Delhi High Court
Sh. S.K.Sharma vs School Of Planning And ... on 5 March, 2013
Author: Valmiki J. Mehta
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ WP(C) No.3648/1992
% March 05, 2013
SH. S.K.SHARMA ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. G.D.Gupta, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. S.K.Gupta & Mr. Vikram Singh, Advs.
versus
SCHOOL OF PLANNING AND ARCHITECTURE AND ORS.
..... Respondents
Through: Mr. R.K.Singh with Ms. Deepa Rai, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VALMIKI J. MEHTA
To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes.
VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J (ORAL)
1. By this writ petition, filed under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India, petitioner-Sh.S.K.Sharma challenges the order dated 25.9.1992 of
the respondent No.1-School of Planning and Architecture terminating the
services of the petitioner during the period of probation.
2. The facts of the case are that the petitioner was appointed by the
respondent No.1 as a Senior Librarian vide appointment letter dated 12 th
WP(C) No.3648/1992 Page 1 of 22
March, 1991. The letter of appointment dated 12.3.1991 specifically
provided that the petitioner will be on a probation period of one year which
may be extended at the discretion of the appointing authority, and, during
the period of probation (including extended period) his services were liable
to be terminated without notice and without any cause being assigned. The
petitioner‟s probation period was extended vide memorandum of the
respondent No.1 dated 9th /21st July 1992 for one year. This memorandum
mentioned that the work and conduct of the petitioner during the probation
period were not found satisfactory. The petitioner was thereafter terminated
from services during the period of probation vide non-stigmatic order dated
25.9.1992 and which reads as under:-
"Prof. V.P.Raori
Director
Ref.O.O.No.250/SKS/SPA(Estt.) 25th September, 1992
OFFICE ORDER
Shri S.K.Sharma is on extended period of probation.
However, in pursuance of para 2 of his appointment Order
vide Memorandum No.F.250/SKS/SPA(Estt.) dated 12.3.1991
which reads as follows:
"Shri S.K.Sharma will be on probation for a period of
one year which may be extended at the discretion of the
appointing authority. During the period of probation,
WP(C) No.3648/1992 Page 2 of 22
including extended period, if any, his services are liable
to be terminated without notice and without any cause
assigned."
The services of Shri S.K.Sharma who is in extended
period of probation are hereby terminated with immediate
effect. On receipt of this letter Shri S.K.Sharma shall stand
relieved.
Though there is no specific provision in the Rules or
in the terms and conditions of his appointment to give him
any notice pay, the School has decided to give him one month
notice pay.
(V.P.Raori)
Director
Shri S.K.Sharma
Senior Librarian"
3. The petitioner has challenged this order of termination on three
grounds as argued before me:-
i) Firstly, it is argued that the relevant service rules of the
respondent No.1 did not contemplate extension of period of probation
beyond one year and since in the present case petitioner had already
completed one year period of probation on 11.3.1992, he is taken to have
been confirmed in the post and cannot be said to be on probation.
Reliance is placed upon Rule 2.4 of the Staff Service Regulations of the
respondent No.1 and which reads as under:-
WP(C) No.3648/1992 Page 3 of 22
"2.4 All appointments to non-teaching
posts/ordinarily/shall be made on probation for a period
of one year after which period, the appointee, if
confirmed, shall continue to hold his office till he attains
the age of 60 years."
ii) Secondly, it is argued that the petitioner‟s services were
terminated by the Director of the respondent No.1, whereas the power to
terminate services of employees of the respondent No.1 is vested only
with the Board of Governors, and therefore, the termination of the
petitioner is bad.
iii) Thirdly and finally, it is argued that the termination of services
of the petitioner is actually to be taken as an order for dismissal from
services amounting to a penalty, and the order of termination though in
form is a simple order of termination during the period of probation,
however, the termination in fact amounted to a penalty order inasmuch as
the petitioner was found to have been guilty of assaulting one Sh. Nand
Kishore, a peon in the library of the School. It is argued that such
termination, without a detailed enquiry in which principle of audi
alteram partem is applicable, is accordingly illegal. Reliance in this
regard is placed upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of
Samsher Singh vs. State of Punjab & Anr., AIR 1974 SC 2192 and
WP(C) No.3648/1992 Page 4 of 22
Dipti Prakash Banerjee vs. Satvendra Nath Bose National Center for
Basic Sciences, Calcutta & Ors., 1999 (3) SCC 60. The law which is
relied upon in this regard on behalf of the petitioner is contained in paras
19 and 21 of the judgment in the case of Dipti Prakash Banerjee (supra)
and which paras read as under:-
"19. As to in what circumstances an order of
termination of a probationer can be said to be punitive or
not depends upon whether certain allegations which are
the cause of the termination are the motive or foundation.
