Citation : 2014 Latest Caselaw 7111 Del
Judgement Date : 23 December, 2014
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 23rd December, 2014.
+ OMP No.1656/2014 & IA No.26202/2014 (for stay)
M/S TARA LOGITECH PRIVATE LTD. ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Atul Nanda, Sr. Adv. with Mr.
Sameer Nandwani, Mr. Rajat & Mr.
Priyadarshi Gopal, Advs.
Versus
M/S RELIGARE FINVEST LIMITED & ANR. ..... Respondents
Through: None.
AND + OMP No.1657/2014 & IA No.26204/2014 (for stay)
M/S TARA LOGITECH PRIVATE LTD. ..... Petitioner Through: Mr. Atul Nanda, Sr. Adv. with Mr. Sameer Nandwani, Mr. Rajat & Mr. Priyadarshi Gopal, Advs.
Versus
M/S RELIGARE FINVEST LIMITED ..... Respondent
Through: None.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
I.A. No.26203/2014 in OMP No.1656/2014 & I.A. No.26205/2014 in OMP No.1657/2014 (both for exemption)
1. Allowed, subject to just exceptions.
2. The applications are disposed of.
OMP Nos.1656/2014 & 1657/2014
3. Both these petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 are preferred with respect to the arbitral awards dated
7th August, 2013 of Sh. Nitin Chadha, Advocate in the claims of the
respondent M/s Religare Finvest Ltd. (RFL) against (i) Ashish Gupta, (ii)
Suresh Kumar Gupta, (iii) Sneh Gupta & (iv) Ruchi Gupta (hereinafter
called "Guptas"). While the arbitral award subject matter of OMP
No.1656/2014 is for recovery by RFL of Rs.2,78,68,302.5 with interest and
cost etc. from Guptas, the arbitral award subject matter of OMP
No.1657/2014 is for recovery by RFL of a sum of Rs.83,82,538.83 besides
interest and costs etc. from Guptas. Both arbitral awards also provide, that
sale proceeds of mortgaged property being house No.76, Harsh Vihar, Pitam
Pura, Delhi-110 034 would be adjusted towards the satisfaction of the
amount payable by Guptas under the arbitral awards.
4. Though the petitioner, in neither of the petitions has impleaded
Guptas as party thereto, but has in OMP No.1656/2014 impleaded the sole
arbitrator Nitin Chadha, Advocate as a party thereto. In my view, the
arbitrator is not required to be impleaded as a party to a petition under
Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. Accordingly, the name of Sh. Nitin
Chadha, Advocate as respondent No.2 in OMP No.1656/2014 is deleted.
5. The petitioner was admittedly not a party to the arbitration agreement
or the arbitral proceedings and the arbitral awards also are not against the
petitioner. These petitions have still been filed, pleading that :
(i) The petitioner had purchased property bearing No. 76, Harsh
Vihar, Pitam Pura, Delhi-110 034 aforesaid vide sale deed
dated 13th December, 2013 from M/s Bhatia Estates Pvt. Ltd. ,
Delhi vide a registered sale deed.
(ii) The petitioner immediately after purchasing the said property
started the work of construction thereon.
(iii) To the shock and surprise of the petitioner, the petitioner on
23rd August, 2014 received a notice from Sh. Sanjay Kumar,
Sub-Inspector, Police Station Rani Bagh, Delhi asking the
petitioner to stop construction as the property in question had
been directed to be attached by this Court vide order dated 13 th
August, 2014 in Execution Petition No.87/2014.
(iv) On enquiry by the petitioner, it transpired that the Guptas had
taken some loan from RFL and had mortgaged the said property
on the basis of certain documents by creating equitable
mortgage and had failed to repay the said loan and therefore the
property was ordered to be attached as aforesaid.
(v) The petitioner however learnt that RFL had also filed OMP
No.1212/2012 and vide order dated 21st December, 2012
wherein the Guptas were restrained from creating any third
party interest in the said property.
(vi) It has also come to the knowledge of the petitioner that another
Execution Petition bearing No.86/2014 is also pending before
this Court.
(vii) On further enquiry, it was learnt that the said property was
actually in the name of Sneh Lata Gupta who was mother of
Ashish Gupta and wife of Suresh Kumar Gupta who had
mortgaged the said property to avail credit facility from Punjab
and Sind Bank, Connaught Circus, New Delhi in the year 2008;
that the said property was sold to M/s Bhatia Estates Pvt. Ltd.
and Mr. Gulshan Kumar Ahuja vide sale deed dated 31 st March,
2012; that the original title deed was released by Punjab and
Sind Bank to Sneh Lata Gupta only after payment of the entire
balance consideration; that since the order of restraint aforesaid
was passed against the Guptas on 21st December, 2012 and sale
in favour of M/s Bhatia Estates Pvt. Ltd. and Mr. Gulshan
Kumar Ahuja had already taken place, the documents
mortgaged with RFL are forged documents and the original
documents were lying with Punjab and Sind Bank at the time
when credit facility was granted by RFL to the Guptas.
(viii) The arbitral awards subject matter of both these petitions are ex
parte.
(ix) The petitioner is the rightful owner of the property and the
order of the Arbitral Tribunal directing sale of the property is
void and without any basis.
