Delhi High Court
Shri Naresh Kumar vs Shri Hiroshi Maniwa & Ors on 5 November, 2015
Author: Valmiki J. Mehta
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ CS(OS) No. 393/2010
% NOVEMBER 5, 2015
SHRI NARESH KUMAR ..... Plaintiff
Through Mr. Shashank Shekhar, Advocate
with Mr. R.K. Dubey and Ms.Ranjita,
Advocates
versus
SHRI HIROSHI MANIWA & ORS ..... Defendants
Through Mr. Mukul Talwar, Sr. Advocate
along with Mr. Aman Bhalla,
Advocate for D-1 to D-7
Mr. Rajmangal Kumar, Advocate
with Ms. Sushma Yadav and
Mr.Aman Singh, Advocates for
Mr. S.K. Dubey, Adv. for D-8 & 9
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VALMIKI J.MEHTA
To be referred to the Reporter or not?
VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J (ORAL)
1. In this suit on 15.10.2015 the following Order was passed:-
"1. The present suit is filed by the plaintiff who was an
employee of the defendant no.7-NYK Line (India) Limited.
Plaintiff has filed the present suit for recovery of monies alleging
his illegal termination. In effect, plaintiff seeks damages for loss
of employment opportunities and other related reliefs.
2. The plaintiff has filed his employment letter dated
15.10.2007 issued by the defendant no.7 company and which
CS(OS) No.393/2010 Page 1 of 17
contains clause 17(a) entitling either parties by three months'
notice or salary of three months in lieu of such notice to
terminate employment.
3. In view of the above, clearly the plaintiff can only be
entitled to the salary of three months, even if there is an illegal
termination, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of S.S.
Shetty v. Bharat Nidhi Ltd., AIR 1958 SC 12. I have also
considered this aspect in the case of L.M. Khosla v. Thai
Airways International Public Company Limited & Anr.,
CS(OS) No.673/1997, decided on 01.08.2012.
4. Counsel for plaintiff is therefore put to notice that the suit is
not maintainable and he seeks time to examine this issue.
5. List on 5th November, 2015."
2. A reading of the aforesaid order shows that employment of the
plaintiff was a private employment and was not a public employment which
is protected like an employment with a State or an arm of a State as per
Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The employment letter of the plaintiff
by the defendant no.7/employer dated 15.10.2007 contains Clause 17(a)
entitling termination of the employment of the plaintiff by a notice period of
three months or salary of three months. This Clause 17(a) reads as under:-
"17. Termination:
Your employment hereunder may be terminated as per Company
Policy:
(a) by either party hereto giving the other three (3) months'
notice in writing of termination, or by paying to the other
party three (3) months' salary in lieu of such notice; or
CS(OS) No.393/2010 Page 2 of 17
(b) by the Company without notice or payment in lieu of notice in
the event of serious misconduct or persistent unpunctuality,
neglect of duty or breach of any rules or regulations of the
Company on your part or if you commit any material breach
of any of your duties or obligations hereunder
On the termination of your employment hereunder you shall
forthwith deliver to the Company all books, documents, papers,
materials and other property of or relating to the business of the
Company which may then be in your possession or under your
power or control.
Termination of your employment hereunder shall be without
prejudice to any rights, which have accrued prior to termination."
3. In view of ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the
case of S.S. Shetty Vs. Bharat Nidhi Ltd., AIR 1958 SC 12 it is clear that
even if there is an illegal termination of an employee by a private employer,
at best the employee is entitled to the salary for the notice period. I have had
an occasion to deal with the ratio in the judgment in the case of S.S. Shetty
(supra) in various cases and the last of such cases is the case of L.M. Khosla
Vs. Thai Airways International Public Company Limited & Anr., CS(OS)
No.673/1997, decided on 01.08.2012. The relevant paras, i.e paras 2 to 8, of
L.M. Khosla's case (supra) read as under:-
"2. The plaintiff was an employee of the defendant No.1-company
and he was terminated from the services of the defendant No.1-
company by giving a one month's pay in lieu of one month's notice
for termination of services. The plaintiff has filed the suit
CS(OS) No.393/2010 Page 3 of 17
challenging his termination and has claimed various reliefs which are
as under:-
"(A) To pass a decree for money awarding compensation to
plaintiff and against defendants liable jointly and severally in
the sum of Rs. 71,81,306/- as claimed in para 26 above
(detailed and digested in Annexure 'H' (COLLY) or such other
amount as adjudged by Hon'ble Court together with interest
pendent lite and future at a rate of 24% per annum or such rate
as allowed by Hon'ble Court.
