Dinesh Ahuja vs Praful Prakash Ramanand
2012 Latest Caselaw 5829 Del

*            THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+                          R.C.REV. 343/2012

                                           Date of Decision: 27.09.2012

DINESH AHUJA                                             ...... Petitioner

                           Through:     Mr. H.K.Monga, Advocate.

                                  Versus

PRAFUL PRAKASH RAMANAND                                ...... Respondent

                           Through:     In person.


CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.L. MEHTA

M.L. MEHTA, J. (Oral)

1. This revision petition under Section 25-B (8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (for short the 'Act') is directed against the order dated 21.04.2012 of Addl. Rent Controller (ARC), whereby the leave to defend application filed by the petitioner, in the eviction petition filed against him by the respondent, was dismissed.

2. The petitioner is the tenant in respect of shop situated at ground floor of premises being F-14/10, Model Town-II, Delhi-9, under the respondent. His eviction is sought on the ground of bona fide requirement of the suit shop by the respondent for his car parking. His

case, in brief, is that he has no other reasonably suitable accommodation on the ground floor for parking his car and that the accommodation available with him on the ground floor is not suitable for parking. The petitioner filed leave to defend application, which came to be dismissed by the learned ARC vide the impugned order. The same is under challenge in the instant petition.

3. At the outset, it may be reiterated that the instant revision petition is under Section 25-B (8) of the Act and the powers of this Court in revision are limited unlike that in the appellate matters. In this regard, it is settled that this Court would not interfere in the revision petition unless there is a gross or material irregularity or non exercise of jurisdiction by the Rent Controller. This Court in the case of Kasturilal Nandraj Vs. Bakshi Ram, Vol. XIX (1981) DLT 329 held that in the revision petitions this Court will not interfere unless there is gross irregularity committed by the Rent Controller or there is great injustice being caused to any party.

4. The case as set out by the petitioner in the leave to defend application, and which is also the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, is that the respondent got possession of adjoining shop No. 2 in September, 2008 and instead of using the same for car parking, has let it out on higher rent, and that would show that he did not require the suit shop for car parking, but for letting out on higher rent. It is also his case that one other shop on the back of the shops

was also vacated and the respondent has removed the shutter and erected the wall, which is bigger than the suit shop, and is lying vacant.

5. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner as also the respondent and perused the record.

6. With regard to the respondent having taken the possession of the adjoining shop No. 2, it is the case of the respondent that he reluctantly agreed to let out the said shop to the sub-tenant therein, in an oral settlement arrived at between them, and also because the said shop could not be used for the car parking. It is submitted that the dimension of the said shop is such that the car cannot be parked inside. During the course of arguments, drawing my attention to the site plan, the respondent pointed out that this shop is in two portions and there exists structural pillars between the two portions, and as a result of which, the size of the first portion in length is not more than six feet, and no car can fit in this portion. This was not controverted by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Undisputedly, the site plan, which has been filed by the respondent, has not been challenged by the petitioner, who has also not chosen to file his own site plan. Thus, the site plan so filed by the respondent, was rightly taken by the ARC as correct. Hence this shop No. 2, which is now in the occupation of the then sub-tenant, even otherwise, could not be said to be suitable and sufficient alternative accommodation for car parking.

7. With regard to the plea that there is another space available on the back of the shops, the respondent's case is that there already exist two staircases, and that space being insufficient, no car can be parked there. With regard to this, the learned ARC also recorded a finding of fact from the averments of the parties that the staircase was already in existence and no staircase was constructed by the respondent and further, that the space available there, cannot accommodate the car, and thus, the said space cannot be said to be available with the respondent for parking of his car.

8. The plea raised by the petitioner in the leave to defend application, disputing the ownership of the respondent of suit premises, was not urged before me by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner.

9. The learned ARC has relied upon the case Sarla Ahuja Vs. United India Insurance Company Ltd. (1998) 8 SCC 119 to record that the tenant cannot dictate how landlord should adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. He has also relied upon the case of Subhash Chander Gupta Vs. Vasudev RC, RC Rev. No. 101/2005 of this court, wherein it was held that the landlord is entitled to evict tenant from the ground floor if he wants accommodation from the tenant for his car parking.

10. In view of my above discussion, and having regard to the scope of revisional powers of this Court, as briefly noted above, I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned order of the ARC. The petition has no merit and is hereby dismissed.

M.L. MEHTA, J.

SEPTEMBER 27, 2012 akb