Action Committee Unaided ... vs Lt. Governor & Ors
2014 Latest Caselaw 343 Del

*      IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

                               Date of Decision: 20th January, 2014.

+                           LPA 30/2014
       ACTION COMMITTEE UNAIDED RECOGNIZED
       PRIVATE SCHOOLS                           ..... Appellant
                   Through: Mr. N.K. Kaul, Sr. Adv. with Mr.
                            P.D. Gupta, Mr. Kamal Gupta, Ms.
                            Diya Kapur, Ms. Shyel Trehan, Ms.
                            Manjira Dasgupta, Vedanta Varma &
                            Mr. Vibhor Kush and Mr. Abhishek
                            Gupta, Advocates.
                            Versus

       LT. GOVERNOR & ORS                            ..... Respondents

                   Through:       Mr. Raju Ramachandran, Sr. Adv.
                                  with Ms. Zubeda Begum, Vivek
                                  Kumar Tandon, Ms. Sana Ansari &
                                  Ms. Vanessa Singh, Advs. for R-1&2.
                                  Mr. Himanshu Bajaj and Ms. Saakshi
                                  Agrawal, Advocates for R-3/UOI.
                                  Mr. Ashok Agarwal, Mr. Khagesh B.
                                  Jha and Ms. Arushi Agarwal,
                                  Advocates for R-4.
                            AND

+                           LPA 31/2014
       FORUM FOR PROMOTION OF QUALITY EDUCATION
       FOR ALL                                   ..... Appellant
                   Through: Mr. Rajiv Nayyar, Sr. Adv. with Mr.
                            Vedanta Varma, Adv.

                            Versus

       LT. GOVERNOR OF DELHI & ORS         ..... Respondents
                   Through: Mr. Raju Ramachandran, Sr. Adv.

                                            with Ms. Zubeda Begum, Vivek
                                           Kumar Tandon, Ms. Sana Ansari &
                                           Ms. Vanessa Singh, Advs. for R-1&2.
                                           Mr. Himanshu Bajaj and Ms. Saakshi
                                           Agrawal, Advocates for R-3/UOI.
                                           Mr. Ashok Agarwal, Mr. Khagesh B.
                                           Jha and Ms. Arushi Agarwal,
                                           Advocates for R-4.
CORAM:
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW

1. Both intra court appeals impugn the common order dated 10th

January, 2014 of the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(C)

No.177/2014 and W.P.(C) No.202/2014 respectively preferred by the

appellants, refusing to grant the interim relief sought by the

appellants/petitioners, observing, "that any interim order of partial stay or

substitution of the Government policy at this stage would create confusion

and would be detrimental to the interests of the children as well as parents

of the wards who are seeking admission", though directing the writ

petitions to be heard at the admission stage itself and listing them for

hearing on 11th March, 2014.

2. Though the appeals came up before this Court for admission on 15th

January, 2014 but since the counsel for the respondents appeared on

advance notice, considering the nature of the controversy and with the

consent of the counsels, we finally heard the appeals.

3. The writ petitions from which these appeals arise were filed

impugning the orders dated 18th & 27th December, 2013 of Hon‟ble the Lt.

Governor of Delhi.

4. The order dated 18th December, 2013 called the "Recognized Schools

(Admission Procedure for Pre-primary Classes) (Amendment) Order, 2013"

was issued by the Hon‟ble Lt. Governor in exercise of the powers conferred

by Section 3(1) of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 read with Rule 43

of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973 and amending the "Recognized

Schools (Admission Procedure for Pre-primary Class) Order, 2007". Vide

the said order dated 18th December, 2013, the Management Quota of 20% in

admission in any private unaided recognized school of Delhi under the

Admission Order 2007 was done away with and fixed parameters and points

for admission to a class at entry level of the school were laid down and the

schools prohibited from fixing additional points other than the points

specified. The subsequent order dated 27th December, 2013 merely

extended the parameter of neighbourhood from 6 Km. as prescribed in the

order dated 18th December, 2013, to 8 Km.

