State vs Habib
2014 Latest Caselaw 2473 Del

*   IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

                                       Date of decision: 16th May, 2014
+   CRL.L.P. 295/2014
    STATE                                            ..... Petitioner
                            Through:   Mr. Ravi Nayak, APP for the State.
                                       Inspector Yashpal Singh, ATO, PS
                                       Swaroop Nagar, ASI Devender, IO
                                       Security
                            versus
    HABIB                                            ..... Respondents
                            Through:   None
    %
    CORAM:
    HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KAILASH GAMBHIR
    HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SUNITA GUPTA
                   JUDGMENT

: SUNITA GUPTA, J. (Oral)

Crl. M.A. No. 6824/2014

By this application filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. r/w

Section 5 of Limitation Act, the petitioner/State is seeking

condonation of delay of 58 days in filing the accompanying

criminal leave to appeal. For the reasons stated in the application,

the same is allowed. Delay of 58 days in filing the accompanying

petition seeking leave to appeal against the impugned judgment is

condoned.

The application stands disposed of.

CRL.L.P.295/2014

1. The present criminal leave to appeal has been preferred by

the petitioner/State under Section 378 (3) Cr.P.C. to challenge that

part of the judgment dated 16th November, 2013, passed by learned

Additional Sessions Judge-01, North Rohini, Delhi whereby the

respondent was acquitted of the charges under Section

328/344/366/376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1806 (hereinafter

referred to as IPC).

2. To appreciate the contention raised by learned counsel for

the petitioner/State, a brief summary of the prosecution case is

given below:-

3. On 4th January, 2009, complainant Smt. Manwati

@Shanti,w/o late Charan Singh, R/o Gurudwara Road, Masjid Wali

Gali, Khasra No. 447, Swaroop Nagar, Delhi came to the police

station and lodged a complaint regarding missing of her daughter

'D', aged about 16 years (herein after also referred as Prosecutrix)

from 27th December, 2008 and she raised her suspicion upon one

boy, namely, Habib, s/o Jamil Khan. On the basis of this

complaint, FIR under Section 363 IPC was registered. On 10th

January, 2009, Smt. Manwati obtained the School Leaving

Certificate and thereafter handed over of 'D' wherein her date of

birth was mentioned as 22nd December, 1991. Information was sent

to Missing Persons Squad and CBI. Information was also gathered

from Ronak. On 30th April, 2009, respondent/accused Habib was

arrested in case FIR No. 97/09 under Section

363/365/366/328/344/384/34 IPC registered with PS Swaroop

Nagar but no fruitful information could be gathered. Later on, the

Investigating Officer came to know that the prosecutrix 'D' had

come to her brother-in-law's house on 30th April, 2009, thereafter

her statement under Section 161 Cr. P.C. was recorded. She was

medically examined. Her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. was

also got recorded. Accused was arrested in this case. After

completing investigation, charge sheet was submitted against the

accused.

4. Charge under Section 363/366/328/376/344 IPC was framed

against the accused to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed

trial.

5. In order to substantiate its case, prosecution has examined as

many as 20 witnesses. All the incriminating evidence was put to the

accused while recording his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C.

wherein he denied the allegations levelled against him and stated

that prosecutrix was more than 18 years of age. She was residing

with her sister. Since father-in-law of her sister used to misbehave

with her and tried to outrage her modesty, as such, she left the

house of her sister and started residing at Rajokari village. He did

not prefer to lead any defence evidence.

6. After minutely scrutinizing the evidence coming on record,

the learned Additional Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that

the age of the prosecutrix was below 18 years. The prosecution had

succeeded in proving that the prosecutrix went from the lawful

custody of her guardian on 17th December, 2008. A room was taken

on rent by the accused, where the prosecutrix was kept and since

the prosecutrix was less than 18 years of age on the date of

incident, as such, her consent was immaterial. Therefore, offence

under Section 363 IPC was proved. He was accordingly convicted

of this offence. However, prosecution failed to prove that the

prosecutrix was kidnapped by the accused to compel her for

marriage or force her to have illicit intercourse or seduce her to do

illicit intercourse or that she was administered some intoxicating

substance in the cold drink. As such, offences under Section

366/328 IPC were not proved. As regards offence under Section

376 IPC is concerned, it was held that prosecutrix had gone along

with the accused voluntarily and resided at the house at Village

Rajokari for almost four months and had sexual relations with the

accused with her own consent and since she was above age of 16

years, therefore, she was capable of giving consent for sex,

accordingly, he was also acquitted of the charge of rape punishable

under Section 376 IPC.