(B) To award such further amount of compensation
ordered/evaluated in terms of enquiry ordered by Hon'ble Court
relating to plaintiff's entitlement for salary level as prayed for
in para 25 above.
IN ALTERNATIVE TO ABOVE:
To declare that plaintiff's employment as Manager Liaison and
Customer Services with defendant company was not validly
terminated by defendants under defendant No.2's letter dated
12.9.1995 (annexed as part of ANNEXURE 'G') and the same
is illegal, invalid, void and a nullity along with declaring that
the plaintiff's employment with defendant company is
determinable only upon plaintiff attaining the age of
superannuation viz. 58 years i.e. on the ending of 30.4.2004
with all benefits/entitlements in tact/attached thereto.
(C) To award costs of the suit in favour of plaintiff and
against the defendants 1 and 2 liable jointly and severally.
(D) To pass such other or further orders as deemed just, fit
and proper in the circumstances of the case."
3. The issues with respect to whether an employee under a private
employment can file a suit seeking continuation of services with
consequential benefits of pay etc and disentitlement of the employer
to terminate the services have been decided by me in three judgments
as under:-
CS(OS) No.393/2010 Page 4 of 17
(i) Shri Satya Narain Garg through his legal heirs Vs.
DCM Limited and Ors. in RFA No.556/2002 decided on
5.12.2011.
(ii) GE Capital Transportation Financial Services Ltd. Vs.
Shri Tarun Bhargava in RFA No.294/2004 decided on
20.3.2012. An S.L.P. against this judgment has been dismissed
by the Supreme Court on 3.8.2012 in S.L.P. No.21723/2012.
(iii) Pawan Kumar Dalmia Vs. M/s. HCL Infosystems Ltd.
and Ors. in RFA Nos.180/2004, 235/2004 and 239/2004
decided on 13.3.2012.
4. In the judgment in the case of Shri Satya Narain Garg (supra),
I have referred to the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the
case of Binny Ltd. & Anr. Vs. V. Sadasivan & Ors. (2005) 6 SCC
657 and which holds that public policy principles or administrative
law principles do not apply to private employment. The relevant
paras in the judgment in Shri Satya Narain Garg (supra) read as
under:-
"7. Merely because two views are possible, this Court will
not interfere with the conclusion arrived at by the Trial Court,
unless the conclusion is illegal or perverse or causes grave
injustice. In case of private employment, the employers are
fully justified in taking steps for termination of services, if it
finds that the employee is not upto the mark. Principles
applicable in public law domain do not apply with respect to
employees in private employment. Employment in private
sector is governed by the terms and conditions of employment,
and unless the termination is shown to be violation of the terms
and conditions of employment, it cannot be said that the
termination is illegal. In the present case, in my opinion, since
there was no fixed period of employment so far as the deceased
plaintiff is concerned, the deceased plaintiff could have been
terminated from services even by a simplicitor notice, assuming
even if the services of the deceased plaintiff were upto the
mark. Further, even if there is illegal termination of services, it
is not possible to grant damages as claimed inasmuch as the
principle of mitigation of damages squarely applies. As per this
CS(OS) No.393/2010 Page 5 of 17
principle of mitigation of damages enshrined in Section 73 of
the Contract Act, 1872 even if an employee is illegally
terminated from services, he cannot sit at home and he must
take sufficient steps to procure alternative employment. The
law in this regard is contained in the judgment of the Supreme
Court reported as S.S. Shetty v. Bharat Nidhi Ltd., AIR 1958
SC 12. Paras 12 and 13 of this judgment are relevant and the
same read as under:
12. The position as it obtains in the ordinary law of master
and servant is quite clear. The master who wrongfully
dismisses his servant is bound to pay him such damages as will
compensate him for the wrong that he has sustained.