5. We may notice that the stand/counter affidavit of the respondents is

not on record, neither in the writ petition nor in this appeal. However,

owing to the process of admission to the schools, which we are informed

ordinarily begins on 1st January of each year having already been delayed

and having been now prescribed to begin on 15th January, 2014 and which

date is now gone and the admissions are held up and any delay would

ultimately result in not only delaying the admissions to the schools but

consequently also the commencement of the academic year, it has been

deemed appropriate to hear the counsels without counter affidavit.

6. The learned Single Judge having declined interim relief to the

appellants, not for the reason of not finding a prima facie case in favour of

the appellants/petitioners but for the reason that the interference in the

admission process at this stage is likely to create confusion and would be

detrimental to the interests of the children as well as parents of the wards

who are seeking admission, we at the outset only asked the senior counsels

for the appellants to address us as to what was the irreparable loss and injury

to the appellants, who are a committee/fora of recognized unaided schools

of Delhi and as to how the balance of convenience was in favour of granting

interim stay of operation of the impugned orders dated 18th & 27th

December, 2013 as is sought and which would result in admissions being

made to the schools in accordance with the Admission Order 2007.

However, notwithstanding our said query, the senior counsels for the

appellant chose to address lengthy arguments spanning over nearly the

entire day on merits of the case of the appellants.

7. The contentions of the senior counsels for the appellants on the aspect

of prima facie case in favour of the appellants are:

(i) that the Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 4th

September, 2006 in LPA No.196/2004 titled Rakesh Goel Vs.

Montford School, also concerned with the admission of the tiny tots

to nursery class in the schools, constituted an Expert Committee

headed by Sh. Ashok Ganguly then Chairman of the CBSE to evolve

a mechanism for having transparency in the process of admissions in

pre-nursery classes and to eliminate the system of interviews;

(ii) that the Ganguly Committee after detailed discussions and

deliberations with all stakeholders vide report dated 14th July, 2007

recommended the admission process to be based on several defined

scientific, rational and tested criteria including of neighbourhood,

alumni, sibling, single parent, management quota etc. and the schools

were given the freedom to choose, emphasize and focus on any

number of criteria and leaving 10% of the total seats to be allotted at

the discretion of the Management;

(iii) that the Cabinet of Delhi after a meeting with the Delhi School

Advisory Board constituted under Section 22 of the School Act, vide

Resolution dated 3rd September, 2007 accepted the Ganguly

Committee‟s recommendations with some modifications;

(iv) that the Directorate of Education (DoE), Government of

National Capital Territory of Delhi (GNCTD) in their affidavit filed

in LPA No.196/2004 supra took a stand that the autonomy to the

heads of private unaided schools as per Rule 145 of the School Rules

has to be protected and for the reasons thereof, recommendation of

the Ganguly Committee imposing a uniform set of criteria on schools

cannot be accepted and each school should be allowed to define and

adopt its own admission criteria, making a scheme out of a set of

parameters so that their autonomy is ensured and that there should be

no lottery system except to break ties;

(v) that the Division Bench of this Court also vide order dated 14th

November, 2007 in LPA No.196/2004 made certain suggestions;

(vi) that pursuant to the aforesaid, the Admission Order 2007 was

issued as per which the schools were to develop and adopt a clear,

well defined, equitable, non-discriminatory and unambiguous criteria

for admission in the interests of the children including on the aspects

of neighbourhood, background of the child, sibling, transfer case,

single parent and management quota not exceeding 20% and were

also given the option of fixing additional parameters though were

required to stipulate a point system for each criteria/parameter; on

29th November, 2007 it was clarified that weightage assigned to the

parameters/criteria adopted by the schools should not be heavily

loaded in favour of a few parameters only; vide subsequent order

dated 6th December, 2007, it was further clarified that there would be

no upper limit/cap for points assigned by the school to any one

parameter;

(vii) that the schools preferred SLP(C) No.246317-18/2007 to the

Supreme Court against the judgment in LPA No.196/2004 supra, vide

interim order in which the operation of the Admission Order 2007

which required the schools to obtain prior approval of the DoE before

finalization of admission criteria, was stayed and it was directed that

it will be sufficient if the admission criteria adopted by the schools

was sent to the DoE;

