Col. Inderjeet Singh vs Mr. Vikram Singh & Anr
2012 Latest Caselaw 4109 Del

*            HIGH COURT OF DELHI : NEW DELHI

+          I.A. Nos. 4420/2010, 10893/2011, 19938/2011,
           2854/2012 & 4213/2012 in CS (OS) No. 874/2002

%                                Judgment Pronounced on : 13.07.2012

      Col. Inderjeet Singh                             ..... Plaintiff
                      Through: Mr. Arjun Singh Bawa, Adv.


                        Versus


      Mr. Vikram Singh & Anr                     ..... Defendants
                    Through: Defendant No.1 in person

Coram:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANMOHAN SINGH

MANMOHAN SINGH, J.

1. By this order I propose to decide the main application filed by the plaintiff under Order XII Rule 6 read with Section 151 CPC for passing a decree on admissions made by the defendants alongwith four more applications filed by defendant No.1, two of them were filed during the course of hearing of the application mentioned above.

2. The present suit is filed seeking partition by metes and bounds in equal shares of the property situated at D-57, Defence Colony, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the „said premises‟) and an injunction against the defendants or its agents, representatives employees from selling or parting possession or crating any third party rights in the said property. Facts of the case

3. Late Gurcharan Singh had been allotted a piece of land bearing No.D-57, Defence Colony, New Delhi, vide lease deed executed on 30th January, 1963 duly registered at S. No.893 in

Addl. Book No.I, Vol. No.929 on pages 97 to 99 dated 11 th February, 1963 with the Sub Registrar, New Delhi.

4. The said Gurcharan Singh died in June, 1968 leaving behind the following legal heirs :

     (i)     Mrs. K. Gurcharan Singh - Widow.

     (ii)    Col. Inderjit Singh - Son.

(iii) Mrs. Anant Verinder Singh - Married daughter.

The property of Late Gurcharan Singh was inherited in the following manner :

(i) Mrs. K. Gurcharan Singh - Undivided share - 2/3rd

(ii) Col. Inderjit Singh -do- 1/6th

(iii) Mrs. Anant Verinder Singh -do- 1/6th

Thereafter, the said legal heirs were substituted in the records of the government of India, Ministry of Works and Housing, Land and Development Office, Nirman Bhawan, New Delhi. The L&DO vide letter No.L&DO/8P.III/8/1429 dated 22 nd July, 1980 had communicated the same to the concerned parties.

5. Mrs. Gurcharan Singh passed away on 9th January, 2001, intestate leaving behind the predecessors in interests of the plaintiff and the defendant i.e. Col. Inderjit Singh (son) and Mrs. Anant Virendar Singh (daughter) as remaining legal heirs. Though the defendant produced a Will dated 15th June, 1990 of late Smt. Gurcharan Singh, but the same was denied by the plaintiff.

6. In order to resolve all differences and disputes and to preserve the peace and harmony of the family, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a Family Settlement dated 9th April, 2001, vide which the „suit property‟ were to be shared equally between the parties.

7. The relevant extract of family agreement dated 9th April,

2001 is given as follows-

"Whereas all these facts are disputed and may lead to litigation and therefore, in order to maintain peace and harmony between the family, preserve the family property and settle the matter amicably, the parties have voluntarily and mutually decided that the parties to this settlement i.e. Mrs. Anant Virender Singh and Col. Inderjeet Singh would share the house bearing No. D-57, Defence Colony, New Delhi, in equal share after the death of their mother Mrs. Katar Gurcharan Singh."

8. Plaintiff states that the deed of settlement was accepted by the parties and this Court vide its order dated 19th February, 2004 recorded the said agreement as an admitted document. Hence, the plaintiff states that the admission made in the said order is an important admission and seeks an order in his favour.

9. In reply to the above application, defendants state that the plaintiff has concealed material facts from this court. The defendants state that the Will of Late Wing Commander Gurcharan Singh dated 12th December, 1965 acted upon by the plaintiff as the record with the L & DO will testify the letter dated 26th May 1978. It is also stated that the plaintiff, during the course of admission and denial of documents, has admitted a power of attorney dated 3rd August, 1968 wherein, the Will of Late Gurcharan Singh has been admitted.