"They are to be assessed by reference to the amount
earned in the service wrongfully terminated and the time likely
to elapse before the servant obtains another post for which he
fitted. If the contract expressly provides that it is terminable
upon, e.g., a month's notice, the damages will ordinarily be a
month's wages... ... ... No compensation can be claimed in
respect of the injury done to the servant's feelings by the
circumstances of his dismissal, nor in respect of extra difficulty
of finding work resulting from those circumstances. A servant
who has been wrongfully dismissed must use diligence to seek
another employment, and the fact that he has been offered a
suitable post may be taken into account in assessing the
damages."
(Chitty on Contracts, 21st Edition, Vol (2), p. 559 para. 1040).
13. If the contract of employment is for a specific term, the
servant would in that event be entitled to damages the amount
of which would be measured prima facie and subject to the rule
of mitigation in the salary of which the master had deprived
him. (Vide Collier v. Sunday Referee Publishing Co. Ltd.,
1940-4 ALL. E.R. 234 at p.237 (A). The servant would then be
entitled to the whole of the salary, benefits, etc., which he
would have earned had he continued in the employ of the
master for the full term of the contract, subject of course to
mitigation of damages by way of seeking alternative
employment."
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
CS(OS) No.393/2010 Page 6 of 17
9. Surely, these types of self-serving averments cannot be
held as discharge of onus of proof of mitigation of damages.
The statement made by the deceased plaintiff is bereft of any
details as to which companies or firms or persons he applied to,
and on which dates, and for what position, and for what salary
and also the details as to why he could not obtain the alternative
employment. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the deceased
plaintiff, even assuming he was wrongly terminated from
services, failed to prove that he had taken sufficient steps for
mitigation of damages."
5. In the case of GE Capital Transportation Financial (supra), I
have referred to the earlier judgment in the case of Shri Satya Narain
Garg (supra), and also the fact that contracts which are determinable
in nature cannot be specifically enforced as per Section 14(1)(c) of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963. I have also referred to the fact that if the
contract of employment provides for one month's notice, then, the
maximum entitlement of damages of an employee who alleges illegal
termination is one month's pay. Paras 10 to 12 of the judgment in the
case of GE Capital Transportation Financial (supra) are relevant
and the same read as under:-
"10. In fact, the subject suit was also barred by Section
14(1)(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 which provides that
the contract which is in its nature determinable, cannot be
specifically enforced. I have referred to the fact that the
contract was determinable by a one month's notice as per
clause 7 of the terms and conditions of the letter dated
21.4.1998 and therefore the contract which was determinable
by one month's notice cannot be specifically enforced. What
cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly i.e. if there
cannot be specific performance of the contract, there cannot be
declaration and injunction to continue such a service contract.
Section 41(e) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides that
injunction will not be granted to prevent breach of the contract,
performance of which could not be specifically enforced.
11. Therefore, looking at the matter from the point of view
of the contract of personal service not being enforceable under
Section 14(1)(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the contract
being determinable in nature and hence cannot be enforced as
CS(OS) No.393/2010 Page 7 of 17
per Section 14(1)(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 or that
injunction could not be granted to prevent breach of a contract
which cannot be specifically enforced, the suit was clearly
barred and not maintainable. The judgment of the trial Court
does not refer to the binding provisions of Sections 14(1)(b), (c)
and 41(e) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. To complete the
discussion on this aspect, I would once again refer to the recent
judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Binny Ltd.
(supra) and which specifically provides that in private contracts
i.e. in strict contractual matters, there does not arise the issue of
applicability of Administrative Law principles.
12. I have already stated above that even presuming there
was breach of contract, at best reasonable damages can be
granted and once there is a clause for termination of services by
one month's notice, it can only be one month's notice which
can be treated as reasonable damages inasmuch as parties
understood the period for obtaining of an alternative
employment as a one month's notice period-vide SS shetty's
case (supra)"
As already stated above, an S.L.P. filed against this
judgment has been dismissed.
