Delhi High Court
Paramjeet Singh @ Pummy vs State on 3 September, 2014
$~16
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ BAIL APPLN. 1900/2014
PARAMJEET SINGH @ PUMMY ..... Petitioner
Through Mr. Praveen Aggarwal, Advocate.
versus
STATE ..... Respondent
Through Mr. O. P. Saxena, APP.
SI Satish Lohia, Police Station Neb Sarai.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDERSHAN KUMAR MISRA
% SUDERSHAN KUMAR MISRA, J.(Oral)
1. The present application for anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 has been moved by the petitioner in relation
with FIR No. 449/2014 registered at Police Station Neb Sarai, under section
323/308/34 of the Indian Penal Code.
2. The petitioner- Paramjeet Singh is the son of the co-accused, Joginder
Singh, who has already been enlarged on regular bail on 18.06.2014. On the
other hand, the anticipatory bail application moved by the petitioner was
dismissed on 24.06.2014. The petitioner has now moved this Court for the
same relief.
3. The complainant in the present case is stated to be the petitioner's
landlord. It is alleged by the complainant, that when he approached the
petitioner with regard to the electricity bill that was raised in respect of the
tenanted premises, he was assaulted by the petitioner and the petitioner's
father - Joginder Singh, and as a result of this, he sustained various injuries,
including, multiple lacerations on his head. The complainant further stated
that, the petitioner's father used a danda, whereas the petitioner used a
kripan.
Furthermore, when the complainant and the complainant's father
confronted the petitioner and his father, the complainant's father was also
struck on his head with a kripan. It was with regard to these incidents that
FIR 449/2014 came to be registered.
4. The counsel for the petitioner has, at the very outset, denied all these
incidents, including, inter alia, that the complainant is the petitioner's
landlord. He further stated that the entire case has been fabricated and that
the FIR is nothing but a "bundle of lies". In addition, counsel for the
petitioner has also sought bail for his client on the ground of parity since,
according to him, the petitioner and his father have been assigned the same
role; and therefore, since the petitioner's father has been granted bail, the
petitioner should be granted anticipatory bail.
Be that as it may, I am not inclined to go into the explanations and
allegations being raised by the petitioner at the bar today; more so, for the
reason that any analysis of the same by me might tend to prejudice his trial.
5. Firstly, the petitioner cannot claim parity with the position of the co-
accused, namely, Sh. Joginder Singh, i.e. his father, for the reason that the
co-accused has been enlarged on regular bail after his arrest. Secondly, the
weapons of offence are different. The co-accused i.e. the petitioner's father
is stated to have used a danda whereas the petitioner is stated to have used a
kripan.
6. In substance, counsel for the petitioner also seems to be taking the
position that there is some inherent right available to citizens to abscond the
moment they fear an accusation and arrest, and to remain away from the
reach of the police till such time as they are able to persuade the courts,
through their counsel, to grant anticipatory bail. At least in my opinion, this
is the effect of submissions made by counsel for the petitioner at the bar.
And, when this proposition was put to the counsel, his response was, "does
that mean that provisions of anticipatory bail must be thrown out from the
statute book".
To my mind, there is a huge gap between the two propositions; and
the mere fact of provisions for anticipatory bail having been enacted by the
legislature, cannot be interpreted as a license to all accused persons to hide
or evade the police, till such time as their claim for protection from arrest is
granted by the courts regardless of how long that takes.
7. Counsel for the State also produced the original medical records and
some photographs which clearly show head injuries suffered during the
assault and profuse bleeding as a result thereof. The gravity of the offence
has also been duly noted by the court below.
8. Looking at the approach adopted by the counsel for the petitioner, I
am convinced that the only purpose of this petition is to secure one aim, i.e.,
to avoid arrest by the police, at all costs. Whenever it is put to counsel as to
why the petitioner should not have been available to the police to do their
job as they think fit, including by arresting him, ever since the dismissal of
his last anticipatory bail application on 24.06.2014, i.e., nearly 2 ½ months
ago, counsel's stock response is, "I will be available to the police provided I
am given protection against arrest".
This stand itself speaks volumes about the conduct and intent of the
petitioner. It means, in effect, that so long the courts continue to decline his
prayer, his position will remain unchanged, i.e., he will continue evade
arrest. I do not think the law, as it stands, permits an accused to lay down
any such preconditions; or to adopt such tactics. To my mind, this petition
is an abuse of process of this Court.
9. Under the circumstances, I do not consider it to be a fit case for grant
of anticipatory bail. Therefore, the bail application is dismissed.
SUDERSHAN KUMAR MISRA
Judge
SEPTEMBER 03, 2014
dr