Defendants submit that the family agreement dated 9th April, 2001 has no legs to stand. In the original affidavit of original defendant i.e. Mrs. Anant Virender Singh vide affidavit dated 5th May, 2005 submitted that an unregistered family agreement cannot override the registered Will. Moreover, the agreement is null and void on account of having been executed under threat and coercion as there was an ongoing eviction dispute between the tenant on the ground floor and various defendants‟ applications included contempt and under Order X Rule 4 CPC seeking dismissal of suit.

10. Family Settlement Defendant No.1 during the course of hearing has denied having in his possession of original family settlement and argued that the application filed by the plaintiff on admission be dismissed. Admittedly, the family settlement dated 9th April, 2001 is an admitted document by both parties. Both the parties have filed the family settlement dated 9th April, 2001. It is Exhibited as Ex.P3 from plaintiff‟s documents and Ex.D3 from defendant‟s documents. The original family settlement dated 9th April, 2001 appears to be in possession of the defendant. I refer an order dated 9th February, 2004 which records that the original documents have been brought by the defendant of which the admission/denial was conducted. Even as per list of documents filed by the defendant which mentions the family settlement dated 9th April, 2001 at serial No.6.

11. The affidavit of the defendants also finds mention that the original family settlement dated 9th April, 2001 is in the possession of the defendant.

12. The defendant has admitted the family settlement dated 9th April, 2001 at the following places :

a. Written statement of the defendant where he admits the family settlement dated 9th April, 2001 and admits that there is no partition by metes and bounds. The said statement was made in pages 10 and 13 of the written statement. In para 11 of the written statement it is admitted by the defendant that "on 9th April, 2001 a family agreement was signed between Mrs. Anant Virender Singh and Col. Inderjeet Singh...".

b. Reply of the defendant to the interim application I.A. No.4420/2010; Order XII Rule 6 r/w Section 151 CPC 1908 admits no partition of the property by metes and bounds.

c. Counter affidavit of the defendant dated 13th March, 2008 admits execution of the family settlement dated 9th April, 2001.

13. The defendant himself has filed the letter dated 22nd July, 1980 issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Works and Housing, Land Development Office, Nirman Bhawan, New Delhi, which clearly states that the property now stands substituted in the books of the said office jointly in their names.

14. The extract of the said letter is reproduced as under:

          "No.L&DO/S.P.III/L/1429          22.07.1980

          To

          Major Inderjeet Singh
          17, Cunningham Road
          Bangalore

Sub :Substitution of lease hold rights in property D-57, Defence Colony, New Delhi 110 024

With reference to his application dated 5.6.1980 on the above cited subject regarding substitution of lease hold rights respect of property No.D-57, Defence Colony. I am directed to say that consequent upon the death of Sri Gurcharan Singh, Mrs. K. Gurcharan Singh, Major Inderjeet Singh and Mrs. Anant Virender Singh are hereby informed that the lease hold rights in property D-57, Defence Colony, have been substituted in their names on the same terms and conditions as laid down in the lease deed executed on 30.1.1963 and duly registered as S. No.893 in Additional Book No.I, Vol. No.929 on pages 97 to 99 dated 11.2.1963 with the sub-registrar, New Delhi on the basis of affidavits, death certificate and copy of the Will etc. furnished by you.

The property now stands substituted in the books of this office jointly in their names as under :

1. Mrs. Kartar Gurcharan Singh undivided share 2/3rd

2. Major Inderjeet Singh undivided share 1/6th

3. Mrs. Anant Virendar Singh undivided share 1/6th"

15. It is clear that in the aforesaid admission of the defendant in the pleading, the defendant has admitted the family settlement dated 9th April, 2001. The defendant therefore, cannot deny the execution of family settlement as the original defendant himself had made his admission about the said document and had taken the defence of coercion.

