Citation : 2014 Latest Caselaw 249 Del
Judgement Date : 15 January, 2014
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 15th January, 2014.
+ RFA 269/2013
GANGADHAR PADHY ..... Appellant
Through: Counsel for the appellant (appearance
not given)
Versus
PREM SINGH ..... Respondent
Through: Counsel for the respondent
(appearance not given)
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
1. The appeal impugns the judgment and decree dated 28 th January, 2013
of the Court of the Additional District Judge (ADJ)-I, Patiala House Courts,
New Delhi of dismissal of Suit No.675/2010 (ID No.2403C031222010) filed
by the appellant/plaintiff for recovery of Rs.5 lakhs from the
respondent/defendant towards damages suffered by the appellant/plaintiff
due to malicious prosecution and defamation of the appellant/plaintiff at the
instance of the respondent/defendant.
2. Notice of the appeal and the application for condonation of 18 days
delay in re-filing the same was issued. The counsel for the
respondent/defendant appeared before this Court on 26th November, 2013
when the delay in re-filing the appeal was condoned and finding the learned
ADJ to have dismissed the suit on the ground that the appellant/plaintiff had
not proved that prosecution was malicious and on the ground that the
appellant/plaintiff was acquitted giving benefit of doubt, the appeal was
admitted for hearing, the Trial Court record was requisitioned and the
counsels asked to address arguments. However, both the counsels sought
adjournment. Considering the nature of the appeal, it was not deemed
expedient to allow it to burden the roster of this Court and accordingly,
judgment was reserved giving liberty to the counsels to file written
submissions within fifteen days. Though more than fifteen days have
lapsed, neither counsel has bothered to file written submissions or to seek
opportunity to address. The Trial Court file has been perused.
3. The appellant/plaintiff instituted the suit from which this appeal
arises, pleading:
(i) that the appellant/plaintiff was introduced to the
respondent/defendant by the uncle of the wife of the
respondent/defendant;
(ii) that the appellant/plaintiff so also came in contact with the
daughter of the respondent/defendant;
(iii) that the appellant/plaintiff developed intimacy with the
daughter of the respondent/defendant and which converted into a love
affair;
(iv) that the daughter of the respondent/defendant took the
appellant/plaintiff to Bangalore where the father-in-law of the
respondent/defendant used to reside;
(v) that the appellant/plaintiff with the daughter of the
respondent/defendant also used to visit the shop at Mohan Singh Place
of a friend of the appellant/plaintiff;
(vi) that the appellant/plaintiff and the daughter of the
respondent/defendant planned to get married;
(vii) that the respondent/defendant and his wife were opposed to the
said marriage and stopped the appellant/plaintiff from even visiting
the colony of Golf Link, New Delhi in which the
respondent/defendant and his daughter were residing and threatened
the appellant/plaintiff;
(viii) that though the appellant/plaintiff stopped contacting the
daughter of the respondent/defendant but the respondent/defendant
fearing that his daughter may secretly marry the respondent
/defendant, got a false complaint made in the name of his daughter to
the Police Station, of the appellant/plaintiff having molested and
having threatened to kidnap her;
(ix) that however the police on investigation did not find any merit
in the complaint and no action was taken thereon;
(x) that the respondent/defendant then with the help of Special
Commissioner of Delhi Police and an Indian Administrative Services
(IAS) Officer filed a false, frivolous and concocted complaint against
the appellant/plaintiff alleging that the appellant/plaintiff had written
unsigned and signed letters to his daughter threatening her and also
linking the appellant/plaintiff with a notorious terrorist and gangster;
(xi) that on the said complaint, the appellant/plaintiff was arrested
and taken to the Police Station where he was given severe beating and
abuses at the instance of the respondent/defendant and after being kept
at the Police Station for one night was granted bail as the offence
under Section 509 IPC is a bailable one;
(xii) that on the next date i.e. on 29th March, 1999, the
appellant/plaintiff as directed reached the Police Station and was made
to sit there from 1200 hours to 2200 hours without food or water and
called to the room of the Station House Officer in the night where he
was confronted with the aforesaid Special Commissioner of Delhi
Police and the IAS Officer and all of whom threatened him with dire
consequence; the appellant/plaintiff was given third degree treatment
and was forced to accept certain letters as his and again beaten up and
tortured and forced to write letters to the daughter of the
respondent/defendant; Rs.2,000/- in his pocket were also taken away;
(xiii) that the appellant/plaintiff was forced to face trauma of trial in a
Criminal Court in the company of hardcore criminals and which trial
went for ten long years;
(xiv) that as the appellant/plaintiff has been defamed and de-
established from Delhi; he was forced to settled down in Mumbai;
(xv) that the cause of action accrued to the appellant/plaintiff on 23rd
September, 1999 when false First Information Report (FIR) No.88/99
was got registered against the appellant/plaintiff and on 9 th September,
2009 when the appellant/plaintiff was acquitted;
(xvi) that the complaint filed against the appellant/plaintiff by the
respondent/defendant was obviously with malicious intention and
wicked designs.
