National Insurance Co. Ltd vs Jitender Kumar & Ors
2012 Latest Caselaw 5292 Del

$~6
*      IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

                                        Decided on: 5th September, 2012
+      MAC.APP. 584/2009

       NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.      ..... Appellant
                    Through Mr. Pradeep Gaur, Advocate

                        versus


       JITENDER KUMAR & ORS                         .... Respondents
                    Through None


       CORAM:
       HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.P.MITTAL
                      JUDGMENT

G. P. MITTAL, J. (ORAL)

1. This Appeal is directed against a judgment dated 29.08.2009 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal(the Claims Tribunal) whereby a compensation of `37,230/- was awarded in favour of the First Respondent for having suffered injuries in a motor vehicle accident which occurred on 02.03.2006. The Appellant‟s plea that there was a conscious and willful breach of the terms of the policy was rejected by the Claims Tribunal.

2. By an order dated 02.12.2009, a notice of the Appeal was ordered to be issued to Respondents No.2 to 4 only on the issue of liability whether the Appellant would be entitled to recovery rights against the Respondents?

3. It is urged by the learned counsel for the Appellant that the

Appellant served notice under Order XII Rule 8 CPC (Ex.R4W1/2) upon the insured and driver, but no valid driving licence was produced by the driver/owner. The driving licence No.2653/MPF/05 alleged to be issued on 29.11.2005 seized by the IO in the criminal case was found to be fake as per the report Mark „A1‟ issued by Licensing Officer, Mainpuri. It is, thus urged that at least recovery rights should have been granted to the Appellant to recover the compensation paid from the owner and the driver.

4. It is true that a notice under Order XII Rule 8 CPC (Ex.R4W1/2 and Ex.R4W1/3) was served upon the owner and the driver. The driver was directed to produce the driving licence, whereas the owner was required to produce the driving licence of the driver as also the original insurance policy. They preferred not to respond to the notice and thus an inference could be drawn against the Respondents that they were not in possession of any other driving licence. The question for consideration is whether report Mark „A1‟ is sufficient to prove that the driving licence No.2653/MPF/05 was fake.

5. To prove that the driving licence was fake, the Appellant examined R4W1 Ajay Sethi. Mr. Ajay Sethi deposed that an investigator Rajender Kumar Mishra has given a report (Ex.R4X2) to show that the licence possessed by the driver was not valid. The investigator was not produced in the Court to depose about this fact. A report Mark „A1‟ purported to be issued by the Licensing Officer, Motor Vehicle Licence Department, Mainpuri was placed on record, but the same was not proved.

6. Section 67 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (the Evidence Act)

lays down the mode of proof of a document, which is extracted hereunder:-

"67. Proof of signature and handwriting of person alleged to have signed or written document produced - If a document is alleged to be signed or to have been written wholly or in part by any person, the signature or the handwriting of so much of the document as is alleged to be in that person's handwriting must be proved to be in his hand writing."

7. Thus, all documents including the public document are required to be proved as per Section 67 of the Evidence Act. In this case, no effort was made to prove the signature of the concerned Licensing Officer on the report Mark „A1‟ and that is why the same was not exhibited.

8. The question for proof of a sanction order signed by the sanctioning authority, that is, Secretary(Medical), Delhi Administration came up before a learned Single Judge of this Court in State (Delhi Administration) v. Brij Mohan, 27 (1985) DLT 322. This Court held that the sanction order is to proved like any other document. Paras 8 and 9 of the report are extracted hereunder:

"(8) Section 61 of the Evidence Act lays down that the contents of a document may be proved either by primary or by secondary evidence. Section 62 thereof defines primary evidence as meaning the document itself produced for the inspection of the court. In other words, the primary documentary evidence of a transaction (evidenced by writing) is the document itself which should be produced in original to prove the terms of the contract/ transaction, if it exists and is obtainable. Since the original sanction was

admittedly placed on record by the prosecution, the requirements of this provision stood satisfied and the question of any secondary evidence for proving the contents of the sanction as such did not arise. Primary evidence in the context of oral evidence, however, means an oral account of the original evidence i.e. of a person who saw what happened and gives an account of it recorded by the court. That question does not appear to have arisen in the instant case because the matter was still at the stage of proof of the consent accorded by the Secretary (Medical). Since Sections 61 to 66 of the Evidence Act deal with the mode of proving the contents of the documents, either by primary evidence or by secondary evidence, I need not dwell upon the same in view of the original document having been placed on the record.