In this area, as pointed out by Shah, J. (as he then was) in
Madan Gopal v. State of Punjab there is no difference
between cases where services of a temporary employee
are terminated and where a probationer is discharged.
This very question was gone into recently in Radhey
Shyam Gupta v. U.P.State Agro Industries Corpn. Ltd.
and reference was made to the development of the law
from time to time starting from Parshotam Lal Dhingra
v. Union of India to the concept of "purpose of enquiry"
introduced by Shah, J. (as he then was) in State of Orissa
v. Ram Narayan Das and to the seven-Judge Bench
decision in Samsher Singh vs. State of Punjab and to
post-SamsherSingh case-law. This Court had occasion to
make a detailed examination of what is the "motive" and
what is the "foundation" on which the innocuous order is
based.
...........
21. If findings were arrived at in an enquiry as to
misconduct, behind the back of the officer or without a
regular departmental enquiry, the simple order of
termination is to be treated as "founded" on the
allegations and will be bad. But if the enquiry was not
held, no findings were arrived at and the employer was
not inclined to conduct an enquiry but, at the same time,
he did not want to continue the employee against whom
there were complaints, it would only be a case of motive
and the order would not be bad. Similar is the position if
the employer did not want to enquire into the truth of the
allegations because of delay in regular departmental
proceedings or he was doubtful about securing adequate
evidence. In such a circumstance, the allegations would
be a motive and not the foundation and the simple order
of termination would be valid."
4. In response to ground (A), counsel for the respondent No.1 has
argued that the Staff Regulations Rule 2.4 does not restrict the period of
probation only to one year and therefore, it is not permissible for the
petitioner to argue that the probation period could not be extended.
5. Secondly, it is argued that the stand on behalf of the petitioner
that the petitioner can only be terminated by the Board of Governors and not
by the Director of the respondent No.1, is a fallacious argument, inasmuch
as, there is no longer operative a Board of Governors of the respondent No.1
and the respondent No.1 being governed by its Rules and Regulations is
governed by four councils being the General Council, Executive Council,
Academic Council and Financial Committee or such other authorities as may
be declared as such. It is argued that the entire powers of administration,
and which included the power to terminate services of the employees, vests
in the Execution Council in terms of Rule 11(i) and which reads as under:-
"Powers and 11(i) Subject to the provisions of the
Functions of Memorandum of Association and
the Executive Rules of the School, Executive
Council Council shall have the management
and control of the affairs and
administration of the funds and;
„properties‟ of the School, and shall
have the authority to exercise all the
powers of the School, and shall have
the responsibilities for control of the
affairs of the School."
It is further argued that the Executive Council can delegate its
powers to the Director of the respondent No.1, and the Director was
accordingly delegated the powers of the Executive Council vide the
resolution of the Executive Council of the respondent No.1 dated 8.5.1980
and para (C) thereof is relevant and which reads as under:
"C. Resolution No.9 be amended to read as under:-
„Resolved that the Chairman, Executive Council shall
have the powers for the management of affairs and funds
of the School and shall have the authority to exercise all
the powers and functions of the Executive Council
provided always that he shall have no greater power in
the matter of expenditure from funds of the School than
the Executive Council possesses. The action taken by the
Chairman under powers delegated shall be reported at the
next meeting of the Executive Council. It was further
resolved that this power be exercised only in cases of
exigencies and emergencies."
It is therefore argued that the Chairman being the Directors of
the respondent No.1 was fully authorized to issue the termination order
dated 25.9.1992 in the present case.
6. Thirdly and finally, it is argued that the judgments relied upon
on behalf of the petitioner have no bearing to the facts of the present case for
various reasons including the fact that in the present case, the petitioner was
guilty of incorrect behavior on various occasions during the first year of
probation and also in the extended period of probation, and which finally
ended with the incident of the petitioner assaulting Sh.Nand Kishore, and
therefore, it cannot be said that the assault on Sh. Nand Kishore was a
foundation for terminating the services of the petitioner as is required by the
judgments relied upon on behalf of the petitioner.