(viii) that upon promulgation of the Right of Children to Free and

Compulsory Education (RTE) Act, 2009 and issuance of Guidelines

dated 23rd November, 2010 thereunder permitting schools to frame

their own policy for admission under the RTE Act, W.P.(C)

No.8533/2010 titled Social Jurist Vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi was

filed in this Court impugning the said criteria; vide judgment dated

19th February, 2013 wherein, the provisions of the RTE Act and the

Guidelines were held to be not applicable to admissions being made

to 75% general category students of private unaided schools and

which admissions were held to be governed by the Admission Order

2007;

(ix) that the Supreme Court vide judgment dated 6th March, 2013

disposed of SLP(C) No.246317-18/2007 supra in view of the

Guidelines dated 23rd November, 2010 supra having been framed;

(x) that the Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 25th

September, 2013 in W.P.(C) No.2463/2013 titled Social Jurist, A

Civil Rights Group Vs. Lt. Governor of National Capital Territory

of Delhi requested the Hon‟ble Lt. Governor to consider the

representation of Social Jurist for amendment of the Admission order

2007 within twelve weeks;

(xi) that the Hon‟ble Lt. Governor, Delhi vide CM No.16832/2013

in disposed of W.P.(C) No.2463/2013 sought extension of time for

disposing of the representation supra by at least eight weeks stating

that the minutes of the meeting of the Delhi School Education

Advisory Board could not be finalized and education being a

transferred subject, the aid and advise of the Council of Ministers for

framing any new policy should be there and since new Government of

Delhi was in the process of formation, it was desirable that no order

be passed without the aid and advise of the new Council of Ministers;

the said application was listed before this Court on 18th December,

2013 when the same was adjourned to 8th January, 2014;

(xii) that notwithstanding the Hon‟ble Lt. Governor having sought

time to dispose of the representation of Social Jurist for amendment

of the Admission Order 2007 on the ground of the new Government

of NCT of Delhi being under formation, on 18th December, 2013

itself, the impugned order amending the Admission Order 2007 was

issued;

(xiii) that the GNCTD has in the various affidavits filed in the

proceedings aforesaid accepted the autonomy of the recognized

unaided schools under the School Rules as per the dicta in T.M.A. Pai

Foundation Vs. State of Karnataka (2002) 8 SCC 481;

(xiv) that the Admission Order 2007 was issued after widespread

deliberations pursuant to the directions of this Court in LPA

No.196/2004 including after considering the recommendations of the

Ganguly Committee and the Delhi School Advisory Board; per

contra, the same has been amended vide the impugned orders solely

by the Hon‟ble Lt. Governor without any consultation with the

stakeholders and without even consulting the experts and without

even the statutory body Delhi School Advisory Board being

consulted;

(xv) that while under the Admission Order 2007, the schools had the

autonomy to fix whatever admission criteria they deemed appropriate

within the prescribed norms, vide the impugned orders the autonomy

of the schools has been taken away by prescribing fixed admission

criteria heavily loaded in favour of „neighbourhood‟;

(xvi) that the Ganguly Committee had frowned on the criteria of

„neighbourhood‟ and had prescribed the same only as one of the

criteria;

(xvii) that if the admissions were to be based solely on the criteria of

„neighbourhood‟, there would be no homogeneity left;

(xviii) that there is no reason for the Hon‟ble Lt. Governor to within a

few days, change his mind; while seeking extension of time for

deciding representation for amendment of the Admission Order,

2007, he gave the reason of it being prudent to await formation of

new Govt. of NCT of Delhi but then issued the impugned amendment

order without even waiting for the government formation;

(xix) that the impugned order is thus without jurisdiction, in

violation of the fundamental rights of the recognized unaided schools

and their management and amounts to taking away fundamental rights

by executive action;

(xx) that the admissions in pursuance to the Admission Order 2007

were going on smoothly for the past five years and there is no reason

for tinkering with the same and if at all it was felt that any of the

schools were violating the spirit of the Admission Order 2007, the

remedy was to take action against them and not to amend the

Admission Order;

(xxi) attention is also invited to paras 41 and 42 of Modern School

Vs. Union of India (2004) 5 SCC 583;

(xxii) that there is no reason to change the admission criteria;