6. In the present case, the plaintiff himself relies upon the terms
and conditions of employment issued by the original employer and
then reconfirmed by the defendant No.1, in the letters dated
27.7.1970 and 30.9.1974. Defendant No.1 is the company which
subsequently took over the original/erstwhile employer of the
plaintiff. It could not be disputed that in terms of these letters the
services after the probation period of the plaintiff can be terminated
by giving one month's notice or one month's pay in lieu of notice.
Since the letters containing the terms of employment are small letters
and the terms are relevant, I seeks to reproduce the same in entirety.
These letters read as under:-
"Mr. L.M. Khosla,
B-5/14, Model Town,
Delhi-9
JS/IG 27th July, 1970.
CS(OS) No.393/2010 Page 8 of 17
Dear Sir,
With reference to your application dated the 2nd June, 1970, and
your subsequent interview, we have pleasure in confirming your
employment with Scandinavian Airlines System, New Delhi in the
capacity of the Documentation Assistant-cum-Reservation Clerk.
Your employment will commence Ist August, 1970, subject to a
three month probation period and medical examination.
Your salary during the probation period is fixed at Rs. 650/- (Rupees
six hundred and fifty only) per month. On confirmation your salary
will be Rs. 700/- (Rupees seven hundred only) per month.
The above salary is inclusive of all allowance and dearness except
for fixed Housing Assistance Allowance which is in your case Rs.
45/- (Rupees forty-five only) per month.
If for any reason your services are terminated or you decide to
terminate your employment during the probation period, either side
will be entitled to give 24 hours notice and salary calculated on daily
basis will be paid up to date of termination. After confirmation one
month's notice from either side.
You will be entitled to eighteen working days leave per year. The
time to be accepted by the Company, taking into consideration the
convenience of work. You will also be entitled to join the Local
Employees Provident Fund after completion of one year's
continuation service.
Kindly confirm the above terms by signing and returning to us the
copy hereof.
Yours faithfully,
SCANDINAVIAN AIRLINES
J. Svane-Christensen
District Manager.
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
CS(OS) No.393/2010 Page 9 of 17
Your ref. Your letter Our ref. Calcutta
SP/IP 30 September 1974
Dear Mr. Khosla,
This is to confirm that Thai International will take over from
SAS the administrative responsibilities of this office as of October
01, 1974. As of same date you are thus in the employ of Thai
International under the very same terms and conditions-including
acquired seniority-as those now enjoyed by you during your
employment with SAS.
Best regards,
Sven Palm
Area Manager"
It is not disputed before me that the defendant No.1 has
given one month's pay to the plaintiff in lieu of the notice period of
one month. Therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to any other
compensation or damages or moneys from the defendant No.1.
7. In the case of Pawan Kumar Dalmia (supra) observations
similar to those made by me in the case of Shri Satya Narain Garg
(supra) were made. Paras 15 and 16 of the judgment in the case of
Pawan Kumar Dalmia (supra) are relevant and the same read as
under:-
"15. Finally, I must add that even at best if the termination of
services of Sh. Pawan Kumar Dalmia was a breach of contract,
parties admittedly being governed by contractual relations, the
maximum effect of the so called illegal termination would have
been an entitlement to salary of two months and admittedly the
appellant-Sh. Pawan Kumar Dalmia on his own showing has
received salary till May, 1999. In any case, the complete
statement of account with respect to full and final settlement
was given vide Ex.DW1/4 dated 15.7.1999. I cannot agree
with the arguments as raised on behalf of the appellant that this
letter dated 15.7.1999 was not served on the appellant/plaintiff
inasmuch as this letter is accompanied by the AD card which
CS(OS) No.393/2010 Page 10 of 17
shows receipt of the postal article by a person one "Sarita". It
is not disputed that the letter dated 15.7.1999 has been sent to
the correct address by the postal department, and therefore,
defendant No.1/respondent No.1 discharged the onus of proof
by filing the AD card. If the appellant wanted to dispute the
receipt of the letter dated 15.7.1999, onus of proof was upon
him to summon the record from the post office to show that
there was no delivery of article at the stated address, however,
the appellant did not do so, and would not have done so
inasmuch as the stand that the registered letter dated 15.7.1999
was not received was a stand which was false to his knowledge
inasmuch as the letter dated 15.7.1999 has been sent to the
admitted address of the appellant, and which is also the address
being the self-leased premises. In view of the aforesaid, the
judgments in the case of Green View Radio Service (supra)
and Dinanath Shantaram (supra) therefore do not have
application to the facts of the present case. Merely denying by
the appellant/plaintiff that he has no family member of the
name of 'Sarita' is neither here nor there as such a person
'Sarita' could have been a servant or any other person found or
otherwise living at the address which is admittedly the address
of the appellant/plaintiff.