7. In my opinion, the writ petition has no merit and is liable to be
dismissed and is accordingly dismissed for the reasons as detailed
hereinafter.
8. The Staff Regulation Rule 2.4 stated above uses two important
expressions. The first expression to be noted is "ordinarily", and the second
expression to be noted is "if confirmed". These two expressions, taken with
the fact that there is no specific bar in the rule for extending the period of
probation, in my opinion, this shows that it cannot be the legal and factual
position in the present case that the petitioner stood automatically confirmed
on expiry of the period of one year of the original appointment dated
12.3.1991. In fact, and as already stated above, the appointment letter dated
12.3.1991 itself stated that the probation could be extended at the discretion
of the appointing authority and during the period of probation (including the
extended period of probation), the services of the petitioner could be
terminated without notice and without any cause assigned. I may state that
the appointment of the petitioner is not an appointment under the Central
Government governed by the CCS Rules or Article 311 of the Constitution
of India. The petitioner is only governed by the relevant Regulations of the
respondent No.1 and by the appointment letter dated 12.3.1991. Once the
regulations require an order of confirmation to be passed, there is no deemed
confirmation or automatic confirmation after the end of the probation period
vide Khazia Mohammed Muzammil vs. The State of Karnataka & Anr.,
2010 (8) SCC 155. It is not disputed that no confirmation order of
regulating the services of the petitioner was ever passed. In fact, the
petitioner had requested vide letter dated 3.8.1992 for confirmation of his
services, but the services were not confirmed in terms of the office
memorandum dated 23.9.1992. Both these documents being relevant are
reproduced below:-
"Letter Dated 3.8.1992
To
The Director
School of Planning & Architecture
New Delhi.
Sir,
This is with reference of your office Memorandum No.F-
250/SKS/SPA/Estt. dt. 21.7.92. Thereby conveying me extension
of probation period for a period of one year.
In this connection I would like to place before the
authorities the following facts:
1. In accordance to appointment letter issued to me wide even
number dt. 12.3.91. The period of probation prescribed was one
year from the date of joining.
2. The prescribed period of probation ended on 30th April,
1952 and the same was successfully completed by me.
3. As no communication was received by me during the
period of probation form 1.5.91 to 30.4.92 about any shortcoming
in performance of my duties.
4. As technically and administratively I have completed the
period of probation successfully on 30.4.92, extension of
probation after lapse of two months and 21 days seems to be
issued under circumstance best known to the issuing authorities
without valid reasons.
In accordance with civil services regulations, Staff Service
rules and others, rules related to service matters. The period of
any probationer can be extended only during the validity of the
original probation.
Hence, extension of probation period after two months and
21 days is not correct and inforceable.
I hereby request you to kindly issue a revise orders
confirming successful completion of probation period on 30.4.92.
Thanking you,
Yours faithfully,
(S.K.SHARMA)
Dated: 3.8.1992 Sr. Librarian
Memorandum dated 23.9.1992
V.P. Raori
Director
Ref. No.R-102/92-SPA 23rd September, 1992
OFFICE MEMORANDUM
Shri S.K.Sharma, Senior Librarian in the School is
hereby informed that his request dated 3.8.1992 has been
considered and examined carefully and it is felt that his request
for successful completion of probation period cannot be acceded
to by the School. I has been decided that the probation period for
the time being will remain extended by one year ending 30 th
April, 1993.
(V.P.Raori)
Director
Shri S.K.Sharma
Senior Librarian"
9. In view of the above it is quite clear that the following
conclusions can safely emerge:-
a) Regulation 2.4 does not provide any maximum period of probation,
much less of one year only.
b) The appointment letter qua the petitioner dated 12.3.1991 specifically
stated that the period of probation can be extended.
c) The petitioner was never confirmed to his post in terms of the
expression "if confirmed" existing in Staff Regulation 2.4 read with the
letter of the petitioner dated 3.8.1992 and the memorandum of the
respondent No.1 dated 23.9.1992, both of which have been reproduced
above.
