown pending by L&E Department of NDMC. It is further submitted that in the affidavit of Mr Harish Chand Sharma on behalf of M/s Sai Nath Enterprises which was submitted at the time of registration, it was declared that "Neither/ nor any proprietor/ partner/ director of M/s Sai Nath Enterprises has been directly and indirectly associated in any manner with any other such Co. Company/Agency/Arms which has any dues payable to North MCD" and from these facts, it is crystal clear that a false and misleading declaration had been made in the affidavit. Further, the Competent Authority recommended for taking further action in the matter as per rules and conditions of registration of contractor/existing policy of registration in view of the violation of terms and conditions of registration. Hence, decision was taken by the Competent Authority to deregister/debar the parking contractor in the present case in view of clause 17 of the instruction for registration/renewal of parking contractor in North MCD and to re-tender the parking site in question leading to the office orders dated 11th November, 2014. It is submitted that the final decision was taken on the complaint regarding the false affidavit submitted by plaintiff No.1 as per the contracts executed between the parties.

10. Learned Senior counsel has referred the affidavit of Mr.U.C.Bharadwaj, Additional Deputy Commissioner, RP Cell, North Delhi Municipal Corporation, Delhi, in support of his submissions. It is stated in the affidavit that the parking charges in the jurisdiction of North Delhi Municipal Corporation were enhanced/ revised with effect from 1st November, 2014. Accordingly, the MLF payable by the parking contractor who were allotted parking sites vide NIT-1/2014 dated 12th March, 2014 and also vide earlier tenders was increased to four times w.e.f. 1st November, 2014 vide Office Order No.DC(RP Cell)/NDMC/2014/D- 572 dated 31st October, 2014.

It is further stated in the affidavit that after revision of four times MLF w.e.f. 1st November, 2014, another tender vide NIT- 03/2014 dated 5th November, 2014 was floated. The Minimum Reserve Price (MRP) in respect of some parkings were also enhanced to four times as compared to previous MLF and the highest bids were also received much above this enhanced MRP, i.e. four times of the previous MLF.

11. Mr.A.S. Chandhiok, learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs, in reply to the above said affidavit, has stated that the plaintiffs undertake to give the peaceful possession to the defendants after expiry of two years, i.e. in June, 2016 and the plaintiffs are also prepared to pay two times of the previous MLF. The said offer of the plaintiffs is not acceptable to the defendants.

12. Mr.Chandhiok, learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs has also argued that the demand of the defendants for hiking the parking fee is unauthorized. The plaintiffs have challenged the arbitrariness of the defendants for the hike of 400% in Monthly License Fee (MLF) in terms of the letter dated 31st October, 2014 and also challenged on the grounds of conflict of agreement and adoption of revengeful and hostile attitude with regard to the de-registration/ cancellation of the two parking contracts. It is also pleaded that contrary to the assurance of the defendants, the subject parking sites were hindered/obstructed by unforeseen factors. Despite repeated reminders, the defendants failed and neglected to remove various hindrances at the parking sites. The defendants were aware all-through about the impediments and hindrances at the subject parking sites. Therefore, they requested the police authorities and sought their cooperation in this regard. But the fact remained that the hindrances were never cleared at the sites. There are other reasons about the hindrances in parking sites, i.e. non-availability of electricity, water logging, unclaimed vehicles, forcible closure by the police authorities as well as impact of odd-even number policy. Therefore, it is submitted on behalf of the plaintiffs that subject to the payment of two times of licence fee, they be allowed to complete the contract period which is expiring in June, 2016. However, the defendants are not agreeable to the same.

13. Learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs states that at this stage, the plaintiffs will not press the request for remission period and they are ready to deposit the amount from the period, i.e. August, 2015 to December, 2015 of the two parking sites to the tune of Rs.2,90,29,340/- in two installments and they undertake to pay two times of the MLF till June, 2016 and after the completion of the period of the contracts, the plaintiffs will hand over the peaceful possession to the defendants. However, the plaintiffs are not agreeable to pay four times of the previous MLF, as according to them, no one is paying four times in Delhi, therefore, the argument of the defendants to claim four times is invalid.

14. The contention of Mr.Gupta, learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the defendants that his clients are now not agreeable to the suggestions made on behalf of the plaintiffs in view of the facts and conduct of the plaintiffs in the present case. He submits that once the agreement has been terminated even before the earlier suits filed by the plaintiffs in which the Court had come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs are guilty of concealment of material facts, no injunction under any circumstances can be passed; the fresh suit having the same relief is not maintainable as the contract between the parties is terminable and no interim order should be passed. The same cannot be enforced and the remedy only lies with the plaintiffs, if any, to claim the damages, if permissible in law and facts and circumstances of the present case.

15. It is submitted on behalf of the defendants that the plaintiffs were aware that the MRP in respect of some parking sites was enhanced to four times as compared to previous MLF. Since the plaintiffs are not ready to pay four times of the previous MLF, the defendants are not agreeable for the same. Another reason given by the defendants is that the plaintiffs have stopped depositing any amount w.e.f. August, 2015 and according to the Department, the plaintiffs were supposed to deposit four times enhanced amount which would come to Rs.5,83,45,653/- up to 31st January, 2016. The said demand is pending against the plaintiffs. Mr.Gupta has further stated that even from August, 2015 the plaintiffs have failed to deposit two times of the previous MLF which was earlier being deposited by the plaintiffs and huge amount is due from the plaintiffs.