16. The judgments cited on behalf of the appellant in the
cases of Jyotsna Raina (supra) and Municipal Corporation of
Delhi (supra) will not apply inasmuch as the employment in
this case is a contractual employment and is not a statutory
appointment or an employment under a statutory corporation or
a company which is "state" under Article 12 of Constitution of
India. The issue of a person being terminated by an authority
inferior to the person who appointed such person is relevant in
proceedings under Services Law or where there is an issue of
violation of Article 14 of the Constitution, but definitely not in
employments which are contractual employments and governed
by contractual terms and conditions. In any case, Board of
Directors is a superior authority than a Chairman of a company
and hence in the present facts it is not that termination can be
said to be by an inferior authority to the appointing authority.
The judgment in the case of Haryana Seeds Development
Corporation (supra) also has no application to the facts of the
present case inasmuch as in the said case, the Court was
concerned with termination of services of a Company Secretary
by a Managing Director and not by the Board of Directors as
has been done in the present case. In fact, a reference to the
judgment in the case of Haryana Seeds Development
Corporation (supra) shows that Board of Directors of a
company can surely terminate the services of a Company
Secretary. Trial Court has also referred to and rightly
distinguished this judgment in para 26 of the impugned
judgment reproduced above. The judgment relied upon in the
case of Amal Kumar Mukherjee (supra) with respect to the
argument that the minute book of a company ought to be bound
and written in hand, is to be read in the context of the facts of
the said case wherein there were disputes inter se shareholders
of a company and in such circumstances, the issue had arisen
with respect to manipulation of the minute book of the
company. In the present case, there is no dispute inter se
shareholders or inter se Directors of the Board of the company
and therefore the judgment in the case of Amal Kumar
Mukherjee (supra) will have no application to the facts of the
present case, especially for the reasons stated above that there is
no subsequent resolution of the Board of Directors or any
resolution in the General Body meeting of defendant
No.1/respondent No.1-company questioning or rescinding the
termination of services of the appellant-Sh. Pawan Kumar
Dalmia."
8. In view of the aforesaid judgments, the following
conclusions in law emerge:-
(i) A contract of private employment is not similar to the
public employment and in such private employment there is no
scope of applicability of the principles of administrative
law/public law.
(ii) A contract of employment which provides
termination of services by one month's notice, then, at best the
employee will only be entitled to one month's pay in terms of the
employment contract. An employee is not entitled to any relief
of continuation in services or pay with consequential benefits for
alleged remaining period of services till the date of his
superannuation.
(iii) As per the provision of Section 14(1)(c) of the Specific
Relief Act, 1963, a contract which is determinable in nature
cannot be specifically enforced. Since the service contract in the
present case is determinable by one month's notice there does
not arise the question of giving of any reliefs which tantamount
to enforcement of a determinable contract. As per Section
14(1)(b), a contract of personal service cannot be enforced when
the employer is not the Government or "State" as per Article 12
of the Constitution of India.
Plaintiff has in fact received one month's pay and
therefore his claim will stand satisfied in law and he is not entitled to
any reliefs as prayed for in prayer clauses in the suit."
(emphasis is mine)
4. It is therefore clear that the plaintiff cannot claim illegality of
termination of his employment either for continuing the employment or for
claiming any monetary amount as if he had continued in employment with
the defendant no.7.
5. In this suit the following are the relief clauses:-
"A. Decree of Declaration declaring that the Termination letter
dated 07.08.2009 is illegal and bad in law;
B. Pass a Decree in favour of plaintiff and against defendants
for a sum of Rs. 1,00,00,000 as damages for loss of reputation,
loss of goodwill, loss of employment opportunities and
causing mental agony and distress to plaintiff by terminating
him illegally and defamation caused to him by indulging into
character assassination through public notice.