(xxiii) that the criteria for admission should be left to the schools, as

long as the same is transparent;

(xxiv) that the DoE in the affidavit filed in the year 2008 in the

Supreme Court in SLP(C) No.24622/2007 titled Forum for

Promotion of Quality Education for All Vs. Rakesh Goel also had

taken the same stand as is being taken by the appellants herein and

supported the Admission Order 2007 and the autonomy of the schools

in the matter of admissions as laid down in T.M.A. Pai Foundation

supra;

(xxv) that the respondents even if of the view that the Admission

Order 2007 is to be amended ought to hold widespread consultation

as done earlier and consult the Delhi School Advisory Board;

(xxvi) that the Educational Institutions are entitled to the

Management quota and which entitlement has been upheld in the

various judgments of the Supreme Court; the said Management Quota

has to be protected and cannot be done away with as has been done

by the impugned orders;

(xxvii) that the orders dated 23rd November, 2010 and 15th December,

2010 of the Govt. of India, Ministry of Human Resource

Development and of the Govt. of NCT of Delhi respectively also

admit of each school formulating its admission policy identifying the

various categories based on principles that are fair, just and

reasonable;

(xxviii) that the Attorney General also in his written submissions

before the Supreme Court in W.P.(C) No.95/2010 titled Society for

Unaided Private Schools in Rajasthan Vs. Union of India had

contended that with respect to 75% of the general category seats, the

schools can formulate a policy for admission which evolves fair, and

transparent criteria on rational, reasonable and just basis;

(xxix) that if the selections were to be made only on the basis of

„neighbourhood‟, it will place all the applicants at par making the

selection random.

8. The senior counsels for the appellants on the ingredients of

irreparable loss and injury and balance of convenience, have contended:

(a) that the impugned orders break the back of Educational

Institutions and the child admitted by the schools in this academic

year will remain with the schools for 14 years;

(b) that the impugned orders take away the constitutional right of

the appellants;

(c) that the academic session commences only in the month of

April each year and the admission process can be deferred/delayed for

one month and the writ petition can be disposed of finally within such

time and no prejudice will be suffered by anyone by so deferring the

admission process;

(d) that when the members of the appellants are in law entitled to

select the students for admission, their such right cannot be taken

away;

(e) that there will be no injury to the State if the same criteria as

prevalent for the last five years is continued for another one year till

the writ petitions are disposed of;

(f) that unless the impugned orders are stayed, the appellants shall

be forced to admit and accept students against their will;

(g) that the impugned orders are a direct attack on the autonomy of

the schools;

(h) that there is no balance of convenience in changing the

admission process during the pendency of the writ petitions as the

same cannot be reversed.

9. Per contra, the senior counsel for the Hon‟ble Lt. Governor has

contended:

(I) that the impugned orders deal with admission to pre-primary

school i.e. at the age of 3 to 6 years;

(II) that the judgment of the Supreme Court in T.M.A. Pai

Foundation supra has to be seen in the context of the facts thereof;

the said judgment is of a pre RTE Act era;

(III) that the RTE Act statutorily recognizes the concept of

„neighbourhood‟;

(IV) that thus the deprecation even if any, of „neighbourhood‟ being

the sole criteria for admission in the recommendations of the Ganguly

Committee, is today of no value;

(V) that even prior thereto under Rule 50(ii) of the School Rules,

no school was entitled to recognition or to continue to be recognized

unless it serves the real need of the „locality‟; thus the concept of

neighbourhood exists in the School Rules itself;

(VI) that the schools are not entitled to profiteer and Management

Quota leads to profiteering;

(VII) that the respondents were vide judgment dated 19th February,

2013 of this Court in W.P.(C) No.8533/2010 supra expressly directed

to re-visit the Admission Order 2007;

(VIII) that merely because the Hon‟ble Lt. Governor had sought

extension of time for re-considering/re-visiting the Admission Order

2007, did not mean that he was denuded of the power to re-consider;

(IX) that the Hon‟ble Lt. Governor on his own, without the Council

of Ministers being in place also, was/is competent to pass the

impugned orders and it cannot be said that the same are without

jurisdiction;