16. The defendant insisted that his four pending applications must be considered before determination of plaintiff‟s application filed under the provision of Order XII Rule 6 CPC. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of plaintiff has submitted that he had no objection of the disposal of those applications also but, his submission is that all the applications are false and frivolous and have been filed in order to drag the proceedings.

17. In view of above, let me first deal with the application by the defendant under Order VII, Rule 11 CPC, being I.A. No. 4213/2012, for rejection of the plaint due to insufficient court fee. The contention of the defendant is that the plaintiff was not in possession of any of the suit property. The plaintiff in clever drafting and construction of undertaking submitted by Dr. V.K. Jain and Mr. J.K. Jain, the tenant undertook to hand over the keys of ground floor to Col. Inderjeet Singh which was amounting to change of status quo of the suit premises as the said undertaking given by tenants was without the consent of the defendants. Although he admitted that plaintiff was in possession of the ground floor premises from 2004 up to February, 2008, but still he submitted that the plaintiff is not in joint possession as on 7th March, 2009, the plaintiff forcibly trespassed and took possession of the ground floor. His possession was illegal and therefore, he was required to pay full court fee.

18. Admittedly, in the letter dated 22nd July, 1980 issued by the Ministry of Works and Housing, Land and Development Office, Nirman Bhawan, exhibited as P-2, the suit property was also mutated in favour of the plaintiff. It is admitted position that the plaintiff and defendants are co-owners and in joint possession of the suit property with respect to undivided share. The plaintiff is in possession of the suit property subsequent order of eviction dated 13th October, 2003 as alleged. Further, the family settlement dated 9th April, 2001 with regard to suit property mentions the following recital:

"Whereas the First Party Mrs. Anant Virendar Singh and her family namely, son Mr. Vikram Singh are residing on the first and the second floor of the said property where they will continue to reside and remain liable for paying all statutory dues viz. Water and electricity charges for that portion.

Whereas, that the ground floor portion of the above said property is presently under the occupation of a tenant Dr. J.K. Jain, purely for residential purposes. It has been agreed and settled between the parties to the present settlement that the rent payable by the tenant shall be shared by the parties to the present settlement equally. Further all statutory taxes i.e. property tax, etc. shall be paid equally by both parties in the present settlement."

19. The plaintiff in para 8 of the plaint has specifically mentioned that the plaintiff has always been a co-owner and in joint possession of the suit property. Counsel for plaintiff has also referred the order dated 12th January, 2006 passed in IA No.2004/2004 in support of his submission. Thus, I find no merit in the application due to the reason that the present application has been filed by the defendant after 10 years of institution of the suit. There is force in the submission of the plaintiff that the plaintiff has affixed the requisite court fee in terms of Section 7(iv)(b) of the Court Fees Act, 1870 read with Article 17(vi) of the Court Fees Act, 1870. None of the decisions referred to by the defendant No.1 is

applicable to the facts of the present case. It appears that the prayer made in the application is totally false and frivolous. Both, the plaintiff and the defendants, are co-owner of the joint possession of the suit property. The application is highly misconceived, which has been filed by the defendant after part hearing of the application under Order XII, Rule 6 CPC. The same is dismissed.

20. Let me now take the second application filed by the defendant No.1 under Order VI Rule 17 read with Section 151 CPC being I.A. No.10893/2011 for amendment of reply dated 27 th January, 2011 to the application filed by the plaintiff under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. Reply to this application has been filed. It appears that the defendant earlier filed an application under Order VIII, Rule 9 CPC seeking permission to file the better reply to I.A. No.4420/2010 under Order XII, Rule 6 CPC. The defendant‟s application was dismissed by the Court on 21st March, 2011. The present application was filed subsequent to the said order almost for the same purpose.

There is no merit in the application. It appears from the application that the defendant is raising the same pleas over and over again. The application is disposed of with clarification that the averment made in the application is being considered while deciding the main application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.

