Citation : 2014 Latest Caselaw 2886 Del
Judgement Date : 2 July, 2014
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision: 02.07.2014
+ RC.REV. 59/2014
SMT. SARASWTI DEVI ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Ashutosh Bhattacharjee &
Mr. J.P. Tripathi, Advs.
Versus
SMT. SANTOSH KUMARI. ..... Respondent
Through: None.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAJMI WAZIRI
% MR. JUSTICE NAJMI WAZIRI
1. This petition impugns an order dated 24.8.2013 whereby the
respondent-landlady's petition under Sections 14(1)(e) and 25 B of the
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 was allowed. The petitioner's
application seeking leave to defend was dismissed and an eviction
order has been passed against her with respect to the shop situated at
the ground floor of property No.643 B-43, Jood Bagh, Tri Nagar,
Delhi. The eviction was sought on the ground that the landlady had a
bonafide need for it i.e. her husband who was otherwise carrying on a
business with his son in manufacturing readymade garments required
the premises, since due to old age he could not cope-up with the hectic
schedule of manufacturing activities. He needed tenanted premises to
start selling of readymade garments; for which he possessed sufficient
experience so as to add to the profitability, along with the
manufacturing facility of readymade garments being run by his son.
The landlady contended that she had no alternate accommodation to
fulfil the bonafide need. A leave to defend was sought by the present
petitioner (tenant) on the ground that the husband was already engaged
and settled in the business of manufacturing readymade garments with
his son, hence he did not need the tenanted premises; that earlier
attempts by the landlady to evict the tenant were unsuccessful; that on
7.8.1993, the husband of the petitioner in Suit No.445/1993 had stated
that he would not want to evict the petitioner and that the Court needs
to differentiate between need and desire of the landlord. The Trial
Court however found that no triable issues were raised by the tenant.
The Court reasoned that additional information sought to be brought
through a rejoinder to the reply to leave to defend could not be taken
into consideration since in proceedings under Section 25 B the
application for leave to defend itself ought to contend all the grounds
which would prima facie make out a case for disentitlement of the
eviction petitioner through an order of eviction of the tenanted
premises. The Court held that the "rejoinder is filed only for the
purpose of replying to the averments made in the reply and any
averment made beyond that is treated as a new stand". The pleadings
would be limited to the averments in the application for leave to
defend and oral arguments are for the assistance of the Court, but
arguments beyond the pleadings could not be taken into consideration.
The Trial Court also reasoned that none of the new facts, sought to be
brought on record, could be considered since it was not the case of the
tenant that the said information was not in her knowledge or did not
exist at the time of filing of the application for leave to defend. This
Court is of the view that the said reasoning cannot be faulted. The
Trial Court also reasoned that in her rejoinder the tenant had admitted
that after the demise of her husband she was running the business from
the tenanted premises. The landlady had placed on record photocopy
of rent receipts and copy of the challans of the rent deposited in the
Court which would show that they were issued in the name of the
tenant/present petitioner. Thus it was concluded that the present
petitioner/tenant was continuing the business in suit shop and hence
this was not a triable issue. The contention that alternate
accommodation was available with the landlady was found to be bald
and vague since it was not supported by any particulars of such
alternate accommodation. This too was found to be a non-triable
issue. The Court relied upon the principle laid down in Shiv Sarup
Gupta vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, 80 (1999) DLT 731 as well as
Tagore Education Society Regd. vs. Kamla Tandon, 2009 (161) DLT
232 to conclude that bald and baseless averments and pleas by a tenant
would not be sufficient to make out a triable issue or to doubt the need
as not genuine or bonafide. The Court further relied upon the
principle laid down in Sarla Ahuja vs. United India Insurance Co.
Ltd., AIR 1999 SC 100 which held that "when a landlord asserts that
he requires his building for his own occupation the Rent Controller
shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not
bonafide. When other conditions of the Clause are satisfied and when
the landlord shows a prima facie case it is open to the Rent Controller
to draw a presumption that the requirement of landlord is bonafide."
The Court further held that "it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to
the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting
possession of the tenanted premises." The Trial Court found reason in
the landlady's ground that due to old age and ailments her husband
could not cope-up with the hectic schedule of manufacturing
readymade garments. The less exhausting and physically less
demanding business of retail of readymade garments was deemed to
be more suitable. Medical documents regarding the husband were
also taken into consideration by the Court in finding the need to be
bonafide.
2. The learned counsel for the petitioner has reiterated the same
arguments as before the Trial Court. In particular he contends that the
need was not bonafide as the landlady's husband was already engaged
in a settled business with the son and the eviction proceeding was only
a sham to evict the tenant from the premises in any way. This Court
is not persuaded by the arguments of the learned counsel because the
need for accommodation changes according to changed circumstances.
In the present case, due to advanced age and deterioration of the health
of the husband of the landlady, the tenanted premises were found to be
more suitable for the husband starting a business of his own so as to
augment his earnings. It cannot be a case that simply because he was
engaged in a business with his son, he could not start his own
business; and surely a landlady cannot be compelled to subject her
husband to hardship at a sufferance of a tenant simply to further
accommodate the tenant. The Trial Court was to see whether the need
was bonafide. In the present case, the bonafide were established.
Therefore, the tenant was rightly directed to be evicted. This Court is
of the view that for the reasons mentioned in the impugned order, no
fault can be found with the conclusion arrived at. There is no reason
to interfere with the impugned order. The petition is without merit
and is accordingly dismissed.
NAJMI WAZIRI (JUDGE) JULY 02, 2014/ak
Publish Your Article
Campus Ambassador
Media Partner
Campus Buzz
LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026
LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!