(X) that in fact this Court, on 18th December, 2013 when the said

application for extension of time was listed, informed of the decision

having already been taken and it was for this reason only that instead

of extending the time, the application was simply adjourned to 8th

January, 2014;

(XI) that the neighbourhood criteria, of within 8 Kms. distance from

the school, provided a catchment area of 150 sq. Kmts. enabling the

schools to admit any student from the said 150 sq. Kmts. area; the

same thus did not amount to curtailment of freedom or autonomy of

the schools which remains unaffected;

(XII) that merely because the school has become famous, it cannot

be heard to say that it will admit students not from its neighbourhood

but resident 25 Km away;

(XIII) that the order has been passed considering the welfare of the

child which is distinct from the aspirations of the parents; if the

children are admitted to schools far away, they have to travel long

hours to and fro, to their detriment and are forced to wake up much

earlier than if were to attend a school in the neighbourhood/vicinity of

their residence;

(XIV) that the argument of the impugned orders interfering with the

autonomy of the schools is illusory inasmuch as there is no

interference with the syllabus, recruitment of teachers etc. of the

schools which provides enough autonomy to the schools;

(XV) that in fact the definition of neighbourhood was changed from

6 Km. to 8 Km. after hearing the schools;

(XVI) that if any glitches are found in the admission criteria as now

introduced, the same will be subject to change;

(XVII) that there is no loss lest irreparable loss to the appellants so as

to call for any interim relief;

(XVIII) that the impugned orders are in the interest of the children.

10. The counsel for Social Jurist which got impleaded as a respondent in

the writ petitions, has invited attention to Section 13 of the RTE Act

prohibiting the schools from collecting any capitation fee and from

subjecting the child or the parents or guardians to any screening procedure.

Attention is also invited to para 28 of Society for Unaided Private Schools

of Rajasthan Vs. Union of India (2012) 6 SCC 1 laying down that the RTE

Act is child centric and not institution centric and it is contended that the

want of the parents to have the child admitted to a far away school is not to

be considered and only the interest of the child is to be seen. Attention is

also invited to paras 33, 36.3, 48 and 59 of the said judgment to contend that

the right to establish and administer an educational institution is not an

absolute right and is subject to the other constitutional provisions and that

the emphasis and focus in T.M.A. Pai Foundation supra was institution

centric and not child centric and that too in the context of higher education

and professional education where the level of merit and experience have to

be given different weightage and it is argued that merit is not a criteria while

admitting a child of the age of 3 to 6 years. It is yet further argued that the

only loss to the schools is of illegal earnings and which cannot be taken into

consideration.

11. The senior counsel for the appellants, in rejoinder, have argued:

(A) that the Management Quota has been recognized in para 66 of

P.A. Inamdar Vs. State of Maharashtra (2005) 6 SCC 537 also;

(B) that there is Management Quota in Guru Gobind Singh

Indraprastha University of the Govt. of Delhi and is thus not a dirty

word;

(C) that if any of the schools, acting under the Admission Order

2007 have misused their liberty, action ought to be taken thereagainst

instead of taking away the autonomy of all the schools;

(D) that as per the information of the schools, the Delhi School

Advisory Board had recommended the continuance of the Admission

Order 2007 for the current year also;

(E) that the DoE in the affidavits in earlier proceedings had

discouraged the lottery system;

(F) that there is no harm in allowing more weightage to certain

aspects;

(G) that no instance of a single school which may have misused the

Admission Order 2007 has been given;

(H) that the Hon‟ble Lt. Governor ought not to have rushed to

change the Admission Order 2007 passed after detailed deliberations;

(I) that while defending the challenge to the Admission Order

2007, the DoE had contended that the same protected the autonomy

of the schools but now the said autonomy has been killed.

12. The senior counsel for the Hon‟ble Lt. Governor has denied the

argument that the recommendation of the Delhi School Advisory Board was

for continuation of the Admission Order 2007 and has stated his instructions

to be that the Board has suggested some changes on the same lines as have

been carried out in the Admission Order.

