Delhi High Court
Harcharan Singh Sethi vs Darbari Lal Batla on 21 August, 2014
Author: Najmi Waziri
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 24.02.2014
Date of Decision: 21.08.2014
+ CM (M) No.163 of 2013
HARCHARAN SINGH SETHI ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. B.S. Chaudhary &
Ms. Chitra Goswami, Advs.
versus
DARBARI LAL BATLA ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. S.C. Singhal, Adv.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAJMI WAZIRI
NAJMI WAZIRI, J.
1. This petition impugns the judgement & order dated 9.5.2012 and
15.1.2013 passed by the Additional Rent Controller and the Rent
Control Tribunal respectively. An application had been moved
by the respondent-landlord against the petitioner-tenant under
Section 14(1)(a) & (j) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958
(hereinafter referred to as „the Act‟) seeking the payment of rent
with respect to shop in property No.A-37, Ground Floor, Rajouri
Garden, Delhi. The Trial Court vide order dated 16.8.2011,
directed the tenant to pay or deposit the legally recoverable
arrears of rent w.e.f. 1.9.2003 till December, 2003, @ Rs.1,330/-
per month. The arrears were paid as directed and the tenant
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continued to pay further rent till February 2012. However, the
Trial Court was of the view that it being the tenant‟s first default
he would get the protection of Section 14(2) of the Act.
2. However, subsequently there was a default in payment from
March, 2012 onwards. The landlord sought eviction of the tenant
for the second default. Accordingly on 9.5.2012, after hearing
the arguments, under Section 14(2) of the Act, the Trial Court
examined the report of the Naib Nazir and recorded that the
tenant had complied with the modified order dated 16.8.2011 but
had not paid the rent since March, 2012. There had conclusively
been a default of the order passed under Section 15(1) of the Act
from March, 2012, hence the tenant would not be entitled to the
protection of Section 14(2) of the Act for the subsequent default.
Accordingly, the Court directed the eviction of the tenant from
the tenanted premises.
3. This eviction order was challenged by the tenant in appeal before
the Rent Control Tribunal which result in the impugned order
dated 15.1.2013. The Rent Controller was of the view that firstly
the appeal was not supported by the certified copy of the
impugned order dated 9.5.2012; no exemption from filing of the
certified copy was granted; the applicaton for exemption from
filing certified copy of the order was never pressed nor was any
order obtained on it; the certified copy was filed only on 4.1.2013
hence the Court held that the appeal could be deemed to have
been filed only on the said date by which time it was severely
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barred by limitation, i.e., there had been unaccounted delay of
seven (7) months.
4. On the merits of the matter, the Trial Court was of the view that
the tenant was under two directions: i.e. payment of arrears of
rent from 1.9.2003 till December 2003, which was duly paid;
secondly the rent was required to be paid by 15 th day of each
succeeding month. The said order was passed under Section
15(1) of the Act. The rent was required to be paid for the
duration of the tenancy. The Tribunal rejected the argument of
the appellant that the rigours of payment of rent by the 15 th day
of each month was not applicable after the disposal of the main
case on 16.8.2011, because the directions were for continued
payment of rent till the subsistence of the tenancy. The Tribunal
further rejected the appellant‟s argument that the rent deposited
twice-over, for the month of December 2003, should have been
adjusted against any subsequent default. The Tribunal
distinguished the judgement relied upon by the appellant in
Sarwan Kumar Onkar Nath Vs. Subhash Kumar Agarawalla
AIR 1987 SC 2302 on the ground that in the said case the tenant
had paid two months‟ advance rent at the inception of the
tenancy with the understanding that it could be set off/adjusted
against the rent whenever necessary or required whereas in the
present case the adjustment was being sought not for advance
payment of rent at the inception of such tenancy but against the
rent paid twice over for the month of December, 2003 by error.
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There was no such understanding of adjusting it in future. The
mistake ouoght to have been pointed out. The Tribunal felt that
the tenant ought to have rectified his mistake earlier and ought to
have sought this adjustment if he so desired. The Tribunal
further took into consideration the case of M/s. Aero Traders Pvt.
Ltd. Vs. Ravinder Kumar Suri AIR 2005 SC 15 relied upon by
the learned counsel for the landlord which held that discretion
under Section 15(7) of the Act connotes necessarily an act of
judicial character. Insofar as the tenant had set up a false plea of
having sent rent through cheques to the landlord, it was held to
be a relevant fact for exercising discretion. The non-payment of
the rent resulted in the Court not exercising the discretion in
favour of the tenant. Accordingly, the appeal was rejected.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner reiterates the same
arguments as raised before the Tribunal and seeks quashing of
the two orders impugned in this petition. In support of his
contention he relied upon C. Ronald & Anr. Vs. Union Territory
of Andaman & Nicobar Islands (2011) 12 SCC 428 to contend
that the tenant would still have the protection of Section 14(2) of
the Act. He relies upon para 7 of the aforesaid judgement, which
reads as under:
"7. As observed by this Court in Vemareddy
Kumaraswamyreddy & Anr. vs. State of A.P. JT 2006(2)
361 (vide para 17) where the words were clear, there is
no scope for the court to innovate or take upon itself the
task of amending or altering the statutory provisions. In
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Union of India & Anr. vs. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal 1992
Supp (1) SCC 323 (vide para 14), it was observed :
"It is not the duty of the court either to enlarge the
scope of the legislation or the intention of the
legislature when the language of the provision is plain
and unambiguous. The court cannot rewrite, recast or
reframe the legislation for the very good reason that it
has no power to legislate. The power to legislate has
not been conferred on the courts. The court cannot
add words to a statute or read words into it which are
not there".
6. The said judgement indeed makes it clear that where the words of
statute are clear there is no scope for the court to innovate upon
the statutory provisions. Section 14(2) of the Act reads as under:
"14. Protection of tenant against eviction. -
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
(2) No order for the recovery of possession of any
premises shall be made on the ground specified in clause
(a) of the proviso to sub-section (1) if the tenant makes
payment or deposit as required by section 15:
Provided that no tenant shall be entitled to the benefit
under this sub-section, if, having obtained such benefit
once in respect of any premises, he again makes a default
in the payment of rent of those premises for three
consecutive months.
7. The order under Section 15(1) of the Act was passed on 9.5.2012
because there was a default of the earlier order dated 16.8.2011
which directed the continued payment of rent by the 15 th day of
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each calendar month. The direction was clearly for the period for
which the tenancy would subsist. It could not be anyone‟s case
that for a subsequent default in payment of rent as directed by the
Trial Court the landlord would need to take out yet another
proceeding under Section 14(1)(a) read with Section 15(1) of the
Act. There was clearly a default of the direction under Section
15(1) of the Act. The tenant had benefited from Section 14(2) in
the earlier proceedings under Section 14(1)(a) which held on
16.08.2011 that the tenant had defaulted in payment of rent from
01.09.2003 to 31st December 2003, but since it was his first
default he would not be evicted because of the aforesaid statutory
protection. But the proviso to Section 14(2) clearly stipulates
that, the second default would not be protected. In the present
case there was a violation of the Court order too. Therefore, the
protection under Section 14(2) of the Act would not be available
to the tenant and the eviction order was rightly passed.
8. This Court finds no reason to interfere with the impugned orders
dated 9.5.2012 & 15.1.2013. They do not suffer from any
material irregularity. The reasons for and the conclusions arrived
at are based on the record and are correct. There is no merit in the
petition. Accordingly, it is dismissed.
AUGUST 21, 2014 NAJMI WAZIRI, J.
b'nesh
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