Accordingly, a claim for Rs.5 lakhs was made.
4. The learned ADJ, after framing issues and recording evidence has
dismissed the suit, finding/observing/holding:
(a) that the daughter of the respondent/defendant had appeared as a
witness and denied any relationship with the appellant/plaintiff and
had supported the complaint by her father against the
appellant/plaintiff herein on the basis of which the FIR was registered;
(b) that the appellant/plaintiff had been acquitted in the prosecution
giving benefit of doubt to him;
(c) that the appellant/plaintiff had failed to prove that the complaint
against him, though lodged by the respondent/defendant, was
malicious or initiated without reasonable or probable cause and there
is no conclusion of the Court which acquitted the appellant/plaintiff
also that the FIR in question was based on false allegations;
(d) relying on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in
Radhey Mohan Singh Vs. Kaushalya Devi AIR 2003 Delhi 413
laying down that there are variety of reasons for which an accused is
given benefit of doubt and this by itself cannot lead to a conclusion
that the complaint was based on extraneous consideration leading to
entitlement of damages, it was held that else the appellant/plaintiff had
been unable to base his claim for damages on the ground of malicious
prosecution as he has merely been acquitted for want of any definite
conclusion arrived at by the Court in which the appellant/plaintiff was
prosecuted.
5. In the absence of any argument on behalf of the appellant/plaintiff, I
have perused the memorandum of appeal. The appellant/plaintiff besides
repeating the contents of the plaint, has urged the impugned judgment to be
wrong inter alia on the ground that the appellant/plaintiff having been
prosecuted at the instance of the respondent/defendant and having been
acquitted, it is obvious that the prosecution of the appellant/plaintiff was
false and the damage to the appellant/plaintiff from such prosecution for ten
years is implicit/inherent. With respect to the Division Bench judgment in
Radhey Mohan Singh supra, it is only stated that the facts thereof were
different as it was a finding of the Trial Court in that case that the plaintiff
had admitted commission of offence (in that case of misappropriation)
giving the respondent reasonable and probable cause of filing the complaint
which on investigation was found to be correct. It is contended that there is
no such admission of the appellant/plaintiff in the present case nor any
finding of the Court deciding the prosecution to the said effect.
6. One thing which is clear from the judgment of the Division Bench of
this Court in Radhey Mohan Singh supra, that acquittal giving benefit of
doubt per se is not a cause for claiming damages for malicious prosecution.
To the same effect is another judgment of this Court in Bhupinder
Chaudhary Vs. Chander Parkash MANU/DE/4799/2009 laying down that
acquittal of the plaintiff in a criminal case does not necessarily lead to a
conclusion that his prosecution was malicious.
7. Still, the whole premise of the case of the appellant/plaintiff before the
Trial Court as well as before this Court in appeal is, that merely on account
of his acquittal, he is entitled to damages against the respondent/defendant
and which as aforesaid, is not the position in law.
8. It has been held in S.T. Sahib Vs. N. Hasan Ghani Sahib AIR 1957
Madras 646 that the action for malicious prosecution is not favoured in law
and should be properly guarded and its true principles strictly adhered to,
since public policy favours the exposure of a crime and it is highly desirable
that those reasonably suspected of crime be subjected to the process of
criminal law for the protection of society and the citizen be accorded
immunity for bona fide efforts to bring anti-social members to the society to
the bar of justice. It was thus held, that to be successful in a suit for
malicious prosecution, it is imperative for the plaintiff to show that the
proceedings had been instituted against him for an offence which was
groundless as evidenced by the successful termination of the proceedings in
his favour, and which were instituted against him by the defendant 'without
probable cause' and from 'malicious motives' i.e. for indirect and improper
motive. It was yet further held that only when the plaintiff has led some
evidence to this effect, can the defendant be called upon to show the
existence of such a cause and the onus lies heavily upon the plaintiff even
though the Rule may appear to require the plaintiff to prove a negative, viz.,
that the defendant had no reasonable and probable cause for the prosecution.
It was yet yet further held that in a suit for malicious prosecution, the
important question is whether the facts as known to the defendant or
reasonably believed by him at the material time, constituted a reasonable
cause for the prosecution. The Court quoted with approval Ramaswamy
Iyer's Law of Torts opining, that to show that there was no reasonable and
probable cause, it has to be shown that the defendant did not believe in the
plaintiff's guilt. It was further observed that police is an impartial agency
constituted by the State for investigation into offences, booking of offenders
and bringing them to justice, on their being satisfied by their enquiries that
the case is truthful and merits prosecution; therefore, if such an agency
prosecuted the offender, it would certainly be a factor in favour of the
complainant having reasonable and probable cause.
9. Reference may also be made to the judgment of the Division Bench of
the Calcutta High Court in Bharat Commerce and Industries Ltd.