13. The counsel for Social Jurist has invited attention to para 53 of

Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan observing that T.M.A. Pai

Foundation and P.A. Inamdar supra are in the context of

professional / higher education where merit and excellence have to

be given due weightage and which tests do not apply to

admission to class I of schools.

14. Though we have for the sake of maintaining the record faithfully

reproduced hereinabove the lengthy arguments addressed but it cannot be

lost sight of that the hearing is on the aspect of grant / non grant of interim

relief only and not for disposal of the writ petitions of which the learned

Single Judge is still seized of.

15. We had as aforesaid at the beginning of the hearing only enquired

from the senior counsels for the appellants that even if we were to agree

with the appellants, of having a good prima facie case, does the same entitle

the appellants to the interim relief, for the grant whereof, traditionally the

ingredients of irreparable loss and injury and balance of convenience have

also to be satisfied. The Courts in (See Prabhjot Singh Nand Vs.

Bhagwant Singh (2009) 9 SCC 435 and Ramniklal N. Bhutta Vs. State of

Maharashtra (1997) 1 SCC 134) have added the ingredient of public interest

also and have held that interim relief can be denied even if the other three ingredients are in

favour of the seeker thereof, if the grant thereof would be against public interest.

16. Save for contending that non-grant of stay of impugned orders would

interfere with the autonomy of the recognized unaided schools which exists

in the matter of admission also and that the child so admitted would remain

in the school for ten years, no other argument in this respect has been raised.

When we further asked the counsels as to how the schools would suffer, if

instead of one child, another child is admitted inasmuch as the fee and other

charges chargeable by the school, would not be different, and more so when

admission is not merit based and there is to be no screening, no answer has

been forthcoming.

17. It thus appears that the argument of autonomy of the school being

affected by admission of one child against another child, cannot be said to

be causing any irreparable loss or injury to the school. It also cannot be lost

sight of that the admission, if any, would be only of one batch of students

i.e. for the current academic year. Upon the appellants succeeding in the

writ petitions and which we are confident would be disposed of before the

commencement of the admissions for the next academic year, the autonomy

of the schools in the matter of admission, even if affected by the impugned

orders, would be restored. It is not as if, it will be gone for ever like

chastity. Conversely, if the writ petitions were to fail and the orders

impugned therein were to be upheld, grant of stay would for all times to

come affect those who under the impugned orders may be entitled to

admission to a school and who would be denied admission, if the operation

of the impugned orders were to be stayed. (We do not accept the contention

that the balance of convenience is in favour of the appellants as the State

would suffer no loss by the grant of interim order. The State has issued the

impugned orders for the benefit of the citizens of Delhi and the Courts at the

time of grant of relief, cannot be unmindful of the effect of the interim

orders on the persons affected thereby. The Supreme Court in ONGC Ltd.

Vs. Saw Pipes Ltd. (2003) 5 SCC 705 took note of the loss to the public at

large by the delays in completion of public projects like road construction

etc. and negatived the argument that none suffers therefrom). Thus, qua

such admission seekers, the grant of interim relief sought would be the grant

of final relief in the writ petitions inasmuch as such persons would not be

seeking admission in the following years.

18. It is not as if, the principles for grant of interim relief in the

proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are different than

under the Civil Procedure Code.

19. The Supreme Court, in:

(i) Deoraj v. State of Maharashtra (2004) 4 SCC 697 held that

the Court could grant interim relief only if satisfied that withholding

of it would prick the conscience of the Court and do violence to the

sense of justice, resulting in injustice being perpetuated throughout

the hearing, and at the end the Court would not be able to vindicate

the cause of justice;

(ii) State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Ram Sukhi Devi (2005) 9 SCC 733

deprecated the practice of grant of relief only for the reason of prima

facie case having been made out, without being concerned with

balance of convenience, public interest and a host of other

considerations;

(iii) Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. Vs. Bombay

Environmental Action Group (2005) 5 SCC 61 held that before an

interim order is passed, the courts must consider the question as

regards the existence of a prima facie case, balance of convenience as

also the question as to whether the writ petitioners shall suffer

irreparable injury, if the injunction sought is refused and have to

strike a balance between the two extreme positions viz., whether the

writ petition would itself become infructuous if interim order is

refused, on the one hand, and the enormity of losses and hardships

which may be suffered if an interim order is granted, particularly

having regard to the fact that in such an event the losses suffered by

the affected parties thereby may not be possible to be redeemed;

(iv) Zenit Mataplast P. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra (2009) 10

SCC 388 reiterated that for grant of interim relief in proceedings

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, all the three ingredients

of prima facie case, irreparable loss and injury and balance of

convenience have to be satisfied.