6. I have enquired from the senior counsel for the petitioner as to how
these petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act are maintainable and
whether not the remedy if any, in the facts aforesaid, of the petitioner is
under Order XXI Rules 58 and 98 to 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908.
7. The senior counsel for the petitioner has referred to paras No.50 and
57 of Booz Allen and Hamilton Inc. Vs. SBI Home Finance Ltd. (2011) 5
SCC 532 to contend that the enforcement of mortgage is not arbitrable and
the arbitral awards are thus contrary to law and public policy of India and
liable to be set aside.
8. The Supreme Court in Booz Allen and Hamilton Inc. (supra) was
concerned with the scope of Section 8 of the Arbitration Act. There, the SBI
Home Finance Ltd. had filed a mortgage suit in the High Court of Bombay
and in which suit an application under Section 8 was filed. The question
before the Supreme Court was whether the suit was to be disposed of under
Section 8 of the Arbitration Act by referring the parties to arbitration. The
said application was dismissed by the learned Single Judge of the Bombay
High Court inter alia on the ground of the appellant having subjected itself
in the preceding 20 months to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Supreme
Court held, i) that though the subject matter of the suit fell within the scope
of arbitration agreement, ii) that though the appellant could not in the facts
be said to have submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the Court, and, iii) that
the application under Section 8 having been filed before the filing of the
written statement, High Court was not justified in rejecting the same on the
ground of delay, but the subject matter of the suit was not arbitrable.
9. The position here is quite different. In the two arbitration proceedings
culminating in the arbitrable awards subject matter of these two petitions,
RFL had made a monetary claim against the Guptas along with a claim for a
direction to Guptas to hand over vacant physical possession of the property
with further directions for sale thereof for satisfaction of the monetary
claims. The arbitral awards allow the monetary claims of RFL and merely
observe that RFL shall be entitled to recover the claims awarded from the
sale proceeds of the property. From the narration in the petitions, it appears
that the property aforesaid has been attached in execution of the arbitral
awards insofar as allowing the said monetary claims.
10. The senior counsel for the petitioner agrees that the petitioner has no
grievance insofar as the arbitral awards allow the monetary claims of RFL
against Guptas. It is stated that the grievance of the petitioner is with respect
to the part of the awards which provide that the said monetary claims can be
satisfied from the sale proceeds of the said property and from the attachment
of the subject property in execution of the said arbitral awards.
11. The only question thus for adjudication at the instance of the
petitioner is whether the rights of the petitioner in the property are
unaffected by the aforesaid attachment of the property in execution
proceedings.
12. Section 36 of the Arbitration Act provides for the enforcement of the
arbitral award under the CPC, in the same manner as if it was a decree of the
Court. Order XXI of the CPC provides for execution of a decree of the
Court. Rule 30 thereunder provides for execution of a decree for payment of
money inter alia by attachment and sale of the property of the judgment
debtor. Rule 54 under Order XXI provides for attachment of immovable
property by prohibiting, the judgment debtor from transferring and charging
the property in any way and all persons from taking any benefit from such
transfer or charge. It appears that the order dated 13 th August, 2014 supra in
Execution Petition No.87/2014 has been made in exercise of such powers.
Rule 58 of Order XXI provides for preferring claim or objection to the
attachment of any property on the ground that the property is not liable to
such attachment and for adjudication of such claim. Such adjudication has a
force of a decree. Section 47 of the CPC provides that all questions relating
to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree shall be determined by
the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit.
13. It thus follows that the question which the petitioner is seeking to be
adjudicated by filing these petitions under Section 34 is a question, the mode
for adjudication whereof is by filing objections as aforesaid in the execution
proceedings in which the attachment has been ordered and not by way of
filing these petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
14. Even otherwise, it is the settled position in law that a non party to an
arbitration and arbitration proceedings cannot prefer objections under
Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. I had an occasion to deal with the said
aspect in Indus Ind Bank Ltd. Vs. Ram Laxman Hotels Ltd. 162 (2009)
DLT 332; on a conspectus of case law, it was held that a petition under
Section 34 can be preferred only by a party to the arbitration proceedings
and not by a third party. I find the High Court of Bombay also to have taken
the same view in Mukesh Nanji Gala Vs. Heritage Enterprises
MANU/MH/2202/2014. Even otherwise, there is no agreement for
arbitration of the dispute between RFL and the petitioner qua the aforesaid
property. Needless to state that merely because an arbitration award provides
that the monetary claims allowed thereunder would be recovered by sale of
some property, cannot entitle the claimant thereunder to enforce the right of
such sale against a non party to arbitration and if such claimant enforces the
award as a decree, such non party to the arbitration has to file objections in
accordance with the procedure provided hereinabove.
15. I may mention that the petitioner has also filed applications for stay
of the arbitral awards aforesaid and their execution. The execution as
aforesaid is pending before this Court. Though a proceeding under Section
34 of the Arbitration Act, strictly speaking, is not a suit but the principle
enshrined in Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is that no restraint
against any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a Court
not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought can be granted.
For this reason also, these proceedings are not the remedy for the relief
sought by the petitioner.
16. The petitions are clearly misconceived and are dismissed.
No costs.
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
DECEMBER 23, 2014 „gsr‟ (corrected & released on January 06, 2015)
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