C. Decree of Declaration Declaring the Due Diligence Report
prepared by the Defendant No.8 & 9 qua the Plaintiff as Null
and Void and consequentially grant exemplary damages for
preparing a fabricated and false report.
D. Award pendent lite and future interest @ 18% from the
date of filing of this suit till the realization,
E. Cost; &
F. Any other order/orders as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit
and proper in the facts of the present case."
6. In view of the above discussion pertaining to the ratio of the
judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of S.S. Shetty (supra), there
cannot be granted relief to the plaintiff of declaring the termination of the
plaintiff as illegal and void inasmuch as even if the termination is illegal and
void, then, at best the plaintiff is entitled to three months' salary for the
notice period and which can be the only maximum liability upon the
defendant no.7. Thus the only relief which the plaintiff is entitled to is that
he would be paid three months' salary which was due to the plaintiff as on
the date of his termination vide Letter dated 07.08.2009, and accordingly,
the defendant no.7 is directed to pay three months' salary to the plaintiff
w.e.f the date of the Termination Letter dated 07.08.2009 along with interest
@ 9% p.a. simple till payment. In case payment is not made within a period
of three months, the rate of interest thereafter will become 18% p.a. simple.
7. Learned counsel for the plaintiff argued that reliefs in the
prayer clauses of this suit are different than in the case before the Supreme
Court in S.S. Shetty (supra) or even from the facts of the case decided by
this Court in L.M. Khosla (supra) and therefore the suit is maintainable,
however, I note that though part of the prayer clause talks of grant of
damages for loss of reputation and goodwill on the ground of defamation, in
the plaint there are no bundle of facts constituting a cause of action as to
how plaintiff has been defamed or plaintiff has suffered loss of reputation
and goodwill. Where relief is sought on the basis of the alleged defamation
or loss of goodwill of the plaintiff with respect to any defamation or any
alleged character assassination, there has to be entire set of facts which are
required to be stated in view of Order VI Rule 4 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 for claiming any damages with respect to defamation or
character assassination or loss of goodwill. I asked the counsel for the
plaintiff to show me that if and what was the public notice issued in the
newspaper by the defendant no.7 defaming the plaintiff and as is orally
argued before me, but the counsel for the plaintiff could not point out to me
any averment made in the plaint that a particular notice of a particular date in
a particular newspaper or other publication was issued by defendant no.7
and which amounts to defamation and character assassination of the
plaintiff. A bland statement made in the plaint, including in the relief clause,
of loss of goodwill and reputation thus cannot be a basis for grant of
damages for alleged defamation, loss of goodwill and reputation as the plaint
lacks averments to constitute such a cause of action. The plaint therefore
lacks the cause of action for grant of damages on such basis and therefore
damages cannot be granted to the plaintiff. It also bears note that in a suit
for claiming damages by defamation, plaintiff must make averments as to
how the plaintiff has been brought down in the estimation of right thinking
members of the society, but even that this averment has been made in the
plaint could not be pointed out to this Court on behalf of the plaintiff.
Really, therefore, plaintiff has no case for claiming damages for defamation
or alleged character assassination of the plaintiff. Finally, while on this
aspect it is noted that if there is an illegal termination, and the remedy as per
law is the three months' salary in lieu of the period of notice, then, for such
aspect there cannot be a claim in law with respect to damages on the ground
of mental agony and distress inasmuch as by law the monetary benefits are
limited to the notice period of termination.
8. In view of the above, there is no merit in the suit, and the same
is therefore dismissed except to the extent of directions issued to the
defendant no.7 to pay to the plaintiff three months' salary due on the date of
Termination Letter dated 07.08.2009 along with interest @ 9% p.a. simple
within a period of three months from today and if this amount is not paid
within three months from today, then, the rate of interest payable by the
defendant no.7 to the plaintiff would become @ 18% p.a. simple till
payment.
9. Payment can be made by the defendant no.7 either directly to
the plaintiff or by giving a pay order in the name of the plaintiff to the
counsel for the plaintiff who is appearing before this Court today.
10. Parties are left to bear their own costs. Pending applications are
also accordingly disposed of.
NOVEMBER 05, 2015 VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J
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