20. Neither is the present such a case where non grant of interim relief

pricks the conscience of this Court or in our view results in injustice to the

appellants nor have the counsels been able to satisfy us of any irreparable

loss to the appellants by denial of interim relief. Rather, the counsels have

argued on the premise that mere satisfaction that there is a prima facie case

is sufficient for grant of interim relief and which is not the correct position

in law as recently reiterated in Best Sellers Retail (India) Pvt. Ltd. Vs.

Aditya Birla Nuvo Ltd. (2012) 6 SCC 792 also. All the ingredients

governing the grant or refusal of interim relief must co-exist and mere

existence of prima facie case does not ipso facto justify the grant of interim

relief. An interim relief will not be granted even though the seeker thereof

might have an unbeatable/invincible prima facie case, if the other

ingredients are not satisfied.

21. There is another aspect of the matter. The impugned orders concern

education which is largely a policy decision. The settled position in law is

that interference by the Courts in academic/educational matters even at the

final stage lest at interim stage is minimal. The Supreme Court recently in

All India Council for Technical Education Vs. Surinder Kumar Dhawan

(2009) 11 SCC 726 reiterated that the Courts are neither equipped nor have

academic or technical backgrounds to take decisions in academic matters

and if the Courts start doing the same, it will lead to chaos in education. It

was further held that if it is a question of educational policy or an issue

involving academic matters, the Courts should keep their hands off. It was

yet further held that the Court should be extremely reluctant to substitute its

own views as to what is wise, prudent and proper in relation to academic

matters in preference to those formulated by the persons authorized to do so

and that the Courts cannot interfere with policy either on the ground that it

is erroneous or on the ground that a better, fairer or wiser alternative is

available; legality of the policy, and not the wisdom or soundness of the

policy, is the subject of judicial review. Similarly, in University Grants

Commission Vs. Neha Anil Bobde (2013) 10 SCC 519 it was held that in

academic matters, unless there is clear violation of statutory provisions,

regulations or notification issued, Courts should not interfere.

22. Applying the aforesaid principles, it is not the case of the appellants

that the Hon‟ble Lt. Governor was not authorized to issue the impugned

orders. Merely because the Hon‟ble Lt. Governor a few days prior to

issuing the impugned orders felt that any decision in this respect should

await the formation of the government, does not take away from his power

to issue such an order. Section 16(3) of the School Act prescribes that

admission to a recognized school shall be regulated by rules made in that

behalf. Rule 145(1) provides that the head of recognized unaided school

shall regulate admissions thereto either on the basis of admission test or on

the basis of result. Though the schools on an earlier occasion as aforesaid,

challenged interference in their admission process but unsuccessfully and

which led to the issuance of the Admission Order 2007. The schools though

today wanting to retain/continue the said Admission Order unsuccessfully

challenged the same also till the Supreme Court. This is a classic example of

"Mind wants change every time but it is unwilling to change any time"

Thus, it is no longer res integra that the admission to recognized schools

can be regulated as was done by the Admission Order 2007. There may

have been certain more play/freedom given to the schools under the said

Admission Order than is available under the impugned orders. However,

the same does not take away from the legal position that the respondents are

under the School Act and Rules authorized and empowered to regulate

admissions to the school.

23. It has also not been argued by the counsel for the appellants that

consultation with the Delhi School Advisory Board though statutory is

mandatory before issuance of such an order. Thus, merely because the

impugned orders do not record the same to be in consultation with the said

Board, cannot also be a ground at least at this stage to stay the operation

thereof.