7. Assailing this part of the impugned judgment, Sh. Ravi

Nayak, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State submits

that the entire evidence led by the prosecution has not been

appreciated by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in correct

perspective. The Trial Court erred in overlooking the statement of

the material witnesses. The learned Trial Court also erred in taking

the date of birth mentioned in the School record as trustworthy. The

medical opinion ought to have been taken to ascertain her exact

date of birth in view of the suggestion of PW12 who had advised

X-ray of the prosecutrix for age determination. Testimony of

prosecutrix herself is sufficient to convict the accused and no

corroboration to the same is required, however, the learned Trial

Court erred in finding the testimony of the prosecutrix unreliable

and coming to the erroneous conclusion that the prosecutrix went

with the accused with her own consent. Based on the above

submissions, learned Public Prosecutor for the State strongly urges

for grant of leave to appeal to challenge the impugned judgment of

acquittal.

8. We have heard the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for

the State and given our thoughtful considerations to the arguments

advanced by him and also perused the Trial Court Record.

9. In the instant case, the learned Trial Court has convicted the

appellant for offence under Section 363 IPC but acquitted of all the

remaining charges. As already noticed, against the judgment of

acquittal, the State has preferred application for leave to appeal.

We have, therefore to examine whether the impugned judgment

suffers from any perversity calling for interference.

10. The law relating to an appeal against an order of acquittal

was succinctly laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of

Goa v. Sanjay Thakran and Another (2007) 3 SCC 755 and it will

be advantageous to reproduce the observations made by the

Supreme Court as under:-

14. By a series of decisions, this Court has laid down the parameters of appreciation of evidence on record and jurisdiction and limitations of the appellate court, and while dealing with appeal against order of acquittal this Court observed in Tota Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab (1987) 2 SCC 529, as under:

6. ...The jurisdiction of the appellate court in dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal is circumscribed by the limitation that no interference is to be made with the order of acquittal unless the approach made by the lower court to the consideration of the evidence in the case is vitiated by some

manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the court below is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any court acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to be characterised as perverse. Where two views are possible on an appraisal of the evidence adduced in the case and the court below has taken a view which is a plausible one, the appellate court cannot legally interfere with an order of acquittal even if it is of the opinion that the view taken by the court below on its consideration of the evidence is erroneous.

15. Further, this Court has observed in Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225 :

7. ...This Court has repeatedly laid down that the mere fact that a view other than the one taken by the trial court can be legitimately arrived at by the appellate court on reappraisal of the evidence cannot constitute a valid and sufficient ground to interfere with an order of acquittal unless it comes to the conclusion that the entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable. While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the appellate court is first required to seek an answer to the question whether the findings of the trial court are palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If the appellate court answers the above question in the negative the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed. Conversely, if the appellate court holds, for reasons to be recorded, that the order of acquittal cannot at all be sustained in view of any of the above infirmities it can then - and then only - reappraise the evidence to arrive at its own conclusions....

and in State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram (2003) 8 SCC 180:

7. There is no embargo on the appellate court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A

miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to re-appreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not. {See Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P. (2002) 4 SCC 85}. The principle to be followed by appellate court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference. These aspects were highlighted by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra (1973) 2 SCC 793, Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225 and Jaswant Singh v. State of Haryana (2000) 4 SCC 484.

16. From the aforesaid decisions, it is apparent that while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal the court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the court below. However, the appellate court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the view arrived at by the court below is perverse and the court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the appellate court, in such circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive at a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether any of the accused is connected with commission of the crime he is charged with.

11. Similar view was taken in Govindraju @ Govinda v. State by

Sriramapuram P.S. & Anr. 2012 III AD (SC) 453, Murlidhar @

Gidda & Anr. v. State of Karnataka, 2014 IV AD (SC) 557 and

Ramesh Vithal Patil v. State of Karnataka & Ors., 2014 IV AD

(SC) 565, Ashok Rai v. State of U.P. & Ors. 2014 V AD (SC) 1. In

the light of the aforesaid principles laid down, we shall consider the

evidence placed on record to find out whether the courts below

have committed any error in dealing with the evidence, which can

be said to be patently illegal, or that the conclusion arrived at is

wholly untenable, calling for interference by us.

12. As regards the submissions of learned Public Prosecutor for

the State that the testimony of prosecutrix does not require any

corroboration, this submission has force, inasmuch as, testimony of

a victim of sexual assault stands at par with testimony of an injured

witness and has undoubtedly a greater weight. Therefore,

corroboration for testimony of victim is not insisted upon provided

that it does not suffer from any basic infirmity and principal factors

do not lent it unworthy of credence.

13. Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Maharashtra v.

Chandraprakash Kewal Chand Jain, AIR 1990 SC 658 laid down

that a woman, who is a victim of sexual assault, is not an

accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person's lust and,

therefore, her evidence need not be tested with the same amount of

suspicion as that of an accomplice. The court observed as under:-

"A prosecutirx of a sex-offence cannot be put on par with an

accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under section 118 of the Evidence Act and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must be attached in evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or a witness and no more. What is necessary is that the Court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the Court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act, which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the Court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the proseuctrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding, the Court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the Court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence."

14. In Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1952 SC 54,

Hon'ble Apex Court declared that corroboration is not the sine qua

non for a conviction in a rape case. In the aforesaid case, Vivian

Bose, J. speaking for the Court observed as follows:

"19....The rule, which according to the cases has hardened into one of law, is not that corroboration is essential before there can be a conviction but that the necessity of corroboration, as a matter of prudence, except where the circumstances make it safe to dispense with it, must be present to the mind of the Judge....The only rule of law is that this rule of prudence must be present to the mind of the Judge or the jury as the case may be and be understood and appreciated by him or them. There

is no rule of practice that there must, in every case, be corroboration before a conviction can be allowed to stand."

15. In Hem Raj v. State of Haryana, 2014 III AD (SC) 546, it

was observed as under:

6. In a case involving charge of rape the evidence of the prosecutrix is most vital. If it is found credible; if it inspires total confidence, it can be relied upon even sans corroboration. The court may, however, if it is hesitant to place implicit reliance on it, look into other evidence to lend assurance to it short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. Such weight is given to the prosecutrix's evidence because her evidence is on par with the evidence of an injured witness which seldom fails to inspire confidence. Having placed the prosecutrix's evidence on such a high pedestal, it is the duty of the court to scrutinize it carefully, because in a given case on that lone evidence a man can be sentenced to life imprisonment. The court must, therefore, with its rich experience evaluate such evidence with care and circumspection and only after its conscience is satisfied about its creditworthiness rely upon it.

16. These observations leave no manner of doubt that a

conviction can be recorded on the sole, uncorroborated testimony

of a victim provided it does not suffer from any basic infirmities or

improbabilities which render it unworthy of credence. We shall now

read the prosecutrix's evidence keeping the above caution in mind.

17. A perusal of the testimony of the prosecutrix goes to show

that the same does not satisfy the aforesaid test. The learned Trial

Court has meticulously dealt with the testimony of the prosecutrix

as well as other witnesses examined by the prosecution. As regards

the age of the prosecutrix, the learned Trial Court referred to the

judgment of Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana, 2013 VII AD (SC)

313, where it was held that Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care &

Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 to determine the age will be

applicable in cases of victim also where victim is a child. As per

Rule 12, the age recorded in the school is to be given preference, if

the same is available and the Court finds it trustworthy and there is

no need to look for any other evidence for determination of age of a

person.

18. Prosecution had examined PW8 Ms. Surender Bhardwaj,

TGT (Hindi), Govt. Girls Senior Secondary School No. 1, Adarsh

Nagar, Delhi where the prosecutrix had studied. As per the

admission record, date of birth was mentioned as 22 nd December,

1991. There was no other evidence regarding age of prosecutrix

and, as such, her date of birth was taken as 22nd December, 1991.

19. The submission of learned Additional Public Prosecutor for

the State that PW12 had advised X-ray of the prosecutrix for age

determination and, as such, the medical opinion regarding her age

ought to have been taken is bereft of merit, inasmuch as, if the

prosecution was not relying upon the date of birth as recorded in

the school record, the Investigating Officer of the case should have

got the ossification test of the prosecutrix conducted but that was

not done. State cannot be allowed to take advantage of its own

lapses by submitting that the age as recorded in the School record

should not be considered for ascertaining the age of prosecutrix.

The learned Trial Court, thus, rightly took her date of birth as 22 nd

December, 1991 as recorded in the school record.