10. Accordingly, it is held that the first argument raised on behalf
of the petitioner is misconceived that the petitioner stood automatically
confirmed after the period of one year of probation.
11. So far as the second argument is concerned, the same is equally
meritless for the reasons that the relevant Rule 11(i) of the Articles of
Association of the respondent No.1 specifically gives the power to the
Executive Council on all matters of the administration and which will
obviously include the aspects with respect to services of the employees of
the respondent No.1. Also, the said Rule 11(i) also states that Executive
Council shall have the responsibility for control of the affairs of the School
and which expression is wide enough to include all aspects of
administration/affairs of the respondent No.1-Organisation including the
aspect with respect to the appointment and termination of services of
employees. The power of Executive Council could have been delegated
further to the Director of the respondent No.1 and which becomes clear from
Rule 14 of the Articles of Association and which reads as under:
"Delegation of 14 The Executive Council may, by a
powers by the resolution, delegate to the Director or
Executive Council to a committee, such of its powers as
it may deem fit subject to the
condition that the action taken by the
Director or committee under the
powers delegated to any of them by
this rule shall be reported at the next
meeting of the Executive Council."
12. The respondent No. 4 in terms of the aforesaid Rules 11 and 14
has filed on record the resolution of the Executive Council of the respondent
No.1 dated 8.5.1980 and which specifically delegated the powers of the
Executive Council to the Chairman viz. the Director of the respondent No.1.
That the Chairman is the Director of the respondent No.1 becomes clear
from Rule 9(a) of the Rules and which reads as under:-
"Membership of the 9. The Executive Council shall be
Executive Council composed of:
(a) Director of the School,
Chairman (Ex-oficio)
............."
13. In view of the above, the position which emerges is that the
powers of appointment and termination of employees vest with the
Executive Council, subject to the relevant Staff Regulations. The Executive
Council had competence to delegate its powers to Chairman/Director of the
school and which was in fact done in terms of the minutes dated 8.5.1980.
Therefore, I do not agree with the argument urged on behalf of the petitioner
that the petitioner has not been terminated by the authority which was
authorized to terminate the services of the petitioner.
14. That leaves us with the last argument with respect to the
termination of the petitioner being actually in the nature of the penalty order
and hence falling foul of the ratio of the judgments in the cases of Samsher
Singh (supra) and Dipti Prakash Banerjee (supra). In order to understand
the lack of merit in this argument, it will be necessary at this stage to refer to
averments which have been made in the counter affidavit to show that the
incident with regard to Sh.Nand Kishore was only one of the
reasons/motives, and not the only reason for terminating the petitioner
during the probation period. The relevant averments in the counter affidavit
read as under:-
"1. The petitioner was working with the School of
Planning and Architecture, (deemed to be a University)
New Delhi, in the capacity of Senior Librarian, on
probation, and his services were terminated vide order
dated September 25, 1992 as his conduct and work was not
found satisfactory. The Petitioner was, time and again,
advised to mend his ways, but to no avail. The petitioner
was also conveyed the contents of his annual confidential
report wherein it is clearly noted that the conduct of the
Petitioner was not satisfactory. A copy of the said annual
confidential report dated 29 May, 1992 is annexed
herewith as Annexure „R-1‟. The office memo dated
9th/21st July, 1992 vide which the petitioner was conveyed
the adverse remarks in the said ACR is annexed herewith
as Annexure R-1A‟.
That, earlier, a joint representation by the members of the
Library Staff, complaining against the conduct and work of
the Petitioner, was submitted to the School authorities on
24.4.1992. A fact finding committee comprising Professor
T.M.Vinod Kumar and Shri Virender Paul was set up vide
office order dated 1.5.1992 t look into the charges against
the Petitioner. The Petitioner was all along aware of the
fact finding committee. The petitioner baldly rebutted the
charges against him vide a hand written letter dated
21.6.1992, a copy of which is annexed herewith as
Annexure „R-2‟. The fact finding committee submitted its
report on 22.6.1992 coming to the conclusion that the
charges against the Petitioner were substantiated on the
basis of evidence brought before it. On the basis of the
report of the said fact finding committee it was decided by
the competent authority that the probation period of the
Petitioner be extended by one year. Accordingly, vide an
Office Memorandum dated 9/21 July, 1992 (copy of which
has been annexed as Annexure „P‟ with the petition) the
probation period of the Petitioner was extended by one
year. The said office memorandum clearly states that the
period of probation of the Petitioner stood extended on
account of the unsatisfactory work and conduct of the
Petitioner. Again, by office memorandum dated 9th/21st
July, 1992 the Petitioner was given another opportunity to
explain the charges made against him. (The said document
is annexure „N‟ with the petition). The Petitioner once
again baldly denied the charges vide his letter dated
29.7.1992 (which appears as annexure „O‟ with the
petition). It is clear that the petitioner was asked to explain
the charges against him not once but on two occasions.