21. Defendant No.1 during the course of hearing of application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC filed another application under Order XIII, Rule 3 CPC read with Section 35 and 61 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 for rejection of family settlement seeking relief that the family settlement dated 9th April, 2001 is not admissible in evidence under Sections 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 because it is an unstamped document and it cannot be relied upon by the plaintiff as it is not admissible in evidence. The defendant has made the same argument in the application filed by

the plaintiff under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, thus, the plea raised in this Court is being decided in the same application, hence, no separate order can be passed. IA is disposed of.

22. The provision of Order XII, Rule 6 of the CPC, 1908 confers wide powers on the Court to pronounce judgments on admission at any stage of the proceedings. The admission may have been made in the pleadings or otherwise. The admission may have been made orally or in writing. The court has the power to act on its own discretion on well established principles. The admission has to be clear, unequivocal and must be taken as a whole.

23. It is settled law that a family settlement does not require registration if either party recognises antecedent title of the other in the property and the dispute between the parties stands resolved by a compromise. There family settlement does not operate or purport to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any rights of the parties to the said property within the meaning of Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908. (See Hansa Industries vs. Kidarsons Industries Ltd., AIR 2007 SC 18, paragraphs 11, 12 and 13.

24. The central idea behind holding validity of a family settlement is that if, by consent of parties a matter has been resolved, it should not be allowed to be re-opened by the parties to the agreement on frivolous and untenable grounds. In view of judgment delivered by Supreme Court in the case of Kale and Others vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation and Others, AIR 1976 SC 807.

25. The Family Arrangement dated 9th April, 2001 is governed by special equities. The principles which apply to the case of ordinary compromise between strangers, do not equally apply to the case of compromises in the nature of family

arrangements. Family arrangements are governed by a special equity peculiar to themselves, and will be enforced if honestly made, although they have not meant as a compromise, but have proceeded from an error of all parties, originating in mistake or ignorance of fact as to what their rights actually are, or of the points on which their rights actually depend. [See Kale and Ors. (supra)]

26. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff submits that the Family Settlement dated 9th April, 2001 is made bonafide and to resolve disputes and rival claims, by a fair distribution of the property between the plaintiff and defendant. The family settlement dated 9th April, 2001 was executed voluntarily by both parties and the legal representative of the defendant (who is now the defendant No.1) appended his signatures to the said document as a witness to the execution of the document.

27. The family settlement dated 9th April, 2001 does not demonstrates a partition by metes and bounds therefore, is not compulsorily registrable as per Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908. (See Nanni Bai and Ors. vs. Gita Bai Kom Rama Gunge; AIR 1958 SC 706, paragraph 13) Even as per case of the defendant, the suit property has not been partitioned by metes and bounds. Thus, the objection of the defendant is without any force in this regard.

28. The objection regarding the registration is not acceptable in view of settled law as in the present case. The family settlement dated 9th April, 2001 is a record and a memorandum of what has been agreed between the parties and thus does not require registration. It is not a document on which the future title of the parties is founded. The memorandum itself does not create or extinguish any rights in the said premises and therefore does not fall within the mischief of Section 17(2),

17(1)(b) of the Registration Act, 1908, and therefore is not compulsorily registerable.

29. In view of settled law on this aspect, the contention of the defendants cannot be accepted. The defendant is raising merely a plea which has no force in law in the facts and circumstances of the present case.

30. Now the next contention of the defendant is that it was executed under coercion of disruption of the then ongoing eviction petition against the tenant of ground floor.

31. The case of the plaintiff is that the plaintiff never threatened to withdraw from the eviction proceedings which were initiated by the plaintiff himself under coercion. Firstly, there is not an iota of evidence which indicates that the plaintiff had expressed his intention to withdraw from the evidence proceedings. Secondly, „coercion‟ is defined under Section 15 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 as:

"...committing or threatening to commit, any act forbidden by the IPC or the unlawful detaining, or threatening to detain, any property, to the prejudice of any person whatever, with the intention of causing any person to enter into an agreement."

