Shri Yoginder Lal Sood vs Union Of India & Anr.
2012 Latest Caselaw 3956 Del

     *       IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

                                               Date of decision: 6th July, 2012

+        LPA.No.475/2012

         SHRI PREM KUMAR & ANR.                        ..... Appellants
                 Through: Mr. Ajay Kumar Jha and Ms. Shweta Sharma,
                 Advocates

                                Versus

         UNION OF INDIA & ANR.                        ..... Respondents

Through: Mr. B.V. Niren, CGSC for UOI.

                                         AND

+        LPA.No. 476/2012

         SHRI NARESH KUMAR & ANR.                      ..... Appellants

Through: Mr. Ajay Kumar Jha and Ms. Shweta Sharma , Advocates

Versus

UNION OF INDIA & ANR. ..... Respondents Through: Mr. B.V. Niren, CGSC for UOI.

                                         AND
+        LPA No. 477/2012

         SHRI BALWANT RAI & ANR.                       ..... Appellants

Through: Mr. Ajay Kumar Jha and Ms. Shweta Sharma, Advocates

Versus

UNION OF INDIA & ANR. ..... Respondents Through: Mr. B.V. Niren, CGSC for UOI.

AND + LPA.No. 478/2012

SHRI SANTOSH KUMAR GUPTA & ANR. ..... Appellants

Through: Mr. Ajay Kumar Jha and Ms. Shweta Sharma, Advocates

Versus

UNION OF INDIA & ANR. ..... Respondents Through: Mr. B.V. Niren, CGSC for UOI.

                                         AND
+       LPA.No. 480/2012

        SHRI S.P. GOEL (DECEASED) THR. HIS LEGAL
        HEIRS AND REPRESENTATIVES & ANR.                 ..... Appellants

Through: Mr. Ajay Kumar Jha and Ms. Shweta Sharma, Advocates

Versus

UNION OF INDIA & ANR. ..... Respondents Through: Mr. B.V. Niren, CGSC for UOI.

                                         AND

+       LPA.No. 481/2012

        SHRI YOGINDER LAL SOOD                        ..... Appellants

Through: Mr. Ajay Kumar Jha and Ms. Shweta Sharma, Advocates

Versus

UNION OF INDIA & ANR. ..... Respondents Through: Mr. B.V. Niren, CGSC for UOI.

CORAM:

HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW

1. All these intra court appeals are preferred impugning the common

judgment dated 10th April, 2012 of the learned Single Judge dismissing

WP(C) Nos. 6850/2007, 6849/2007, 6852/2007, 6851/2007, 6848/2007 &

6853/2007 respectively preferred by the appellants herein. The said writ

petitions were preferred impugning the orders dated 15.09.2007 of the

District Judge exercising powers as Appellate Authority under Section 9 of

the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 and

dismissing the appeals preferred by the appellants against the orders of the

Estate Officer of eviction against each of the appellants from the

shops/quarters in respective occupation of the appellants President's Estate

Market, Rashtrapati Bhavan, New Delhi.

2. The learned Single Judge has observed/found -

i. that it is beyond the realm of controversy that after the year 1993

there was no subsisting right of the appellants to remain in

possession of their respective shops/quarters, as the term of the

agreement under which each of them was permitted to occupy the

subject premises had then came to an end by efflux of time;

ii. that in the year 2003 "notice to evict" was served upon each of the

appellants as they were in arrears of licence fee and the ground of

bona fide necessity was also invoked;

iii. that in the replies to the said notices, the factum of being in

arrears of licence fee was contested but the plea of bona fide

requirement was not disputed; rather the notice to evict was

contested by the appellants on the plea that though revised licence

fee was payable from January, 2000, the same was being illegally

demanded from the year 1992;

iv. that the Estate Officer had passed the orders of eviction on the

ground that each of the appellants were unauthorized occupants

after the termination of their respective agreements;

v. that the plea of the appellants before the learned Single Judge was

that-

a. that the plea of bona fide requirement of the subject premises

and of there being high security risk due to commercial use of

the subject premises in the Rashtrapati Bhavan, which was

accepted by the Estate officer as well as by the Appellate

Authority, did not stand established; and,

b. the ground of the appellants being in arrears of licence fee did

not survive due to a consensus being arrived at, of the revised

licence fee being payable only from January 2000; it was thus

argued that the eviction orders were bad,

c. that the eviction orders were also in contravention of the

Guidelines to Prevent Arbitrary Use of Powers to Evict

Genuine Tenants from Public Premises under the Control of

Public Section Undertaking/Financial Institutions of the year

2002,

d. that the Estate Officer had carried out corrections in the cross

examination of the respondent's witness disclosing bias.

vi. the learned Single Judge relying on the Division Bench judgment

dated 23rd March, 2012 in LPA No. 977/2011 titled Life Insurance

Corporation of India Vs. Damyanti Verma has negated the

challenge on the ground of the Guidelines aforesaid;

vii. the learned Single Judge has further held that once the appellants

had become unauthorized occupants owing to the term for which

they were permitted to occupy the premises having expired, the

grounds of eviction urged were irrelevant;

viii. the learned Single Judge has in a detailed judgment dealt with other

pleas aforesaid also of the appellants.

