Delhi High Court
Rajesh Bandhu & Ors. vs State Nct Of Delhi on 9 January, 2012
Author: Sudershan Kumar Misra
$~29
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ BAIL APPLN. 25/2012
Date of decision: 9th January, 2012
RAJESH BANDHU & ORS. ..... Petitioner
Through Mr. Gaje Singh, Advocate.
versus
STATE NCT OF DELHI ..... Respondent
Through Ms. Jasbir Kaur, APP for State.
Ms. Neha Jain & Ms. Vidhi Gupta, Advocates
for complainant.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDERSHAN KUMAR MISRA
SUDERSHAN KUMAR MISRA, J. (Oral)
1. The present petition has been filed under section 438 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure for grant of anticipatory bail.
2. In substance, the pertinent fact that emerges is that FIR No.
243/2011 u/s 498 A/406 IPC was lodged at P.S. Bawana on 17th July,
2011 at the statement of Smt. Vineet Rani, wife of Late Shri Abhishekh
Bandhu who died in a road accident within about 7 months of the
marriage. It was stated in the FIR that the petitioners, i.e. the
complainant's husband's family, had joined hands to throw her out of the
house and to deprive her of her rights as the Class I heir of her late
husband.
3. The case against the petitioners, as stated by the complainant
in the FIR, is that after the death of the complainant's husband, the
petitioners started to misbehave with her and tortured her physically as
well as mentally and even held her responsible for the death of her
husband. The complainant also alleged that after much persuasion, only
some of her articles (stridhan) had been returned to her and the other
clothes, utensils and jewellery were still with her mother in law
(petitioner no. 1).
4. It was further stated that since the complainant's late
husband was working as a Lab Assistant in Hindu Rao Hospital, his
untimely death had given rise to an entitlement of the complainant to
compassionate employment in the hospital as his widow. However, this
was sought to be thwarted by the first petitioner i.e. complainant's mother
in law, who sent a communication to the Hospital stating that in fact the
complainant was not even married to her late son, thereby seeking to
deprive her of even the benefits of compassionate employment.
5. Counsel for the petitioners, however, contends that all the
allegations leveled against the petitioners in the FIR are totally false and
have been made by the complainant in connivance with her family
members to extract more money from the petitioners. Counsel further
contends that, in fact, all the dowry items including clothes, utensils and
jewellery articles had been returned to the complainant and her family
members. He then states that no useful purpose would be served by
sending the petitioners to face the hardship of custodial investigation.
Counsel submits that the petitioners want to settle the matter with the
complainant and if they are not granted anticipatory bail they would not
be able to join the negotiations.
6. The object of Section 438 is to prevent undue harassment of
the accused persons by pre-trial arrest and detention. However,
anticipatory bail cannot be granted in all cases as a matter of course. The
power under Section 438 of the code has to be exercised sparingly and
only in exceptional cases. The Supreme Court in Balchand Jain v. State
of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1976 SC 366 held that:
"The power exercisable under Section 438 is
somewhat extraordinary in character and it is
only in exceptional cases where it appears that the
person may be falsely implicated or where there
are reasonable grounds for holding that a person
accused of an offence is not likely to otherwise
misuse his liberty then power is to be exercised
under Section 438."
This view was reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of
Adri Dharam Das Vs. State of WB (2005) 2 SCC 303 and again in
Naresh Kumar Yadav Vs. Ravinder Kumar (2008) 1 SCC 632.
7. Further, the grant or refusal of anticipatory bail depends
upon a variety of circumstances such as the nature and gravity of the
offence, the contribution of the accused person and the need for custodial
interrogation. The Supreme Court as well as various High Courts have
time and again emphasized the importance of dealing strictly with
complaints u/s 498-A IPC as leniency in such cases is likely to shake the
confidence of the people in the judicial system. In the present case, the
investigations are still at a preliminary stage. Moreover, the conduct of
the petitioners, particularly petitioner no.1, does not inspire confidence as
she had herself written a letter to the hospital stating that the complainant
was never married to her son, however, this crucial fact is not mentioned
in the petition for anticipatory bail. Despite being asked repeatedly,
counsel for the petitioner has also not offered any explanation regarding
this communication. Therefore, keeping in view of the stand of the
petitioners in the petition that all the dowry items of the complainant were
returned to her on the day of 'tehrvi' of the complainant's husband; the
only logical conclusion can be that the petitioner no.1 had made a false
statement in her letter to the employer of the complainant's late husband.
This conduct of the petitioner is reprehensible, to say the least.
8. The complainant's husband died in a road accident within
about 7 months of the marriage. There are no children from the marriage.
The allegation that the petitioners, i.e. the husband's family have now
joined hands to throw her out and to deprive her of her rights as the Class
I heir of her late husband are not without substance and merit
investigation and trial.
9. After hearing the petitioners' counsel at length, I had
adjourned the matter to the post lunch session to enable counsel to take
further instructions. After lunch also, nothing useful has emerged. I
might note that at one point counsel stated that in fact, the complainant's
late husband was the main bread winner for the entire family. It is
obvious that the petitioners' sole aim is to thwart the criminal process and
to frustrate the rights of the complainant, who is now left without much
support.
10. Anticipatory bail has already been denied thrice to the
petitioners by the Sessions Court. Taking into consideration the nature
and gravity of the offence alleged and the surrounding circumstances, I
am not inclined to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioners.
11. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
SUDERSHAN KUMAR MISRA, J.
JANUARY 09, 2012