20. As regards the testimony of the Prosecutrix (PW1), she has

deposed that in the year 2009, she was studying in class IX in the

Govt. Girls Senior Secondary School, Adarsh Nagar and used to

come from her house at Bhalaswa Dairy to attend the school. On

27th December, 2008, she was going to Adarsh Nagar market for

shopping purpose when suddenly accused Habib came in her way

and stopped the vehicle in front of her. He then told her that Ronak

and one boy named Lal were sitting in the car and they want to talk

to her but after she sat in the said vehicle she could not see anyone

and as she tried to come out of that vehicle, accused Habib caught

hold of her hand by stating that he wanted to talk to her about

Ronak and Lal and started the vehicle. Accused Habib then stopped

the vehicle at some distance, brought cold-drinks in two glasses and

on drinking the said drink she became unconscious. After regaining

consciousness, she found herself locked in a room. Accused Habib

came to the room in the night, offered her food and on her denial to

eat the food he started beating and misbehaving with her and

further told her to allow him to do whatever he wanted to do.

Thereafter, accused had physical relations with her against her

wishes and without her consent. The next morning, accused left the

room but had left one lady to keep an eye on her and if she had to

go to the toilet that lady used to accompany her. She was confined

in the said room for a period of about four months and during that

period accused Habib raped her several times. One day, accused

brought her friend Ronak in the said room and when the prosecutrix

asked for her help, she refused to do so. Accused also brought Lal

to the said room on some another day and so both Ronak and Lal

were aware that she has been confined in the said room by the

accused Habib. Accused again brought Ronak to the room and this

time she remained with her in that room for about 13 days and

thereafter she left with Habib. On the subsequent day, she got an

opportunity to escape from the said room, thereafter she reached the

STD booth from where she made a telephone call to her brother-in-

law (Jija) and told him the location of the said booth. Her jija

alongwith one other person reached there and from there she was

taken to her jija's house where other family members were also

called. After two days, she was taken to the PS Swaroop Nagar

where the IO prepared her recovery memo, Ex. PW 1/A and was

thereafter taken to BJRM hospital, where she was medically

examined after obtaining the consent from her mother for her

internal examination and in the hospital doctor also took her

vaginal swab. Thereafter, in the court, her statement u/s. 164

Cr.P.C. was recorded by the Ld. MM.

21. In her cross-examination, she stated that her statement u/s

164 Cr.P.C. was recorded by the Ld. MM in which she had stated

that since July, 2008, she used to reside at the house of her elder

sister at Kewal Park. She had stated that accused Habib was the

brother of Ronak and they alongwith Lal entered into conspiracy in

taking her away. She admitted the fact that on some occasions,

accused Habib used to drop her to the school but denied the

suggestion that due to the aforesaid reason she had developed

friendship with him. She admitted that her mother used to object on

dropping her to school by the accused as she used to inform her

mother the days as and when accused used to drop her. She

admitted that the diary Ex. PW 1/D1 to Ex. PW 1/D3 is in her own

handwriting as she used to write the diary but went on stating that

most of the portions in the diary were got written from her

forcefully. Regarding the photograph Ex. PW 1/D4, she denied the

suggestion that the said photograph was got clicked by her with the

accused as she was in love and affection with him, rather the same

was done forcibly under a threat. She also admitted that all the

photographs and drawings/ pictures Ex. PW 1/D5 were got

prepared from her forcefully. She further denied the suggestion that

she did not raise alarm when accused Habib caught hold of her

hand because she was having friendly relations with him and was

going with him voluntarily. She admitted that she had not given the

description of the lady who used to keep an eye on her during the

confinement period to the police as the police itself did not inquire

about the same. She admitted the fact that Lal and Ronak used to

visit that room during her confinement but denied the suggestion

that Lal and Ronak noticed that she was residing happily in the said

room and that is why they did not inform her family members or

the police.

22. The learned Trial Court did not find the testimony of the

prosecutrix to be reliable on the following grounds:-

(i) The accused was previously known to her as she has

admitted in her cross examination that sometime accused used to

drop her to school in his taxi. Her mother and brother used to

object her dropping at school by accused which shows they were

having friendship otherwise, why she will go in his taxi.

(ii) According to her, the accused had taken her in a car in a

crowded place. When she did not find R and Lal in the vehicle,

she tried to come out from the vehicle. But, accused caught hold

her hand and started plying the vehicle, but she failed to explain as

to why she did not raise alarm.

(iii) According to prosecutrix, she was given cold drink by the

accused and when she regained her consciousness, she found

herself in a room which was at village Rajokari, belonging to PW

Shakuntala Devi. According to PW 19 ASI Devinder, there were

sixteen rooms in the said house. If accused had taken her in

unconscious condition then definitely other residents would have

noticed accused carrying prosecutrix and would have objected to

it. As such, her version that she was brought to the room where she

was kept does not appear to be convincing.

(iv) According to the prosecutrix, she was confined in the room.