24. We have also enquired from the senior counsels for the appellants as

to how deprivation for admission through the Management Quota causes

loss to the schools. The schools are not entitled to charge any capitation fee

or any excess amount from the students admitted through the Management

Quota also. Though Management Quota has been recognized in several

judgments but in relation to admission to professional courses, where merit

is a criteria. It is not so here. We are thus not satisfied of any loss lest

irreparable loss to the appellants from being denied admission to 20% of the

seats through Management Quota also.

25. We had during the hearing enquired from the senior counsel for the

respondents, whether not the emphasis on neighbourhood is likely to lead to

the applicants with the same points being much more than the seats

available and how the admission would be governed then. The senior

counsel replied that the same will then have to be on the basis of lottery.

26. Though the senior counsels for the appellants, upon it being pointed

out that the paragraphs relied upon of Modern School supra, are of the

minority view, withdrew reliance on the said judgment but we may notice

that the majority view in the said judgment also held that a balance has to be

struck between autonomy of schools and measures to prevent

commercialisation of education. The impugned orders appear to be a step in

that direction. The Supreme Court in para 61 of the majority judgment in

T.M.A. Pai Foundation supra has also observed that in schools, there is no

merit based selection.

27. We may notice that Chapter XII of the School Rules containing Rules

131 to 145 deals with admission to recognized schools. Though Sub-rule (1)

of Rule 145 provides that the head of every recognized unaided school shall

regulate admissions thereto but Sub-rule (2) thereof makes the Rules 131 to

144 providing for admission to aided schools, applicable to unaided schools

also subject to the provisions of Sub-rule (1). Rule 134 provides for

admissions to be without any distinction of religion, race, caste, place of

birth or any of them and Rule 144 enables the Director to issue instructions

with regard to any mater not covered by any Chapter relating to admissions.

The said two Rules appear to be not inconsistent to Sub-rule (1) of Rule 145

and to be thus applicable to recognized unaided schools also. Again prima

facie, it appears that while the Admission Order 2007 contained the

possibility of the school making distinction in the matter of admission, on

the grounds prohibited under Rule 134, the amendments thereto prevent the

possibility of such distinction/discrimination. Similarly, it appears that the

DoE is empowered to issue instructions to unaided schools also relating to

admissions thereto.

28. We therefore are of the view that the appellants have not been able to

satisfy us of any irreparable loss and injury to them from the non-grant of

the interim order sought.

29. We are further in agreement with the learned Single Judge that any

interference at this stage would create confusion and would be detrimental

to the interests of children as well as parents of the wards who are seeking

admission. Significantly, the impugned orders are not challenged by the

parents who appear to have welcomed the same. As aforesaid, the process

for admission to the said schools has already been delayed and the date

fixed of 15th January, 2014 for commencement thereof for the current

academic year has also passed. Though the counsels for the appellants have

argued that the writ petitions thus can be disposed of within a month‟s time

but the said argument loses sight of the history of such litigations which are

known to have on each aspect travelled upto the Supreme Court. Notice can

be taken of the fact that though residences in Delhi are spread over the NCR

region but the School Act and the Rules are applicable only to the Schools

in Delhi and not to the schools in the areas of NCR situated in the State of

Uttar Pradesh and Haryana. Notice can also be taken of the fact that the

number of admission seekers is much more than the seats available in the

schools. The same leads to elaborate planning on the part of the parents of

the children, for arranging for admission if not got in one school into

another and any uncertainty in the rules of admission is likely to cause grave

prejudice to the parents‟ body. We are thus of the opinion that the interim

relief sought by the appellants does not pass the anvil of the fourth

ingredient of public interest also.

30. Though undoubtedly the Hon‟ble Lt. Governor issued the impugned

orders without waiting for formation of the new GNCTD but the GNCTD,

by defending the challenge to the impugned orders, has shown its support

therefor.

31. We reiterate that we have had to give the aforesaid detailed reasoning

only for the detailed arguments addressed before us even though in the

absence of the counter affidavit of the respondents and we thus clarify that

any observation herein would have no bearing on the final adjudication of

the matter.

32. There is no merit in these appeals, which are dismissed. No costs.

33. During the pendency of these appeals, the process of admissions was

kept in abeyance. The GNCTD to now forthwith notify the new date for

commencement of admission process.

CHIEF JUSTICE

RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.

JANUARY 20, 2014 Bs.