32. I agree with the learned counsel for the plaintiff that an act of withdrawing from litigation does not tantamount coercion within the meaning of the Indian Contract, 1872 as in the present case there is no specific allegation of kind of coercion or fraud in the pleadings of the defendant. There can be no departure from the settled principle that general allegations are sufficient to amount to coercion, no matter how profound, the language in which the allegations may be couched. There shall be specific details as per requirement of Order VI, Rule 14 CPC. The following decisions are referred to:

(i) Bishundeo Narain and Another vs. Seogeni Rai and Others, AIR 1951 SC 280, Para-27 and 32

"27. We will deal with the case of coercion first. It will be seen that the plaintiffs case regarding that is grounded on the single allegation that their father was threatened with death. When all the verbiage is cleared away, that remains as the only foundation. The rest, and in particular the facts set out in paragraphs 8 to 12 about the ferocious appearance of Firangi Rai and his allegedly high-handed and criminal activities and his character, are only there to lend colour to the genuineness of the belief said to have been engendered in Ghughuli Rai's mind that the threat of death administered to him was real and imminent. But as regards the threat itself, there is not a single particular. We do not know the nature of the threat. We do not know the date, time and place in which it was administered. We do not know the circumstances. We do not even know who did the threatening. Now, when a court is asked to find that a person was threatened with death, it is necessary to know these particulars, otherwise it is impossible to reach a proper conclusion.

32. The last contention is that even if the plaintiffs fail in all else, their case cannot be wholly dismissed because, admittedly, certain properties are still undivided and the plaintiffs are entitled to have them partitioned and to be given separate possession of their share."

(ii) Ramesh B. Desai and Ors. vs. Bipin Vadilal Mehta and Ors., AIR 2006 SC 3672, para-19 and 21

"19. Undoubtedly, Order VI Rule 4 CPC requires that complete particulars of fraud shall be stated in the pleadings. The particulars of alleged fraud, which are required to be stated in the plaint, will depend upon the facts of each particular case and no abstract principle can be laid down in this regard. Where some transaction of money takes place to which 'A', 'B' and 'C' are parties and payment is made by cheques, in normal circumstances a third party 'X' may not get knowledge of the said transaction unless he is informed about it by someone who has knowledge of the transaction or he gets an opportunity to see the accounts of the concerned parties in the Bank. In such a case an assertion by 'X' that he got no knowledge of the

transaction when it took place and that he came to know about it subsequently through some proceedings in court cannot be said to be insufficient pleading for the purpose of Order VI Rule 4 CPC. In such a case 'X' can only plead that he got no knowledge of the transaction and nothing more. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the High Court was in error in holding that there was no proper pleading of fraud.

21. Mr. Iqbal Chagla, learned Counsel for the respondents, has submitted that the full particulars of fraud had not been given in the Company Petition and as such there was no compliance of Order VI Rule 4 CPC in the Company Petition and the learned Company Judge has rightly dismissed the same. In support of this submission he has placed reliance on Bishundeo Narain and Anr. v. Seogeni Rai and Ors. [1951] 2 SCR 548 wherein it was held that "in case of fraud, undue influence and coercion, the parties pleading it must set forth full particulars and the case can only be decided on the particulars as laid. There can be no departure from them in evidence. General allegations are insufficient even to amount to an averment of fraud of which any court ought to take notice however strong the language in which they are couched may be". Reliance has also been placed on Bijendra Nath Srivastava v. Mayank Srivastava and Ors.: AIR 1994 SC 2562 and paragraphs 208 and 228 of the report in Sangramsinh P. Gaekwad and Ors. v. Shantadevi P. Gaekwad and Ors., AIR 2005 SC 809 , where the same principle has been reiterated. We have already considered this aspect of the matter and in our opinion in the facts and circumstances of the case the plea raised in the Company Petition cannot be held to be wanting in compliance of Order VI Rule 4 CPC."