16. It is the admitted position that the contracts between the parties is terminated in November, 2014. The plaintiffs were aware about the termination, however, the said fact was not disclosed by the plaintiffs in the earlier suits.

17. The law on this issue is quite settled. Reliance is placed on the following decisions:-

a. In the case of M/s Exclusive Motors Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s India Tourism Development, OMP No.183/2008 decided on 4th April, 2008 in para 20 the similar question has been discussed by this Court and held as under:-

"20. As far as the question whether in respect of a contract or transaction which is determinable in terms, the relief of injunction is available, there can be no two opinion on the issue. Indian Oil Corporation -vs- Amritsar Gas 1991 (1) SCC 533 and Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Vs. Shri Srinam Narain AIR 2002 SC 2598 are two clear authorities of the Supreme Court, on the issue that where contracts are determinable, the court cannot grant specific performance and therefore also cannot grant injunction. The latter case is also authority on the point that correctness of an order of revocation or determination can be considered at the stage of interim injunction only for the limited purpose of ascertaining whether there is prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff/petitioner and not for determination of the question finally. The decision of Amritsar Gas was followed in two Division Bench judgments in Rajasthan Breweries Ltd -vs- Stroh Brewery Company AIR 2000 Del 450 and North Eastern Handloom and Handicraft -vs- Sports Station Ltd (FAO(OS) 127/2007; Decided on 09.07.2007). This court held that an agreement inherently and intrinsically terminable in nature cannot be specifically enforced and only an action for damages lies where a party complains unlawful termination."

b. In another case of Planet M. Retail Ltd. v. Select Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., 2014(4) Arb. LR 348 (Delhi) in para 11 it was held as under:-

"11. The question that has come up before this Court, therefore, is whether the petitioner can be allowed to continue to run the business in the shop under a determined licence deed and thereby indirectly imposing a contract upon the respondent against his own choice. The question whether termination is legal or illegal is a question which can only be arbitered by the parties before the Arbitrator. What relief could be granted to the petitioner in case it is found that the termination of

Licence Agreement was illegal is also a subject matter of an arbitration. It is argued on behalf of the respondent that the petitioner has no right to continue in the shop under a terminated Licence Agreement. On the other hand, it is argued by the petitioner that he shall suffer an irreparable loss and injury. Reliance is also placed by the respondent in Rajasthan Bereweries Ltd. v. The Stroh Brewery Ltd. 2001 (1) RAJ 309 (DEL), Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Amritsar Gas Service(1991) 1 SCC 533, Exclusive Motors Pvt Ltd. v. TDC, OMP No. 183/2008, decided on 04.04.2008, Provogue (India) Ltd. v.Naveen Kohli (2008) 150 DLT 537, Thomas Cook (India) Ltd. v.Hotel Imperial (2006) 127 DLT 431, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Sri Sriman Narayan AIR 2002 SC 2598,Chandu Lal v. MCD AIR 1978 Delhi 174, MIC Electronics Ltd. v.MCD 2011 (II) AD (D) 625, and R.P.S. Educational Society (Regd) v. DDA, OMP No. 538/2008, decided on 02.09.2009 [reported as 2009(4) Arb. LR 39 (Del.)]"

c. In the case of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Amritsar Gas Service, (1991) 1 SCC 533, the Supreme Court has held that a dealership agreement containing a clause entitling either party to terminate the agreement with thirty (30) days notice was determinable in nature, and therefore, in terms of Section 14(1) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 a relief of restoration of dealership cannot be sustained. Section 14(1) (c) of the Specific Relief Act states that a contract which is in its nature determinable cannot be specifically enforced. It was further held that even if the termination of the agreement was illegal, the only relief which could be granted was the award of compensation for the period of notice.

d. A similar view was espoused by the Supreme Court in E. Venkatakrishna v. Indian Oil Corporation and Ors., (2000) 7

SCC 764 wherein it was held that "all that the arbitrator could do, if he found the termination of the distributorship was unlawful, was to award damages, as any civil Court would have done in a suit". The appellant therein was appointed as a dealer of the first respondent to distribute liquefied petroleum gas and the dealership agreement therein contained a termination clause that the distributorship could be terminated if the dealer did any act which was prejudicial to the interests of the respondent.

18. Therefore, the relief sought in the injunction application is not liable to be granted being contrary to the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Even if the termination of the agreement was found to be unlawful, the only relief which could have been granted is damages/compensation for the period of notice as provided in the contract.

19. Under these circumstances, as there is no consensus with regard to admission of four times of the previous MLF and even on merits, the plaintiffs have no case for grant of ad-interim injunction under the peculiar facts of the present cases, the interim applications filed by the plaintiffs are accordingly dismissed.

CS (COMM.) No.11/2016 & CS (COMM.) No.12/2016

20. Let the written statement be filed by the defendants within four weeks from today. Replication, if any, be filed within four weeks thereafter.

21. List the matter before the Joint Registrar on 8th April, 2016 for admission/denial of the documents.

22. After completion of the same, the matter be listed before Roster Bench on 18th April, 2016 for framing of issues and directions for trial, subject to the orders of Hon'ble Judge Incharge (Original Side).

(MANMOHAN SINGH) JUDGE FEBRUARY 9, 2016