However this part of her testimony does not find corroboration

from PW4 Shakuntala who had testified that she had given the said

room on rent to Samir @ Habib, i.e., accused and accused used to

reside with one girl Mehak and introduced her as his sister and she

had inquired from Mehak and Mehak told that her parents had

already died and accused is her brother and she wanted to live with

him. There was no reason why PW4 Shakuntala will falsely

depose in favour of accused.

(v) As per the testimony of PW7 R, Mehak was the prosecutrix.

Both the accused and the prosecutrix remained in the house of

PW4 Shakuntala Devi as brother and sister. It reflects that she was

living in the said house with her own consent otherwise why she

would tell PW4 that she was the sister of accused, rather she could

inform her that accused had kidnapped her and confined her

forcibly.

(vi) She remained in that house for quite a long period and during

that period, she never raised any alarm that she has been confined

there or when accused committed rape with her. She was fully

grown up girl and could very well protest the act of accused. It

was admitted by ASI Devender Singh (PW19) that the house in

which prosecutrix was confined was having 16 rooms of hut type

and all the rooms were occupied. There was a common latrine and

bathroom of all the 16 rooms. The said house was 100 sq. yds.

The distance of room and latrine was about 10-15 steps for going

to latrine and bathroom. One has to pass through the open space in

front of those rooms and the room where the prosecutrix was

confined was the first room of the house and the last room of the

house was nearest to the latrine and bathroom. He further

admitted that if a person goes for latrine and bathroom, then he

will be visible to occupants of the other rooms. In these

circumstances, when so many persons were residing in the nearby

room, it is not possible to confine her for such a long period of

about four months. She would have ample opportunity to inform

to neighbourers or run away.

(vii) The plea taken by the prosecutrix that she could not run away

as one lady was keeping watch on her was also not believed as she

did not give any description or physique of the lady who used to

keep an eye on her. The Investigating Officer had admitted in

cross examination that he did not make any inquiry regarding the

lady. Moreover, it is impossible to keep watch upon the

prosecutrix because if the room would have been locked from

outside, after confining her inside the room then, that lady would

have been noticed by the neighbours and enquired as to what she

was doing there and why the prosecutrix was confined in the room

and if the door of the room was opened then prosecutrix had an

ample opportunity to raise alarm and inform those persons that she

was confined forcefully in the said room.

(viii) The manner in which prosecutrix allegedly ran away also

creates a doubt that she was confined. According to her, on the

next day of R leaving the room she managed to escape from the

said room and reached one STD booth from where she made a call

to her brother-in-law Rakesh (PW2) who came and took her to his

house. The STD owner was not examined to corroborate her

testimony. Moreover, according to PW7 'R', she was confined in

the same room where 'D' was confined. Then, what prevented the

police to recover the prosecutrix on the same day. No reason has

come on record why immediately after recovery of the prosecutrix,

police was not informed.

(ix) On perusal of the diary and photograph Ex.PW19/B4a to

Ex.PW19/B4k and PW19/B4, it is very unlikely that the contents

written in the diary can be written forcefully and the photographs

of the accused with the prosecutrix also do not appear to be taken

forcefully. The photographs reflect that both the accused and the

prosecutrix were in deep relationship.

(x) It seems that prosecutrix had run away with the accused from

her house and remained with him for such a long time and accused

left her abandoned or due to the family pressures, prosecutrix has

concocted this false story that accused had kidnapped her by

making her unconscious and committed rape with her. The

circumstances rather suggest that prosecutrix had gone voluntarily

with the accused and had sex with him voluntarily.

(xi) Keeping in view the fact that she was above age of 16 years,

therefore, she was capable to give consent for sex. Prosecution

had failed to prove that she was kidnapped by compelling her for

marriage or had illicit intercourse or that she was administered any

intoxicating substance in cold drink. As such, accused was

acquitted for offence under Section 363/366/376/328 IPC.

23. On careful reading of the impugned judgment and the

material placed on record, including the testimony of prosecution

witnesses, we find that the trial Court had given clear, cogent and

convincing reason for disbelieving the testimony of prosecutrix. It

cannot be said that the findings of the trial Court are palpably

wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. We

do not find that there is any illegality, perversity or infirmity in the

order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. The present

Criminal Leave Petition preferred by the petitioner/State to

challenge the judgment 16th November, 2013, passed by learned

Additional Sessions Judge-01, North Rohini, Delhi is, therefore,

dismissed.

24. It is ordered accordingly.

Copy of the judgment along with the Trial Court record be

sent back forthwith.

(SUNITA GUPTA) JUDGE

(KAILASH GAMBHIR) JUDGE MAY 16, 2014 rs