Both times, i.e., in his hand written letter dated 21.6.1992
and his letter dated 29.7.1992 the petitioner chose to
baldly deny the said chares.
That not satisfied with the work and conduct of the
petitioner, the probation period of the Petitioner was
extended by one year i.e., upto 30th April, 1993 by office
memorandum dated 21.7.1992. It is worth mentioning that
no other action, save extension of the Petitioner‟s
probation period was consequent and attendant jupon the
report of the fact finding committee dated 22.6.1992. The
Petitioner has obliquely tried to convey in his petitioner
that the order of termination of service was a consequence
of the finding o the fact finding committee. This position
is false and denied. It is once again reiterated that the only
action taken against the Petitioner on the basis of the fact
finding committee report dated 22.6.1992 was that the
probation period of the Petitioner was extended with the
idea of giving the Petitioner another chance to mend his
ways. However, the Petitioner proved recalcitrant. On
August 29, 1992, the Petitioner physically assaulted one
Mr. Nand Kishore, a peon, in the Library of the School. A
copy of the complaint submitted by Mr. Nand Kishore is
annexed herewith as Annexure „R-3‟. This incident was
looked into and statement of witnesses recorded. It was
established that the Petitioner had, in fact, physically
beaten up Mr. Nand Kishore. Even otherwise, the conduct
of the Petitioner continued to be unsatisfactory. On 14 th
September, 1992, the Library Advisory Committee
comprising Prof. T.M.Vinod Kumar, Prof. Malay
Chatterjee, Mr. Satish Khanna, Mr. Virender Paul and Mr.
K.V. Tiwari vide a letter of the same date recommended
that the Petitioner‟s continuance in the School would not
be in the interest of the School. The said letter is annexed
herewith as Annexure „R-4‟. In view of this
recommendation the services of the Petitioner who was on
extended probation, were terminated vide a office memo
dated September 25, 1992. It is worth emphasizing that
the letter of termination of the Petitioner‟s service is an
order simplicitor and casts no stigma on the Petitioner. In
fact, the School authorities took extreme care and
exercised abundant auction in wording the order of
termination in a manner which would not be prejudicial to
the Petitioner‟s future career. The Respondent No.1 issued
two letters dated September 25, 1992. (Annexed with the
petitioner as Annexure „T‟). the first of these two letters, a
memorandum No.O.M.No.250/SKS/92/SPA(Estt), is a
covering letter informing the petitioner personally of the
reasons for the termination of his services. The second
document is an office order which simply conveys the fact
of termination of the Petitioner‟s service with immediate
effect. Thus, the reason for termination and the order of
the termination were conveyed separately to the Petitioner.
This was done keeping in mind that the Petitioner‟s
professional future and career may not be prejudiced. It is
thus clear that as the Petitioner was a probationer, the
authorities were required to do nothing more than issue a
simple letter terminating his services. No right of the
Petitioner has thus been violated." (underlining added).
15. Alongwith the aforesaid averments made in the counter
affidavit, we can also refer to the relevant ACR prepared for the petitioner
and which contained adverse remarks requiring improvement of the
petitioner, and only thereafter he was to be confirmed. The petitioner was
put to due notice of the adverse entries made against him in the ACR.
Further, the Library Committee by its letter dated 14.9.1992 informed the
Director of the respondent No.1 with respect to the lack of satisfactory
conduct of the petitioner in the performance of his duties, and which letter
reads as under:
"14th September, 1992
The Director
School of Planning and Architecture,
New Delhi-110002
Dear Prof. Raori,
We, the undersigned members of the Library
Committee, have been closely monitoring the performance of
Shri S.K. Sharma, Senior Librarian, for over one year. He has
been given several opportunities to improve his performance by
the Chairman of our Committee. The most recent such meeting
was held today from 1.30 p.m. to 3.00 p.m. His performance has
in fact gone from a bad to worse. Subsequent to the submission
of the Enquiry Committee he assaulted Shri Nand Kishore in the
Library.