33. It is stated by the plaintiff that the defendants have distorted and concocted facts in order to renege out of his obligations as mentioned in the family settlement dated 9th April, 2001. There was no undue influence or coercion exercised upon the defendant. The plaintiff had never sought to withdraw from the eviction proceedings initiated by himself against Mr. D.K. Jain (erstwhile tenant at the „said premises‟). The defendant himself in

the written statement stated that Late Brigadier Virender Singh (defendant No.1‟s father) had assumed control of the litigation from the defendant in 1990.

34. It is a settled principle of law that one of the co-owners can file a suit for eviction of tenant in a property generally owned by the co-owners. (See M/s. India Umbrella Manufacturing Co. and Others vs. Bhagabendei Agarwalla (Dead) by LRs Smt. Savitri Agarwalla and Ors., AIR 2004 SC 1321, paragraph 6 cited Sri Ram Pasricha vs. Jagannath and Others, 1977 1 SCR 395; Dhannalal vs. Kalawatibai and Others, AIR 2002 SC 2572). A co-owner filing a suit for eviction does so on his own behalf and in his own right and as an agent of other co-owners. The consent of other co-owners is assumed to be taken unless, it is shown that other co-owners were not agreeable to eject the tenant and the suit was filed in disagreement.

35. In the present case, the suit was preferred by the plaintiff himself. One of the co-owners, cannot withdraw his consent so as to prejudice the other co-owner. The suit once filed, the rights of the parties stand crystallized on the date of the suit and the entitlement of the co-owners to seek ejectment must be adjudged by reference to the date of institution of the suit. (See also Mohinder Prasad Jain vs. Manohar Lal Jain, AIR 2006 SC 1471, paragraphs-7 & 8).

36. The court is empowered to ignore any defence which is barred under Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act, 1872 or which is a mere moonshine and has been raised for the purpose of delaying the proceedings. In the present case, the defendants have failed to provide any valid and requisite details of threat and coercion. It is apparent that the objection has raised by the defendants just for the sake of objection, otherwise there is no force in the submissions of the defendants.

37. The other objection of defendant that the plaintiff has

concealed the Will of late Wing Commander Gurcharan Singh is also without any force. It is not denied by the plaintiff that the mutation was done before L&DO, Nirman Bhawan, New Delhi, on the basis of Will of Gurcharan Singh dated 12th December, 1965. Admittedly, the suit property as per letter dated 22nd July, 1980 in favour of the following:

i) Mrs. Kartar Gurcharan Singh - 2/3rd share

ii) Col. Inderjeet Singh - 1/6th share

iii) Mrs. Anant Virendar Singh - 1/6th share

38. With regard to the objection taken by the defendant for concealment of Will dated 15th December, 1965, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff has argued that the submission has no force as late Gurcharan Singh passed away in June, 1968. He had executed a Will dated 15th December, 1965 vide which he had bequeathed the „said premises‟ to his legal heirs in the following ratio :

            Legal heirs            Relationship           Share in the
                                                        'said premises'

  Kartar Gurcharan Singh           Wife                  ½ Share

  Sardar Sarbaland Singh           Son                   1/6th Share

  Captain Inderjeet        Singh Son                     1/6th Share
  (retd. As Colonel)

  Mrs. Anant Virender Singh        Daughter              1/6th Share

39. He further submitted that thereafter, the „said premises‟ were mutated in favour of the remaining legal heirs of late Gurcharan Singh in the records of the Land & Development Office vide letter No.L&DO/8P.III/8/1429 dated 22nd July, 1980 as follows :

   Mrs. Kartar Gurcharan Singh                        2/3rd
   Col. Inderjeet Singh                               1/6th




    Mrs. Anant Virender Singh                       1/6th

40. I am of the view that the objection raised by the defendant No.1 in this regard also false and frivolous due to the reason that after the determination of share between the parties which were mutated in the remaining legal heirs of late Gurcharan Singh, the plaintiff and defendants themselves, in order to resolve their differences and disputes have entered into a family settlement dated 9th February, 2001. This objection raised by the defendant is even otherwise inconsistent.