(9) Then comes the most important question viz. the genuineness of a document produced in evidence i.e. is a document what it purports to be and this is dealt with in Sections 67 to 73 of the Evidence Act. Section 67 refers to documents other than documents required by law to be attested. It simply requires that the signature of the person alleged to have signed a document (i.e. the executant) must be proved by evidence that the signature purporting to that of the executant is in his handwriting. Further it requires that if the body of the document purports to be in the hand- writing of someone, it must be proved to be in the hand- writing of that person. However, Section 67 does not in terms prescribe any particular mode of proof and any recognised mode of proof which satisfies the Judge will do. Thus, the execution/ authorship of a document may be proved by direct evidence i e. by the writer or a person who saw the document written and signed or by circumstantial evidence which may be of various kinds, for example, by an expert or by the opinion of a non-expert who is acquainted with the hand-writing in any of the ways mentioned in Explanation to Section 47 or even by comparison etc. (See Sections 45, 47, 73 & 90 of the Evidence Act)......"

9. The question of proof of a public document came up before Bombay High Court in C.H. Shah v. S.S. Malpathak & Ors., AIR 1973 Bom. 14, where it was held as under:-

"4....... In all cases of secondary evidence under Section 65 read with Section 63 of the Evidence Act when a copy or an oral account of a document is admitted as secondary evidence, the execution of the original is not required to be proved but if the original itself is sought to be tendered it must be duly proved and there is no reason for applying a different rule to public documents. Secondly, in the case of a certified copy, before a presumption of its genuineness can be raised under Section 79, as laid down by the Supreme Court in Bhinka's case already referred to above it must be shown that the certified copy was executed substantially in the form and in the manner provided by law. There would, therefore, be a check or safeguard in so far as the officer certifying it in the manner required by law would have to satisfy himself in regard to the authenticity of the original and in regard to the accuracy of the copy which he certifies to be a true copy thereof. On the other hand if the original of a public document is to be admitted in evidence without proof of its genuineness, there would be no check whatever either by way of scrutiny or examination of that document by an officer or by the Court. The third and perhaps the most important reason, for not accepting Mr.Shah's argument on the point which I am now considering is that neither Section 67 nor Section 68 of the Evidence Act which lay down that the signature and the handwriting on a document must be duly proved do not make any exception in the case of public documents. In view of the provisions of the said section all documents whatever be their nature must be therefore be proved in the manner provided by Section 45, 47 or 73 of the Evidence Act........

5. The only question which remains for consideration is whether a presumption of the genuineness of the original of a public document should be drawn by reason of Illustration

(e) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act to the effect that official acts have been regularly performed. It is no doubt

true that it has been held by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of East India Trading Co. v. Badat & Co., AIR 1959 Bom. 414 that Section 114 of the Evidence Act is wide enough to permit the Court to raise a presumption not only with regard to oral evidence, but also with regard to documentary evidence. It may be mentioned that the decision of the Division Bench in the said case was reversed on appeal by the Supreme Court by a majority AIR 1964 SC 538, but in the judgment of the majority the Supreme Court has not referred to the point mentioned above. Apart from the undesirability of taking a view which would let in any and every document tendered by Government in suits to which it is a party without proof of genuineness, in my opinion, no presumption under Section 114 can be drawn in view of the mandatory and unqualified term of Sections 67 and 68 of the Evidence Act. Section 114 which to put it in popular language, merely empowers the Court to use its commonsense, cannot be used to contravene an express provision of the Act itself. I, therefore, hold that if the original of a public document is sought to be tendered in evidence, it must be proved in the manner required by law....."

10. Thus, the report Mark „A1‟ purported to be issued by the Licensing Officer, Mainpuri cannot be looked into unless signatures thereon were proved by examining a witness.

11. It is true that there are some difficulties in summoning the witnesses from the registering authorities. This aspect was taken into consideration while framing the Delhi Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules, 2008. Under Rule 7 it has been provided that the submission of report as per Form "D" (provided in the Rules) by the registering authority would be made admissible without any formal proof. Rule 7 is extracted as under:

"7. Presumption about reports- The contents of reports submitted to the Claims Tribunal in Form "A" and Form "D" by investigating police officer and concerned registering authority respectively, and confirmation under clause (b) of rule 5 by the insurance company shall be presumed to be correct, and shall be read in evidence without formal proof, till proved to the contrary."

12. Since the report of the Licensing Officer has not been proved, the same cannot be looked into. The Appellant was rightly declined recovery rights.

13. The Appeal is devoid of any merit; the same is accordingly dismissed.

14. Statutory amount of `25,000/- shall be refunded to the Appellant Insurance Company.

15. Pending Applications stand disposed of.

(G.P. MITTAL) JUDGE SEPTEMBER 05, 2012 pst