Mr. K.C.Sharma vs Bses Yamuna Power Limited
2013 Latest Caselaw 989 Del

*     IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+                        WP(C) No. 2107/2000

%                                                      February 28, 2013


MR. K.C.SHARMA                                      ..... Petitioner
             Through:             Mr. R.K.Saini with Mr. Vikram Saini, Advs.

                         versus

BSES YAMUNA POWER LIMITED               ..... Respondent

Through: Mr. Sandeep Prabhakar with Ms. Prerna Mehta & Mr. Amit Kumar, Advs. for R-1.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VALMIKI J. MEHTA To be referred to the Reporter or not?

VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J (ORAL)

1. Counsel for the parties have been heard at length. The present

petition impugns the order dated 21.10.1999 of the disciplinary authority

setting aside the findings and conclusions of the enquiry officer dated

1.12.1994. The order of the disciplinary authority reads as under:-

"O R D E R WHEREAS the disciplinary proceeding under Regulation

- 7 of the Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking (DMC) Service (C&A) Regulations 1976 was initiated against h.K.C.Sharma, Asst. Acctt. Vide memo No.VC-31-33/94- Vig/TS/553 dated 1/12/94.

AND WHEREAS the case of Sh.K.C.Sharma was referred to regular departmental enquiry to enquire into the charges levelled against him. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report holding the charge against Charged Officer as not proved.

AND WHEREAS the Disciplinary Authority considered enquiry report submitted by Enquiry Officer in departmental proceedings against Sh.K.C.Sharma Asstt. Acctt. alongwith relevant records of the case and on basis of his own analysis, appreciation and evaluation of the facts and documentary evidence on record found that there are sufficient grounds which establish the charge against Charged Official. Thus Disciplinary Authority disagreeing with the findings of the Enquiry Officer held the charge as proved and accordingly proposed to impose upon Sh.K.C. Sharma the Major penalty of reduction by three stages in the time scale of pay for a period of three years, during the period of reduction he will not earn any increments and such reduction will have the cumulative effect and will postpone his future increments of pay. Sh.K.C.Sharma, Asstt. Acctt. Was accordingly informed vide show cause notice/memo no. VC-31-33/94- Vig/TS/AVO-IV/713 dated 22/1/99.

AND WHEREAS Sh.K.C.Sharma submitted his reply to show cause memo dated 22/1/99 issued to him.

AND WHEREAS the undersigned as competent Disciplinary Authority has gone through carefully the reply to show cause notice submitted by Sh.K.C.Sharma, Asstt. Acctt. and other relevant records of the case. I find the submissions as no new facts have been brought out for consideration and granting of personal hearing in the matter will not serve the purpose. Sh.K.C.Sharma, Asstt. Acctt., E.No.11846 is going to retire from service of DVB after attaining the age of superannuation on 31.8.2000.

NOW, I, THEREFORE, hereby confirm and impose

upon Sh.K.C.Sharma, Asstt. Acctt. The penalty of reduction by three stage in the time scale of pay till the date of his retirement, during the period of reduction the official will not earn increments and reduction will have the cumulative effect."

2. A reading of the aforesaid order shows that there is no

discussion of the points in issue which require determination, and as to what

are the reasons which has led the disciplinary authority to pass the impugned

order. Putting it differently, an order of a quasi judicial authority has to be

a speaking order in terms of the Constitution Bench judgment of the

Supreme Court in the case of S.N.Mukherjee vs. Union of India, 1990 (4)

SCC 594. Indubitably the impugned order dated 21.10.1999 is not a

speaking order as per the ratio of the Constitution Bench judgment of the

Supreme Court in the case of S.N.Mukherjee (supra).

3. Even the order of the appellate authority is a cryptic order

containing no reasons whatsoever and the same reads as under:-

"ORDER WHEREAS disciplinary proceedings under Regulation 7 of DESU(DMC) Service (C&A) Regulations, 1976 was initiated against Shri Khem Chand Sharma, Asstt. Acctt., E.No.11846, vide Memo No.VC-31-33/94-Vig/TS/553, dtd

- 1.12.94.

AND WHEREAS vide order no. VC-31-33/94- Vig/TS/AVO-II/713, dtd -21.10.99, major penalty of reduction by three stages in the time scale of pay till the date of retirement with further stipulation that during the period

of reduction Shri K.C.Sharma will not earn increments and reduction will have the cumulative effect, was imposed upon the said Shri K.C.Sharma.

AND WHEREAS Shri K.C.Sharma aggrieved with the imposition of the aforesaid penalty preferred and appeal dtd- 22.11.99 which has carefully been considered by the undersigned as Appellate Authority. I do not find any force in the appeal. No point of any substance has been raised and the main facts of the matter are very clear. Shri K.C.Sharma in his appeal has made weak technical/procedural arguments and has not made any significant specific point on the specific facts and merits of the case. AS regards the quantum of punishment a lenient view has already been taken by the Disciplinary Authority. AS a lenient view has already been taken I do not consider it necessary to intervene further.

NOW, THEREFORE, the appeal dtd-22.11.99 preferred by the said Shri Khem Chand Sharma is dismissed."

4. Requirement of recording of reasons is a very salutary rule

because not only it helps the higher authorities or Courts which have to

examine the case but also the aggrieved person knows the reasons why the

case is decided against him. This requirement of giving reasons is a sine qua

non ingredient of the principles of natural justice which are enshrined in our

Constitution by virtue of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

5. In the present case, the requirement of giving reasons by the

disciplinary authority was all the more necessary because of the important

aspect that the disciplinary authority disagreed with the detailed findings and

conclusions of the enquiry officer.

6. In view of the above, the orders of the disciplinary authority

and the appellate authority are set aside.

7. The question then follows, should the petitioner automatically

get the benefit of the orders being set aside? I do not think so. The orders

are being set aside only for non complying with the principles of natural

justice. Setting aside of the orders cannot in law mean that automatically the

benefit of the orders not existing can be given to the charged official

inasmuch as by setting aside of the orders on the technical ground of non-

compliance with the principles of natural justice, there is no immediate

finding that the charged official is not guilty. This issue of guilt or

otherwise will be finally decided on the order now being passed afresh by

the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority. Also, in exercise of

my jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, I am entitled

to pass orders so as to ensure that justice is served and not that technicality

overwrites justice.

8. Therefore, while setting aside the impugned order dated

21.10.1999 of the disciplinary authority and the order dated 2.2.2000 of the

appellate authority, it is ordered that it would not be that the petitioner will

get all consequential benefits, and the orders are only set aside to enable the

appropriate authorities to pass a speaking order in accordance with law.

9. Writ petition is disposed of with the aforesaid observations.

VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J FEBRUARY 28, 2013 ak