Vs. Surendra Nath Shukla AIR 1966 Calcutta 388 observing, that though in
the past, "malice" was identified with "lack of reasonable and probable
cause" and often malice was inferred from lack of reasonable and probable
cause but the concept of malice is to be kept distinct from the concept of
lack of reasonable and probable cause; malice denotes spite or hatred against
an individual and prosecution can be held to be malicious only if it is found
to be vindictive, initiated to malign the plaintiff before the public or guided
by purely personal consideration. It was reiterated that if there is an honest
belief that the accusation is true, then even though the belief is mistaken, the
charge may still be reasonable and probable.
10. Applying the aforesaid principles with which I respectfully concur, I
am unable to find any merit whatsoever in the case of the appellant/plaintiff
and the learned ADJ is correct in concluding that the appellant/plaintiff has
utterly failed to prove his prosecution, though at the instance of the
respondent/defendant, to be malicious.
11. The daughter of the respondent/defendant whose modesty the
appellant/plaintiff was accused of outraging, appeared as a witness not only
in the prosecution, supporting the complaint but also as a witness on behalf
of the respondent/defendant in the suit from which this appeal arises and
both times denied any intimacy, love affair or relationship with the
appellant/plaintiff as claimed by the appellant/plaintiff. I have perused the
testimony of the daughter of the respondent/defendant in the suit from which
this appeal arises as well as as discussed in the judgment of acquittal of the
appellant/plaintiff and I am unable to therefrom find her such denial to have
been dented in any manner in cross-examination by the appellant/plaintiff.
12. Though it was the case of the appellant/plaintiff in the plaint that he
was introduced to the respondent/defendant and his family by the uncle of
the wife of the respondent/defendant but the case of the
respondent/defendant was, that the appellant/plaintiff was a domestic servant
in the house of a neighbour and had been harassing the daughter of the
respondent/defendant. The appellant/plaintiff denied that he was a domestic
servant and claimed to be a friendly astrologer of such neighbour. Though
the appellant/plaintiff in the suit did not examine the person in whose house
in the prestigious colony of Golf Link the appellant/plaintiff admitted to be
residing, not as a domestic servant but as a friend but the said person is
found to have been examined in the prosecution case and to have deposed
that the appellant/plaintiff was a domestic servant living in the servant
quarters, though at times performing Pooja in the house. The mere fact that
the neighbour of the respondent/defendant was availing the services of the
appellant/plaintiff living in the servant quarter into servant quarter, to
perform Pooja, will not change the status of the appellant/plaintiff from that
of a domestic servant in a neighbour's house as averred by the
respondent/defendant to that of a neighbour. The case set up by the
appellant/plaintiff, of affair with the daughter of the respondent/defendant
and her denial has to be seen in the said light.
13. The appellant/plaintiff admits intimacy on his part with the daughter
of the respondent/defendant; she denies and her denial, the appellant/plaintiff
as aforesaid has been unable to dent. The complaint by the
respondent/defendant of harassment by the appellant/plaintiff of his
daughter, seen in this light, cannot be said to be 'without any probable or
reasonable cause'.
14. The judgment of the acquittal of the appellant/plaintiff itself records
as many as 47 letters having been allegedly sent by the appellant/plaintiff to
the daughter of the respondent/defendant. The appellant/plaintiff has proved
some of those before the Trial Court. Of course, the judgment in the
prosecution holds the prosecution to have failed to prove the said letters in
the handwriting of the appellant/plaintiff. However, the said letters
otherwise are in consonance with the intimacy admitted by the
appellant/plaintiff with the daughter of the respondent/defendant.
15. The appellant/plaintiff has been unable to prove any reciprocity of the
said intimacy by the daughter of the respondent/defendant; though he
claimed that the daughter of the respondent/defendant had sent a number of
greeting cards to him but claimed to have lost the same; though he claimed
to have travelled to Bangalore with the said daughter of the
respondent/defendant but the said case was disbelieved in the judgment of
acquittal and no attempt even to prove the same and which could easily have
been proved, has been made in the present proceedings.
16. The admitted expression by the appellant/plaintiff of intimacy towards
the daughter of the respondent/defendant is thus found to be unilateral.
17. The appellant/plaintiff has also failed to prove any malice. The only
malice attributed by him to the respondent/defendant is that the complaint
was initiated to prevent his daughter from marrying the appellant/plaintiff.
However, once the appellant/plaintiff fails to prove the reciprocity of his
admitted intimacy, the said plea of malice also remains unsubstantiated.
18. The appellant/plaintiff thus has indeed failed to prove the necessary
ingredients to be entitled to the damages for malicious prosecution.
19. The appeal thus has no merit and is dismissed. The Trial Court did
not impose any costs on the appellant/plaintiff and which appears to have
encouraged the appellant/plaintiff to prefer this appeal, without even
intending to seriously pursue the same. The appellant/plaintiff is burdened
with costs of this appeal which is assessed at Rs.20,000/-. However, the
counsel for the respondent/defendant also having not bothered to contest the
appeal, the said costs, instead of being payable to the respondent/defendant,
be paid to the Delhi High Court Bar Association
Lawyers' Social Security and Welfare Fund, New Delhi.
Decree sheet be drawn up.
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
JANUARY 15, 2014/'bs'..
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