M/S Saptagiri Restaurant vs Airports Authority Of India
2014 Latest Caselaw 5019 Del

*      IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

                                       Date of decision: 9th October, 2014.

+      LPA No.681/2014, CMs No.16706/2014 (for stay) & 16707/2014
       (for exemption)

       M/S SAPTAGIRI RESTAURANT                     ..... Appellant
                     Through: Mr. J.K. Mittal, Mr. Rajveer Singh,
                              Ms. Divya Sharma and Mr. Rakesh
                              Mittal, Advs.

                              Versus

       AIRPORTS AUTHORITY OF INDIA             ..... Respondent
                   Through: Ms. Anjana Gosain and Mr. Pradeep
                            Desodya, Advs.

                                   AND

+      LPA No.682/2014, CMs No.16708/2014 (for stay) & 16709/2014
       (for exemption)

       M/S SAPTAGIRI RESTAURANT                     ..... Appellant
                     Through: Mr. J.K. Mittal, Mr. Rajveer Singh,
                              Ms. Divya Sharma and Mr. Rakesh
                              Mittal, Advs.

                              Versus

       AIRPORTS AUTHORITY OF INDIA             ..... Respondent
                   Through: Ms. Anjana Gosain and Mr. Pradeep
                            Desodya, Advs.

CORAM:
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW


LPA Nos.681/2014 & 682/2014                                      Page 1 of 7
 RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.

1. These intra court appeals have been listed post-lunch, on urgent

mentioning by the counsel for the appellant. The appeals impugn the

separate but similar orders, both dated 1st October, 2014, of the learned

Single Judge of this Court of dismissal in limine of W.P.(C) Nos.6742/2014

& 6766/2014 respectively, preferred by the appellant.

2. The counsel for the respondent appears on advance notice. We have at

the stage of admission only, heard the counsel for the appellant finally.

3. The writ petitions were filed impugning separate letters, both dated

11th April, 2014, of the respondent, giving 180 days notice to the appellant of

termination of license granted to the appellant for operating a Snack Bar

Counter in the Ground Floor Check-in area of Anna International Terminal

Building (originally allotted) at Chennai Airport in W.P.(C) No.6742/2014

and license granted for operation of Snack Bar Counter in the Car Park area

of Kamaraj Domestic Terminal Building (originally allotted) at Chennai

Airport in W.P.(C) No.6766/2014, respectively. The writ petitions also

sought the relief of restraining the respondent from interfering in the

peaceful operation of the respective Snack Bars, for the residual period of

licenses till 7th April, 2020 in W.P.(C) No.6742/2014 and till 15th March,

2016 in W.P.(C) No.6766/2014.

4. The learned Single Judge dismissed both the writ petitions on the

ground that the licenses granted to the appellant, by their express terms, were

terminable by 90 days notice and thus the prayer as sought for by the

appellant, for being allowed to continue operation of the Snack Bars, cannot

be granted. Liberty was however given to the appellant to seek other

remedies, as available in law.

5. The counsel for the appellant before us is unable to controvert the

aforesaid reason given by the learned Single Judge. His contention however

is that the reason for termination of licenses given in the notices dated 11th

April, 2014, of the area the Airport licensed to the appellant for Snack Bars

falling in the area of the Master Concessionaire for development, operation

and maintenance of food and beverage outlets at the said Airport since

introduced, is incorrect. It is contended that upon renovation of the Airport

and introduction of the system of Master Concessionaire, the appellant was

made to surrender the original area of the Airport licensed to it and to shift to

a new place in the new Airport, only after the new place so allocated to the

appellant had been demarcated and at the time of which demarcation, the

area of the Master Concessionaire was taken into consideration. It is argued

that having made the appellant spend a considerable amount of money in

setting up the Snack Bars at the new location, the action of the respondent of

terminating the licenses, even though entitled under the terms thereof, prior

to the agreed maximum term thereof, is arbitrary. Similarly, it is contended

that though the term of the license with respect to the Snack Bar Counter in

the car park area had expired but since the appellant owing to the renovation

work was unable to operate the same, the respondent having thereafter for

this reason extended the term of the license, cannot now renege.

6. Finding that the writ petitions impugning the notices dated 11 th April,

2014 were filed towards the end of September, 2014, we have enquired from

the counsel for the appellant the reason for the delay till the last minute in

approaching the Court and as to why the appellant is not disentitled to the

relief on this ground alone.

7. The only explanation offered by the counsel for the appellant is that

the appellant is a licensee of the respondent at several other Airports also and

owing to such relationship, did not want to immediately rush to the Court

and was making attempts at reconciliation and to make the respondent

understand that the reason given for termination was erroneous.

8. However, there are neither any pleadings to the said effect nor any

document to support the same. Rather, what we find is that the appellant,

after the notices dated 11th April, 2014 of termination of licenses, represented

thereagainst for the first time vide letters dated 17th September, 2014 only.

Even in the letters dated 17th September, 2014, we do not find mention of

any earlier reply to the notices dated 11th April, 2014 or any earlier

representation thereagainst. There is no reference therein also to any parlays

which may have been held in the interregnum. The appellant did indeed

approach the Court at the fag end of the notice period of 180 days and which

in our opinion, disentitles the appellant for any discretionary relief on this

ground as well.

9. The appellant, in the license agreements entered into with the

respondent, having expressly agreed that the respondent may terminate the

said license at any time with 90 days notice and without even assigning any

reason, we are unable to find any error whatsoever in the reasoning given by

the learned Single Judge. We may further refer to The Corporation of

Calicut Vs. K. Sreenivasan (2002) 5 SCC 361 laying down that owing to

Section 64 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, a licensee, if evicted, even

though grounds for revocation of licence do not exist, or is forcefully

evicted, his only remedy is to recover compensation from grantor and not to

resume occupation. The same view was also taken by a Division Bench of

the Kerala High Court in Trivandrum Golf Club Vs. State of Kerala

MANU/KE/0337/2010 and interim injunction against dispossession sought,

declined. The Supreme Court, in appeal preferred thereagainst, vide

judgment reported in (2010) 12 SCC 723, refused to interfere. We have also

in Gesture Hotels and Food Pvt. Limited Vs. The New Delhi Municipal

Council 210 (2014) DLT 359 following the same view held that no

injunction against dispossession of a licensee can be granted. The appellant,

for the said reason also is not entitled to the relief sought of continuation as a

licensee.

10. We yet further find that it was a general term and condition of grant of

such license that the disputes and differences arising therefrom and to which

the provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants)

Act, 1971 did not apply, shall be referred to arbitration. We see no reason as

to why the appellant should not be bound by the dispute resolution remedy to

which it had agreed. We do not find the matters to be entailing any public

law element, for this Court to, notwithstanding such contractual remedy,

allow the writ jurisdiction to be invoked.

11. Thus, for the aforesaid additional reasons also, we are of the view that

the appellant is not entitled to any relief. The appeals are accordingly

dismissed. However, the appeals having been disposed of expeditiously, no

costs.

12. On request of the counsel for the appellant, we clarify that

notwithstanding the dismissal of these appeals, the appellant shall have the

remedy of availing alternative remedy as granted by the learned Single

Judge.

RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.

CHIEF JUSTICE OCTOBER 09, 2014 'bs'