3. The counsel for the appellants before us has raised only two

submissions-

the first is that the notice under Section 4 of PP Act leading to the eviction

Order by the Estate Officer was barred by res judicata. Secondly it is urged

that the documents which this Court, vide order dated 11th March, 2003 in

CWs.No. 1834/2003, 1777/2003, 1778/2003, 1782/2003, 1786/2003,

1796/2003 then preferred by the appellants had, directed to be supplied to

the respondents were never supplied and thus the proceedings before the

Estate Officer are vitiated.

4. As far as the first of the aforesaid contentions is concerned, the

counsel for the appellant has urged that prior to the notice under Section 4 of

the PP Act pursuance to which eviction order has been passed by the Estate

Officer, two earlier notices under Section 4 had been issued. He has in this

regard invited attention to the first Section 4 notice dated 30 th January, 2003.

In the said notice it is stated that the appellants had earlier been served with

a notice dated 16th December, 2002 notifying that the term for which they

were directed to occupy the premises had expired and giving the appellants

30 days time to vacate the premises. By the said Section 4 PP Act notice,

the appellants were called upon to show cause as to why Order of eviction

be not passed. The counsel for the appellants states that no further

proceedings were however taken in pursuance to the said notice dated 30th

January, 2003 and a second Section 4 PP Act notice dated 30 th July, 2003

was served. It is further argued that vide order dated 19th August, 2003 in

C.Ws.No.5155/2003, 5156/2003, 5157/2003, 5158/2003, 5159/2003 and

5193/2003 then preferred by the appellants, the said notices dated 30 th July,

2003 were quashed. It is thus the argument of the counsel for the appellants

that the third notice under Section 4 of PP Act dated 25th September, 2003

which has resulted in the orders of eviction was barred by res judicata.

5. We, however do not find any merit in the aforesaid contention. The

second Notice under Section 4 of PP Act dated 30th July, 2003 was quashed

by this Court for the reason of not giving the mandatory 7 days time to show

cause and with liberty to the respondent to issue fresh notices under Sections

4 and 7 of the PP Act. Thus it cannot be said that the fresh notices dated

25th September, 2003 served on the appellants were barred by res judicata.

6. It is also worth highlighting that it is not the plea of the appellants that

the notice dated 16th December, 2002 vide which, notwithstanding the

permission granted to occupy the premises having lapsed, the said

permission was also terminated, was withdrawn. Once the right of the

appellants to occupy the premises has been determined, and such

determination remains, even if the first notice under Section 4 of the PP Act

is not acted upon or the second notice quashed, it cannot be said that the

proceedings in pursuance to the third notice are barred by res judicata.

There was no adjudication in pursuance to the first two notices and thus the

question of res judicata even otherwise does not arise.

7. There is similarly no merit in the second argument also. The order of

eviction has been sustained only on the ground of the permission to occupy

the premises, having been terminated. It is not the argument of the counsel

for the appellants before us that the permission to occupy the premises still

subsists. We may also record that we have recently in Indian Institute of

Public Opinion Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India (LPA

No.9/2012 decided on 11.05.2012) held that once the right to occupy the

premises is validly determined, the non-proof by any of the other ground for

seeking eviction is irrelevant.

8. As far as the guidelines of the year 2002 are concerned, though the

question qua the same stands conclusively determined vide our judgment in

Life Insurance Corporation of India Vs. Damyanti Verma (LPA

No.978/2011 decided on 23.03.2012) and Indian Institute of Public

Opinion Pvt. Ltd. (supra) but we may also notice that the said guidelines are

for public sector undertaking and financial institutions and not qua the

public premises as in the Rashtrapati Bhavan.

9. We are even otherwise aghast that the appellants notwithstanding the

permission in their favour to occupy the premises having lapsed in the year

1993 i.e. nearly 20 years back, are still in occupation of the premises which

are perhaps the best address not only in the city of Delhi but the entire

country. The same can be a result only of dilatory tactics adopted by the

appellants from time to time, including by abuse of process of the court. We

do not find any merit in these appeals and dismiss the same. Since the

appeals have been disposed of on the very first day, we refrain from

imposing any cost on the appellants.

RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J

ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE th JULY 6 , 2012 M