In continuation of our Report dated 22nd June, 1992,
we have regretful come to the conclusion that his continuance in
the School will be detrimental to the well-being of our Libraries
and their staff.
Yours sincerely,
(T.M.VINOD KUMAR)
(MALAY CHATTERJEE) (SATISH KHANNA)
(VIRENDRA PAUL) (K.V. TEWANI)"
16. A resume of the above facts shows that the petitioner was found
wanting on various occasions during his probation period. This lack of due
conduct of the petitioner was repeatedly brought to the petitioner‟s notice,
which however, was of no avail. The unsatisfactory work and conduct of the
petitioner is not only with respect to one incident but to many incidents, and
which have been adverted to by the Library Committee in its letter dated
14.9.1992. Also, and as stated above, the lack of satisfactory performance of
the petitioner was an aspect included in his ACR and brought to the notice of
the petitioner. In the facts of the present case where there are series of acts
and lack of satisfactory conduct during the probationer period, and it is not
as if that the incident of assault on Sh.Nand Kishore was the only incident
for terminating the probationer services of the petitioner, therefore, in my
opinion, it cannot be said that the impugned order dated 25.9.1992
terminating the services of the petitioner amounts to in substance a dismissal
order on the basis of the incident involving Sh. Nand Kishore. As already
stated above, it is an undisputed position that the order is not stigmatic.
17. I may note that even assuming some enquiry was conducted
against the petitioner, the enquiry proceedings are only preliminary enquiry
proceedings and it was not a full-fledged enquiry as required of a
departmental enquiry/ full scale formal enquiry pursuant to which an order is
passed by disciplinary authority. Merely because the petitioner is called
upon to reply to the charges or some witnesses have been examined or
statements recorded will not mean that the enquiry against the petitioner was
a full-fledged enquiry like a departmental enquiry/ full scale disciplinary
enquiry. The Supreme Court in the judgment reported as Kendriya
Vidyalaya Sangathan vs. Arun Kumar Madhav Rao Sinddhaye & Anr.,
2007 (1) SCC 283 has held that where the enquiry is not a formal
departmental enquiry/ full scale formal disciplinary enquiry and where non
observance of prescribed Rules or procedure or principles of natural justice
could have the result of vitiating the whole enquiry, then, the mere fact that
an employee was allowed to participate in such preliminary enquiry or some
queries were put to certain persons would not alter the nature of the enquiry,
which continued to be only a preliminary enquiry. In the present case also,
in addition to what has been stated above of the petitioner being guilty of
various acts unbecoming of a conduct of an employee during the probationer
period, additionally and independently it can also be held in the facts of the
present case that the enquiry against the petitioner was only in the nature of
preliminary enquiry and which cannot be equated to a full-fledged
disciplinary enquiry/full scale formal enquiry. Therefore, if there is an order
of terminating the services of the petitioner by non-stigmatic order, the same
is only an innocuous termination in terms of the appointment letter and
hence valid because the services cannot be said to have been terminated by
way of punishment in accordance with the Supreme Court judgment in the
case of Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan (supra). Similar are the
observations of the Supreme Court in the judgment reported as Pavanendra
Narayan Verma vs. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences & Ant., 2002
(1) SCC 520 which holds that the order of terminating the services of a
probationer cannot be said to be a penalty order unless the order is an order
which is such as would have to be and is passed by a disciplinary authority
on the basis of the incident alleged resulting in the penalty being imposed.
18. Finally I must refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the
case of Muir Mills Unit of NTC (UP) Ltd. vs. Swayam Prakash Srivastava
& Anr., 2007(1) SCC 491, and which judgment holds that in fact the
termination order of a probationer‟s services if it states that the services were
not satisfactory, yet, such observations cannot be termed as a stigmatic order
for being challenged by the probationer. It is further provided in this
judgment that principle of audi alteram partem is not applicable requiring
hearing to the petitioner with respect to the non-stigmatic termination.
19. In view of the above, there is no merit in the petition, which is
accordingly dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J
MARCH 05, 2013
ak