41. Similarly, the Will for the year 1990 placed by the defendant is without any consequence as the family settlement dated 9th April, 2001 is of subsequent date, though according to plaintiff, it is a forged document. Nothing more is required to be discussed any further in this regard in view of abovesaid reasons given.

42. Fourth application which was filed by the defendant being I.A. No.19938/2011 for taking up various other pending applications filed by him is also without any merit.

As this court while considering the plaintiff‟s application under Order XII Rule 6 has heard both parties who have addressed their submissions in the entire matter. Thus, it appears to the Court that the application appears to have been filed in order to delay the proceedings. The same is accordingly dismissed.

43. In the present case, admittedly there is no suit of declaration on behalf of the defendants seeking cancellation of family settlement. It appears from the conduct of the defendant after execution of document that there is an unequivocal and unambiguous admission about the document. The said document identified antecedent title in the property and admittedly there is no partition by metes and bounds mentioned in the said document.

Thus, it has to be governed by special equities and is binding upon the parties. Defendant No.1 is the son of deceased Mrs. Anant Virendar Singh, he cannot therefore be allowed to give different meaning of the said document.

44. The purpose of Order XII, Rule 6 of the CPC, 1908 is to enter into speedy justice on admitted facts. The law with regard to Order XII Rule 6 CPC has been laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. vs. United Bank of India and Others, reported at (2000) 7 SCC 120, relevant portion of which reads as under :

"12. As to the object of the Order XII Rule 6, we need not say anything more than what the Legislature itself has said when the said provision came to be amended. In the objects and reasons set out while amending the said rule, it is stated that "where a claim is admitted, the court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on admitted claim. The object of the Rule is to enable the party to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled." We should not unduly narrow down the meaning of this Rule as the object is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment. Where other party has made a plain admission entitling the former to succeed, it should apply and also wherever there is a clear admission of facts in the face of which, it is impossible for the party making such admission to succeed."

45. It was observed in the case of Rajiv Sharma and Anr. Vs. Rajiv Gupta, reported at (2004) 72 DRJ 540 that the purpose of Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC is to enable the party to obtain speedy justice to the extent of relevant admission, which according to the admission, if the other party is entitled for.

If the pleadings of the nature of the written statement in the present case, which are a total moonshine, are taken note of, the provision of Order XII, Rule 6 CPC would be virtually annihilated. (See P.P.A. Impex Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Mangal Sain Mittal, 166 (2010) DLT 84 (DB), para 10 and 11, and M/s.

Mechelec Engineers and Manufacturers vs. M/s. Basic Equipment Corporation, AIR 1977 SC 577, paras 8 and 9).

46. In T. Arvandandam vs. T.V. Stayapal and Another, 1977 4 SCC 467, the Court while dismissing a vexatious plaint, which is equally applicable when the court is confronted with a defence which is implausible, vexatious and meritless, the court should exercise its power under Order VII, Rule 11 CPC, 1908 and reject such claims.

47. Under these circumstances, it is clear from the conduct of the parties that there is an admission on the fact of the existence of the Deed of Family Settlement dated 9 th April, 2001. Therefore, the plaintiff‟s application is allowed as this court feels that no further enquiry is required pertaining to the family settlement. All the applications filed by the defendants are disposed of. Accordingly, no further orders are required to be passed.

48. A preliminary decree of partition is passed in respect of suit property, i.e., D-57, Defence Colony, New Delhi. Accordingly, Ms. Manmeet Arora, Advocate, (Mobile No.9811333871) is appointed as a Local Commissioner to visit the suit property and to suggest modes of partition by metes and bounds in equal shares. The fee of the Local Commissioner is fixed at the first instance at Rs.70,000/- which shall be shared by both the parties in equal proportion. The report be filed by the Local Commissioner before the next date of hearing. Both parties are directed to provide full co-operation to the Local Commissioner.

CS (OS) No. 874/2002

List the matter on 8th October, 2012 for awaiting the report of the Local Commissioner.

MANMOHAN SINGH, J.

JULY 13, 2012