Citation : 2015 Latest Caselaw 3188 Del
Judgement Date : 21 April, 2015
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ O.A. 252/2014 in CS(OS) 2509/2010 and
I.A. 22868/2014 (under Section 5 of Limitation Act)
Decided on 21.04.2015
IN THE MATTER OF:
GUNJAN KUMAR ..... Plaintiff
Through: Mr. M. Dutta, Advocate
versus
VIPIN PARWANDA & ANR ..... Defendants
Through: Mr. Mukesh Kaushik, Advocate for
the appellant/applicant in O.A. 252/2014 and
I.A. 22868/2014.
CORAM
HON'BLE MS.JUSTICE HIMA KOHLI
HIMA KOHLI, J. (Oral)
1. The present Chamber Appeal has been filed by Ms. Sonia
Grover(daughter of the defendants No.1 and 2) against the order
dated 02.09.2014, passed by the Joint Registrar, whereby the
impleadment application filed by her was dismissed (I.A. 8628/2014).
2. A brief background of the case is necessary.
3. The plaintiff has instituted the accompanying suit for possession
and injunction against the defendants (parents of the applicant) in
respect of the ground floor of premises No.A-139, Kalkaji Extension,
Delhi. The plaintiff's case is that the defendants No.1 and 2 had
represented themselves to be the co-owners of the suit premises. As
per the averments made in the plaint, the parties had entered into an
Agreement to Sell dated 01.11.2009, in respect of the suit premises,
whereunder the plaintiff had agreed to purchase the same for a sale
consideration of `22,50,000/-. Thereafter, the sale deed was executed
by the defendants in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the suit
premises and on the said date, after adjusting the earnest money of
`12,50,000/- paid by the plaintiff, the balance sum of `10 lacs was
also received by the defendants.
4. It is the case of the plaintiff that at the time of executing the
sale deed, though it was recorded in the document that actual physical
possession of the suit premises had been handed over by the vendors
to the vendee, but the defendants had expressed some difficulty in
handing over possession on account of the applicant's final school
examinations and they had promised the plaintiff that they would hand
over vacant peaceful possession to her immediately after their
daughter's examinations were over. However, when the defendants
continued occupying the suit premises and failed to hand over peaceful
possession thereof to the plaintiff, she was compelled to institute the
accompanying suit in December, 2010.
5. Summons were issued in the suit on 10.12.2010 and vide order
dated 18.02.2011, the defendants were directed to maintain status
quo in respect of the title and possession of the suit premises. Though
the defendants were served with the summons in the suit, they did not
enter appearance and as a result, they were proceeded against ex
parte vide order dated 20.5.2011. After the aforesaid order was
passed, the plaintiff filed her affidavit by way of evidence. The ex
parte evidence of the plaintiff was closed on 11.01.2013. On the said
date, the defendant No.1 turned up and he was granted permission to
cross-examine the plaintiff's witness but he did not conduct any cross-
examination. With these orders, the suit was directed to be placed
before the Court on 20.3.2013.
6. In the meantime, on 21.01.2013, the defendants filed
applications under Order IX Rule 7 CPC and Section 5 of Limitation
Act, praying inter alia for setting aside the ex parte order dated
20.05.2011. Notice was issued on the said applications and the same
were finally allowed vide order dated 20.03.2013. On the said date,
last opportunity was granted to the defendants to file their written
statement on or before 02.04.2013 and the case was directed to be
placed before the Joint Registrar for admission and denial of
documents. However, the defendants failed to avail of the liberty
granted to them to file their written statement. As a result, on
10.09.2013, the Joint Registrar closed their right to file the written
statement. On 13.01.2014, permission was granted to the defendants
to conduct admission and denial of the documents filed by the plaintiff
but counsel for the defendants refused to do so. As a result, the
documents filed by the plaintiff were deemed to be admitted by the
defendants and the case was directed to be placed before the Court for
further proceedings.
7. On 31.03.2014, a Chamber Appeal, registered as O.A. 51/2014
was filed by the defendants against the order dated 10.09.2013
passed by the Joint Registrar, closing their right to file the written
statement. Notice was issued on the said Chamber Appeal and the
plaintiff has filed a reply in opposition thereto. Appropriate orders
have been passed in the said appeal separately.
8. Coming back to the applicant herein, she alongwith her brother,
Mr. Abhinav Parwanda had filed an application for impleadment under
Order I Rule 10 CPC, registered as I.A. 8628/2012. It was recorded in
the order dated 13.05.2014, that despite opportunities being granted
to the applicants to address arguments on the maintainability of the
said application, none had been appearing on their behalf. In the
interest of justice, the said application was adjourned to 08.07.2014
and thereafter to 02.09.2014. Finally, by the impugned order dated
02.09.2014, the aforesaid application was dismissed by the learned
Joint Registrar who had observed that it was not maintainable in view
of the fact that the applicants had themselves agreed by virtue of
clause 3 of the Memorandum of Family Settlement dated 23.10.2009,
executed between them and the defendants No.1 and 2(their parents)
that they would sell the suit premises and the sale proceeds would be
divided between them. It was therefore observed that the applicants
were neither necessary, nor proper parties in the suit and the said
application was dismissed. At the same time, liberty was granted to
the applicants to pursue their remedies in accordance with law.
9. Counsel for the appellant/Ms. Sonia Grover submits that at the
time of passing the impugned order, the learned Joint Registrar had
erred in interpreting the terms and conditions of the Memorandum of
Settlement dated 23.10.2009 and had failed to appreciate the fact that
the appellant has a share to the extent of 20% in the suit premises
and therefore, she has a stake in the said premises. It is further
stated that though it was recorded in the Memorandum of Settlement
that the suit premises had to be sold, but it was nowhere recorded as
to the manner in which the said premises was to be sold and that
appellant's consent had not been obtained by her parents before
executing the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff.
10. Counsel for the respondent/plaintiff vehemently opposes the
present Chamber Appeal and submits that the appellant is neither a
necessary, nor a proper party in the present proceedings. He explains
that as per the title documents dated 11.07.1994, the DDA had
executed a conveyance deed in respect of the suit premises in favour
of the defendants No.1 and 2 and subsequently, they were the ones
who had got the property converted from leasehold to freehold. He
submits that in such circumstances, it cannot be urged by the counsel
for the appellant that she has any right, title or interest in the suit
premises and in any case if she has any claim against her parents on
the basis of a Memorandum of Settlement, then it is for her to seek
her remedies against them in an independent proceeding. However,
she cannot be permitted to intervene in the plaintiff's suit and expand
the scope of the said suit from one for possession and injunction to a
suit for partition/recovery of monies against the defendants.
11. The law on the question as to whether the scope of a suit for
eviction/possession of a property purchased by the plaintiff from the
defendants can be expanded to include a third party claiming to have
an interest over the said property and seeking impleadment as a
co-defendant in the said suit, is well settled. As held in the case of
Kasturi Vs. Iyyamperumal and others reported as AIR 2005 SC
2813, the twin tests that must be satisfied for determining the
question as to who is a necessary party in a suit for specific
performance are that firstly, there must be a right to some relief
against such a party in respect of the controversies involved in the
proceedings and secondly, no effective decree can be passed in the
absence of such a party.
12. In the aforecited case, the Supreme Court had carefully
considered the provisions of Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act and
opined that the guiding principle for impleadment is that the presence
of a party is absolutely necessary to adjudicate the controversies
involved in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale, as,
the only question that is required to be adjudicated in such a suit is
the enforceability of the contract entered into between the contracting
parties. It was held that an applicant whose interest is adverse to the
defendant ought not to be impleaded in a suit for specific performance
for the reason that if a person seeking addition in such a suit, it is
natural that the scope of the said suit would be enlarged far beyond
the relief sought by a contracting party.
13. In the case at hand, the appellant/intervener does not seek
impleadment in the suit on the basis of a contract between the plaintiff
and the defendants in respect of the suit premises, which is the
foundation of the present suit for eviction and possession instituted by
the plaintiff. Instead, the appellant/intervener bases her claim on an
independent interest arising out of a Memorandum of Settlement
dated 23.10.2009, purportedly executed between her, her brother and
the defendants No.1 and 2. The consequence of permitting the
appellant impleadment in the present suit, would be that the nature of
the suit will change drastically and it would be converted from a suit
for eviction and possession to a suit for partition and declaration,
which is impermissible in law. Therefore, no permission can be
granted to the appellant for impleadment in the suit, as it would
change its entire character.
14. Apart from the above, on a bare reading of Order I Rule 10(2) of
the CPC which refers to "all the questions involved in the suit", it is
clear that the controversies raised by the appellant here are entirely
different from those required to be examined in the suit instituted by
the plaintiff and quite clearly, the said controversies do not involve the
plaintiff. Rather, they are confined to the appellant/intervener and the
defendants(her parents). Since the appellant is not a party to the sale
deed, it cannot be urged that without her presence, the dispute raised
in the suit cannot be determined.
15. Resultantly, the question of impleading the appellant/intervener
in this suit or entertaining her plea of impleadment based on the
purported Memorandum of Family Settlement dated 23.10.2009,
executed by her, her brother and the defendants does not arise. Any
permission granted by the Court to the appellant/intervener for
impleadment would only lead to unnecessarily complicating the
litigation, which is far beyond the scope of the suit instituted by the
plaintiff [Refer: Anil Kumar Singh Vs. Shivnath Mishra, (1995) 3 SCC
147]. It is therefore held that the appellant is neither a necessary,
nor a proper party in the present proceedings; nor is her presence
considered necessary for a complete and final decision on the
questions involved in the suit.
16. The Chamber Appeal is dismissed, while upholding the impugned
order dated 02.09.2014, passed by the Joint Registrar. Needless to
state that if the appellant/intervener has a remedy in law, it is for her
to seek the same in an independent proceeding.
(HIMA KOHLI)
APRIL 21, 2015 JUDGE
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